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In this thesis I wish to analyse the complex relationship between actors’ media-
related practices, legitimacy and long-term engagement. Based on a qualitative 
approach my research investigates two cases –Citizens for Europe, a civil society 
organisations involved in issues relating to European citizenship, and the Chaos 
Computer Club, one of the world’s oldest and largest hacker organisations. More 
concretely, through face-to-face interviews, participant observation and media 
analysis I analyse the role media practices play for the two organisations to 
establish legitimation and to sustain their political engagement over time. 
Accordingly, my thesis seeks to provide an empirically informed interpretive 
account of the meaning media-related practices have for actors’ political 
endeavours. From a more operationalised perspective, I am trying to make a 
convincing argument that practices circulating around and oriented towards 
media technologies and infrastructures play a configurative role for actors’ ability 
to co-determine democratic constellations. Instead of suggesting a straightforward 
causal chain my thesis conceptualises the entanglements between media practices, 
legitimation and long-term engagement as interlocking arrangements grounded in 
relational dynamics. Overall, my thesis aims to compliment existing research on 
the role media technologies and infrastructures play for the formation of political 
arrangements by looking at organisation-based engagement. In doing so, my 
research partially bridges a current research gap concerning the relationship 
between organisational actors’ media-related practices and their ability to establish 
legitimacy and to perpetuate political engagement over time. 
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But Count Leinsdorf was in favor of organizations. “Remember,” he said, “that no 
good has ever come of ideological politics; we must go in for practical politics.” 
[…] “You can put a people on its feet, but it must do its own walking. Do you see 
what I mean? Put it on its feet – that’s what we must do. But a people’s feet are its 
firm institutions, its political parties, its organizations, and so on, and not a lot of 
talk.” “Your Grace! Even if it doesn’t exactly sound like it, you have just uttered a 
truly democratic ideal!”. 
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, 1930–43: 376–7. 
 
But what of the social contexts within which new projects of positive political 
action (policy promotion, advocacy, implementation) can emerge and be 
sustained? We need to know much more about the social and political forms that 
make such positive political actions possible and meaningful. 
Nick Couldry, Media, Society, World, 2012: 114. 
 
There are explanations aplenty for why things are the way they are: it’s 
globalization, it’s the network society, it’s an ideology of transparency, it’s the 
virtualization of work, it’s the new flat earth, it’s Empire. We are drowning in the 
why, both popular and scholarly, but starving for the how.  
Christopher Kelty, Two Bits, 2008: x. 
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c h a p t e r  o n e  
Introduction and Thesis Outline  
In 1989 Vincent Mosco observed that, ‘Computers are studied from almost every 
perspective imaginable. […] It is easy to feel swamped by the sheer amount of 
material available on the computerisation of society and the global spread of 
communications media’ (Mosco 1989: 18). In retrospect, Mosco had not seen 
anything yet. In 2014 the World Wide Web turned twenty-five. The very year 
Mosco contemplated the sheer quantity of academic studies on mediated 
communication, Tim Berners-Lee, a scientist at the Swiss research facility CERN, 
invented the web. Ever since, it has touched upon virtually every aspect of social, 
cultural, economic and political life – for good and for ill. Today, the way business 
operates, the way sociality is experienced, the way wars are conducted and the way 
democracy is constituted in one way or another are affiliated to the pervasiveness 
of technologies and infrastructures that build on the internet, and even more so 
the web. It is the last in this list – the correlation between political arrangements 
and how people make use of particular media technologies and infrastructures – 
that lies at the heart of this thesis. The questions this thesis explores are motivated 
by the fact that the ways people use and appropriate media technologies and 
infrastructures stand in strong relation to the texture of social and political life 
(Dahlgren 2013; Cammaerts 2012; Couldry 2012). It is likely that they do so more 
than ever before. 
It has become a statement of the obvious to say that “new media” are changing 
the way people do politics. At the same time, investigating and conceptualising 
the interdependencies between media change and societal change in concrete 
terms and understanding empirically how they relate continues to be an 
astonishingly difficult task. It is particularly challenging to answer the question of 
who can be a political actor for how long and in what form in the “digital age”. 
Discussions about the role media technologies and infrastructures play within 
society are certainly not new. Yet, echoing the increasing interpenetration of 
every-day life with media, these debates have gained in prominence and 
importance. The 1980s, and even more so the 1990s, saw the rise of cyber-
utopians, who envisioned the world as a place free of institutional constraints, 
where computer networks would create a global society, bringing forth an idyllic 
environment within which individual liberty would flower (see Turner 2006). In 
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the course of the 1990s and early 2000s the arguments diversified, with critical 
observers pointing towards the continuing digital divide, the commodification of 
communication networks and the increasing centrality of authority (Lovink 2002). 
Today, it seems there is no position that has not been articulated on the role media 
technologies and infrastructures play in relation to democracy – from abyssal 
scepticism to high-altitude optimism. Is there anything left to say at all? Taking 
into consideration that Mosco pointed to a similar question, it might be advisable 
to say, “Yes there is”. 
To avoid misunderstanding I will first outline the scope and limits to my 
research by noting what this thesis is n o t  about. Aspiring to advance claims about 
the role of media technologies and infrastructures in democracy is to tackle a 
matter of sobering proportions. To narrow the focus, I do not pursue in depth the 
causes and effects of technology in general. At the same time, my aim is not to 
unveil whether technology can fix democracy – in cases where it seems defective – 
or make it invalid – in cases where it seems working well. This is closely connected 
with the fact that I am neither investigating the citizenry at large nor analysing 
single individuals’ engagements. This is also to say that the efforts to broaden 
political participation – often referred to as e-democracy – are not the nucleus of 
my research. Finally, I do not focus attention on media institutions as power 
holders in their own right (Freedman 2014). Although these are without doubt 
intriguing and highly relevant objects of study, the segment I have chosen is 
already a large enough one to explore. 
The driving force behind my thesis is the question: How do emerging modes of 
doing democracy interrelate with media technologies and infrastructures? In more 
concrete terms, I shall look at how civil society organisations exercise their agency 
in relation to media environments (Mattoni 2012; Madianou and Miller 2013). 
Instead of studying media and communications as entities, my research analyses 
how collectively organised actors relate to, make use of and appropriate media 
technologies and infrastructures. In contrast to a number recent studies that have 
zeroed in on crowds and movement-based activism (Castells 2012; Bennett et al. 
2014) the subjects of my investigation are actors who – at least in part – work 
through the formal political system. Accordingly, I am looking at more or less 
formal political entities rather than at informal or only partially formalised actors. 
Whether the actual engagements of these actors are formalised is open to 
question. 
Organisations, of course, are composed of individuals. In that sense citizens 
come into this study through the backdoor, as individual, organisational and 
societal layers are closely interwoven (Berger and Luckmann 1967). As my unit of 
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analysis is organisations it is helpful to point out at this stage that I am not 
interested in organisational effectiveness or in (micro or macro) organisational 
behaviour in the way organisational scholars might be (see Mosley 2011; Soule 
2013). By taking an actor perspective my interest is rather in organisations as spaces 
where actors come together to construct and take part in collective action that co-
determines political arrangements (Bimber et al. 2012). More particularly, I ask 
about the role media-related practices play for organisations in establishing 
legitimacy and sustaining long-term engagement. My research started with the 
overall question of how it is possible to change the agents, themes and modes of 
engagement and what resources actors need to do that. I narrowed this overly 
broad question down by focussing on the role media play in this process. Breaking 
the question down into several interrelated questions further contained my 
inquiry. What is the relation between actors’ media practices and the possibility of 
generating politically meaningful action? How do actors’ media practices relate to 
legitimation processes? What is the relation between media practices and actors’ 
ability to sustain their engagement over time? 
Considering the pervasiveness of media saturation and the dynamics of change 
these are exciting as well as challenging times to write a thesis on the correlation of 
media practices and democracy. One of the questions that kept on emerging 
during the early stages of thinking about the topic was: does my project matter? As 
with the question of whether there is anything left to say, I came to the 
conclusion: yes it does. And, I want to argue, it does primarily in two ways. First, 
organised forms of political engagement are generally considered fundamental for 
civil society and for democracy at large (Tocqueville 2004; Warren 2001; 
Rosanvallon 2008). At the same time, it seems questionable as to whether the 
political role of civil society organisations can be fully grasped without taking into 
consideration their media-related practices. One can scarcely comprehend the 
challenges societies face today without taking into account how media and 
communications form part of these very challenges. Trying to understand the 
imbrications of media-related practices and political processes requires 
recognition of the embeddedness of digital technologies and infrastructures while 
at the same time resisting purely technological readings (Sassen 2008: 329). To 
deepen understanding of the role media-related practices play in organisations’ 
co-determining political arrangements is to ask questions of fundamental political 
importance today. 
Second, there is also a more pragmatic reasoning about the relevance of this 
thesis; namely, the existing research gap. Such lacunas appear most clearly once 
the different disciplines are brought into dialogue with each other. As indicated 
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above, scholars have theorised and conducted outstanding research on the 
interrelation between digital media and political actors. The focus of these studies 
has been largely on movement-based activism, protest, mobilisation and other 
forms of “contentious” involvement (Juris 2008; Cammaerts et al. 2013; Postill 
2014). Far less work has been untertaken in recent years on more concrete entities 
like organisations and on engagements other than protest and mobilisation (Karpf 
2012). While scholars from varying disciplines have underlined the importance of 
legitimacy for political actors (Suchman 1995; Scott 2014; Rosanvallon 2011) 
research on the correlation between media-related practices and legitimation is 
rare (Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]; Herbst 2003; Koopmans 2004) and what 
there is relies on outdated models of communication. Similarly, time is generally 
acknowledged as a critical component for social and political actions (Weber 1978; 
Sewell 2005) and it has been convincingly put that, ‘[i]mportant transformations 
of society rarely result from single discrete events’ (Beniger 1986: 2). While media 
and communications scholars acknowledge the relevance of sustained political 
activism (Juris 2012; Rucht 2012), the issue of concrete correlations between 
media-related practices and sustaining engagement over time has been neglected. 
In other words, what is missing to further illuminate the ongoing diversification 
in the agencies, repertoires and targets of political activism (Norris 2002) is an 
empirical account of the role organisational actors’ media-related practices play for 
establishing legitimacy and for sustaining engagement over time. 
This brings me to the more concrete aims of my thesis. Above all, I wish to 
investigate the missing links between media practices, legitimacy and long-term 
engagement. Accordingly, my thesis seeks to provide an empirically informed 
interpretive account of the meaning media practices have for actors’ political 
endeavours. From a more operationalised perspective, I am trying to make a 
convincing argument that practices circulating around and oriented towards 
media technologies and infrastructures play a configurative role for actors’ ability 
to establish legitimacy and to sustain their engagement over time. Divided into 
thematic subsections, my thesis aims to make three kinds of interlinked scholarly 
contributions: methodological, theoretical and empirical. Methodologically 
speaking, my thesis provides an example of how to study organisational actors’ 
media-related practices ethnographically, which nowadays is less and less 
understood as one discreet method, and rather as a methodological toolbox 
enabling a distinctive mode of epistemological encounter (Hine 2000; Marcus 
2009). The theoretical contribution of my thesis consists of interpreting existing 
ideas in new ways, bringing together streams of critical thought from diverse 
disciplines that are not often merged and providing a conceptually innovative 
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contemplation of actors’ media practices. In doing this, I aim to identify concepts 
that can make sense of contemporary engagement practices and to refine debates 
about media, legitimacy and long-term engagement. Lastly, my thesis provides an 
empirically nuanced reconsideration of the role media-related practices play for 
organised collectives. The questions I began with emerged out of media studies, 
but the answers I propose might end up making sense in other fields like social 
movement studies and political sociology as well. 
The research approach taken to fulfil these aims follows. To begin with, I 
consider it fruitful to bridge the ongoing divide between ‘media studies research 
and theory and research by sociologists, political scientists, and historians’ 
(Downing 2008: 41). One way of bringing the above-stated aims to life is by 
conceptually integrating insights from media and communication studies with 
those from other disciplines. My thesis deliberately engages with different strands 
of literature and draws on theoretical and empirical approaches from outside the 
field of media studies as it is through such a perspective, I believe, that an 
understanding of present-day developments may be achieved. Accordingly, my 
analysis builds upon existing scholarship and synthesises the findings of previous 
studies in media and communications, political science and sociology, democracy 
theory and social movement studies with my own empirical findings. 
Another dimension that fundamentally informs my approach is to avoid grand 
statements proclaiming generalisations. In “The Boy in the Bubble” Paul Simon 
sings: ‘These are the days of miracle and wonder. This is the long distance call. The 
way the camera follows us in slo-mo. The way we look to us all. The way we look 
to a distant constellation that’s dying in a corner of the sky. These are the days of 
miracle and wonder’. One might take Simon’s satirical snapshot as a metaphorical 
synopsis of one camp of generalisations: the overly optimistic accounts 
considering technology as a silver bullet solving humanity’s troubles. On the 
other side one finds sceptical and even cynical accounts that see commodification, 
surveillance and control at every turn. Media technologies and infrastructures are 
often understood as a key to apparently unprecedented, radical, revolutionary 
changes – for good and for bad. In order to gain a little distance from such 
generalising accounts it seems reasonable to substitute the key with a bunch of 
keys – media being only one of them – and the singular keyhole with a multiplicity 
of keyholes. What lies behind each door continues to change while actors with 
varying interests and commitments are figuring out which key fits which hole. 
One has to be cautious not to reduce political actors to their technologies and 
infrastructures. I am not interested in technology per se but in the 
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accomplishment of human action related to particular technologies and 
infrastructures. 
Another concrete way of bringing the aims of my thesis to life is to look at 
processes instead of “effects”. It is problematic, if not impossible, to conclude – let 
alone empirically measure – that the impact of a particular organisation has 
increased through employing a particular technology. This is simply because it is 
impossible to know what would have been the case without the given technology. 
In other words, it is close to impossible to figure out that the activity X of group Y 
has led to the impact Z. Societal constellations are too complex to reconstruct or 
predict straightforward causal chains. This, however, does not mean that one can’t 
draw any conclusions about the political importance of particular organisations’ 
engagement. A first step to doing so is to avoid reducing the richly contextual 
relations that surround media-related practices to an unrevealing technological 
determinism (see Rodriguez et al. 2014), as it ‘depends on how people and 
practices exist, how organizations and laws exist, how ideologies and discourses 
exist; and it is in constant motion’ (Kelty 2013: n.p.). Instead of anticipating 
universal answers to the earlier stated questions, I expect to find answers that are 
very much tied to place and time. 
The contemporary media technologies and infrastructures in question are 
mostly digital, networked and increasingly portable. Yet, instead of buying into 
‘the mythology of the new’ (Papacharissi 2010: 7–10) it is more sensible to consider 
“media” as historically relative phenomena, given that every medium functions 
through re-mediation of its predecessors (Gitelman 2008). Some media changes 
might be more sudden than others while some sets of political fundamentals 
might remain relatively unchanged. More often, societies experience “reforms” 
instead of a “revolution” (Lefebvre 1991: 383) of the social order. My thesis does 
not trace radical transformations, but rather looks for the minor, ongoing changes 
that are already under way. Legitimation and long-term engagement are both 
processual and relational dynamics. This also means not discrediting traditional 
and institutionalised forms of politics while at the same time concentrating on 
emerging forms of engagement. 
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, fulfilling the stated aims of this thesis 
relies on case study research (Stake 1995; Yin 2009; Ragin and Becker 1992). To 
investigate how, where and why media-related practices matter in specific 
political contexts I ground my thesis on two well-established qualitative 
techniques: face-to-face interviews and participants observation. These main 
methods of data collection were complemented by a media analysis that allowed 
the introduction of additional primary and secondary material. Although I did not 
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go “native”, as an anthropological account would demand, the approach 
employed in my thesis is best described in the framework of ethnographic inquiry. 
The two cases under investigation were Citizens for Europe (CFE) and the Chaos 
Computer Club (CCC). CFE was a small civil society organisation established at 
the beginning of 2010 that aimed to promote transnational citizenship and to 
empower citizens in Europe to exert their desire for political participation. The 
CCC, founded in 1981, was Europe’s largest, and one of the world’s oldest, hacker 
organisations, advocating more transparency in government, communication as a 
human right and free access to computers and technological infrastructures for 
everyone. 
Reading this very brief prelude to the two cases might give the impression that 
CFE and the CCC had not very much in common as they not only strongly 
differed in age and size, but also in their fields of engagement. While it was 
certainly the case that both organisations told a different story, they did share a 
number of important similarities. To begin with, both collectives considered 
themselves civil society organisations located somewhere between everyday civic 
engagement and political decision-making. Members of CFE and the CCC equally 
acted on and pointed towards the need to democratise democracy (Santos 2005). 
Besides the fact that they were both predominantly based in Germany, the two 
organisations were based on the same legal structure – registered associations – 
and also shared the communality of being issue-oriented organisations (Marres 
2005). As civil society organisations they did not have any official authority that 
had been granted to them directly or indirectly by “the people”. That is to say, 
they were not legitimised through formal political procedures, but had to develop 
other modes of legitimation. The stark differences in size and length of time they 
had been in existence made them exciting case studies for analysing the role 
media-related practices play in the emergence of organisational engagement, and 
how it both changes and persists. 
Organisational activism is not a new phenomena (Clemens 1993; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). Similarly, hackers are not a new phenomenon. WikiLeaks, 
Anonymous and Edward Snowden might have catapulted the figure of the hacker 
into global consciousness recently, but the history of hackers can be traced back to 
the 1950s, and the explicit political use of hacking at least back to the 1980s (Levy 
2010; Thomas 2002; Coleman 2012). Yet, echoing the earlier-stated gap in research, 
substantive research on the correlation between organisational actors’ media-
related practices and legitimacy and sustaining engagement over time is, to say the 
least, rare today. Bringing the two organisations’ stories together was an ideal way 
to investigate how media practices relate to establishing legitimacy and sustain 
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engagement over time. Investigating CFE and the CCC also complied with the idea 
that social scientific research requires insights which are nourished ‘by 
confrontation with fresh empirical objects’ (Bourdieu 1996: 178). During the 
period of research for and the writing up of this thesis, there has been no 
substantial research undertaken by any other researcher on either of the two 
organisations. 
Let me conclude this introductory chapter by outlining the road ahead. The first 
section contains Chapter 2–3 provide justification for the research and make sense 
of the scholarly resources enlisted along the way. Due to the disparity of 
disciplines included in my research approach my literature review extends over 
two chapters and is more extensive than what might be commonly expected.  
Theoretical frame: Media practice approach (embedded in media 
environments), legitimation (in relation to institutionalised politics and 
mainstream media) and long-term engagement. Bringing these three bausteine 
together … Chapter 4 is dedicated to the research methods that guided the 
analysis. From Chapter 5–9 I incorporate the empirical building block of this 
thesis. Finally, Chapter 10, is the concluding chapter of my thesis. In detail, the 
chapters are organised as follows. 
In Chapter 2, ‘Literature Review (part one)’, I discuss and critically engage with 
democratic theories and focus on approaches that bring forward a processual 
understanding of democracy rather than conceptualising democracy as a more or 
less fixed condition. Following on from this, by reviewing the growing body of 
literature that conceptualises the intensifying pervasiveness of media technologies 
and infrastructures, I point to approaches that develop and adapt a media practice 
perspective. In addition, the chapter compares writings that address – in overly 
enthusiastic to entirely sceptical way – the relation between political dynamics 
and contemporary media environments and, finally, looks at scholars who 
contrast both optimistic and sceptical accounts by promoting a more cautious and 
balanced approach. 
Chapter 3, ‘Literature Review (part two)’, proceeds with a review of studies that 
examine the relationship between non-state actors and different media outlets. 
The chapter zeroes in on relevant literature that considers the political relevance of 
mainstream media, mediated visibility, alternative media for actors who aim to co-
determine democratic constellations. In this context I also discuss writings that 
emphasise the role hackers play for contemporary political constellations. The 
second half of the chapter discusses studies that emphasise the importance of 
legitimacy in societal constellations and reviews accounts that point to temporal 
dimension as being important to bring the means of political engagement to life. 
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The chapter argues that a number of important questions remain unresolved and 
emphasises that there is good reason to look at the role civil society organisations’ 
media-related practices play in their ability to establish legitimacy and for 
sustaining engagement over time. Finally, the chapter introduces the research 
questions that inform my thesis. 
Chapter 4, ‘Methodology: Contextuality as a Method’, demonstrates how the 
research endeavour of my thesis was put into practice. The chapter discusses the 
strengths (and limitations) of qualitative research in light of the focus and 
intentions of this thesis. More concretely, this chapter introduces case study 
research and the three complementary research methods that provide my data set 
– face-to-face interviews, participant observation and media analysis – as suitable 
techniques for finding convincing answers to my research questions. Finally, the 
chapter briefly introduces the two cases under investigation – Citizens for Europe 
and the Chaos Computer Club – and explains how each method was adapted to 
the particular case. 
Chapter 5, ‘Citizens for Europe’, is the starting point of the empirical analysis in 
this thesis. It investigates both CFE’s inward-oriented and outward-oriented 
communication practices and analyses how media-related practices relate to the 
formation of organisational structures. In addition, the chapter reveals how the 
organisation’s Every Vote 2011 campaign grounded in a trans-media campaign, 
which enabled citizens to voice their political concerns and symbolically to 
participate in political procedures they were otherwise excluded from. On the one 
hand, the chapter underlines how face-to-face interactions and mediated 
communication act as interlocking arrangements that are vital for animating the 
organisation’s political goals. On the other hand, by bringing together analysis of 
internal organisational formations and external-oriented communication, this 
chapter reveals the role media-related practices play for establishing and for 
maintaining CFE as a civil society organisation. 
This sets the scene for Chapter 6, ‘Intermediary Politics’, in which I address the 
organisation’s in-house publication Open Citizenship. The chapter argues that 
practices related to the journal contribute to the stabilisation of CFE’s political 
work as it enables the organisation to partially legitimise their activities and to 
establish longer term relationships with individual and collective actors. The 
chapter also shows how practices related to the CFE website add another 
dimension to the organisation’s legitimation by acting as an infrastructure that 
affiliates CFE with trusted organisations. This leads the chapter to investigate 
CFE’s efforts to establish and maintain a trans-local community of practice by 
bringing together individual and collective actors to act together. Finally, the 
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chapter further examines correlations between media-related practices and CFE’s 
aim to establish and maintain itself as a legitimate agent acting to mediate between 
different political spheres. 
Chapter 7, ‘The Chaos Computer Club’, is the starting point into the empirical 
analysis of my second case study – the CCC. The chapter initiates with an analyse 
of a set of practices that hackers are probably most renown for: hacking. In a 
second step the chapter analyses how the CCC constructs, supports and maintains 
alternative communication infrastructures that enable users to avoid being 
embedded in revenue-driven and data-hungry communication services. In 
addition the chapter investigates the organisation’s internal use of media 
technologies and infrastructures and reveals how deliberating, collaborating and 
coordinate political work takes place with the support of technical means that 
allow the Club to sustain their engagement ways over time. Overall, this chapter 
argues that the hacker organisation is acting politically with and through media-
related practices. 
In Chapter 8, ‘Hackers in media Environments’, I elaborate how the CCC’s way 
of acting with and through contemporary technologies are entangled with 
articulating knowledge and distributing information to frame technological 
developments as political phenomena relevant to society at large. The chapter 
shows how over time the interrelation between acting with, through and about 
media technologies and infrastructures has intensified rather drastically, at the 
same time as the channels and practices related to communicative action have 
diversified and multiplied. Instead of protesting or mobilising the hacker 
organisation predominantly relies on acting on the given issue through direct 
digital action and on articulating their field-tested knowledge and experience to a 
wide spectrum of audiences and publics. In doing so the chapter shows how the 
CCC thematises new political issues and provides a hermeneutic to people so they 
can understand the political dimension and societal significance of particular 
technical issues. 
Chapter 9, ‘A Concrete Multiplicity’, follows up on the previous chapter by 
arguing that CCC’s legitimation is strongly related to the organisation’s 
interactions and collaborations with institutional political entities. The chapter 
interrogates the correlation between the CCC’s multi-layered media practices and 
its interactions with government agencies and conceptualises the dynamics at 
hand as circuits of legitimation. In addition, the chapter reveals that the CCC’s 
political capacity was only brought to life once the hackers’ skills, knowledge and 
experiences were consolidated and communicated coherently beyond a circle of 
like-minded people. As the chapter reveals, guided by a core group of 
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spokespersons and long-term active members, the Club’s multi-socialised and 
multi-determined members were shaped into an organisation with a focus on 
particular issues and coherent public representation. Overall, the chapter 
emphasises how legitimation and sustaining engagement practices, in the case of 
the CCC, in large part grounds in acting with, through and about media 
technologies and infrastructures. 
Finally, Chapter 10, contains the conclusion of my work and draws the pieces of 
my analysis together. The chapter reviews the key features of the argument built 
through Chapters 5 to 9 and discusses the contribution my thesis has made to the 
project of deepening understandings of the correlation between actors’ media-
related practices, legitimation and sustaining engagement over time. In addition, 
the concluding chapter revises my research project in relation to the existing 
literature. The chapter also points to the limitations of my study and to possible 
future fields of investigation. 
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c h a p t e r  t w o  
Literature Review (part one) 
One way of bringing the above-stated aims to life is by conceptually integrating 
insights from media and communication studies with those from other 
disciplines. My thesis deliberately engages with different strands of literature and 
draws on theoretical and empirical approaches from outside the field of media 
studies as it is through such a perspective, I believe, that an understanding of 
present-day developments may be achieved. Accordingly, in this chapter and 
throughout the following chapter I discuss, contrast and critique writings from 
media and communications, political science and sociology, democracy theory 
and social movement studies. The first section critically engages with democratic 
theories in some depth and focuses on approaches that bring forward a processual 
understanding of democracy and bring into prominence the practical part of 
bringing politics to life rather than conceptualising democracy as a more or less 
fixed condition. Following on from this, the second section reviews the growing 
body of literature that conceptualises the intensifying pervasiveness of media 
technologies and infrastructures. In this section I particularly point to approaches 
that develop and adapt a media practice perspective. Section three zeroes in on 
writings that address – in overly enthusiastic to entirely sceptical way – the 
relation between political dynamics and contemporary media environments. The 
final section looks closely at scholars who contrast both optimistic and sceptical 
accounts by promoting a more cautious and balanced approach. The next chapter 
will complement this literature review by engaging with social movement studies 
and writings on legitimacy. Taken together the two chapters introduce and 
explicate the theoretical frame that informs my thesis. 
 
2.1 The state of democracy 
Over recent decades voices proclaiming the foundations of democratic societies 
around the globe to be in a state of erosion or even crisis have become ever more 
audible. Critical observers stress that although the spread of democracy has been a 
victory in terms of numbers, the actual conditions in societal constellations often 
do not support this success story, given the rapid expansion in socio-economic 
inequality and political polarisation (Sennett 1992; Lee et al. 2014). The particular 
transformations inside democratic states, the new emergent privatised forms of 
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authority in the public domain, it is argued, are partial and incipient but 
nevertheless strategic developments that ultimately lead to a redefinition of 
democratic politics embodied in and beyond state boundaries (Sassen 2008). 
Recent reflections on “the state of democracy” have perhaps been best captured in 
Pierre Rosanvallon’s observation that, ‘The democratic ideal now reigns 
unchallenged, but regimes claiming to be democratic come in for vigorous 
criticism almost everywhere’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 54). Even scholars who are 
renowned for their rather traditional take on democratic theory emphasise that ‘a 
realistic assessment of the current state of democracy must admit that democratic 
regimes are faced with numerous challenges that threaten to undermine their very 
legitimacy’ (Kriesi 2013: 1). Contemporary views that question the general health 
of democracy stand in stark contrast to the enthusiasm that used to hold liberal 
democracy the all-encompassing saviour for most of the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
Etymologically recalling the power (kratos) of the people (demos), democratic 
processes seem to have lost parts of their legitimising power, especially when it 
comes to practices that interfere with people’s daily lives. A decreasing level of 
trust in political institutions is but one of many issues that reflect this tendency 
(Rosanvallon 2008). Ever since Max Weber (1978), it has been acknowledged that 
the functioning of a political regime depends not only on the structure of its 
governmental institutions, but equally on the extent to which it is socially and 
culturally anchored. Scholars have stressed that with the declining representative 
role of formal political institutions and the spread of market logics, liberal 
democracies have experienced a widening schism between the constitutional and 
the popular pillars of legitimacy (Calhoun 2007). Robert Dahl (1971) notably 
described legitimacy as a reservoir; if the water falls below the required level, 
political stability is endangered. Noticing a parched basin, with no sight of 
replenishment some witnesses have drawn the conclusion that the ideals of 
representative democracy per se are under siege (cf. Alonso et al. 2011). Such 
fundamental doubts concerning the viability of democracy are also formulated in 
accounts that bring into question how democracy can be thought and 
operationalised on a global scale (Fraser 2007). Contemporary societal 
configurations, then, point to the existence of deep-rooted political 
contradictions: the rhetorical success of democracy as a signifier yet its very 
differently lived realities. 
Most observers would agree that the failing of democratically elected 
institutions to generate the legitimacy necessary for many government functions 
should be regarded as a quintessentially destructive dynamic. Yet some scholars 
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who convincingly point to disintegration as the becoming of politics sit side by 
side this perspective. For John Pocock (2003: 159–61), in his analysis of 
Machiavelli’s treatise The Prince and other Italian Renaissance writings, political 
instability and the dissolving of legitimacy represents a constructive moment. 
This, according to Pocock, is so because uncertainty provides the opportunity for 
innovation and because it is here that a new settlement for public affairs may be 
achieved. Pocock’s (2003) work on republicanism in its Florentine and Anglo-
American manifestations is helpful. It helps to keep in mind that the restructuring 
of political constellations is the recurring momentum of politics and, at the same 
time, each particular of transformation is unprecedented in its own unique way. 
Implicitly echoing the notion that restructuring is an inherent part of politics per 
se scholars continue to reconceptualise the notion of democracy. Most 
prominently, liberal models of democracy have been joined with conceptions of 
deliberative democracy and participatory democracy. Even in cases where 
representative democracy is considered the core of any democratic model, scholars 
extend this core in the direction of deliberative and participatory accounts (Kriesi 
2013). 
The central claim of deliberative theorists is that citizens should defend their 
moral and political arguments with reasons and should deliberate with others on 
the reasons they give. Most arguments in the deliberative literature rest on or 
relate to Jurgen Habermas’ (1989) notion that deliberation is most central to 
generative and transformative democratic outcomes. This goes beyond traditional 
forms of democracy because, ‘[u]nlike many democratic theorists, proponents of 
deliberative democracy do not view formal procedures such as voting and political 
rights as definitive of democracy’ (Warren 1996: 241). Deliberative democracy is 
often presented as more than a theory of legitimacy and forms a body of 
substantive rights around it based on achieving “ideal deliberation” that would 
counter the threats that democracy is often held to pose to pluralism and 
governability (Cohen 1989). Advocates of deliberative theories have been criticised 
for their primary interest in the process of deliberation while leaving intact the 
conventional institutional structures and political meaning of democracy 
(Pateman 1970). In particular, Habermas’ account has been criticised for applying 
an idealistic and normative standard to democratic practices (Fraser 1992). As a 
consequence, critics argue, deliberation theory is usually not concerned with the 
structural deficits of wider societal structures and fails to confront limitations of 
the complexity, size and scale of contemporary politics (Fraser 2007). 
The latter criticism has been partially answered in one of the rare writings that 
merge aspects of political theory and philosophy with media and communication 
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studies. In Democracy Across Borders James Bohman (2007: 219) points out that 
distributed publics – assemblies that have emerged through networked forms of 
communication – are the sorts of transformative agents best able to contest and 
shape the new dispersed forms of delegated authority. In the long run, his 
argument goes, new intermediaries will replace contemporary democratic 
intermediaries whose agency opens up and maintains the spaces needed for the 
exercise of communicative power (Bohman 2007). While his tone is optimistic, 
Bohman positions himself between the idea that civil society is the sole adequate 
agent of transformation and the argument that progress for the better is only to be 
expected by the movement of things from top to bottom. Consequently, Bohman 
(2007) advocates the idea that instead of looking for a single axis on which to 
connect emerging actors to politics, it is more useful to take into account a variety 
of possible forms of communication and ways in which connections might be 
made between communicative and decisional status. While his argument remains 
vague on exactly how these multiple connections are to take place, his approach is 
valuable in terms of it acknowledging the emergence of new political subjects and 
practices that relate to the emergence of networked forms of communication. 
Typically, debates in recent years have tended to focus a kind of continuum, 
with participatory democracy at one end of the scale and representative 
democratic models at the other (see Della Porta 2013). Those sceptical of or arguing 
against deliberative accounts tend to stress a participatory-oriented understanding 
of democracy, or what has been described as the struggle to ‘democratize 
democracy’ (Santos 2005). Participatory democracy has been seen to be the closest 
approximation to direct democracy, and its advocates argue for the relevance of 
institutional reforms that would allow citizens to participate cooperatively with 
officials in political decision-making (Pateman 1970). The changes required, as 
formulated, for example, in Carole Pateman’s (1970) densely written critique of 
revisionism, necessitate the reform of undemocratic authority structures. 
Following this line of thought the concept of participatory democracy refers to a 
particular type of polity, to an organisational form and to a decision-making mode. 
The type of polity is based on ‘a macropolitical vision of political and economic 
institutions governed by their constituents’; the organisational form is 
‘characterized by decentralization, a minimal division of labor, and an egalitarian 
ethos’; and the mode of decision-making ‘is direct rather than representative and 
relies on consensus rather than on majority rule’ (Polletta 2004: 235). Translating 
this notion into a contemporary context, scholars have recently proposed that 
networked associations should be legally and politically acknowledged by 
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governmental agencies as political entities capable of contributing to policy-
making through means of mediated communication (Noveck 2009). 
Critics of participatory democracy emphasise that examples of participatory 
behaviour tend to be limited to a few instances of local politics and that theorists 
tend to rely on an idealised notion of citizens (Mutz 2006). Theories of 
participatory democracy suggest that, as Diana Mutz argues, ‘if only governments 
would provide meaningful opportunities for people to participate in the political 
process, then citizens would be emboldened by their power and rise to these 
participatory occasions’ (Mutz 2006: 135–6). Although deliberative and 
participatory accounts are often considered mutually exclusive, contributors from 
both camps agree that the boundaries of the political are not only rapidly changing 
on a geo-political level, but also day-to-day practices and modes of interaction 
around political constellations are continuing to shift (Fraser 2007). Deliberative 
and participatory accounts both refer to emerging engagement practices as 
antidotes to the apparent thinning of civic culture and the dissolving of a common 
public world. In doing so they equally point towards a processual understanding 
of political arrangements, as emphasised in phrasings that describe democracy as ‘a 
human creation necessarily situated in culture and history, always imperfect and 
open to improvement, and therefore also always variable’ (Calhoun 2007: 153). As 
Rosanvallon underlines in his take on the ongoing formation of politics: ‘There is 
always something fundamentally indeterminate in democracy’ (Rosanvallon 
2008: 169). Accordingly, democracy is an ongoing (global) project with a long and 
uneven history that is driven by actors with varying interests and commitments 
(Keane 2009). Consequently, it is less convincing to go on about the “state of 
democracy”, implying a more or less fixed condition, than to see democracy in 
terms of democratic constellations that continue to be in the making. Democracy 
is about ‘creating a democratic political culture’ (Lechner 2003[1990]: 179). This is 
not to say that societies are constantly experiencing radical change, but that 
transformation is an inherent part of democratic politics. A processual 
understanding of democracy is not only fruitful because it acknowledges that 
‘[w]hatever form it takes, the democracy of our successors will not and cannot be 
the democracy of our predecessors’ (Dahl 1989: 341), but also because it brings into 
prominence the practical part of bringing politics to life. 
This processual approach towards democracy suits the perspective I take 
throughout my thesis because it avoids trying to find answers to the question 
whether the developments taking place are good or bad for democracy. Searching 
for this kind of answers is not helpful – or even impossible – in the context of the 
cases I investigate. Along with this orientation I have decided to frame the 
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processes I am investigating under the notion of engagement. As equal positioning 
of all actors in decision-making processes appears to be unrealistic it is suitable to 
take a cautious distance from idealised notions like Pateman’s (1970) depiction of 
full participation. In recent years the notion of “participatory culture” has become 
a popular notion to answer questions concerning the social and political 
transformations taking place. Participation is an ambiguous notion that is hailed as 
the saviour when democracy appears to be in difficult times and at the same 
critiqued for feeding the commercial system (Goldberg 2010). “Participatory 
culture” incorporates such a large number of different practices and ideologies 
moving between descriptive and normative definitions and ranging from 
minimalist to maximalist variations that the term ‘has become an empty signifier 
often used in very superficial ways’ (Jenkins & Carpentier 2012: 2) that does no 
longer make clear what people are actually participating in. When conceptualised 
in conclusive ways participation remains a valuable concept for considering, for 
example, citizens’ interaction with contemporary media environments 
(Carpentier 2012; Dahlgren 2013) and ways how people link to political 
movements (Della Porta & Rucht 2013). Yet, it is less fruitful when considering 
how civil society organisations interact with politics and how they take part in 
establishing democratic constellations – which stands in the focus of this research. 
Accordingly, the leading notion that guides this thesis is engagement as it is a 
fruitful conception when looking at the existing links between organisational 
actors and politics, which is understood as ‘the ensemble of practices, discourses 
and institutions which seek to establish a certain order’ (Mouffe, 2000: 101). As 
will be further underlined in the third chapter of this thesis, engagement is also a 
particularly helpful term when looking at the links between organisational actors 
and politics from a temporal perspective. 
The accentuation of active creation of political culture is also performed by 
scholars who underline that ‘[t]he domain of “democracy” is now more likely to 
extend (and increasingly does extend) to institutions and practices outside of 
institutionalized politics’ (Warren 1996: 250). Further concretising this tendency, 
Peter Dahlgren (2009: 118) has pointed out that new practices and traditions can 
and must evolve to ensure that democracy does not stagnate. Democracy, 
according to Dahlgren, is something that is done in various contexts and there are 
many ways of ‘doing democracy’ (Dahlgren 2003: 159). From a practice-oriented 
point of view the retreat from formal political processes is not necessarily a sign of 
political disaffection or apathy. As Dahlgren illustrates in his recent writing on 
The Political Web, the rise of non-conventional forms of political engagement 
might just as well be understood as ‘a political act, a considered and rational 
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response under prevailing circumstances’ (Dahlgren 2013: 13). Theoretical and 
empirical accounts convincingly suggest that democratic constellations are not 
experiencing general political fatigue, but are in fact witnessing the emergence of 
new routes and paths to engagement. 
From a more historical perspective, recent occurrences can be interpreted as an 
intensification of a process that firs arose with the political developments of 
dissent in Eastern Europe in the 1980s (Offe 1987). One can notice, then, that 
sceptical accounts of the “state of democracy” are accompanied by reasonable 
voices emphasising that ‘narrow categories must give way to a more diverse 
understanding of democratic activities’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 17). In accordance with 
the notion that political engagements is in transformation, democratic theorists 
have emphasised the rise of ‘supervising’ (Rosanvallon 2008) or ‘monitoring’ 
(Keane 2009) abilities by citizens. Both terms signify active modes of 
involvement, a synecdoche for the chastening of power, signifiers that underscore 
the importance of subjecting bodies of decision-making to permanent public 
scrutiny and control (Rosanvallon 2008: 57–61; Keane 2009: 688–9). These extra-
parliamentary power-monitoring institutions supplementing representative 
forms include public integrity mechanisms, judicial activism, blogging and other 
unprecedented forms of media scrutiny (Keane 2009: xxvii; Rosanvallon 2008: 
66–71). Rosanvallon, in referring to a tradition of sceptical philosophy, considers 
the questioning of government action as ‘the essence of constructive democratic 
politics’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 164). Dahlgren fittingly refers to such engagements as 
“alternative democracy” to point to ‘efforts aimed at attaining social change by 
democratic means while circumventing electoral politics’ (Dahlgren 2013: 4). 
WikiLeaks’ disclosure of US foreign policy documents is a fitting example of what 
such critical monitoring of governments and corporate interests can look like in, 
possibly, its most radical form. These accounts act as helpful points of reference as 
they explore the diffusion of non-conventional forms and sites of democratic 
engagement and bring them in close contact with contemporary media 
technologies and infrastructures. 
Empirical research on the diversification of political expression reveals that 
political activism has been transformed by ‘a diversification in the agencies (the 
collective organizations structuring political activity), repertoires (the actions 
commonly used for political expression), and the targets (the political actors that 
participants seek to influence)’ (Norris 2002: 215–6). In her writing on the ongoing 
displacement of politics Nortje Marres (2005) brings these two aspects – emerging 
actors and modes of engagement – together skilfully. Her approach is particularly 
helpful as it complements idealistic models of democracy by underlining how 
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today the locations in which democratic politics are enacted are not just multiple 
but also partial and contested, and that so too are the subjects and forms of doing 
democracy (Marres 2005: 16). Recognising that democracy does not exist as a 
political system as such but is pursued by a wide range of actors and through a 
wide range of engagement practices allows one to shift the focus from rather 
abstract democratic theories to an investigation of the actual engagement practices 
by concrete actors within specific democratic constellations. Taking such an 
approach seriously, the field of media and communication studies is a particularly 
fruitful area of investigation to further understanding of how engagement 
practices by emerging actors contribute to the formation of democratic 
constellations. Why this is the case will be further explicated in the following 
section 
 
2.2 Media practices in everyday life 
Many discussions around the crisis or revival of democratic constellations today 
relate in one way or another to the social, cultural and political role of “new 
media”. Following the intensifying pervasiveness of media technologies and 
infrastructures over the past decade, scholars have intensified their preoccupation 
with how social interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1967) change when media 
communication becomes a fundamental part of it (Couldry 2012). In his classical 
writing The Media and Modernity John Thompson highlighted how 
communicative transmissions and exchanges involve ‘the creation of new forms 
of action and interaction in the social world, new kinds of social relationships and 
new ways of relating to others and to oneself’ (Thompson 1995: 4). Media, in other 
words, play a central part in ‘the provision and selective construction of social 
knowledge, of a social imaginary, through which we perceive the “worlds,” the 
“lived realities” of others, and imaginarily reconstruct their lives and ours’ (Hall 
1977: 340–1). Speaking in general terms, media are ‘all those communicative 
technologies, ranging from handwriting to television and electronic mail, that 
allow people to get messages across to one another without face-to-face co-
presence’ (Hannerz 1996: 19). Media, in other words, are a constitutive part of the 
very formation of cultures and societies per se. 
As this thesis is not the place – considering its focus and spatial limitation – to 
provide a full historical survey a good starting point to reflect on the more recent 
developments related to “media” is the appearance of the world’s most used 
computer network, the internet. What began as an US academic research project 
in 1969 saw rapid global growth after its commercialisation in 1994, with more 
than 2 billion people around the globe using it today. Central applications like 
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email and the Web make the internet a potent network to communicate audio, 
video, writing and interactive content. In particular, the Web has become 
indispensable for making new social acquaintances and cultivating old friendships, 
for keeping up-to-date with world affairs and a whole raft of interactions that 
constitute our daily routines today. To explain the rise and pervasiveness of the 
world wide web it is enough to go back in time to 2004, a time before Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube and numerous other ‘platforms’ (Gillespie 2010), 
which only ten years later share more than 1 billion users and account for around a 
quarter of internet traffic. The dominance of major so-called ‘social media’ (see van 
Dijck 2013) is by no means merely a “Western” phenomenon. In densely 
populated countries like China (Weibo and QZone) online platforms facilitate and 
intensify the exchange of data, affects, and money in equivalent ways. 
Considering the continuing excitement around “new” media it is worth 
revisiting the fact that different forms of collaborative and interactive media not 
only predate today’s “social media” but also the web. The use of intranets, 
electronic bulletin board systems, audio-text chat lines and videotext forums 
transformed the relation between audience, producer, source and receiver of 
messages and information from the 1980s into the 1990s (Rafaeli and LaRose 
1993). These ‘collaborative media’ (Rafaeli and LaRose 1993) already exemplified a 
hybrid form of interpersonal and mass communication. In this context it is helpful 
to take into consideration historically coined depictions that consider media as 
‘socially realized structures of communication, where structures include both 
technological forms and their associated protocols, and where communication is a 
cultural practice’ (Gitelman 2008: 7). This approach also relativises the “newness” 
of a given technology by tracing its origins. Take, for example, the metamorphosis 
of the telephone into the mobile phone into an all-purpose computing device. 
From this perspective, current developments that have seen the displacement of 
‘the traditional dualism of mass and interpersonal forms of communication’ by 
‘interactive, networked forms of communication’ (Livingstone 2009: 1) are better 
considered an intensification than an unprecedented novelty.  
Paralleling, and in strong interrelation with, the spread of the internet, the 
widespread, discrete embeddedness of computing technology and 
communications media in everyday life has become an increasingly global 
phenomenon. Echoing classic definitions of infrastructure many platforms and 
devices today fade into the background having become generic, unquestioned 
infrastructures for communication and social interaction (van Dijck 2013: 68; Star 
and Ruhleder 1996). Nowadays, personal cameras, for example, are common 
equipment for documenting just about everything, from banal day-to-day 
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activities like driving a car and lifestyle-related sensations like extreme sport to 
previously largely inaccessible situations like war scenarios. At the same time, 
more than ever before urban public spaces are saturated by media – from visible 
large-scale LED screens and public information systems, through to commercial 
advertising and personal media like mobile phones, to invisible but omnipresent 
satellite surveillance systems (Berry et al. 2013). Using and interacting with a wide 
range of digital technologies and infrastructures has become a vital component of 
the way people deal with and shape their day-to-day lives (Hepp 2012). This is to 
point to media change as an ongoing process that goes hand in hand with the 
shifting of societal constellations (Meyrowitz 1985). Institutional political routines 
are no exception in this regard. Suzi LeVine, US diplomatic representative for 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein, recently became the first US ambassador to swear 
her oath of office using a Kindle Touch. Besides such rather banal examples one 
can also point to the fact that in the world’s largest democracies – India, Brazil and 
the United States – citizens cast their vote on digital voting machines. 
To deepen understandings of how people make use of particular media, 
scholars have recently joined the ‘practice turn’ of sociologists (Schatzki et al. 
2001). In place of rather detached investigation of media contents or media effects, 
practice-oriented approaches move human acting into the foreground of analysis 
(Bräuchler and Postill 2010). As Nick Couldry emphasises, in a media-saturated 
world one needs to develop an approach that ‘starts not with media texts or media 
institutions, but with practice – not necessarily the practice of audiences, but 
media-oriented practice, in all its looseness and openness’ (Couldry 2004: 119). In 
a widely adopted definition, a social practice is described as a ‘routinized way in 
which bodies are moved, objects are handled, subjects are treated, things are 
described and the world is understood’ (Reckwitz 2002: 250). Although a wide 
range of practices have a routinised form, social actors may also invent new 
practices or redefine existing ones (Reckwitz 2002). Practice-oriented analysis is a 
promising approach for deepening our understanding of how contemporary 
combinations of competence, material and meaning are enacted and reproduced 
because it allows to us to see what people actually do with media and how media-
related practices intersect with other social practices. 
The larger value of practice theory for media sociology ‘is to ask open questions 
about what people are doing and how they categorise what they are doing, 
avoiding the disciplinary or other preconceptions that would automatically read 
their actions as, say, “consumption” or “being-an-audience”’ (Couldry 2004: 125). 
In more concrete terms, media-related practices are understood in an inclusive 
way, referring ‘to how different “forms” altogether build a more complex and 
 31 
socially situated “pattern” of acting with media’ (Couldry 2012: 34). Bringing 
together the above-mentioned understandings, Alice Mattoni defines media 
practices as, 
(1) both routinised and creative social practices that; 2) 
include interactions with media objects (such as mobile 
phones, laptops, pieces of paper) and media subjects (such 
as journalists, public relations managers, other activists); (3) 
draw on how media objects and media subjects are 
perceived and how the media environment is understood 
and known. (Mattoni 2012: 159) 
Mattoni’s inclusive definition is particularly advantageous as it allows the 
incorporation of a variety of activities that range from mundane to highly complex 
practices which in one way or another relate to or are explicitly embedded in pre-
existent social practices. One can think of Iranian youth exchanging mobile phone 
numbers during traffic jams and flirting with each other via text messages. 
Similarly, one can think of terrorist networks relying on complex communicative 
actions that include handwritten documents as well as hidden codes in public 
websites. Uploading content to file-sharing websites is as much included in the 
notion of media practices as is updating profiles on online platforms as are more 
expert-oriented practices like coding and programming. The entanglement of a 
diversity of media-related practices, as the last part of Mattoni’s (2012) depiction 
suggests, points to the notion of “media environment” as a conceptual term 
central to deepening understandings of how people engage with their social and 
political surroundings. 
The ethnologist Hermann Bausinger in his essay on ‘Media, Technology and 
Daily Life’ was one of the first to address the notion of media environment by 
formulating the following research objectives. 
(1) To make a meaningful study of the use of the media, it is 
necessary to take different media into consideration. […] (2) 
As a rule the media are not used completely, nor with full 
concentration. […] (3) The media are an integral part of the 
way the everyday is conducted. […] (4) It is not a question of 
an isolated, individual process, but of a collective process. 
[…] (5) Media communication cannot be separated from 
direct personal communication. (Bausinger 1984: 349–50) 
More recently, with the converging nature of the internet and the entanglement of 
diverse types of media outlets, researchers have further operationalised this 
analytical framing. The relevance of treating media as integrated, interconnected 
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environments rather than a list of discrete objects is emphasised by Couldry who 
says that ‘an older division of the space of media and communications research 
around particular media (television, radio, film and so on) is now of strictly 
limited value’ (Couldry 2013: 1024). The notion of media environment, then, has 
two analytical benefits. First, it takes into account how media are best understood 
in their converged, digital and hybrid form where the dichotomy between 
producers and users is constantly being blurred (Jenkins 2006; Chadwick 2013). 
Second, it allows us to see different channels and platforms of communication as 
interdependent and the simultaneous presence of a multiplicity of media 
technologies and infrastructures (Madianou and Miller 2013; Mattoni 2012). 
Theoretical explorations of and empirical research on media environments point 
to more or less amorphous clusters that are defined by a whole set of actors – 
journalists, audiences, activists, media organisations, publics, consumers, 
producers, and hybrid forms.  
One possible limitation of media environment as an analytical frame is its 
tendency to merge everything together without leaving enough room for making 
analytical distinctions. This potential “deficit” is counterbalanced by the fact that 
the notion strongly relies on practice-oriented conceptualisations. Here again 
Mattoni (2013) makes an important contribution by highlighting how, during her 
research on grassroots mobilisation against precarity in Italy, two types of media 
practice emerged. First, media knowledge practices – related to the development of 
knowledge about the media environment – and second, relational media practices 
– oriented towards interaction with media technologies, media outlets and media 
professional (Mattoni 2013: 47–9). The strength of bringing practice-oriented 
approaches into dialogue with the notion of media environment is that it allows 
researchers to apply a wide-angle lens that takes into account the blurred 
boundaries between media-related practices, mediation and mediatisation. 
In accordance with the interdependence of social and media change, it can be 
argued that at least since Western modernity, politics and media environments 
correlate with each other. Consider, for example, the use of broadcasting and 
leaflets as mass-mobilisation tools in Nazi Germany. Martín-Barbero unpacks this 
entanglement of political and media change by explaining that ‘politics are a sort of 
social fabric where social actors negotiate their identities through interaction’ 
(Martín-Barbero 2006: 284). His assertion positions communication, and along 
with it, mediated communication as central for the creation of political culture. 
This entanglement of politics and media-related practices, scholars argue, has 
never been as advanced as it is today. ‘The rapid diffusion of new communication 
technologies creates a pressing need to rethink the complex and multifaceted 
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forces that are reshaping the political communication environments of the 
western democracies’ (Chadwick 2013: 3). Tellingly, it has become far from 
controversial to state that media environments play their part in the formation of 
political constellations in general, and the way individual and collective actors 
organise, mobilise and engage with politics in particular. Yet, while scholars agree 
that with the shifting prominence of media environments in the social world 
there are emerging patterns of political engagement to investigate, there continues 
to be stark disagreement about the actual significance, character and consequences 
of these engagements. Indeed, as I will discuss in the following paragraphs, 
scholars and observers have drawn, in overly enthusiastic to entirely sceptical 
ways, all kinds of conclusions about the relation of actors’ media-related practices 
and the configuration of democratic constellations. 
 
2.3 From sceptics and optimists 
In its possibly most optimistic form, cybernetic utopians like Stewart Brand 
envisioned society as a place where “old” forms of political organisation become 
unnecessary because computer networks would create a global society without 
central control (see Turner 2006). As Fred Turner (2006) has made clear, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s many internet advocates – amongst them scholars, 
technology experts, public officials, journalists and business leaders – understood 
the internet as a new network of networks free of institutional constraints, 
creating an idyllic environment for individual liberty. During the course of the 
1990s the decline of this first-wave cyber-utopianism saw its more modest 
continuity in the rise of the network metaphor, which has been advanced most 
notably by Manuel Castells (2000). Writings that consider the network the prime 
category to understand networked individualism in general (Rainie and Wellman 
2012) and political transformations in particular (Castells 2012) still enjoy a broad 
popularity. The strength of this line of argument is its emphasis on growing 
interconnections amongst individuals through mediated communication. Yet, 
from a theoretical point of view, the weakness of the network metaphor is that it 
tends to overstress the notion of the network to the detriment of all other aspects 
of social, cultural and political life and therefore homogenises the diversity of very 
different phenomena. From a more politically oriented perspective, one danger of 
the network argument, as Natalie Fenton and Veronica Barassi (2011) have argued 
convincingly, is the equation of democracy with individualistic use of technology. 
An extension of the cyber-utopian and network argument is the more recent 
proclamation that due to the seemingly autonomous and non-hierarchical nature 
of media environments politics and contemporary engagement practices are no 
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longer in need of organisation (Shirky 2009). Echoing the notion that organisation 
has become redundant, writings on social movements argue that individually 
expressive personal action frames displace collective action frames (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013). Optimistic observers see the availability and use of contemporary 
media technologies and infrastructures engendering egalitarian and decentralised 
networks that have no need of leadership and allow for new forms of political 
engagement (Bennett et al. 2014; Castells 2012). The Occupy movement is the 
proto-type of such a crowd-enabled network. While Lance Bennett and his 
colleagues acknowledge that ‘there is a core group of more active participants and 
that the contribution of this core is highlighted and amplified by the crowd’ 
(Bennett et al. 2014: 250) they emphasise hierarchy-free “connective” activism 
enabled predominantly through mediated communication. 
Authors who have looked more closely at the role of media technologies in 
actors’ organisational challenges, such as coordination, self-structuring and 
membership negotiations, come to a different conclusion. Anastasia Kavada 
(2010), for example, explores the role of email lists in the achievement of 
consensus throughout the 2004 European Social Forum (ESF) in London. She 
demonstrates that the ESF’s decision-making system involved certain inequalities 
and exclusions that were not formally acknowledged. Email lists ‘aided in 
obscuring these exclusions and inequalities by making them more informal and 
thus less explicit’ (Kavada 2010: 370). Organisational dynamics can also be 
witnessed across different political collectives where leadership groups construct a 
basic operational identity by establishing ‘collective names, by coining a series of 
hashtags, of icons, of internet memes’ (Gerbaudo 2014: 267). The struggle to 
establish a coherent identity is often accompanied by internal power structures 
that manifest themselves in physical form – for example, an exclusive space for a 
core group or media committee – as well as in informational form – for example, 
restricted access to passwords (Terranova and Donovan 2013). The Facebook and 
Twitter accounts of Occupy LA, for example, which had tens of thousands of 
followers, ‘were operated as a “boat” with about six captains, who decided what 
would be posted and what would be ignored’ (Terranova and Donovan 2013: 300). 
Even prominent examples like the commons-based peer production Wikipedia, 
which is often referred to as an amorphous, self-organising formation, has 
developed hierarchies and orders of some sort that are enforced through 
leadership, communication norms and censure that ‘seek to strike a balance 
between stability and open-ended flexibility’ (Kelty 2013: n.p.). Corresponding to 
these arguments scholars interested in the organisational functioning of social 
movements have argued that ‘no group makes every single decision by consensus, 
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and no group offers equal power to anyone who wants it’ (Polletta 2004: 8). The 
manifestation of participatory democracy within movements (Polletta 2004) is 
widely regarded as difficult to implement, particularly when the scale of the group 
increases. Lengthy negotiations tend to render movements inflexible, make more 
difficult for them to respond quickly and less likely to keep a narrow focus on a 
small set of issues (Sikkink 2002: 312). Conclusive accounts of social movements’ 
internal dynamics demonstrate their struggle to reconcile aspirations to 
participatory and independent action with persistent needs for coordination and 
public representation (Melucci 1996: 344–7). 
Enthusiasm concerning the disappearance of “organisation” is also subdued by 
scholars who emphasise that the metaphors of networking, entanglement and the 
like, might be politically inspiring, but remain one-sided as they assume a world 
without institutional politics and without structured centres of political resistance 
(Benhabib 2007: 260). As scholars have pointed out, this continuing presence of 
hierarchy within movements and institutions across society puts into question 
the imaginary of the network on which many authors rely (Gerbaudo 2014: 266). 
Accordingly, there is good reason to question whether ‘connective action’ 
(Bennett and Segerberg 2013) characterises political engagement at large and 
whether it is applicable, for example, to engagement practices by civil society 
organisations that aim to influence concrete political arrangements. Rather than 
talking of ‘organizing without organizations’ (Shirky 2009) it appears to be more 
reasonable to argue that contemporary media environments have contributed to 
the emergence of ‘organizing through different organizations’ (Karpf 2012). In 
accordance with this line of thought scholars have challenged the notion that 
digital media render formal organisations irrelevant by showing how people’s 
attitudes, motivations, goals and digital media use are related to their 
organisational involvement (Bimber et al. 2012). This is not to argue against the 
notion that political engagement has changed and that media technologies play 
their part in this change, but to argue that it remains vital to take into account 
organisational question when investigating the role non-state actors’ use of media 
play in contemporary political constellations. 
Combining the enthusiasm for networks and the centrality of digital platforms 
in political life, recent accounts have merged into a new wave of optimism 
accompanying the spread of “social media” (see van Dijck 2013). This view of 
dispersed communication power reached its apotheosis in claims made about the 
revolutionary role of singular platforms during the Arab Spring of 2011 and the rise 
of networked protest that culminated in the Occupy movement (Castells 2012). As 
Paolo Gerbaudo’s on-site fieldwork has shown, using interchangeable idioms like 
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“Twitter revolution” or “Facebook revolution” for the uprisings in Iran, Tunisia 
and Egypt is an oversimplification that is oblivious to uneven and complicated 
historical processes (Gerbaudo 2012). The political turmoil in Egypt was far from 
following a neat topology and did not lead to the outcomes often envisaged by 
voices proclaiming the revolutionary role of digital media. What this example 
demonstrates is that the tendency in celebratory accounts of political activism is to 
see technology not as an independent variable from which other variables – 
organisational practices, objectives and tactics – depend, but as the only thing that 
can unite otherwise egotistical rational individuals (Gerbaudo 2014: 266). It is 
worth noting that Bennett and his colleagues, for example, explicitly talk of 
‘technology-enabled crowds’ (Bennett et al. 2014: 255). Accordingly, one of the 
challenges when analysing what people do with media is to avoid purely technical 
discussions that tend to reduce actors and engagement practices to technological 
means. This, again, is not to say that technology does not matter, but to emphasise 
that ‘technological changes are far from being independent of other dimensions of 
social existence’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: xix). As scholars from various 
disciplinary backgrounds outline convincingly (i.e. Sassen 2008; Qiu 2009; Della 
Porta 2013), one risk of relying on technological readings is to drift towards a 
processual automatism where growing digital activism overrides existing ways of 
engaging with politics and (automatically) leads to a more active civil society, 
which then (again automatically) leads to an extended terrain of empowerment. In 
this instance the actor’s agency is taken for granted and analysis is solely concerned 
with the question of how that agency is employed through technical means. 
On the opposite side, representing the sceptical point of view, scholars have 
pointed to growing online power hierarchies that contradict arguments 
proclaiming the formation of a Habermasian online public sphere (cf. Volkmer 
2014).1 Matthew Hindman (2008), amongst others, presents evidence from the 
United States – based on internet service provider traffic data, a three-million-
Web page survey of link structure among political sites, a census of top bloggers, 
and systematic data on search engine usage – that online political messages are 
created and filtered by a small set of elites and media institutions: ‘Paradoxically, 
the extreme “openness” of the Internet has fueled the creation of new political 
elites’ (Hindman 2008: 4). This more sceptical account is helpful for pointing out 
that optimistic accounts often underestimate or even ignore existing power 
hierarchies within contemporary media environments. This also hints at the 
                                                
1 It is important to keep in mind that in his habilitation treatise, which turned into the 
seminal publication Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), Habermas 
criticised the rise of mass media for perpetuating the privatisation of civic life by 
turning citizens into consumers. 
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notion that optimistic accounts often leave aside the enduring significance of 
mainstream media. Although a vast number of people today have access to the 
internet – about half of the world’s population – access continues to be a political 
category. The number of people who have access to the newspaper with the 
widest circulation, public broadcaster or most popular news shows watched by 
millions remains negligible (Freedman 2014). Put in more operationalised terms, 
the dynamics concerning who can effectively speak, and be listened to (Couldry 
2010), continue to be highly relevant for the making of democratic constellations. 
Critics also scrutinise the notion that the ‘wealth of networks’ (Benkler 2006) is 
increasingly decentralising the structures of production and distribution of 
information, culture and knowledge. Jodi Dean (2010), for example, sees 
individual and collective actors  being increasingly embedded in capital-oriented 
communication, entertainment networks and other manifestations of what she 
terms ‘communicative capitalism’. From this perspective contemporary media 
environments are corporate paradises, privileging technologies that connect 
networks of consumers, organise user data and refine surveillance of online 
identities instead of leading to more political opportunities (Dean 2010). Such all-
embracing criticism tends to create an almost inescapable conclusion that 
disregards constructive and encouraging examples of engagement, as well as 
existing dichotomies relating to contemporary media environments. All the same, 
this criticism is valuable as it takes into account the centralisation tendency within 
platforms and across communication infrastructures generally. 
Beyond the platform level, critics have pointed to the infrastructural 
transformation of the internet per se, from a distributed network to a small, 
centralised web of powerful telecommunication giants and data centres creating 
digital monocultures (Kelty 2013). While access to information today appears to be 
dispersed one can simultaneously observe the formation of media oligopolies that 
range from Google to News Corporation. This trend is intensified as large 
corporations continue to assimilate upcoming and competing platforms. Over 
recent years the diversity of online networking services, for example, has shrunk 
drastically, and in early 2014 Alexa traffic rankings listed only two nonprofit 
platforms amongst the top 100 most popular websites worldwide – the online 
encyclopaedia Wikipedia and the blog software WordPress. As Clemencia 
Rodriguez and her colleagues have put it, ‘Even a radio station powered by solar 
energy or batteries allows for more autonomy from corporate interests and state 
surveillance than Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter’ (Rodriguez et al. 2014: 9). 
Scholars have illustrated the political scope of the interrelation of centralised 
services and engagement practices, amongst others, by analysing the case of 
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WikiLeaks. When Amazon, PayPal, and other corporations – following pressure 
from governmental actors – closed the services they had previously provided for 
the whistleblower platform in 2010, they deprived WikiLeaks of its domain name 
and access to necessary funds in the middle of a major release that required both 
(Hintz 2013). The interplay of the private sector and political elites underlined 
understandings that actors who are able to control access to infrastructure have 
turned into important gatekeepers (Hintz 2013: 152). In stark contrast to 
sentiments proclaiming a hierarchy- and organisation-free setting, these examples 
implicitly support the notion that ‘No territory, ideal, virtual or physical, exists 
without a capital (from caput head)’ (Debray 2000: 15). 
Another line of argument that tempers praise of the internet comes from 
critical voices arguing that it is difficult, to say the least, to find evidence that the 
internet is empowering previously excluded groups and bringing about a 
revitalisation of democracy (Curran et al. 2012). Consider, for example, social 
equality related to income and the fact that the concentration of wealth has 
increased over the last twenty years, particularly in the most digitally networked 
countries (Lee et al. 2014). In a similar, but more simplistic tenor, critics dismiss 
online-related activities as ersatz activism and avoidance of engagement with 
“real” politics (see Karpf 2012). This mode of passive political activity is often 
referred to as slacktivism – a neologism blending the words slacker and activism 
and denoting an activity in support of a social cause that has little or no practical 
consequences other than to make the person doing it feel good. Slacktivism critics 
are certainly right to question the deeper political significance and value of, for 
example, e-petitions or campaigns that are restricted to mobilising followers 
online. At the same time it is important to include progressive cases, as some 
critics in fact do (Curran et al. 2012). In his substantial investigation of US advocacy 
groups David Karpf (2012) refers to the “MoveOn effect”, which is seen with 
emerging advocacy organisations that build their reputation and engagement 
largely on new techniques of fund-raising and mobilisation – slacktivism being 
only one of them. Karpf (2012) is cautious enough to emphasise that emerging 
online groups that are reliant on media related practices are by no means taking the 
place of existing organisations but are broadening the organisational horizon by 
establishing new engagement practices. 
Particularly since the 2000s, the above critiques have been accompanied by 
voices that contradict equations like ‘authority is weakened when information 
systems are merged’ (Meyrowitz 1985: 63). Scholarly work increasingly argues that 
media technologies and infrastructures strengthen existing and establish new 
authority structures, which have become most visible in the dramatic rise of 
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surveillance strategies and practices. The growing connection between 
surveillance and so-called big data, critics argue, has led to a ‘collect-everything 
approach to monitoring and intelligence’ (Andrejevic and Gates 2014: 185) by 
governmental agencies and private corporations alike.2 In this context it is 
worthwhile to mentioning that sociological and historical analyses have 
convincingly depicted more recent developments as continuous with the 
exploitation of information that have roots in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century (Beniger 1986). Not only academics, but also politicians closely follow 
technological developments with scepticism. Recently Martin Schulz (2014), 
President of the European Parliament, wrote a dedicated op-ed in which he 
warned that the conjunction of “big data” and the hysterical exaltation of security 
have the potential to promote anti-democratic tendencies. Political scandals 
following Edward Snowden’s disclosure of the National Security Agency’s spying 
and surveillance tactics have given further weight to the view and turned debate in 
this areas into an ever more pressing issue. 
Sceptical accounts are a valuable reminder that contemporary reconfigurations 
of democratic constellations do not only imply the potential for empowered 
agents but also comprise a risk leading to a widening sense and state of 
powerlessness. The strongly varying pros and cons that have been discussed in the 
above sections show how broad the range of interpretations, opinions and 
research findings are in relation to the role media environments play for 
contemporary political actors. Overall it remains questionable whether, and in 
what ways, media-related practices allow for the proper realisation of political 
engagement. Besides the ability for reception and expression, the idea of 
engagement also requires concrete opportunities for involvement and 
intervention in local, national and global issues (Dahl 1989; Rosanvallon 2008). It 
is understood that actors’ voices are heard more or less loudly across diverse media 
environments, but the political outcome depends on whether anyone is listening 
(Couldry 2010). While the technical issues are changing alongside changes in 
technological dynamics, the question is whether the practical problem of political 
action is as well. Following the credo that some of the consequences of media 
change give rise to optimism while others evoke scepticism, some scholars have 
decided to strike a balance. 
 
 
                                                
2 The OpenNet initiative is an informative source of the latest trends and statistics in 
this regard. 
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2.4 Steering a middle course 
Contrasting both optimists and sceptics who tend to portray media environments 
either as a quick fix for or as posing a threat to democracy, more cautious observers 
propose a middle ground. As Henry Jenkins put it in a recent conversation with 
Couldry on the participatory promise of contemporary culture and politics: 
We are long past the point where we can get away with 
either fully celebratory or fully cynical accounts of the 
changes that have been set in motion by these shifts in who 
has access to the means of cultural production and 
circulation […] Cyberutopian and cyberdystopian rhetorics 
mapped too easily onto existing fault lines in critical and 
cultural studies. (Couldry and Jenkins 2014: 1108–9) 
Such a middle-ground perspective strongly echoes the notion that the 
interdependencies between media and political change are far from 
straightforward or one-dimensional. It thus avoids negative or positive 
deterministic projections, proposing a more nuanced reading of the relationship 
between evolving media environments and political engagement (Dahlgren 2013). 
Bart Cammaerts (2008) in his substantial critique of participatory online platforms 
underlines that one should reject one-size-fits-all readings of contemporary media 
practices. I It would be all to easy to regard media exclusively in terms of their 
democratic and participatory potentials, but Cammaerts emphasises that one 
‘should thus also acknowledge the limitations of and constraints to these 
participative and democratic potentials’ (Cammaerts 2008: 360). Approaches that 
push for a more nuanced understanding can be traced back at least to the 1980s. 
At a time when the mainframe computer was still considered an emblem of 
bureaucratisation, Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983) envisioned a decentralised media 
environment that might strengthen democratic culture by enabling grassroots 
organisations to circulate their ideas more widely than before. At the same time he 
warned that, ‘In some times and places the even more capacious new media will 
open wider the floodgates for discourse, but in other times and places, in fear of 
that flood, attempts will be made to shut the gates’ (de Sola Pool 1983: 251). 
Writing only some years later, Dahl pointed out that: ‘Without a conscious and 
deliberate effort to use the new technology of telecommunications on behalf of 
democracy, it may be used in ways harmful to democracy’ (Dahl 1989: 339). The 
MacBride Report – written by a UNESCO commission headed by Nobel Peace-
prize laureate Seán MacBride – stated in its concluding section: ‘Communication 
can be an instrument of power, a revolutionary weapon, a commercial product, or 
a means of education; it can serve the ends of either liberation or of oppression, of 
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either the growth of the individual personality or of drilling human beings into 
uniformity’ (MacBride 1980: 253). One could say the same things about the 
technologies and infrastructures that support and make possible communicative 
action. 
Practical examples that validate the ambiguous and often contradictory use of 
media technologies and infrastructures can be seen in many contemporary cases. 
During the dramatic 2009 post-presidential election protests in Iran, citizens 
purchased affordable CDs loaded with anti-censorship software, enabling a more 
or less substantial stream of images and videos on online platforms and 
mainstream news channels (Sreberny and Khiabany 2010). At the same time, the 
Iranian regime also used digital media to fortify its surveillance apparatus, as many 
other authoritarian as well as democratic governments.3 Deep-rooted 
contradictions can also be witnessed in other cases. The handful of corporations 
that are in control of the financially most successful cloud computing services are 
all running on “open source” software (Kelty 2013). Similarly, the open source 
operating system Linux, developed and used by software activists to enable free 
(re)distribution and modification of code, is used by the US Navy to keep its drone 
fleet in the air. 
Scholars have rightfully emphasised that drawing simple relationships between 
the advent of a new generation of technology and its societal consequences might 
overlook the contradictory consequences mediation often results in. Robin 
Mansell (2010) persuasively cautions that it is important to consider the new 
forms of online activity in relation to their offline consequences for political and 
social action: ‘The notion that empowerment for citizens is the “natural” outcome 
of the networked relationships that permeate society does not take account of the 
indeterminate consequences for power relations in society’ (Mansell 2010: 6–7). 
Instead of arguing for a “better” or “worse” world at large, scholars who take the 
middle ground point to more particular changes taking place in relation to 
engagement practices. Actors’ media-related practices do not happen in a 
contextual vacuum but are responsive to local needs (Rodríguez 2011) and 
continue to be affected by societal arrangements like class, age and mobility (Qiu 
2009). 
At this point, I want pause to glance at the road travelled so far. By way of 
introduction, I considered the processual nature of democracy. Thereafter, I 
examined the growing body of literature conceptualising the pervasiveness of 
media technologies and infrastructures. In this connection, I emphasised the 
                                                
3 As various current examples around the globe illustrate, drawing exact lines between 
authoritarian governments and fully democratic states is a difficult task. 
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relevance and persuasiveness of approaches that develop and adapt a media 
practice perspective. Subsequently, I zeroed in on scholars who address the 
relation between political dynamics and contemporary media environments. In a 
last step I have discussed writings that contrast both optimistic and sceptical 
accounts by promoting a more cautious and balanced approach. Summarising the 
above empirical and theoretical accounts it is understood that shifting forms of 
political engagement are accompanied by the diversification of political actors who 
may differ with regards to access to resources and episodic or enduring 
engagement (see Fraser 1992). Accordingly, there is need to look more closely at 
emerging forms and sites of engagement and the actors who develop, perform and 
maintain these engagements (Marres 2005). To put it in other words, there is need 
for empirical research into the social and political forms that make positive 
political actions possible and meaningful (Couldry 2012: 114). Taking the idea that 
media environments play a vital part in the formation of democratic constellations 
serious one is well advised to look at what actors actually do with particular media 
technologies and infrastructures and what their practices mean for their everyday 
and long-term involvement with politics. The second part of my literature review 
will now further engage with writings by scholars engaged in the approximation 
of political science, sociology, social movement and media studies. 
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c h a p t e r  t h r e e  
Literature Review (part two) 
The chapter initiates with a discussion of democratic theorists who stress that 
organised actors make important contributions to democratic constellations and 
form a constitutive part of civil society. Following this discussion the section 
proceeds with a review of studies that examine the relationship between non-state 
actors and different media outlets and a discussion of relevant literature that 
considers the political relevance of mainstream media, mediated visibility, 
alternative media for actors who aim to co-determine democratic constellations. 
In this context I discuss recent writings that highlight the ever more substantial 
role hackers play in contemporary political constellations. The second section 
reviews writings that emphasise the central importance of legitimacy in societal 
constellations and focuses on approaches that bring forward a relational 
understanding of legitimation. The third section engages with accounts that point 
to the importance of time to bring the means of political engagement to life. The 
last section argues that despite the useful qualities of the writings discussed 
throughout this and the earlier chapter a number of important questions remain 
unresolved. Accordingly, the chapter argues, there is good reason to look at the 
role civil society organisations’ media-related practices play in their ability to 
establish legitimacy and for sustaining engagement over time. Finally, the last 
section introduces the research questions informing my thesis. 
 
3.1 A pluralisation of actors 
Countering the notion of a general rise of political apathy, voices proclaiming the 
days of democracy constructed by a small group of elected politicians to be over 
are increasingly being heard. Donatella Della Porta, one of the most renowned 
scholars in this context, stresses that ‘if some traditional types of associations are 
less and less popular, others (social movement organizations among them) are 
instead growing in resources, legitimacy and members’ (Della Porta 2010: 803). 
The notion that as institutional politics declines a variety of associations emerge, 
goes along with the argument that disintegration is in part the “becoming” of 
politics (Pocock 2003). The political relevance of democratic constellations relying 
on a diverse range of associations has been underlined by a number of influential 
theorists. Political philosophers from Hannah Arendt to Ernesto Laclau have 
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emphasised that democracy is more than simply a set of political establishments. 
In the words of Rosanvallon, ‘Democracy is defined by its works, and not simply 
by its institutions’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 307). In fact, political scientists have 
stressed that part of the very definition of liberal democracies is that they create 
the space for a plurality of civic and political associations (Dahl 1989: 233). 
Similarly, democracy theorists have pointed to a deep link between the formation 
of democratic constellations and the actions of organised associations (Warren 
2001). The notion of creating local or regional associations to make democracy 
work over time goes back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s (2004) classical study 
Democracy in America. Noting the prominent role associations played in the early 
years of the American republic, de Tocqueville (2004) argued that democracy is 
first and foremost a matter of shared ideas and practices that enable individuals to 
combine into organised collectives. 
While organised associations make important contributions to democracy – 
including civic socialisation, political education, resistance, representation, 
deliberation and direct governance – scholars stress that greater realism is needed 
in what is often presented as a normative model (Fung 2003). Associations are 
starting points, mechanisms and frameworks of struggle more than indicators of 
political ends in themselves (Calhoun 2007: 172). While some writings make an 
effort to accentuate the epochal newness and singularity of current proceedings 
(Castells 2000; Shirky 2009), others have convincingly argued that political 
challengers may draw from familiar models of social organisation as the templates 
for unfamiliar forms of political engagement (Clemens and Cook 1999: 459). A 
telling example in this regard is the continuing importance of clubs or registered 
associations, which have been the subject of classical sociological 
conceptualisation as a characteristic form of organised collectivity (see Weber 
1978: 27). In Germany, for example, registered associations (‘eingetragener Verein’) 
have a legal status that goes back to the Prussian Civil Code of 1794. Defined in §56 
of the German Civil Code, in Germany it is a fundamental right of every citizen to 
be able to establish a registered association.4 At the same time, one can expect that 
organisational practices and the interests that are the basis for clubs are subject to 
constant change. Since the 1960s the density of registered associations in Germany 
has been growing continuously (Adloff 2013) – ranging from self-help groups and 
sports clubs to musical societies and associations for ecological conservation. 
                                                
4 Registration holds many legal benefits because a registered association can legally 
function as a corporate body rather than just a loose group of individuals. Although 
not every club is necessarily a registered association, the terms “club” and “registered 
association” will be used synonymously. 
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Following these accounts, one can ascertain that associations are a constitutive 
part of civil society – ‘a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, 
composed above all of the intimate sphere, the sphere of associations, social 
movements and forms of public communication’ (Cohen and Arato 1992: ix). 
Cohen and Arato’s writing is particularly helpful in this context as it regards civil 
society as a possible terrain for progressive politics and associations as 
organisational forms that – based on their engagement practices – facilitate and 
maintain demanding visions of politics. With the prominence of media 
technologies in the social world at large, and especially in the diversification of 
political engagement, research on the use of media by non-state actors has in 
recent years gained currency. Scholars from different disciplines have pointed to 
the need to investigate interactions between democratic constellations and non-
state actors’ interactions with different media outlets and technologies. Writings 
by scholars who promote the coming together of political science, sociology, 
movement and media studies are of particular value in this context. 
In one of the early insights into the relationship between non-state actors and 
media outlets, William Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld (1993) noted that social 
movements are dependent on mainstream media to mobilise public support, to 
increase the validation of their demands and to circulate their messages beyond 
the likeminded. In accordance with this reasoning scholars have argued that due to 
the ongoing fragmentation of media outlets and the competition of different 
groups and actors for public attention, mainstream outlets remain an important 
site for actors to get their message across in public discourse (Koopmans 2004; 
Rucht 2004). The notion that mainstream media play a part in shaping the 
political agenda has been part of academic discourse for more than four decades 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972) and scholars continue to emphasise the scenery-setting 
role mainstream formats play for movement actors (Andrews and Caren 2010). 
This might be partially due to the fact that in countries like Germany people tend 
to be loyal to established news outlets and are less likely to adopt newer, 
individualised services (Newman and Levy 2013). Overall, recent publications on 
mediation and protest movements have stressed the increased relevance of 
mediated visibility if political collectives are to exist in the public mind, make their 
voices heard, achieve public recognition and gain attention beyond the circle of 
likeminded individuals and publics (Rucht 2013).5 Accordingly, mainstream 
                                                
5 It is important to keep in mind that more radical groups and collectives often prefer 
to stay in the background and therefore might even put some efforts into staying 
invisible and outside of media attention. 
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visibility tends to be described as an effective and possibly necessary route for 
political impact (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). This development is considered 
counterproductive by those critics who see non-state actors as captivated by the 
demands of news media which is seen as leading to trivialisation and debasement 
of their aims (see Powers 2014). For emerging groups like Anonymous, it has been 
argued that in sating the media hunger for spectacle, media attention and column 
inches have become ends in themselves and therefore an obstacle to political 
movement building (Coleman 2013). In this context it is important to remember 
that media-related practices do not equal empowerment and mediated visibility is 
not a political end in itself (Cammaerts et al. 2013). 
Working through the literature on the relationship of non-state actors and 
mainstream media it becomes apparent that one needs to differentiate between 
different forms of interaction. Richard Ericson and his colleagues (1989), for 
example, make a useful distinction between media access and media coverage. By 
access, they mean ‘the news space, time, and context to reasonably represent the 
authority of their office’, whereas coverage entails ‘some news space and time but 
not the context for favourable representations’ (Ericson et al. 1989: 5). This 
distinction is vital because it demonstrates that media access – as with access to all 
kinds of resources at institutional levels – remains a political question (see 
Freedman 2014). While media coverage simply denotes the amount and 
prominence of attention and visibility a group receives, media access indicates that 
an actor has a particular standing and is treated as an actor with a serious voice in 
the media (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Ferree et al. 2002). In addition, speaking 
with their own voice enhances actors’ ability to embed their concepts and ideals in 
public discourse (Phillips et al. 2004). As prominent research like the study on the 
“making and unmaking” of the 1960s student movement (Gitlin 1980) has 
demonstrated, gaining coverage once may not be hard, but gaining and sustaining 
regular access and standing can be extremely difficult. 
With the growing pervasiveness of digital technologies, scholars pointing to 
the political relevance of radical and alternative media (Downing 2000; Atton 
2004) have complemented research on mainstream media over recent years. A 
prominent example in this context is the Global Justice Movement (GJM). To 
mobilise against the World Trade Organization’s meeting in Seattle in 1999 and to 
enhance alternative reports on political and social issues, the GJM created an 
online infrastructure that included, amongst other things, the alternative media 
network Indymedia, electronic mailing lists and information portals (Kahn and 
Kellner 2004). Besides countering, withdrawing from or adapting to mainstream 
media (Rucht 2004), scholars emphasise that social movements increasingly 
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invest human, technological and financial resources in ‘“being the media” instead 
of hating it, to paraphrase a slogan of Indymedia’ (Cammaerts 2012: 125). As with 
the Bolivian tin miners who by 1920 were already using radio technologies to 
mobilise people in their political struggle against corporate and state oppression 
(see Rodriguez et al. 2014), so the creation and maintenance of alternative media 
has gained particular momentum since the 1980s. At that time John Downing 
(1989) published an article on the political potential of endeavours like the 
electronic mail system PeaceNet and projects like Public Data Access that aimed to 
make government information accessible. His argument was that these services 
were ‘constructing an alternative public realm, a space in which political 
movements can exchange and refine new perspectives and information in the 
light of practical projects’ (Downing 1989: 156). While Downing was right in 
underlining how media-related practices can strengthen but not operationalise 
democratic culture, his notion of ‘grass-roots teledemocracy’ (Downing 1989: 162) 
suggests that online communication channels are more independent from existing 
institutions and power constellations than is the case. 
Studies of alternative media persuasively demonstrate how each media 
landmark – from the printing press to radio, television and html codes – comes 
with an undercurrent of practices that appropriate dominant systems of media 
production and consumption for alternative purposes (Bailey et al. 2007). Yet, it is 
important to remember that from an infrastructural perspective, alternative media 
today often depend on large-scale infrastructures like data centres that are in the 
hands of corporations and under governmental control (Kelty 2013). In this 
context it is also worth highlighting that scholars have pointed to the increasing 
conflation of alternative and mainstream media. ‘With the recent emergence of so-
called “new information and communication technologies” and online platforms, 
alternative uses of media technologies are not clearly divorced from their 
corporate originators’ (Rodriguez et al. 2014: 2). This is not to deny their political 
significance but to emphasise a non-idealistic approach to alternative media. 
In addition to actors’ use of alternative media, scholars have considered 
interactions with media environments as partially responsible for making 
networked forms of organisation a signature element of actors other than states 
(Sassen 2008). Here “network” does not act as an all-embracing metaphor but is 
understood as concrete ‘forms of organization characterized by voluntary, 
reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’ (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998: 8). The interrelation between mainstream, alternative media and 
horizontal forms of communication has been demonstrated notably in Jeffrey 
Juris’ ethnographic account of movements against corporate globalisation. 
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Networking Futures (Juris 2008) argues that through mainstream and alternative 
media as well as horizontal networks of communication non-state actors are able 
to influence people’s minds and foster social change. While this might read as an 
overestimation of the causality between media-related practices and political 
influence, Juris (2008) relativises this impression by stressing that actors are often 
limited to specific events and often do not define the rules under which they are 
being portrayed across mainstream coverage. The ongoing convergence of 
different media outlets, technologies and platforms is further elaborated by 
Cammaerts (2012), who persuasively links up various ways in which media and 
communication are relevant to political activists. Brought together under the 
conceptual framework ‘mediation opportunity structure’ he considers four 
interrelated factors as relevant: framing processes, self-representation, the use of 
digital media to mobilise for and organise direct actions, and media-related 
practices that constitute resistance in their own right (Cammaerts 2012: 118). As a 
consequence, Cammaerts remarks that media-related practices ‘are not merely 
relevant to the symbolic and discursive realms in which social movements 
operate, but that they are also instrumental and material to realizing their 
immediate goals’ (Cammaerts 2012: 117). In a similar vein scholars have condensed 
the far-reaching political relevance of technology by emphasising that not only the 
appropriation of individual tools but also access to telecommunications 
infrastructure like satellites and internet servers, as well as “logical” infrastructure 
such as codes and protocols, are prime points of political engagement (Hintz 2013; 
Milan 2013). In other words, scholars emphasise that over recent years media 
technologies and infrastructures have increasingly become sites of political 
struggle in their own right. 
One domain of scholarship that brings the above-mentioned factors together in 
revealing ways is writing on hacking. With the increasing relevance of practices 
related to media technologies and infrastructures for democratic constellations in 
general, and for political engagements in particular, scholarly and media interest in 
“hacker cultures” (Thomas 2002) has grown considerably in the past decade. As a 
regular reader and viewer of news media one has become accustomed to minor or 
major reports on “hackers”. Anonymous, WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden, to 
mention only a few contemporary examples that continue to travel around the 
globe’s newsfeeds. While governmental institutions and mainstream media tend 
to use “hacking” as a catch-all term to describe almost any computer-related crime 
(Nissenbaum 2004) these depictions are complemented and somewhat contrasted 
by recent theorisation and research that highlights the ever more substantial role 
hackers occupy for contemporary societal constellations. 
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Scholars have, for example, pointed to the explicitly political dimension of 
computing in the form of hacktivism (Jordan and Taylor 2004; Jordan 2013). Chris 
Kelty (2008) in his much-praised work Two Bits has widened the lens through 
which to look at hackers, or geeks as he calls them, by convincingly demonstrating 
that hackers argue with and about technology. That is to say, they do not only 
express ideas but also ‘express infrastructures through which ideas can be 
expressed (and circulated) in new ways’ (Kelty 2008: 29). Leah Lievrouw uses the 
term “alternative computing” instead of hacking to describe a range of activities 
that explicitly focus on ‘constructive political, social, and cultural purposes, rather 
than those that are primarily criminal, terroristic, or exploitative enterprises’ 
(Lievrouw 2011: 99). In her recent ethnographic investigation of free and open-
source software actors Gabriella Coleman (2012) describes hacking not only as a 
technical endeavour but also as an aesthetic and a moral project that converges 
powerfully with humour, cleverness, craft and politics. 
Computer hackers tend to be skilled programmers, security 
researchers, hardware builders, and system administrators, 
and they often self-identify as such. They are generally 
motivated by some version of information freedom and 
participate in ‘hacker’ events and institutions like the 
Computer Chaos Club, ShmooCon, and free software 
projects. (Coleman 2011: 512)  
Coleman’s approach is particularly helpful as she underline that hackers, coders, 
and geeks are behind a vibrant political culture and stresses the diversity and 
complexity of hacker cultures by remarking that ‘once we confront hacking in 
anthropological and historical terms, some similarities melt into a sea of 
differences’ (Coleman 2012: 18). This depiction underlines how hacker ethical 
principles, as described in Steven Levy’s (2010: 39–46) seminal work, often have a 
common core – a commitment to information freedom, a mistrust of authority, a 
heightened dedication to meritocracy and the firm belief that computing 
technology, in the right hands, can be the basis for beauty and a better world. John 
Postill (2014) has recently further promoted Kelty’s, and even more so Coleman’s 
approach that hackers constitute a relevant political culture. He refers to hackers 
and other social agents like tech lawyers and online journalists, ‘who combine 
technological skills with political acumen to pursue greater Internet and 
democratic freedoms, both globally and domestically’ (Postill 2014: 2), as freedom 
technologists. Postill explicitly points to hackers as actors who play a part in 
alternative political engagements by, amongst other means, contributing their 
skills and know-how to protest movements like the Indignados in Spain. 
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More recently, there has also been growing interest in hackers’ relation to 
alternative and mainstream media outlets. It has been shown, for example, that the 
alternative media network Indymedia has a long history of collaborating with 
hackers as well as coordinating hackerspaces to share technical expertise (see 
Giraud 2014). At the same time, the growing approximation of hackers and 
mainstream media has been witnessed in WikiLeaks’ partnership with the New 
York Times, the Guardian and Spiegel, amongst others, to bring government 
secrets into the public domain (Brevini et al. 2013). Even more recently, the 
shifting relationship between hackers and media organisations has gained mass 
attention though the case of Snowden’s collaboration with the journalist Glenn 
Greenwald, who edited and published the disclosures for the Guardian. Taken 
together, recent theorisation and research highlights the ever more substantial role 
hackers play in for contemporary political constellations. Overall, it can be said 
that recent investigations of hacker cultures bring forward a multi-layered and 
revealing characterisation of hackers by looking closely at who they are, what they 
do and why they do it instead of preserving stereotypes or proclaiming 
generalisations. It is this latter conceptual positioning of hackers, hacking and 
hacktivism that my research is drawing on and aims to enlarge. 
Zooming back out from the concrete example of hacking to the more general 
question of research into the interrelation between political activism and 
contemporary digital technologies, the above section confirms the value of a 
research approach that takes into account the interrelation of diverse platforms, 
tools and media objects. Directly linked to the value of applying the notion of 
media environment as an analytical perspective, the above section also underlines 
the value of practice-oriented research as it reveals that, to understand the role 
media play for democratic constellations one has to look at what people actually 
do with media. At the same time, the above paragraphs also point to existing gaps 
in contemporary research and existing focal points that, as a consequence, leave 
other factors somewhat under-researched. 
 
3.2 From visibility to legitimation 
As has been shown so far, scholars have convincingly drawn attention to the 
increasing prominence of media-related practices for non-state actors as they 
attempt to give their political endeavours life. Overall studies investigating the 
investigating the interrelation of political engagement and media practices tend to 
have a one-medium bias: they focus on mainstream media (Andrews and Caren 
2010; Koopmans 2004); or radical or alternative media (Downing 2000; Atton 
2004); or particular technological tools like mailing lists (Kavada 2010); or focus 
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on singular platforms (Thorson et al. 2013; Obar et al. 2012). While research that 
explores the role of media environments has only recently gained attention 
(Mattoni 2012; Cammaerts 2012; Costanza-Chock 2014/forthcoming), it can be 
said that the interrelation between digital technologies and social movements’ 
emerging forms of political activism has been investigated in conclusive and 
insightful ways (Donk et al. 2004; Juris 2008; Cammaerts et al. 2013). Yet, the 
focus of a large number of recent studies has been the role digital media play for 
movements in coordinating collective action, mobilising large-scale protest and 
distributing their claims amongst a global audience. That is to say, recent writings 
interested in the political dimension of media practices for the most part focus on 
“contentious” and “movement-driven” activism. 
On the one hand this points to a lack of research that takes into account both 
“outsider tactics”, which operate largely beyond institutional processes and 
“insider tactics”, which relate to institutional politics and governmental processes 
of decision-making (Andrews and Edwards 2004). This is even more surprising as 
scholars have explicitly pointed out that political collectives often practise both 
and strategically combine indirect and direct strategies (Amenta et al. 2010). On 
the other hand there is a lack of research on more concrete entities like civil society 
organisations and other associations that are not sponsored by corporations and 
powerful interest groups (Fenton and Barassi 2011). This is also true for the 
analysis of hacker cultures, where excellent research has been done on the free 
software movement (Kelty 2008) and dispersed collectives like Anonymous 
(Coleman 2013) but no substantial research on more organisation-based hacker 
groups. 
As has been highlighted throughout the above sections, such research is of great 
importance as it illustrates the ways in which media-related practices become 
relevant for actors’ political projects. At the same time, it leaves under-researched 
factors that appear to be of great importance to further understandings the 
diversification in agencies, repertoires and targets of political activism by concrete 
actors within specific democratic constellations (Norris 2002; Marres 2005). More 
research is needed to grasp the role media-related practices play for the emergence 
of positive political actions that become meaningful and sustained (Couldry 2012: 
114). Positive political action in this case includes both emerging and existing sites, 
forms and actors that co-determine democratic constellations. Focusing 
exclusively on ‘new forms of political investment’ (Rosanvallon 2011: 7) is 
dangerous because it oversimplifies contemporary engagement practices. The 
same is true for the reverse approach. With good reason, scholars have argued that, 
‘Democracy needs both a functioning party system and a viable domain of extra-
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parliamentary politics; at present both are in transition’ (Dahlgren 2013: 12). 
Representative forms of government have not disappeared and institutional 
politics continue to be of high significance when it comes to day-to-day claim-
making interactions among actors belonging to different social and political 
spheres (Alonso et al. 2011). In other words, the complex relationships between 
political institutions and emerging engagement practices continue to be a central 
dynamic of democracy (Melucci 1985: 814). Current approaches suggest a certain 
deficit as they tend to be inattentive or tend to avoid the ways in which media 
practices connect with basic political considerations. A promising way to bring 
this research agenda to life is to look at concrete entities, to include both insider 
and outsider tactics in the analysis and to investigate the relationship between 
actors’ media practices and particular political fundamentals. 
Ever since Weber’s (1978) initial writings on legitimacy, social theorists have 
underlined the central importance of legitimacy in societal constellations. 
Following Rosanvallon’s (2011, 2008) extensive reflections on contemporary 
political figurations, democratic constellations cannot be understood without 
reference to the relocation and multiplication of legitimacy. According to Mark 
Suchman, legitimacy is virtually the basis of politics as it addresses the forces ‘that 
constrain, construct, and empower organizational actors’ (Suchman 1995: 571). In 
the expanding literature on legitimacy Suchman’s definition has been generally 
accepted as the most suitable: ‘Legitimacy is a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ 
(Suchman 1995: 574). Overall, legitimacy, to a large degree, rests on being socially 
‘comprehensible’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ (Suchman 1995). Echoing the notion of 
taken-for-grantedness, Berger and Luckmann (1967: 94–5) consider legitimation a 
process whereby comprehensibility deepens and crystallises. Skill, effort and 
practice are considered necessary elements in the process by which an actor 
becomes taken-for-granted (Bourdieu 2000). Accordingly, legitimacy is not 
simply out there for the asking, but has to be created as well as exploited by actors 
that seek to gain legitimation. 
While theoretical accounts differ in their focus on the subjects, sources and 
consequences of legitimacy, perspectives converge in seeing legitimation as a 
process rather than a binary state where an organisation is either legitimate or not. 
It is understood that no political actor is (il)legitimate for 100 per cent of the time 
or across all locations. Legitimacy is never definitively acquired and remains open 
to challenge and dependent on social perceptions (Rosanvallon 2011: 7). 
Accordingly, ‘(de-)legitimation is the process by which the legitimacy of a subject 
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changes over time’ (Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 57). Having legitimacy with 
one set of institutions or constituents may well mean having less among others. 
Instead of constructing normative measures of legitimacy it therefore appears to 
be more constructive to advance a process- and actor-oriented notion of 
legitimation, as is the case in studies on organisational legitimacy. Taking into 
account that legitimation is a process that ultimately depends on the actors that 
gain as well as the actors that attribute legitimacy it is advisable to narrow the 
range of analysis. Accordingly, instead of grasping the entire legitimation 
landscape of a given organisation my research focuses on the role media-related 
practices play in relation to more or less institutionalised entities. In other words, 
to achieve an empirically convincing data set I largely narrow my focus on 
legitimation dynamics between civil society organisations, media environments 
and institutionalised politics. 
Taking into consideration strategic and institutional traditions (Suchman 1995; 
Scott 2014), organisational legitimacy is best understood as being constituted by 
three interrelated aspects. First, legitimacy is the outcome of the process of 
legitimation enacted by the acting organisation and at the same time, grounded in 
the larger environment in which the organisation is embedded (Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975). Second, legitimacy is socially constructed, achieved and maintained 
through social dialogue (Phillips et al. 2004). Third, legitimacy is a contested 
process that unfolds across time (Johnson et al. 2006). 
Echoing this relational approach to legitimacy, Pierre Bourdieu understood 
political action as a struggle over both the legitimate boundaries of recognised 
players and those of legitimate positions. 
Political struggle is a (practical and theoretical) cognitive 
struggle for the power to impose the legitimate vision of 
the social world, or, more precisely, for the recognition, 
accumulated in the form of a symbolic capital of notoriety 
and respectability, which gives authority to impose the 
legitimate knowledge of the sense of the social world, its 
present meaning and the direction in which it is going and 
should go. (Bourdieu 2000: 185) 
Legitimacy, long been recognised as a core element in political and governance 
regimes, often deals with the relationship between societal acceptance of regimes 
and institutions and their ability to exercise power and authority (Deephouse and 
Suchman 2008). The legitimation of democratic leadership is based on a written 
constitution, institutional frameworks and people’s votes. At the same time, 
legitimacy is not exclusively subject to the rhythms and defaults of institutional 
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politics, but also relates back to the notion that ‘there is more than one way to act 
or speak “on behalf of society”’ (Rosanvallon 2011: 8). Civil society organisations, 
for example, lack a clearly definable constituency and are not subject to direct 
constraints resulting from public accountability. Accordingly, they have to 
construct legitimacy in different ways. For that reason CSO tend to consider 
themselves “representative thinkers” (Arendt 1958) or, even more importantly, as 
“representative actors”, justifying their engagement in terms of being an 
associations that acts on a particular set of issues in the interests of the general 
public. 
Relevant here are Christine Oliver’s (1991) notions of cooptation and influence 
as two strategies of manoeuvring central to formation of organisational 
legitimation. Cooptation is the ‘strategic use of institutional ties to demonstrate 
the organization’s worthiness and acceptability to other external constituents 
from whom it hopes to obtain resources and approval’ (Oliver 1991: 158). Research 
into organisations that are highly involved in collaborations with other 
organisations in their field shows that these have typically been accepted as 
legitimate actors by institutional political processes (Clemens 1993). Influence is 
intended to change ‘institutionalized values and beliefs’ or to shape public 
perceptions of ‘definitions and criteria of acceptable practices or performance’ 
(Oliver 1991: 158). Although Oliver tends to see influence and cooptation as 
conceptually different, they are not necessarily separate processes. Cooptation of 
external stakeholders and exercising influence by affecting broad public 
perceptions, for example, often go hand in hand (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1222). 
Thus it is important to note that for civil society organisations legitimation does 
not guarantee “success”, but rather legitimacy matters because organisations rely 
on acceptability and credibility in their social environment to effect (unintentional 
or intentional) political change (Walker and McCarthy 2010). 
When we take into account the fact that civil society organisations cannot draw 
on electoral constituencies for legitimation, not only do their concrete actions 
come into focus but we also see how they frame and communicate their actions is 
particularly important. Considering the importance of communicative action for 
civil society organisations, scholars have underlined that ‘somewhere between 
specific legitimacy-granting authorities and society-at-large as a source of 
legitimacy stand the media’ (Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 55). One of the first 
writings to underline the legitimising power of mainstream media was Paul 
Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton’s (2004[1948]) seminal, yet conceptually largely 
underdeveloped middle-range concept of “status conferral”. Lazarsfeld and 
Merton argued that the media – newspaper, radio and film in their day – have the 
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ability to ‘confer status on public issues, persons, organizations, and social 
movements’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]: 235). As the authors put it, ‘This 
status-conferral function thus enters into organized social action by legitimizing 
selected policies, persons, and groups which receive the support of mass media’ 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]: 236). The media environment has changed 
drastically since the publication of their article in the immediate post-war period. 
Nonetheless, more recent writings on media as a source of legitimacy are 
implicitly or explicitly grounded in Lazarsfeld and Merton’s writing. 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) suggested that the media are an institutionally rich 
indicator of society-wide legitimacy. Thompson (1995) in his work on the growing 
impact of media in modern societies, argues that legitimacy can be partially 
secured through the media. Similarly, Michael Schudson acknowledges that news 
media has the ability to amplify particular perspectives and to confer ‘public 
legitimacy’ (Schudson 1996: 19) on individuals and institutions. Susan Herbst 
refers to media-derived authority as ‘the legitimation one garners through 
communication channels and media texts’ (Herbst 2003: 489). While Herbst 
appears to widen the field of analysis beyond mainstream media she reduces the 
complex linkages between legitimation and media environments to the ‘amount 
of coverage one receives and to some extent, the style of the coverage’ (Herbst 
2003: 489). Following this trend, measuring legitimacy by counting quantity of 
media coverage that organisations receive has become a popular strategy. In the 
same vein the prestige media are considered indicators of society-wide legitimacy 
(see Deephouse and Suchman 2008). In a more nuanced approach Ruud 
Koopmans (2004) considers media legitimacy as the degree to which reactions by 
relevant actors to mass coverage are supportive. In this context it is also argued 
that organisations that use insider tactics and regularly interact with institutional 
politics receive more media attention and, as a consequence, greater legitimacy 
(Andrews and Caren 2010: 846). In contrast, so the argument goes, organisations 
that use outsider tactics receive less media attention and generate minimal 
legitimacy (Andrews and Caren 2010: 846). Correspondingly, scholars suggest that 
if organisations attract favourable media coverage or are requested as news sources, 
journalists view them as legitimate actors (see Yoon 2005). This, again, goes back 
to the classical assessment that recognition by mainstream media shows, ‘that one 
is important enough to have been singled out from the large anonymous masses, 
that one’s behavior and opinions are significant enough to require public notice’ 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]: 233). Scholars have also discussed the reliance 
of institutional political actors on media outlets to establish and secure legitimacy 
(Rosanvallon 2011). In addition, works rooted in resource mobilisation theories 
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and new social movement theories evoke aspects of legitimacy, but never 
systematically address the role media practices and media environments play for 
legitimation (Downing 2008; Van de Donk et al. 2004; Lievrouw, 2011). 
Taken together the above accounts convincingly underline how mainstream 
media play a dual role in legitimacy research, ‘serving both as an indicator of 
legitimation by society-at-large and as a source of legitimacy in their own stead’ 
(Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 56). Yet, considering the writings and research 
discussed in the previous chapter and in the earlier sections in this chapter, it 
becomes evident hat several key factors are missing. First, researchers focus their 
attention on those media elements that are open to public scrutiny, like media 
coverage. Second, scholars base their arguments on an outdated communication 
models. Third, scholars construct a far too rigid causal chain between media 
attention and legitimacy. Following the rather narrow angle of previous studies, 
there is considerable need for political and media sociology to complement 
existing research to deepen understandings of emerging actors’ struggle for 
legitimation. First, considering the distinction between coverage by and access to 
mainstream media, further investigation of different forms of interaction between 
media outlets and non-state actors seems warranted. Second, as shown in the 
previous chapter, an exclusive focus on mass or mainstream media outlets is no 
longer sufficient to gain in-depth understandings of the issues at stake. 
Accordingly, we need to investigate the interrelations between actors’ practices 
related to contemporary media environments and legitimation. Third, 
investigating the interrelation between media practices and legitimation also calls 
for analysing the role these practices play in the formation and organisation of 
particular groups. 
To further explicate the contribution my research intends to make in this 
context, it is helpful to concretise the aim of this thesis. The objective of my thesis 
is not to redevelop or renew a concept that is ‘an anchor point of a vastly expanded 
theoretical apparatus’ (Suchman 1995: 571) and that acts as one of the principal 
concepts in political science. This would simply be too much to ask of any single 
piece of research. Instead, I seek to add certain elements to the overall picture by 
bringing legitimacy into closer contact with actors’ media-related practices. The 
argument is that one has to take into account a wide range of practices, ranging 
from interactions with media environments to less visible, latent channels of 
communication that might be constitutive for a group’s organisational nature. 
Investigating the relationship between legitimacy and media practices is to analyse 
how a variety of social actors exercise their agency within complex media 
environments (Couldry 2012). Analysing the correlation between legitimacy and 
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civil society organisations from this point of view also means to sidestep a 
normative conception of legitimacy. In practice this means that instead of 
investigating existing authorities’ points of view – for the large part media 
organisations, corporations and institutional politics – my research looks at 
organisational legitimacy by focusing on emerging actors’ media-related practices. 
To put it precisely, I am interested in the role media-related practices play in the 
legitimation of organised collective actors. 
While the above discussion has developed some inaugurating reasoning for the 
importance of investigating legitimation, it is fruitful to further emphasise this 
line of thought by bringing the concept of legitimacy into dialogue with the 
notion of long-term involvement. 
 
3.3 A long-term perspective 
Writings from a more institutional perspective have shown that organisations 
that are associated with established institutions and have legitimacy before 
government agencies also have enhanced rates of survival (Scott 2014). The notion 
that organisations are in need of legitimacy for long-term survival is underlined by 
research highlighting how increased legitimacy protects organisations from 
instability as they tend to be rewarded with resources (Walker and McCarthy 
2010). At the same time, insider tactics are considered valuable as they allow 
organisations to build long-term relationships with institutional actors and help 
to increase organisational legitimacy (Clemens 1993). Scholars also emphasise that 
the establishment of legitimacy itself only unfolds across time (Johnson et al. 
2006: 59). Theorists such as Weber and, following him, Alfred Schutz (1967), 
identified time as an underlying dimension of meaningful social action. As societal 
change most of the time stems from persistent – not revolutionary – political 
engagement and processes (Lefebvre 1991; Sassen 2008), scholars have 
convincingly argued that duration is a critical component of political action 
because influencing rationalities and constructing new social and political 
imaginaries are long-term goals. 
As Tilly and Wood’s historical account highlights, for example, the means of 
political collectivity only come to life, if they ever do, ‘over the long run and after 
repeated efforts’ ( Tilly and Wood 2003: 148). According to the authors, forming 
special-interest associations, demonstrating, lobbying, making statements for 
public consumption, and related means of coordinated action provide ‘an 
opportunity to offer a sustained challenge to powerful figures and institutions’ 
(Tilly and Wood 2003: 148). The emphasis on temporality not only hooks into the 
notion of legitimacy but also echoes the earlier emphasis on democracy as an 
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ongoing project with a long and uneven history driven by actors with varying 
interests and commitments. The major challenge for non-state actors, then, is not 
a solitary act of disobedience or mobilising people for a single protest, but 
sustaining ongoing engagement (Juris 2008). The question is less about whether 
people will show up once for a large-scale event than whether participants can 
sustain involvement over time with sufficient intensity to continue leverage over 
political processes (Amenta et al. 2010). In other words, scholars convincingly 
reason that political engagement requires sustained engagement (Andrews and 
Edwards 2004: 498). Others have phrased the need for continuity in more ornate 
terms by stating that, ‘if something is constructed, then it means it is fragile and 
thus in great need of care and caution’ (Latour 2004: 246). Following Alberto 
Melucci’s classical writing on collective action, it is in this context that organised 
forms of engagement matter particularly, as ‘organizations are not meant simply to 
be short-lived sites for self-development’ (Melucci 1996: 34). 
In a rather prosaic manner one could say that with the pervasiveness of media 
technologies and infrastructures, activism has become more flexible, giving 
individual and collective actors a range of options between long-time engagement 
and momentary press-the-button commitments (Karpf 2012). Yet, scholars have 
warned that this may lead to more fleeting and momentary commitments and 
actions, resulting in short-term actions and rapidly shifting issues (Curran et al. 
2012). Prominent examples of the latter are video campaigns by humanitarian 
organisations that reach millions of viewers within weeks and disappear from the 
screens soon afterwards without having much of a noticeable outcome. Taking 
into account the earlier finding that recent writings put an emphasis on 
contentious and movement-based activism, one can add that recent studies tend 
to emphasise spectacular, event-oriented, highly visible aspects of collective 
action that tend to evaporate soon after they are enacted. 
At the same time scholars who stress the need to investigate long-term 
dynamics have become more persistent over the past years. Amenta and his 
colleagues (2010), for example, stress that analyses focusing only upon events 
surrounding mobilisation miss out on significant elements that sustain collective 
development over time. Even authors who stress the redundancy of organisational 
forms consider the capacity for sustainability imperative for political activism as 
research has shown that crowd-enabled networks like the Occupy movement 
might be able to respond quickly to new opportunities but their messages become 
diluted over time (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Organisationally enabled 
activism, in contrast, encourages less personalisation, reduces diversity of 
expression and sustains a more focused message (Bimber et al. 2012). Time is also a 
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key issue in Geert Lovink and Ned Rossiter’s (2011) emphasis on the need for 
networked actors to depart from the short-termism of political interventions. 
The sustainability issue is a highly political one. Once a 
network becomes sustainable it addresses the problem of 
time, which tends not to be the default of networks. […] The 
annoying network is the one that lasts the test of time and 
refuses to disappear. (Lovink and Rossiter 2011: 281) 
The authors expand on this approach by emphasising that agency does not lie in 
the spectacle of the happening, but rather subsists within the connections and 
practices that occur before and after the event (Lovink and Rossiter 2011: 287). In a 
similar tone, scholars have pointed to the ‘need for sustainable organization, even 
if decentralized and network-based, which can survive the ebbs and flows of mass 
mobilization’ (Juris 2008: 159). Through comparative accounts of mass 
mobilisations in Prague and Barcelona and subsequent media analyses, Juris 
(2008) found that protests are important networking tools, but they are difficult 
to reproduce over time. 
In the context of the World Social Forum, Dieter Rucht (2012) has pointed to 
gatherings – contentious or not – and relatively durable infrastructures – 
composed of participating organisations, coordinating committees, media groups, 
newsletters and the like – as vital for sustaining political engagement. In particular, 
communication-based infrastructures are designed for the mundane task of 
keeping things going as they allow for sustained flows of interaction within and 
between collectives and networks (Rucht 2012). Juris (2012), in his more recent 
participatory observation of the Occupy movements in New York and Boston, 
points in a similar direction. 
[N]etworking logics have become more salient since the 
evictions of the largest camps around the United States 
from mid-November to early December 2011. This shift 
toward less publicly visible forms of organizing and 
networking outside centralized physical spaces may help to 
ensure the staying power of #Occupy – a significant 
challenge given the vulnerability of the #Occupy 
movements to disaggregation in the absence of longer-term 
network structures. (Juris 2012: 261) 
Similar to Rucht’s approach, Juris considers combining media-related practices 
and shared presence as a fruitful strategy for political actors whishing to reproduce 
themselves over time. More concretely, he considers flexible integration of 
networking and aggregation logics as key to achieve lasting change (Juris 2012: 
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269). This aspect is also convincingly emphasised in ethnographic and qualitative 
research providing evidence that mediated communication amongst actors 
supports network formations but cannot compensate for personal face-to-face 
contact and interaction (Kavada 2010; McCurdy 2012; Kannengießer 2014). Along 
the same lines, scholarship recognises that the internet and its manifold segments 
are only one part of political actors’ communication ecology that enhance, rather 
than replace, face-to-face organising (Costanza-Chock 2014/forthcoming). 
Corresponding with the notion that actors are in continuous need to 
communicate and coordinate collectively Ulf Hannerz has stated that, ‘To keep 
culture going, people as actors and networks of actors have to invent culture, 
reflect on it, experiment with it, remember (or store it in some other way), debate 
it and pass it on’ (Hannerz 1997: 5). In a related context Hannerz stresses the 
relevance of media to this process as they enable people to ‘preserve ever more 
kinds of ideas and cultural forms, in great detail’ (Hannerz 1996: 24). The political 
importance of expanding archiving and storing practices is also underlined by 
Cammaerts (2012), who points out that the permanent nature of artefacts enables 
symbols and discourses embedded in them to be culturally transmitted on a long-
term basis. 
In her critical history of “social media” José van Dijck (2013) has underlined 
how the contemporary dominance of commercially run platforms forces all 
societal actors – including media organisations, state institutions and civil society 
organisations – to reconsider and recalibrate their position in public space. 
Consequently, van Dijck (2013) raises the critical question of whether sustaining 
public and nonprofit space is possible in a culture of connectivity dominated by 
data corporations. Other scholars have similar concerns about the potential of 
contemporary media technologies and infrastructures to aggregate apparently 
limitless numbers of individual voices to temporarily “have their say”, and 
question the potential for sustainable social change (Kavada 2014). Contemporary 
media environments might have exponentially increased opportunities for 
mobilisation and connection but, as Couldry cautions, ‘it is much more difficult to 
know whether they do so in any long-term and effective way’ (Couldry 2014: 125). 
It is important to note that scrutinising the relationship between media practices 
and sustaining long-term political involvement does not categorically deny the 
relevance of event-based engagements. ‘Change requires both processes of 
interruption and continuity in order to advance newer modes of doing’ 
(Papacharissi and Easton 2013: 171). Put in more explicitly political terms, scholars 
point out that collective actors are situated in ‘the tension between flexibility, 
mobility and speed on the one hand, and the continuity of an engagement that is 
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always vulnerable to becoming hazy if it is not continuously stimulated by events 
that can make it actual’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 353). Consequently, when 
investigating the relationship between media practices and engagement practices 
one has to take into account different temporalities, which range from single 
events to long-term involvement. 
Digging deeper into the literature that persuasively investigates the 
interrelations between emerging actors’ media practices and their ability to bring 
about political change, one realises that this balancing act is intimately related to 
the overall coherence of a given organisation. Establishing and sustaining a 
cohesive identity appears to be central for organisations if they are to draw people 
to their events, interact with mainstream media and establish legitimation (Soule 
2013). The political action of representation, to paraphrase Bourdieu (2000: 185), 
relies on the ability of a group to make it appear as if it speaks with a single voice. 
In this regard scholars emphasise that the ongoing multiplying of mediating 
arenas can be both an opportunity and a challenge for political organisations. On 
the one hand digital media can be used to construct collective discourse and to 
achieve internal consensus (Della Porta and Rucht 2013). Particular 
communication tools can also be used to conceal power asymmetries within a 
movement and therefore aid in ‘maintaining a collective identity based on 
openness and participation, even when those values are not always upheld in its 
practice’ (Kavada 2010: 370). On the other hand, when too many individual voices 
represent an organisation online keeping its public profile coherent can be 
challenging (Obar et al. 2012). In their study of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign 
organisation, Fenton and Barassi (2011) highlight the frustration the organisation 
experienced with the multiplication of representative voices through its digital 
platforms. 
The notion that communicating in coherent ways is vital for sustaining 
engagement practices over time also acknowledges the earlier mentioned 
relevance of organisation. As Karpf puts it, ‘Lowered transaction costs have made 
individual political actions far easier. Yet sustained collective action continues to 
require organization’ (Karpf 2012: 8). Interestingly, one can bring actors’ 
contemporary struggles for coherent representation into contact with an 
argument that John Padgett and Christopher Ansell make in relation to the rise of 
the Medicis in the fifteenth century. “Robust action”, they argue, needs to be 
grounded in ‘multivocality’ (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1263). Translated into 
contemporary scenarios, this means that organisations need to communicate in 
ways that ‘single actions can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives 
simultaneously’ (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1263). In a world saturated with 
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mediated communication this can be a challenging task for actors aiming to bring 
about political change. 
 
3.4 Broad considerations and three research questions 
To conclude the two chapters above I now want to explicate the theoretical 
framework that I have established and that informs my thesis. My research is set 
within a processual understanding of democracy (Dahl 1989; Dahlgren 2003; 
Lechner 2003[1990]; Calhoun 2007). The focus of my research is on emerging 
engagement practices as engagement – in contrast to participation – appears to be a 
fruitful conception when looking at the links between organisational actors and 
politics. Instead of looking at citizens at large or single individuals I bring forward 
an organisational perspective. More concretely, I am not looking at organisational 
actors from a behavioural perspective but from an actor point-of-view.  
Accordingly, I do not propose a deterministic approach, but, at the same time, it 
would be misguided to frame my research as non-media centric. While I move 
beyond the technologies themselves my main interest is in understanding how 
civil society organisations make use of particular media technologies and 
infrastructures. Within this frame I focus my attention to media-related practices 
taking place within contemporary media environment (Couldry 2004, 2012; 
Mattoni 2012) – including a wide range of devices, tools and platforms that actors 
use as well as interactions with mainstream media. Bringing media practices and 
media environment in correlation with each other adapting a one-medium bias 
and allows enables me to apply a wide-angle lens that takes into account the 
blurred boundaries between media-related practices, mediation and 
mediatisation. By doing so I aim to go beyond sceptical or overly optimistic 
assumptions and integrate my thesis within a tradition of scholars that vitalise a 
middle-ground perspective (Mansell 2010; Cammaerts 2012). In other words, my 
research does not aim to answer questions whether current developments are 
“good” or “bad” or to construct a causal chain between media practices and 
democratic constellations but investigates more generally the formative and 
moulding forces of practices related to contemporary media environments. This 
approach is operationalised by looking closely at the role media-related practices 
play in relation to legitimacy and longer-term engagement. Looking at the 
correlations between media, legitimation and longer-term engagement is a 
promising field of inquiry also because it has not been in the focus of much 
research yet. Even works rooted in resource mobilisation theories and new social 
movement studies evoke aspects of legitimacy, but don’t systematically address 
the role media practices and media environments play for legitimation and longer-
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term engagement (Van de Donk et al. 2004; Lievrouw, 2011; Cammaerts et al. 
2013). Consequently, my thesis aims to increase scholarly knowledge on the 
correlation of organisational actors’ use of media, legitimation and longer-term 
engagement within contemporary democratic constellations. 
The interrelation between media-related practices, legitimacy and sustaining 
engagement over time is evidently a complex relational framework. On a very 
basic level it is understood that a media-saturated environment provides ample 
opportunities for actors to exert agency and to challenge both democratic deficits 
and political constraints. At the same time, actors also have to take into account 
structural limitations inherent to media practices. All the same, it remains largely 
unclear as to what role actors’ media-related practices play for their legitimation 
and long-term engagement. In exploring and discussing relevant literature from 
the fields of media and communications, political science and sociology, 
democracy theory and social movement studies my aim has been in part analytical 
and in part critical, but above all constructive. Over recent years there have been 
constitutive studies on the relation between media environments and political 
activism. More concretely, scholars have investigated the role actors’ media-
related practices play for their ability to mobilise and coordinate collective action. 
As shown, the focus of these studies has been largely on movement-based 
activism and contentious activism. At the same time, important political 
fundaments like legitimacy and long-term engagement have been largely left aside 
so far. 
In a somewhat oversimplified manner it can be said that there are studies on 
media and political activism, but they do not focus on legitimacy and sustaining 
engagement over time. Similarly, there are intriguing writings on the importance 
of legitimacy for actors’ ability to co-determine political constellations. 
Nevertheless, scholars covering this important issue seldom address the role 
media-related practices play for the formation and securing of legitimacy. In the 
rare case where they do so, the approach is limited to the mainstream media and 
outdated modes of communicative practices. Scholars have also emphasised the 
relevance of longer-term engagement to bring about political change, but studies 
on the actual role of media-related practices to sustain actors’ engagement over 
time are rare. Accordingly, despite their useful qualities, the empirical and 
theoretical accounts discussed throughout the above sections leave a number of 
important questions unresolved. Bringing these gaps in current research together, 
there is good reason to embark on this academic journey. More concretely, there is 
good reason to look at the role civil society organisations’ media-related practices 
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play in their ability to establish legitimacy and for sustaining engagement over 
time. 
Doing just this, my thesis started with the overall question of how it is possible 
to change the agents, themes and modes of engagement and what resources do 
actors need to do that? I narrowed this overly broad consideration down by asking 
for the role of media practices in this process. Splitting the question into a number 
of questions then further narrowed my inquiry. Afterwards I brought this set of 
small questions together and formulated the following three interrelated research 
questions: 
1 .  In what ways do contemporary media technologies and infrastructures matter 
in the reconfiguration of democratic constellations? 
2.  How do media-related practices connect to organisational actors’ ability to 
establish legitimacy? 
3.  What is the role of organisational actors’ media-related practices in sustaining 
engagement over time? 
The critical review of relevant literature and the three research questions guided 
the analysis conducted throughout the research project and the methods selected 
for investigation. The latter will now be introduced in the following chapter. 
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c h a p t e r  f o u r  
Methodology  
Contextuality as a Method 
The preceding chapters have explained the importance of the questions that are 
the central concern of this thesis. The following sections will demonstrate how 
this research endeavour was put into practice. The chapter discusses the strengths 
(and limitations) of qualitative research in light of the focus and intentions of this 
thesis. More concretely, this chapter is structured according to the methods that 
provide my data set: face-to-face interviews, participant observation and media 
analysis. The first section discusses the value of case study research for fulfilling 
the aim of my thesis. The second section is dedicated to the three methods that 
provided my data set. The two case studies were undertaken through 
ethnographic participant observation and face-to-face interviews. These main 
methods of data collection were complemented by data from media sources, 
specialist publications and the organisations’ own communication outputs. The 
final section introduces the two cases and explains why these were suitable for 
finding answers to my research questions. This last section will also explain how 
each method was adapted to the specific case. 
 
4.1 Case study research 
David Silverman (2013) recommends the following steps for a fruitful research 
design: formulate the overall question; select the cases through which to study the 
question; formulate specific research questions; select the appropriate methods; 
collect the data; evaluate and reformulate the specific research questions; analyse 
the data; evaluate the data; formulate and discuss the findings. My research started 
with a very broad question: How it is possible to change the agents, themes and 
modes of engagement and what resources do actors need to do that? To find 
answers to this question I did some preliminary research and selected two cases 
that appeared to be most appropriate. To investigate these two cases I decided to 
employ qualitative research methods, for reasons that will be given below. To 
make my broad question more workable (in theory and in practice) I further 
narrowed my field of interest after selecting the two cases. The central endeavour 
was now to look at how practices related to media technologies and infrastructures 
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might illuminate fundamental aspects of democratic constellations by 
investigating the role these practices play in shaping emerging forms of political 
agency and themes; which led me to formulate the earlier-stated set of research 
questions. 
I was not expecting to find universal answers to these questions, rather answers 
that were very much tied to place, history and my own position as a researcher 
integrated within social fields (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Research, like all 
social practices and endeavours, is driven by one’s place and concerns in the world. 
‘The great force of history’, James Baldwin wrote, ‘comes from the fact that we 
carry it within us and are unconsciously controlled by it in many ways’ (Baldwin 
1965: 47). The constant presence of history is as true for the role of the researcher 
as it is for the very formation and characteristics of media that consists of ‘very 
particular sites for very particular, importantly social as well as historically and 
culturally specific experiences of meaning’ (Gitelman 2008: 8). Accordingly, my 
thesis does not seek to construct conceptual categories that brush over the 
enormous plurality of experiences, but rather aims to further understanding of the 
role media-related practices play in specific social and political contexts. ‘The fact 
that digital media culturally matters is undeniable but’, as Coleman has put it, 
‘showing how, where, and why it matters is necessary to push against narrow 
presumptions about the universality of digital experience’ (Coleman 2010: 489). 
More concretely, the aim of capturing the nuances of different forms of 
experience around the use of media technologies and infrastructures is realised by 
describing, analysing and interpreting. That is, by giving an account close to the 
original data, systematically producing an account of key factors and relationships, 
and giving sense to the data by interpretatively producing insights (Wolcott 1994). 
As an overarching research strategy, a constructivist grounded theory approach 
was adopted, which encourages a researcher’s persistent interaction with their 
data and leads the researcher from studying concrete realities to rendering a 
conceptual understanding of them (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 2002). 
Glaser and Strauss’s seminal The Discovery of Grounded Theory was the first to 
elaborate the process of generating theory arising from the data. To develop 
‘theory as it emerges’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 45), grounded theory consists of 
simultaneous data collection and analysis, with each task informing and focusing 
the other throughout the research process. Researchers are encouraged to 
continuously interact with their data while remaining constantly involved with 
their emerging analyses. 
This approach to research is commonly referred to as induction – a type of 
reasoning that begins with the study of a range of individual cases and extrapolates 
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from them to form a conceptual category (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In the context 
of grounded theory, it implies moving up from the detailed descriptive level to the 
conceptual level – from the particular to the more general. In brief, theorising in 
grounded theory means developing (abstract) concepts and specifying the 
relations between them (Charmaz 2002). More specifically, as Kathy Charmaz has 
noted, one can distinguish between an objectivist approach to grounded theory 
that ‘assumes an external reality awaiting discovery and an unbiased observer who 
records facts about it’ (Charmaz 2002: 677) and a constructivist approach. It is the 
latter that is practised in this research. 
Constructivists study how participants construct meanings 
and actions, and they do so from as close to the inside of the 
experience as they can get. Constructivists also view data 
analysis as a construction that not only locates the data in 
time, place, culture, and context, but also reflects the 
researcher’s thinking. (Charmaz 2002: 677) 
Reflecting the need for contextuality in empirical research, I employ qualitative 
research practices, which, ideally, are flexible, iterative, naturalistic and result in 
thick descriptions that are reflexive about the ways in which research data is 
constructed (Geertz 1975). Qualitative research, generally speaking, ‘is oriented 
towards analyzing concrete cases in their temporal and local particularity and 
starting from people’s experience and activities in their local contexts’ (Flick 2009: 
21). Put differently, qualitative methodologies offer a multi-layered view of the 
nuances of social reality without privileging the interests of those who occupy 
positions of authority and power within a given society (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 
2011). Consequently, doing qualitative research means to ‘study things in their 
natural setting, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 3). Despite the 
possible value of quantitative data, it has been emphasised that interaction with 
political activists calls for qualitative research that attempts to understand the 
world from the subject’s point of view (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). One 
expansive field within the qualitative paradigm is case study research. 
The basic idea of case study research is that one case or a small number of cases 
are studied in detail, with the general objective of developing as full an 
understanding of the case under investigation as possible. Overall, case studies are 
the preferred strategy when ‘the investigator has little control over events and 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’ 
(Yin 2009: 1). A case study is expected to catch the multifacetedness of a single case 
– understanding its activities in various ‘locations’ and ‘circumstances’ clearly is an 
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essential part of this complexity (Stake 1995: xi). While case study analysis is a 
research approach that has been fed by many different theoretical tributaries, what 
is shared by all approaches is the emphasis on in-depth explorations of the 
complexity and uniqueness of a particular case in a “real life” context (Ragin and 
Becker 1992). A case study is an analysis of the particular, the concrete and the 
singular, and, to a large degree, resembles the ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1975) and 
portrayal of particular or even unique circumstances, practices and people. As they 
can explain how, why and where things happened or are happening, qualitative 
case studies are particularly useful for understanding and exploring the process 
and dynamics of change in specific social, cultural and political contexts. Indeed 
the effort to observe, examine and specify mechanisms of influence requires 
detailed case studies (Andrews and Edwards 2004: 500–1). 
Considering the empirical validity of case study research one can detect an 
apparent contradiction. On the one hand, a case study approach privileges in-
depth enquiry over generalising about a population at large. On the other hand, it 
is frequently emphasised that qualitative research should produce explanations 
that have some demonstrable wider resonance (Ragin and Becker 1992; Stake 1995; 
Yin 2009). The primary purpose of case study research to generate holistic, in-
depth understanding of a specific case seems, on the face of it, to contradict the 
form of generalisation that it is said to allow. This apparent paradox is traceable to 
researchers’ divergent agendas and the fact that definitions around case study 
research are contested. Case study research can be theory based, problem based, 
descriptive or exploratory. More specifically, case studies can be used to test, 
illustrate or generate theory; identify the sources of problems or solutions to 
problems; describe something; and explore something (Gomm et al. 2000). Since 
these approaches are in not entirely distinguishable from each other, my research 
employs these approaches as complementary rather than as opposing elements. 
Accordingly, this research is a theory-based (situated in a wider field of theoretical 
and empirical arguments and literature), exploratory (aiming for enhanced 
understanding of a new or under-researched inquiry) case study research that aims 
to generate theory. 
As the two cases investigated by no means exhaust the diversity of actors’ 
media-related practices. I am not aiming to construct a broad theoretical 
framework applicable to civil society organisations per se. Looking at case study 
research from this perspective also answers questions concerning the external 
viability of my thesis. My research does not aim to provide objective “truths” 
about the interrelation of technology and democracy. I am not aiming to identify 
general patterns that span diverse societies as my approach sees great benefit in 
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looking at a limited set of factors and experiences to develop a better picture of the 
different facets of democratic constellations. This equally rejects very optimistic as 
well as overly sceptical accounts and resonates with writings that situate emerging 
forms of engagement practice within broader social and political arrangements 
(Sassen 2008; Qiu 2009; Dahlgren 2013; Couldry 2012). Instead of generalising 
about the negative or positive dimensions of contemporary media, one is well 
advised to analyse what actors actually do and what their practices oriented 
towards media mean for their involvement with politics. Case study research is 
therefore an appropriate method for recognising that engagement practices are not 
the same everywhere, but an outcome of specific contexts. Consequently, 
investigating single cases allows one to gain a detailed understanding of the role 
media-related practices play for actors in particular political constellations. 
This is not to say that a single case study or a small number of studies cannot 
have general significance and stimulate further investigations (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
Grounded theorists can build on an epistemologically sophisticated view of 
emergence that allows for possibilities of emergent categories in the practice of 
theorising (Charmaz 2002). Grounded theory, then, has more to do with creating 
theories than with empirical generalisation in a strict sense. Ultimately, the aim of 
my contextualised qualitative research is to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the organisations under investigation and to develop theoretical 
statements about their engagement practices. Intertwined with the commitment 
to theorise is the risk of being drawn away from features important for 
understanding the case itself (Stake 1995). Resisting such deflection can be 
achieved by referring the research analysis to systematic procedures so as to 
identify essential features and relationships. 
This approach goes back to Harry Wolcott’s (1994) useful distinctions between 
description, analysis and interpretation, which represent three different 
components of qualitative work: description involves producing an account that 
stays close to the original data; analysis involves going beyond these largely 
descriptive iterations and systematically producing an account of key factors and 
relationships among them; and interpretation involves trying to give sense to the 
data by creatively producing insights about it (Wolcott 1994). In particular, the 
latter, the practice of interpretation, is fundamental in case study approaches that 
aim for theory building. As Weber put it, ‘Sociology […] is a science concerning 
itself with the interpretive understanding of social action’ (Weber 1978: 4). This is 
ever more the case as transformation in increasingly complex scenarios is a 
complicated matter. ‘Such change is only partly legible and hence interpretation 
becomes critical in the account of that change’ (Sassen 2008: 401). These remarks 
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do not advocate complete relativity for researchers, but point to researchers’ role 
as the composers of the facts they assemble, as well as the impracticality of 
occupying the position of a neutral observer. Case study researchers become 
immersed in an ongoing interpretive role as they gather evidence and try to make 
sense of it (Stake 1995: 43). Qualitative, and especially case study research, implies 
a commitment to an interpretive understanding of people’s experiences. These 
experiences are brought to light in the first instance through an in-depth 
exploration from multiple perspectives. 
One of many strengths of case study research is that it can take an example of an 
activity and use multiple methods and extensive data sources to explore and 
interrogate it (Stake 1995; Yin 2009). The methods vary depending on the concrete 
case and the specific research questions. ‘Good social science is problem driven 
and not methodology driven in the sense that it employs those methods that for a 
given problematic, best help answer the research questions at hand’ (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 242). To investigate how, where and why media-related practices matter in 
specific social and political contexts I decided to ground my thesis on two well-
established qualitative techniques: face-to-face interviews and participant 
observation. These main methods of data collection were complemented by a 
media analysis that allowed the introduction of additional primary and secondary 
material such as data from media sources, specialist publications and the 
organisations’ own communication outputs. Although I did not go “native”, as a 
classic anthropological account would demand, the approach employed in my 
thesis is best described within the framework of ethnographic fieldwork grounded 
in three complementary research methods – face-to-face interviews, participant 
observation and media analysis. 
 
4.2 Three complementary research methods 
Ethnography, from a rather classical or traditional perspective, ‘is based on the 
close-up, on-the-ground observation of people and institutions in real time and 
space, in which the investigator embeds herself near (or within) the phenomenon’ 
(Wacquant 2003: 5). One of the core objectives of ethnographic work is to reveal 
complexity. At the same time the shifting complexity constituting “the field” or 
“the object” of the research needs to be taken into account in a reflexive manner by 
the researcher. Taking into account contemporary complementary accounts that 
mandate the researcher’s continuing physical presence to accomplish 
ethnographic fieldwork, some scholars have pointed to a less stringent 
understanding of ethnography and challenge traditional assumptions. Taking into 
account the multiple and heterogeneous sites of cultural formations, George 
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Marcus points out that ‘Fieldwork stories today are thus less about a fieldwork 
experience bounded by the Malinowskian scene of encounter’ (Marcus 2009: 19). 
Researchers who implement an extended approach describe contemporary 
fieldwork as a matter of polymorphous engagements – interacting with 
informants across a number of dispersed sites, but also doing field work by 
collecting data eclectically in many different ways from a disparate array of 
sources, attending carefully to popular culture, and reading newspapers and 
official documents (Gusterson 1997). Echoing this approach to ethnographic 
research Hannerz states: 
There are surely a great many activities where it is 
worthwhile to be immediately present, even actively 
engaged, but also others which may be monotonous, 
isolated, and difficult to access. What do you do when 
“your people” spend hours alone at a desk, perhaps 
concentrating on a computer screen? (Hannerz 2003: 211) 
It can be said, then, that more recent methodological accounts invite questions 
regarding the thickness and density of ethnography in practice. In recent years – 
intensified by the widening and deepening of media’s pervasive presence – the 
trend of moving away from “fields” as spatially defined localities towards social 
and political locations, networks and multi-sited approaches has been further 
elaborated. Scholars are increasingly applying an ethnographic lens to practices, 
subjects, modes of communication and groups strongly dependent on digital 
technologies and infrastructures for their formation and existence (Hine 2000; 
Coleman 2010). While a large number of these studies do not research political 
collectives, there are a number of highly convincing examples that employed 
ethnographic fieldwork – Networking Futures (Juris 2008), Blogistan (Sreberny 
and Khiabany 2010) and Two Bits (Kelty 2008), to name a few prominent ones. 
Taking this more recent tradition of ethnography as a source of inspiration, the 
main mode of data collection in my research is face-to-face interviews. 
Interviews take the individual as a point of departure for the research and are ‘the 
main road to multiple realities’ (Stake 1995: 64). Conducting qualitative in-depth 
interviews allow one to develop detailed descriptions, integrate multiple 
perspectives, describe processes and to learn how events and social settings are 
interpreted (Weiss 1995: 10–1). In-depth interviews seek “deep” information and 
understanding. As John Johnson (2002) highlights, the word deep has several 
meanings in this context. First, the interviewer seeks to achieve a similar level of 
understanding as held by the participants in some everyday activity, event or 
place; second, deep understandings go beyond common sense explanations for 
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understanding cultural form, activity, event, place or artefact; third, deep 
understandings can reveal how assumptions, practices and ways of talking partly 
constitute our interests and how we understand them; fourth, deep 
understandings allow us to grasp and articulate the multiple views of, perspectives 
on, and meanings of some activity, event, place or cultural object (Johnson 2002: 
106–7). 
In-depth interviews can be informal, conversational, semi-structured, open-
ended or sequential (Johnson 2002). Sequential interviews, beyond fostering trust 
between the interviewer and the participant, allow the interviewer to get closer to 
the studied phenomenon and add depth, detail and resonance to the participant’s 
story (Charmaz 2002). There is also a rather practical side to choosing in-depth 
interviews as a predominant method for data collection. When the cases under 
investigation are not linked to a particular setting, but can be ascertained from 
individuals in various settings, interviews are appropriate and rewarding (Hesse-
Biber and Leavy 2011: 93–5). Instead of a one-way pipeline this research considered 
interviews as active, interactional and constructive two-way conversations 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1995). The term “active” underscores the perspective that 
an interview is a dynamic meaning-making venture in which interview 
participants are meaning makers instead of passive conduits for retrieving 
information from an existing vessel of answers (Holstein and Gubrium 1995). This 
is not to say that no roles are attached to the interview situation, or to ignore how 
interview settings are to some degree always a guided conversation. As Robert 
Weiss makes clear: 
In the qualitative interview the respondent provides 
information while the interviewer, as a representative of 
the study, is responsible for directing the respondent to the 
topics that matter to the study. (Weiss 1995: 8) 
It is also the case that the interviewer is responsible for judging when a 
respondent’s report is adequate and when it needs elaboration and, should 
elaboration be desirable, for helping the respondent expand their responses 
without constraining the information they might provide (Weiss 1995: 8). A 
useful and effective mode of finding more interview partners is ‘snowball 
sampling’ (Weiss 1995), whereby interview subjects refer the researcher to 
additional prospective subjects. As will become obvious for the reader in the 
empirical chapters the data set gathered from interviews was the main building 
block of my research. This is, first of all, apparent in the fact that participant 
statements that were gathered through interviewing figure very prominent 
throughout the thesis. To do so was a conscious decision, as I wanted to let the 
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participants speak in their own voice and let them tell their point of view in their 
own words. At the same time interviews very interwoven with two other forms of 
data collection.  
The interviews were complemented by participant observation. Observation 
per se is a mundane procedure; as human beings we are participants and observers 
in all our everyday interactions. From the outset, then, scientific observation 
shares common features with actions that people practise in everyday life. Yet, 
only rarely are observations practised as a scientific method, as very few 
individuals actually engage in the systematic use and recording of information for 
scientific purposes (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011). More particularly, participant 
observation is one of several methods that fit into the general category of 
qualitative research. ‘Observation is a fundamental and highly important method 
in all qualitative inquiry. It is used to discover complex interactions in natural 
social settings’ (Marshall and Rossman 2010: 140). Participant observation is a 
particularly useful process for understanding how, and to some extent why, 
political actors act, think and feel as they do (Benford 1987: 28). Practically 
implementing the method, the researcher takes part in the activities, rituals, 
interactions and events of a group or individuals (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011). The 
researcher is both a participant – to varying degrees – and an observer – also to 
varying degrees. 
As an ethnographic research method participant observation should be 
distinguished from pure observation and pure participation. Pure observation 
removes the researcher entirely, or at least to the maximum extent possible, from 
the studied actions and behaviours. With pure participation, often described as 
“going native”. researchers shed their identity as investigator and adopt the role of 
a full participant. In particular, Raymond Gold’s (1958) classic article on roles in 
field observations has been a source for researchers defining different levels of 
participation. Following his conception, the four participation roles are: the 
complete observer (remains detached und unknown to the research group); the 
observer-as-participant (status of the researcher is overtly known to the research 
group, but the researcher boundary is acknowledged); the participant-as-
observer (researched culture is aware of the researcher’s status and the researcher 
openly engages with the research group); and, finally, the complete participant 
(observer becomes completely absorbed in the researched community) (Gold 
1958). Participant observation is rarely the only technique used by a researcher 
conducting ethnographic research (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011). As Howard Becker 
states: 
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We can find out, not with perfect accuracy, but better than 
zero, what people think they are doing, what meanings 
they give to the objects and events and people in their lives 
and experience. We do that by talking to them, in formal or 
informal interviews, in quick exchanges while we 
participate in and observe their ordinary activities, and by 
watching and listening as they go about their business. 
(Becker 1996: 58) 
In fact, there are distinct advantages in combining participant observation with 
interviews. The data from each can be used to illuminate the other and 
observations can have an important effect on how researchers interpret what 
people say in interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 102). Talking to people 
and observing them act as complementary research methods. 
Beyond participant observation and face-to-face interviews, my thesis is 
informed by a media analysis that brought together a wide range of media 
documents and sources on the organisations under research. Exhaustive 
examinations of both the digital archives and the on-going output of alternative 
and mainstream media, as well as the organisations’ own communication outputs, 
was a starting point of my research subjects. These media environments continued 
to be a valuable source throughout my investigation. Some of the reports, coverage 
and self-portraits were “historical” while others were contemporary. On the one 
hand, the analysis included reading news reports, notices and portrayals of the 
cases under investigation in German quality newspapers (particularly Spiegel, 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) as well as 
relevant online news sites (particularly Heise, Zeit Online, Spiegel Online). On 
the other hand, I systematically searched for media outputs across alternative and 
mainstream channels of both organisations and individual members, followed the 
organisations’ websites and press releases, their output on popular online 
platforms, subscribed to their newsletters and mailings lists as well as regularly 
read their in-house publications Open Citizenship and the Datenschleuder. This 
form of media analysis acted complementary to the two primary methods – 
interviews and participant observation – and was critical as a secondary source for 
contextualising the two case studies. It enabled me to add an environmental 
richness to my research and therefore helped me contextualising the participants’ 
statements and directed my questions and interactions with the participants. 
Consequently, analysing media output on and by the respective organisation 
strongly informed my interpretation of what participants were saying and what I 
was observing by allowing me to get an external perspective that positioned the 
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cases within a larger picture. In addition, as media-related practices are at the core 
of my research, the media analysis notably added to my understanding of the role 
media environments plaid for the participants. 
Comprising these data echoes the above-mentioned shifting of ethnographic 
research practices (Gusterson 1997; Hannerz 2003; Marcus 2009). As politically 
ambitious organisations constantly leave behind them digital traces of their 
activities – self-composed and externally constructed – gathering this form of data 
was a fruitful method for gaining an understanding of events and activities that I 
could not observe first-hand either because they took place in the past or they 
took place at the same time. Researches, all in their own specific way, have referred 
to this mode of data collection as ethnographic fieldwork (Hine 2000; Coleman 
2010). Contemporary media environments provide researchers with an intriguing 
window onto the public and semi-public communication networks of individual 
and collective actors, offering opportunities to partially look behind the veil of 
difficult-to-study processes (Thorson et al. 2013). At the same time, my approach 
is not that of the increasingly popular surveys that rely on the appraisal of “big 
data”. Echoing Rodriguez and her colleagues (Rodriguez et al. 2014: 153), I consider 
this type of data insufficient for answering complex research questions about 
social interactions and political negotiations that traverse different uses of media. 
Instead of looking at countless numbers of interactions, I am more interested in 
the multifaceted processes that constitute and surround communication. This is 
not to discredit quantitative approaches per se, but to point to the appropriateness 
of qualitative research methods for the focus of my thesis. 
Practices related to contemporary media technologies and infrastructures were 
not only my object of study but also a source that complemented the interview 
and observation data set. This conscious and necessary mingling was apparent in 
many practices throughout my research. Emailing, phone calls, using search 
engines and online instant messaging, amongst other things, were inevitable 
elements of finding out contact details, getting in touch with participants and 
arranging meetings. And this brings me to briefly reflect on the more general role 
of technology in my research. Unlike some other studies in the field of political 
and media sociology, which put forward a technology-oriented reading (Castells 
2012; Bennett et al. 2014), this thesis rests on empirical research that puts at its 
centre social actors and their surroundings, within and through which 
technologies operate. A technological reading ‘inevitably neutralizes or renders 
invisible the material conditions and practices, place-boundedness, and thick 
social environments within and through which these technologies operate’ 
(Sassen 2008: 342). Following this credo, technologies are considered social 
 76 
products, rather than phenomena that can be researched and discussed outside of 
their societal context. 
This is not to say that technical items are neutral in themselves or do not 
matter, but rather that ‘society and technology are mutually determining and even 
dialectic’ (Lievrouw 2011: 226). Instead of simply denying the weight of technology 
or deterministically overestimating its impact, my thesis aims to apply a balanced 
understanding of the multifaceted interdependences of societal constellations and 
technology. Turning the spotlight on social actors and the thick social 
environments within and through which media operate has methodological and 
ethical significance. A characteristic feature of ethnographic writing is the 
substantial citation of original data, by using verbatim quotes from conversations 
and interviews. Allowing participants to speak for themselves, to express their 
thoughts and ideas in their own words, is to acknowledge that the interviewees 
are not simply objects of study but individual agents with distinct personalities 
(Blumer 1966: 542). As mentioned above, this is not to ignore the fact that (social) 
scientists, implicitly or explicitly, attribute a point of view and interpretations to 
the people whose actions they analyse. Such an understanding of the relationship 
between actor and technologies does not point towards a causal attempt of 
interpretation – what does technology do to people? – but is about the 
reconstruction of scenarios in which particular technologies become meaningful 
for actors – what do people do with media? 
 
4.3 The case studies: Citizens for Europe and the Chaos Computer Club6 
In the following section I want to give a brief introduction to the two cases under 
investigation. After revealing my motivation and reasoning for choosing the two 
cases I will briefly present the main characteristics of Citizens for Europe and the 
Chaos Computer Club and will then specify the ways in which I applied the 
above-mentioned research methods. Most research starts with the question: what 
should I investigate and who should I look at (Silvermann 2013)? It took me 
several months to decide which cases to look at as coming to a decision in his 
regard strongly effects not only methodological choices but also the actual 
research per se. After reflecting about several possible cases and getting in contact 
with some of them – among others, UK Uncut (a UK-based protest group 
mobilising against tax avoidance) – I decided for the two cases at hand for four 
reasons: First, I wanted to look at organisations that either were already around for 
                                                
6 Disclosure note: during the time of my research I was at no time a member of the 
organisations under investigation and did not receive any form of payment from 
them. 
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some time or had good chances to survive for the time of my fieldwork; second, I 
wanted to analyse organisations that were practicing a constructive vision of 
politics; third, I realised that I looking at German organisations might be the best 
choice as Germany was the political environment I was most accustomed with; 
and finally, I decided to investigate CFE and the CCC because I was convinced that 
both organisations were acting on issues critical for contemporary political 
constellations in Europe and elsewhere  
While the latter three choices appear to be more or less straightforward the first 
might be worth explicating. As will become obvious throughout this thesis, the 
two cases are both examples that have managed to sustain themselves. Another 
option for choosing adequate cases could have been to look at organisations that 
have failed to sustain their engagement. Yet, this would have raised a number of 
analytical and methodological problems. First, predicting which organisation 
might “fail” during the time of research would have been simply impossible. At 
the same time, the risk that one of the two cases might not manage to survive the 
research period was already part of the research scenario that informed my thesis. 
Second, researching an organisation that has failed in the past and reconstructing 
their failure through a practice-oriented lens would have been challenging, to say 
the least. Interviewing people about their past experiences is an ambiguous task 
(Johnson 2002) and observing participants retrospectively would have been 
impossible. 
Citizens for Europe. Established by young Europeans from across the 
European Union (EU), at the beginning of 2010 Citizens for Europe (CFE) was a 
registered association that, according to its website, acted as a non-partisan, not-
for-profit organisation. The organisation’s website further states that it aimed to 
support and advance the current state of the EU ‘by developing and promoting a 
new and modern form of a transnational EU citizenship that is independent of 
national and cultural attributes and empowers citizens in the EU to fully exert 
their desire for political participation’. At the time of research the organisation had 
nine members. Four of them were central – Martin Wilhelm, the founder and 
director, Christian Mieß, a project manager also in charge of public relations, 
Arianna De Mario, a project manager focusing on campaign-oriented work, and 
Louisa Prause, a project assistant involved in the organisation’s in-house 
publication. The other five members had either advisory functions or were more 
or less present in the work of the organisation. The organisation lists the European 
Commission and the French foundation Fondation Charles Léopold Mayer as 
major financial donors. Organising conferences, discussion forums and 
workshops that revolved around notions of political engagement and citizenship 
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were listed as the primary modes of engagement. CFE’s website also notes issue-
driven political campaigns and the formation of a European network of civic actors 
to foster democratic constellations in Europe. 
The Chaos Computer Club. Founded in 1981 in Germany the Chaos Computer 
Club (CCC) has a membership figure of around 4500, which makes it Europe’s 
largest and one of the world’s oldest hacker collectives. Since 1984 the collective’s 
event agency has been responsible for one of the world’s largest annual hacker 
conventions, the Chaos Communication Congress. Judging from the Club’s main 
website, its organisational structure is best described as polycentric, consisting of 
multiple, interconnected nodes across Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 
together with several less formal affiliated national and international hackerspaces. 
This decentralised formation does not rule out certain formal structures. The CCC 
acts as a registered association, represented by an executive board, and labels itself 
a non-governmental, non-partisan, not-for-profit and voluntary civil society 
organisation sustained by membership fees and donations. The Club states on its 
website that it largely supports the principles of the hacker ethic (Levy 2010), 
advocates more transparency in government, communication as a human right, 
and free access to computers and technological infrastructures for everyone. They 
aim to do this through a number of activities that range from technical research, 
campaigns, events and political consulting to public relations and operating 
communication tools. 
Taking these two very brief introductory sections as initial accounts, Citizens 
for Europe and the Chaos Computer Club are very different organisations. They do 
not only strongly differ in age and size, but also in their fields of engagement. 
While the hackers explicitly emphasise transparency and free communication as 
democratic fundamentals, CFE focuses on transnational citizenship in the 
European Union. To join the CCC it is enough to fill out a member registration 
form and to pay a small annual fee. CFE, in contrast, is a closed club that does not 
admit new members, but instead hires new employees. At the same time the two 
case studies also share a number of similarities as both organisations aim for 
political change and point to the need to democratise democracy (Santos 2005). 
The two cases consider themselves civil society organisations rather than 
considering their political work movement-based. Accordingly, CFE and the CCC 
both belong to the intermediary field between citizenry and governmental 
institutions: the layer of organised civil society, which constitutes a main pillar of 
democracy (Cohen and Arato 1992; Warren 2001). The two organisations are based 
on the same legal structure – registered associations – and are both issue-oriented 
organisations (Marres 2005). As civil society organisations both are not legitimised 
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through formal political procedures; that is to say, they do not have any official 
authority that has been granted to them directly or indirectly by “the people”. As a 
consequence, they have to develop other modes of legitimation. 
The strength of bringing the two case studies together is that this allows me to 
study two organisations active in different fields illustrating both their different 
characteristics and their common features. Additionally, the fact that one of them 
has existed for a considerable period and the other one is “in the making” allowed 
me to observe the relevance of media practices in relation to temporal dimensions. 
The choice to look at organisations that were predominantly based in Germany 
was also made because it was the political environment that I am most accustomed 
with. Investigating CFE and the CCC complied with Pierre Bourdieu’s view that 
social scientific research requires ‘theories which are nourished less by purely 
theoretical confrontation with other theories than by confrontation with fresh 
empirical objects’ (Bourdieu 1996: 178). Compared with the growing interest in the 
role social movements have played in political constellations over the past decade, 
civil society organisations are a more or less neglected field in communication 
studies and media sociology. Throughout the time of developing my thesis, 
conducting research in the field and putting my findings on paper, there has been 
no substantial research on either of the two organisations. 
Initially I was very sceptical about gaining access to these organisations – 
especially the hacker community, as it appeared to be some sort of amorphous 
collective dispersed across more or less inaccessible locations. Soon after sending 
the first emails to members asking them to participate in my research I discovered 
that most people were interested in “cooperating”. In my initial approach via 
email and later via face-to-face contact I always explained the purpose of my 
enquiry by framing it in a rather broad manner, for example: ‘Dear …, I am 
currently a PhD student at Goldsmiths. My research investigates organisations 
that engage with and aim to influence democratic constellations. One of my main 
interests is in the role media technologies and infrastructure play for their political 
endeavours. Would you like to meet for a conversation in the coming days?’ 
In the time spam from 2011–2013 I conducted fifty-two interviews with thirty-
two participants and had numerous informal conversations with many more. The 
starting point of the interviews was a core list of prepared questions that I tried to 
get through with each participant. This “question catalogue” was often adjusted to 
the specific participant and, reflecting the idea of grounded theory, was revised 
over time by incorporating findings as I went along. Although the point of 
departure was a more or less standardised list of questions, sooner or later the 
interviews unfolded rather organically, turning into conversations, and the 
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questions were never posed in the same form or at the same point in the 
interview. In many cases the participants touched on core questions without being 
prompted. In this sense, I did not fight for control of the interview, but 
approached it as collaboration or discourse between two speakers. The interview 
participants were seen as meaning makers instead of passive conduits for 
retrieving information from an existing vessel of answers (Holstein and Gubrium 
1995). This is not to say that there were no roles attached to the situation or to 
ignore that the interview setting is to some way always a guided conversation 
(Weiss 1995). 
While all interviews conducted in this research can be described as qualitative 
in-depth interviews, individual interviews varied and are best described as having 
the following attributes: they were informal, conversational, semi-structured, 
open-ended, and in several cases, sequential (Johnson 2002). Sequential 
interviews allowed me to foster trust and get closer to both the participant’s 
stories and the studied organisations (Charmaz 2002). All interviews, except one, 
were tape-recorded. While recording I took extensive handwritten fieldnotes, 
which enabled me to complement the audio files with situational impressions 
that might otherwise have been lost in the moment. Shortly after the interviews I 
listened to the recordings and took more notes to avoid losing the impressions 
that were still present. The recordings were then transcribed in chronological 
order. Throughout the interviews I gained experience of how to guide a 
conversation, when to chase a particular issue, became more used to the technical 
terminology, and was increasingly reflective about the interview situation. 
The interviews were crucial for exploring the different ways participants 
described their practices related to media for pursuing their political goals as well 
as their organisational arrangements (see Bimber 2003). The interviews were also 
fundamental for acknowledging the interviewees as agents with distinct 
personalities as participants were invited to speak in their own voice (Blumer 
1966: 542) throughout the empirical chapters of my thesis. In addition, the 
interviews were a vital access point for being able to implement participant 
observation. After initial meetings and interviews with a number of participants I 
was able to join the organisations in more secluded settings like meeting rooms, 
offices and pressrooms; although at no stage did I “go native”. My insights were 
based on temporally limited observation and my role as a researcher was always 
recognisable as such to the participants (Gold 1958). During the observations I 
observed and made handwritten notes on what people were saying and doing. The 
overall aim of my interviews and observations was not so much to gain knowledge 
of participants’ psychological states of mind as an in-depth understanding of the 
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everyday activities of participants that contributed to the engagement practices of 
the organisation. To complement this aim I sifted through and collected hundreds 
of media texts and documents related to or generated by the organisations. The 
media analysis initiated before the interviews and observations and continued 
during the period in which I talked to participants and observed their activities and 
lasted until spring 2014 so to stay as close as possible to the case studies. Taken 
together, the three data sets complement each other and enable a complex 
understanding of the political aims of the organisations under investigation and 
what role media practices play for bringing these goals to life. In more detail, the 
three methods were adapted to the two case studies, as shown below. 
 
Interviews with CFE. In the case of Citizens for Europe, given its size the 
interview sample was rather straightforward. After identifying the main members 
through their characterisation on the CFE website, I contacted Martin, the director 
and founder of the organisation, via email. After a first meeting and interview with 
him he recommended other members as interview partners, which matched my 
identification of members of the core group. Due to the fluctuating and loose 
affiliation of some members I focused on the more stable members and conducted 
sequential interviews with all participants. In total I conducted and tape-recorded 
twelve semi-structured, open-ended interviews with all four core members. All 
interviewees agreed to use their real names. These interviews were accompanied 
by more informal conversations during which I took extensive fieldnotes. 
 
Interviews with CCC. In the case of the Chaos Computer Club the interview 
sample was constructed through three basic methods: personal e-mails sent to 
participants identified through an online search of the Club’s websites and in-
house publications, as well as diverse mainstream, alternative and hacker-specific 
media outlets; directly contacting participants during my visits to hacker 
gatherings and hackerspaces; and ‘snowball sampling’ (Weiss 1995), whereby 
interviewees referred me to additional prospective participants. As the list of 
interviewees grew I started to mention the list to potential participants to 
demonstrate the level of access and trust I had already gained. The sampling was 
completed by an active sampling process so as to include different voices in the 
research. Accordingly, I conducted forty interviews with a total of twenty-seven 
participants who ranged from long-term to new members and board members, 
from former members to active spokespersons and closely affiliated individuals 
(see Appendix 1). All interviews, except one – because the interviewee asked me to 
only take notes – were tape-recorded. Similarly, all interviewees agreed to use 
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their real names or easily identifiable hacker aliases, except one, who preferred to 
remain anonymous. 
 
Participant observation of CFE. The observational data was gathered during two 
workshops that CFE co-organised in Berlin in the summer of 2011 and in 
Copenhagen in February 2012. Both workshops took place over two days. In 
addition, I paid numerous visits to CFE’s office in Berlin where I was able to 
closely observe the organisation’s working environment, to see how the office 
space was used and to see how they were using media in their day-to-day routines. 
On most occasions my role was as observer-as-participant – where the status of 
the researcher is overtly known to the research group but the researcher boundary 
is acknowledged (Gold 1958). In some cases my role turned into the participant-
as-observer – the researched culture being aware of the researcher’s status and the 
researcher openly engaging with the research group (Gold 1958). The latter was the 
case during the two workshops where I acted as an observer as well as active 
participant. In both cases my position remained strongly research oriented and I 
was able to set the context for interviews. 
 
Participant observation of the CCC. In comparison to the observation of CFE 
members the participant observation of the hacker Club was more elaborate 
because the organisation was much more de-localised. Reflecting this 
organisational arrangement my observation was more extensive and manifold. 
One set of data gathering took place during several large-scale events such as the 
2011 Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin, the 2012 SIGINT conference in 
Cologne and the 2012 GPN gathering in Karlsruhe. During these events I 
conducted interviews, made conversation with all sorts of people (members, 
visitors), listened to talks s of CCC members and other presenters, had non-formal 
conversations with journalists and observed CCC members in action. In addition 
to these events I visited various CCC-affiliated hackerspaces in Hamburg, Stuttgart 
and Berlin like the Hamburg hackerspace Attraktor, the Raumfahrtagentur (‘Space 
Travel Agency’), the C-base and the official Club hackerspace in Berlin Mitte. As 
with my experience conducting interviews, I became more and more used to 
initially unfamiliar settings like hackerspaces and was able to observe the 
surroundings in a more reflective and detailed manner. On all occasions my role 
was observer-as-participant – my role as a researcher was overtly known to the 
research group but the researcher boundary was acknowledged (Gold 1958). The 
observation part was crucial to meet CCC members, to get to know their way of 
interacting in different environments and to decide where to go next. Following 
the participants’ recommendations I decided where to continue my fieldwork. 
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The observation, in other word, enabled me to follow the participants’ stories and 
their understanding of what was relevant. After getting more familiar with 
individual members I joined them on several occasions during meetings with 
media representatives. The observation phase began after gaining access to the 
group was ensured via initial meetings and interviews with individual members of 
the Club. In many instances the interviews more or less fluidly developed into 
participant observation, and vice versa (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). At the same 
time, spending a lot of time in the press room during the Congress, for example, 
and talking to journalists also enriched my media analysis as I witnessed 
interactions between CCC members and media representatives in the flesh.  
 
Media analysis of CFE and the CCC. To avoid a “fetishisation” of single popular 
platforms (see Thorson et al. 2013) I did not focus on a specific communication 
medium or platform, but included the more diverse media environment within 
which the organisations were active (see Appendix 2). In practice this meant 
subscribing to the organisations’ newsletters and public mailing lists, frequently 
looking at the organisations’ websites and following their activities on popular 
online platforms like Twitter and Facebook. The media analysis also included 
regularly reading their in-house publications Open Citizenship and 
Datenschleuder and following mainstream media coverage of the organisations as 
well as output by the organisations across alternative and mainstream media 
channels. This part of the research was particularly fruitful as it enabled me to “go 
back in time” by sifting through digital archives of a wide range of media outlets. 
Without any claim to completeness, my research made extensive use of the media 
traces the organisations left across media environments. While I was not aiming to 
research “online communities” or to focus exclusively on “online culture” (Hine 
2000) it is important to point out that referencing and analysing digital artefacts 
and online platforms contextualised and supported a meaningful portrayal of the 
cases under investigation. 
 
Incorporating these three data sets enabled me to gain a comprehensive picture 
and understanding of the actors’ media-related practices and the role these played 
for the organisations’ legitimation and long-term engagement. As well as pointing 
out the strengths of a particular research approach, it is also important to 
acknowledge its limitations. The main constraint associated with focusing on an 
organisation’s point of view is that it excludes first-hand “outside” perspectives 
from institutional politics and media organisations. My research does, for 
example, not explicitly mention motivations, strategies and the like on the side of 
journalists and politicians. On the one hand, this is due to limited space and the 
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massive research it would need to cover all the actors involved. On the other hand, 
it is based on a conscious decision not to aim for a grand theory of the entire 
phenomenon of media and politics. Instead my thesis contributes a building 
block, which may serve a larger heuristic purpose in the overall understanding of 
the role media-related practices play in anchoring civil society organisation within 
societal arrangements. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced and discussed the value of case study research for 
fulfilling the aim of my thesis. The three complementary research methods that 
provide my data set – interviews, observations and media analysis – have been 
emphasised as suitable techniques for finding convincing answers to my research 
questions. Finally, this chapter briefly introduced the two cases under 
investigation – Citizens for Europe and the Chaos Computer Club – and explained 
how each method was adapted to the particular case. Let me now move to the 
empirical findings and discussion, analysis and interpretation of these findings. 
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c h a p t e r  f i v e  
Citizens for Europe  
 
This chapter is the starting point of the empirical analysis in this thesis. Together 
with the following chapter it investigates Citizens for Europe’s (CFE) political 
aims and how the organisation aims to bring those goals to life. More particularly, 
these chapters investigate the relationship between the organisation’s media-
related practices and the formation of legitimacy and engagement over time. The 
first section focuses on the day-to-day communicative practices amongst CFE 
members and what role media technologies play in inward-oriented 
communication. The second section looks in more detail at the actors’ outward-
oriented communication and at how media-related practices relate to the 
formation of organisational structures. The third and forth sections investigate 
how CFE’s media-related practices relate more concretely to CFE’s political 
engagements. By analysing the organisation’s Every Vote 2011 campaign for 
foreigners’ right to vote, the two sections highlight two developments. First, the 
trans-media campaign enabled citizens to voice their political concerns and 
symbolically to participate in political procedures they were otherwise excluded 
from. Second, the organisation’s media-related practices had long-term 
consequences for the overall standing of CFE and the stabilisation of its political 
work. The aim of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it underlines how face-
to-face interactions and mediated communication act as interlocking 
arrangements that are vital for animating the organisation’s political goals. On the 
other hand, by bringing together analysis of internal organisational formations and 
external-oriented communication, this chapter reveals the role media-related 
practices play in generating legitimacy and for sustaining political engagement 
over time. 
 
5.1 Internal communication and organisational formations 
The methodology chapter gave a first insight to the organisational characteristics 
of CFE by pointing to its self-conception as a bi-partisan, non-membership civil 
society organisation engaging with citizenship in the European Union (EU) and 
fostering political participation in Europe. Complementing this conception it can 
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be said that CFE acts in a field described as follows: ‘Within Europe and the EU we 
find noteworthy differences and even tensions in regard to political traditions, 
notions of citizenship, assumptions about openness and access, conceptions of 
what constitute civil society, and so on’ (Dahlgren 2013: 8). In will now look more 
closely at CFE’s actual constitution as a civil society organisation by analysing the 
organisation’s internal communicative practices. 
Martin Wilhelm founded CFE in 2010 after gaining several years experience in 
different non-governmental organisations across Europe, in particular not-for-
profit foundations. The organisation’s first employee was Christian Mieß, who 
was Martin’s former classmate in their political science studies. As a first step, 
Martin, who was director of CFE, and Christian, whose role was entitled project 
manager, registered CFE as a legal body. 
It was obvious that we needed a legal structure to be able to 
apply for funding – that’s why we established a registered 
association. (Christian) 
Because funding procedures in Germany and the EU do not tend to fund loose 
clusters of individuals, forming a registered association was fundamental for the 
establishment and subsistence of the organisation. Without funds, as participants 
remarked, CFE would simply not have been able to pay running costs like salaries 
and office rent. Immediately after its formation as a legal entity, CFE was 
successful in securing its initial core funding through the EU’s Youth in Action 
Programme. The act of forming a registered association might be seen as a trivial 
detail. At the same time it can be read as a stark contradiction of the idea that 
organisation as a way of acting together has become redundant in times of 
technological pervasiveness (Shirky 2009). Structural elements like funding 
procedures in democratic states continue to give strong preference to organised 
associations in comparison to amorphous groupings. 
In the first months after its launch CFE enlarged its team by employing Arianna 
De Mario as a project manager, and in early 2011 Louisa Prause joined the 
organisation as an editorial member.7 Arianna and Louisa both applied for the 
positions after reading employment ads on an online platform specialising in job 
offers for Berlin and its surrounding region. This, again, might be considered a 
mundane practice that is part of pre-existing social practices, like making any job 
application. Despite, or exactly because of the ‘banal’ (Atton 2004: 4) nature of this 
media-related practice, it hints at the central role digital media play in establishing 
                                                
7 Lisa Pettibone also joined the team early on, but was not actively present during my 
research due to fieldwork she was accomplishing for her PhD at the Free University of 
Berlin. 
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civil society organisations. For the participants, finding a suitable employee or 
appropriate job was directly related to online platforms. Accordingly, the 
formation of a group whose political work is called into being above all through 
the abilities, skills, passions and experience of its individual members relied on 
practices that were oriented towards digital media. 
With Martin being the founder and director of CFE, the organisation’s internal 
hierarchies were relatively fixed from the beginning and did not change notably 
over the time of my research. 
Our organisation is by no means based on direct democracy. It 
is clear that Martin determines the guiding principles. He is 
the initiator and the main organiser. But we are all in 
accordance with that. No project would be implemented 
without all of us agreeing on it. (Louisa) 
Of course Martin is the head, but I wouldn’t say that we are all 
subordinated to him. (Christian) 
Martin himself acknowledged that the overall orientation of the organisation was 
predominantly based on his conception and decisions. 
Around 70 per cent of the decisions are top down. Take, for 
example, a recent workshop for integration commissaries: I 
would think about which actors we could work with, make 
some telephone calls to gain further background information 
and finally I place it on the table and say “this is what we’re 
going to pull off”. (Martin) 
While there were clear hierarchical structures (Polletta 2004), with Martin as the 
driving and guiding force, the day-to-day working routines were based on 
dialogue and in consultation with all team members. In particular, the elaboration 
and execution of the actual projects and activities was heavily reliant on 
interaction amongst the participants. All interviewees stressed the vital role of 
internal communicative practices for the organisation’s viability. 
Internally, communication is very important so that 
everything is in good working order. (Louisa) 
We need to interact with each other all the time to make sure 
that things work the way they should and also to generate new 
ideas. (Arianna) 
It’s great that we have a common space. Particularly during 
intense planning phases it is very important to share an office 
so we can talk with others face-to-face. (Louisa) 
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Largely because of the organisation’s size and physical closeness of its members, 
participants emphasised that their internal day-to-day communication was 
predominantly face-to-face interaction. In fact, the interviewees explicitly 
identified the need to work together in physical closeness.  
It wouldn’t work out if we weren’t at the same place and 
couldn’t sit together to discuss and ask stuff. We are not 
online enough to give up our common office. (Christian) 
One of the main reasons for the relevance of internal communication was to keep 
up a constant flow of information amongst the team members to enable 
knowledge exchange but also to avoid misunderstandings and redundancy. 
Every now and then we had the situation that someone in our 
team was in contact with really interesting people and others 
didn’t know about it because it simply wasn’t communicated 
properly. Afterwards we realised that it would have been 
really helpful to have these people on board for a particular 
project or for an issue of our journal. Internal communication 
is a challenge that we are constantly dealing with. (Martin) 
Taking into account that the organisation consisted of a rather small team of 
around four to six members and was located in a common two-room office in 
Berlin, one might be surprised to hear that communication within the team was 
considered a challenge. 
Although we are a small team and we are working in the same 
office, we are not always present at the same time because we 
have different working hours. We have a joure fixe, which is 
good to share relevant information and to keep each other 
updated on the stuff we are working on. But it’s not enough. 
(Martin) 
During my research I noticed that CFE started to complement their face-to-face 
interactions with a range of tools to make the group’s working process more 
transparent and responsive. On every visit I made to CFE’s office in Berlin Mitte its 
walls were differently “decorated” with large-format posters and notice boards 
with drawings, brainstorming maps, to-do lists, short announcements, time 
schedules and strategy maps. The decision to use offline instead of online media to 
strengthen internal flows of information and communication was based on 
Martin’s judgement. 
We won’t compile wikis or similar online platforms because 
nobody would actually use them. (Martin) 
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Martin’s quote suggests a rather critical view about digital tools (Curran et al. 2012). 
He did not explain why he considered noticeboards and other offline media more 
valuable than online wikis. For him it was a given fact that digital platforms were 
not a constructive way to ease the challenge CFE faced regarding communication 
amongst its members. As will be shown in the coming sections, my initial 
impression that Martin was generally sceptical about implementing digital 
technologies and infrastructures was reinforced in interviews and observations. 
On first sight, then, using media technologies and infrastructures appeared to 
play an important role for the initial formation of the group of employees, but 
only a minor role for internally oriented communicative practices. Yet, looking 
more closely at the participants’ day-to-day modes of communicating with each 
other, different practices related to and relying on media technologies began to 
emerge. 
The good old telephone is still very helpful. Whenever I need 
some information and I’m not in the office I give Martin, 
Arianna or Louisa a call – or the other way around. Calling 
someone is very immediate and prompt. (Christian) 
Participants used their ‘good old telephones’ which also included mobile phones, 
to maintain the communication flow and information exchange over distances. 
Calling someone was clearly preferred in comparison to writing emails, for 
example. Participants considered talking on the phone to be personal, active and 
productive while writing an email to communicate with a colleague was regarded 
as ‘impersonal’ (Christian) and ‘not time efficient’ (Martin). Although Martin 
pushed for offline media and was sceptical about the use of digital tools to further 
information and knowledge exchange amongst colleagues, CFE started to 
implement online services. In particular, file-hosting services that allowed file 
synchronisation amongst members were embedded in day-to-day 
communication practices. 
With Dropbox, for example, I can always see who has made 
what kind of changes to a document. It allows every member 
of the team to be up to date. (Martin) 
At the moment we use Dropbox and an external server to 
archive our material and to record our work processes. 
(Arianna) 
Making use of Dropbox, as Martin and Arianna’s quotes emphasise, was 
particularly important for two reasons. First, it allowed CFE to establish more 
transparent work processes and by doing so assisted collaborative work amongst 
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colleagues. Second, it allowed the organisation to create a usable archive of 
documents like working reports, funding applications and campaign strategies 
that were acquired over time. In particular, the latter played an increasingly 
important role in the organisation’s political work. Creating a common online 
pool for archiving media material (Hannerz 1996; Cammaerts 2012) enabled access 
to information, knowledge and experiences that might be relevant for current as 
well as future activities. Archiving practices were not only important for existing 
members to be able to go back in time, but also to enable new temporary and 
longer term members to access the organisation’s history and to directly build on 
past activities. The more knowledge and experiences CFE accumulated over time 
the more members felt the need to archive it in accessible ways to avoid losing or 
forgetting relevant information and to make use of it for the organisation’s future 
engagement. 
So far everyone has a private computer and a 2.5-gigabyte 
Dropbox account. That’s clearly not enough. And there are 
also security and privacy issues regarding where we store our 
data – which in part includes rather sensitive material like 
funding applications. That’s why we are planning to get our 
own server by next year. This allows us to have more control 
over the infrastructure where we store our documents and 
allows the whole team to access the data from any location. 
(Martin) 
The fact that the organisation was in need of more storage space and aimed to 
make its use of cloud infrastructures more secure underlined the increasing 
relevance of practices related to file-hosting services. Following CFE’s worries 
about outsourcing the organisation’s body of acquired knowledge to a profit-
oriented corporation, which was partially related to the growing discourse around 
state surveillance and corporate data hunger, the organisation transferred its 
documents to ownCloud. This was seen as a solution to both problems, as 
ownCloud is a free, open-source file-hosting service that allows clients to operate 
its software system on private servers with no limits on storage space. Besides 
displaying awareness of public debates, Martin’s increased sensitivity also showed 
that CFE considered its knowledge and experiences increasingly valuable and 
important for the viability of the organisation as such. 
Considering these initial findings one can cautiously conclude that with its 
growing involvement over time CFE made increasing use of media-related 
practices. Newer services like cloud computing did not replace older forms of 
communication like telephony (Gitelman 2008) as different media-related 
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practices were complimentary. Similarly, while face-to-face communication was 
central for aspects related of day-to-day information exchange and consensus-
building, direct interactions were complemented by practices related to both 
online and offline media (Mattoni 2012). Despite the CFE’s manageable team size 
and the physical closeness of its members, media-related practices were 
particularly important as part of CFE’s ‘organizational repertoire’ (Clemens 1993) 
for two time-related reasons. On the one hand, they allowed establishing and 
maintaining day-to-day communicative routines which meant a consistent flow 
of information amongst members. This steady flow, in turn, maintained a 
transparent and constructive working process as it kept the whole team up-to-
date as well as responsive to other members’ needs. On the other hand, media 
related practices such as archiving were important for the longer term formation of 
the organisation as it allowed to preserve relevant information that would lead to 
an accumulation of knowledge and experience over time. Due to its digital quality 
the information was not only easily shared amongst members but also accessible 
to new people who joined the team. From this perspective, being able to archive 
and collaboratively access diverse media materials contributed to the ability of the 
organisation to sustain engagement over time. 
I will now consider the organisation’s outward-oriented communicative 
practices. In keeping with the overall interest of my research, particular attention 
is paid to the role of media-related practices in relation to the formation of 
legitimacy and long-term engagement. 
 
5.2 Outward-oriented communication 
Asked whether CFE could be considered a political organisation all participants 
answered in the affirmative. 
We are a political organisation; if you understand politics as 
something taking place apart from party politics. We consider 
politics a societal endeavour and there are existing structures 
that we are trying to alter. In this sense we are political; but 
neither left nor right. (Christian) 
While participants understood their activities as political in every respect, they 
stressed that their way of doing democracy was not necessarily in accordance with 
institutional or traditional understandings of engaging with politics (Lechner 
2003[1990]; Dahlgren 2003). Despite the fact that none of the participants were 
interested in joining a political party they considered organised forms of political 
engagement most valuable (Karpf 2012; Bimber et al. 2012). Besides explicitly 
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underlining the bi-partisan nature of the organisation Christian’s quote highlights 
how CFE aimed to act on the structural deficits of political constellations. Martin 
explained his understanding of how CFE was practising politics related to political 
participation in Europe and citizenship in the EU in the following way. 
Citizens for Europe is as a problem-solving organisation that 
reveals societal mischiefs, makes them visible, categorises 
them and elaborates proposals for solutions. We do so either 
based on high visibility campaigns, through our in-house 
publication and/or through network meetings. (Martin; 
emphasis added) 
The three modes of engagement that Martin considered to be CFE’s pillars for 
acting on political deficits serve as an orientation guide throughout the next 
section (campaign) and the following chapter (in-house publication and network 
meetings). For now I will look more closely at the organisation’s different modes 
of ‘problem-solving’ – revealing, making visible, categorising and elaborating 
proposals – that strongly suggested that CFE was interacting with a variety of 
individual and collective actors beyond the organisation’s boundaries. As the 
participants emphasised, acting on the democratic deficits of contemporary 
political constellations in Europe was inseparable from engaging with different 
audiences and publics as well as actors belonging to civil society, academia and 
institutional politics. To do so, different forms and channels of communication 
were deployed. Most of them appeared to be related to online services. 
We decided to put a strong focus on one medium – the 
internet – simply because there was initially not enough 
money to use other media like leaflets or posters. Right from 
the beginning we initiated several things: we bought a 
website, we established a Facebook page and we set up a 
Twitter account. (Christian) 
Christian continued his depiction that the decision to rely on digital media as 
primary channels of external communication was first of all based on financial 
resources as follows: 
The highest running costs we have besides payrolls are in 
relation to communication – a fast internet connection, our T3 
backbone and our phone bills. (Christian) 
While adding another factor Arianna illustrated the situation in a very similar way. 
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By utilising certain digital technologies you can work faster 
and above all cheaper. That’s why we use some of them quite 
intensively. (Arianna) 
Even after registration as a legal body and receiving core funding from the EU, 
financial resources continued to be an abiding theme for CFE as a non-
membership organisation. The organisation’s initial external communicative 
course of action made this obvious. In fact, as Christian mentioned, financial issues 
had a concrete effect on the organisation’s initial media-related practices. All the 
same, CFE was not only able to use a number of information and communication 
channels from day one but also intensified its use of online services over time. 
In the first months we mostly used traditional media like 
telephone and email. Then came the Facebook page and 
Twitter, followed by a wide range of services like Pinterest and 
other platforms that Christian takes care of nowadays. 
(Arianna) 
In the beginning everyone worked on everything. Over time 
we specialised. Christian now is the one who is 
predominantly involved with external communication. 
(Louisa) 
CFE’s increasing involvement with and appreciation of external communication 
put Christian in the position of a “public relations officer” – a common post in 
civil society organisations, no matter the size (Obar et al. 2012). As Christian 
mentioned: 
All that media stuff is more work than one might expect. To 
give you a small example: I wanted the information from our 
website to be equally distributed across our network, and I 
wanted the process to be automated. So I had to become 
acquainted with how to solve this problem. By now I make a 
post on the website and it automatically appears on Facebook 
and on Twitter. (Christian) 
Christian’s specialisation had direct consequences for his media-related practices. 
Martin and the other members stressed that they didn’t check their emails after 
finishing work and avoided making work-related phone calls outside working 
hours. Christian, in contrast, explicitly stated that he often did ‘work-related stuff’ 
like uploading content on Facebook in his free time because he was in charge of 
what has been referred to as “publicity work” (Powers 2014). He was the only 
member who was explicitly mixing private and work life, for example, by linking 
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his private Twitter account with the official CFE account. While showing me the 
latest profile updates, tweets and retweets on his smart phone during the 
interview, Christian stated: 
Without this, I could simply not do what I am doing for the 
organisation. It’s often the case that I’m home in the evening 
or on the road when I read something interesting and I upload 
it directly. (Christian) 
Christian’s increased involvement with publicity was building on former work 
experiences as well as on a social network of friends and former colleagues. 
During my student days I worked for another organisation. 
That’s where I learned what kind of media stuff works and 
what doesn’t. Also, some of the friends and people we know 
through our network are screenwriters or work with media 
agencies. They provided us with helpful suggestions. All this 
information taken together has formed the way our current 
external communication channels work. (Christian) 
Besides the affordability of the information and communication channels CFE was 
using, the organisation was relying on bringing together different experiences to 
enable an economical and comprehensive utilisation of different digital services, 
online platforms and media formats. Based on its own experiences and collective 
consultation, the organisation elaborated a strategic approach towards using 
outward-oriented communication channels. 
From day one we decided on how to distribute information 
about our organisation. If people want to have information on 
the organisation itself they visit the website, if they want 
background information on political participation and 
citizenship they can get it through our Tweets; that’s where I 
can integrate things that I hear and see immediately. Social 
media in general works best with young people. With older 
generations you still have to use the telephone. (Christian) 
Accordingly, as well as for financial reasons, the decision to make use of different 
communication channels and platforms from an early stage was based on the 
possibility of using different platforms as distribution channels for particular 
information. As well as Christian’s efforts to automate updating practices, I 
increasingly noticed other linking practices like embedding hashtags in email 
newsletters: ‘Call for Action towards cosmopolitan citizenship and full political 
participation in the European Union #diversity #participation #citizenship’ (CfE 
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email newsletter 26 April 2013, Appendix 3). One can interpret the practice of 
strategically linking different outward-oriented communication channels with 
each other as an aspect of the aim to form a coherent public identity (Fenton and 
Barassi 2011). More concretely, the aim of CFE’s ‘multivocality’ (Padgett and Ansell 
1993: 1263) was to communicate their activities in ways that could be interpreted 
coherently from multiple positions at the same time. 
The way CFE’s outward-oriented media practices have been presented so far 
indicates a certain kind of naturalness. To have a website, to create accounts on 
popular online platforms and to link these services with each other appears to be 
the most obvious thing to do in establishing a civil society organisation. While 
email and telephony were considered ‘traditional’ or ‘old school’ forms of 
communication, online platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Pinterest were 
referred to as ‘contemporary’. Yet, this seeming obviousness was only one part of a 
larger picture. The process of establishing and maintaining external 
communication channels was far from being a smooth, linear development based 
on consensus. While the overall significance of outward-oriented communication 
was not questioned, in particular CFE’s use of ‘social media’ (van Dijck 2013) was 
the outcome of conflicting conceptions amongst its members. These frictions 
became most visible around the alteration of Christian’s role within the 
organisation. In the first two years he was solely responsible for publicity work. 
This changed as participants continued to scrutinise the usefulness of certain 
outward-oriented communication channels for supporting CFE’s political work. 
Overall he was kind of a “spokesperson” – not that we would 
have used that expression. He was responsible for external 
communication, for writing newsletters, and for building up 
structures like a list of subscribers. Of course, he also tweeted 
and updated our Facebook page. (Martin) 
At the same time as CFE diversified and interconnected its outward-oriented 
communication Christian’s exclusive role as a “spokesperson” was restrained. 
This change, to a large degree, rested on Martin’s general attitude towards social 
media. 
Christian strongly pushed for the implementation of various 
social media tools. On the one hand I think it is relevant to try 
these things out. But, on the other hand I don’t really know in 
what ways our Facebook page is helping us to fulfil our aims. 
(Martin) 
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Countering this notion, Christian underlined the importance of Twitter and 
Facebook by arguing against the idea that “social media” were exclusively 
outward-oriented communication channels. 
I don’t use these platforms only for distributing information. I 
purposely follow specific people and organisations who are 
active in our field. That way I gain relevant information and 
create contacts. (Christian) 
For Christian, being active on popular online platforms was an important part of 
being embedded in larger flows of information amongst a wide range of individual 
and collective actors and, consequently, for positioning the organisation within a 
context of issues related to CFE’s political engagement. For Martin, in contrast, the 
outcomes of this discursive positioning remained too vague. 
Social media has the potential to generate unexpected 
contacts. That’s what I value it for. But in our short history it 
hasn’t brought us any big bangs. It’s rather a diffuse exchange 
of ideas, contacts, being invited to some gathering every now 
and then. So far nothing has come up that needed a strategic 
decision or my signature. It’s rather a byproduct. (Martin) 
Echoing his earlier mentioned hesitation to implement digital platforms to ease 
challenges in regards to internal communication, he was not convinced that 
Christian’s efforts put into online platforms would actually feed back into the 
group’s stabilisation or generate political opportunities. Louisa was also sceptical 
when asked about the overall importance of “social media” for bringing the 
organisation’s political goals to life. 
It’s hard to say, but I doubt that it is important for our 
organisation to continuously post something on Facebook. I 
sometimes have the feeling that nobody actually reads all the 
stuff that runs on Twitter and the other platforms. (Louisa) 
Arianna echoed these attitudes by underlining the casualness of online platforms 
for the organisation’s day-to-day activities. 
It can be extremely important for specific campaigns. For 
everyday business it is rather a background phenomenon. It’s a 
nice thing to have, but not a major tool for achieving our 
political goals. (Arianna) 
The participants acknowledged that a well-orchestrated “social media” campaign 
might be a potent way to promote political goals and to gain mediated visibility 
for some organisations. All the same, similar to other civil society organisations 
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that tend to be sceptical or unsure about the actual value of online media (Fenton 
and Barassi 2011), Martin, Arianna and Louisa were doubtful about online 
platforms having provable outcomes for CFE specifically. Instead of attaching a lot 
of importance to the political relevance of online media CFE critically questioned 
the significance of web-based platforms for bringing about political change. In 
relation to the lack of provable outcomes, Martin recognised that “social media” 
could increase CFE’s overall reach and speed of information distribution, but 
rather than appreciating these saturating effects he attached negative experiences 
to them. 
Some people told me that they felt a bit bombarded by our 
information. Especially those who follow us on Facebook and 
Twitter and receive our newsletter often receive information 
twice or threefold. It hasn’t had any explicit negative effects so 
far, but I think we have to pay attention to how much 
information we distribute. (Martin) 
The participants’ general scepticism towards online platforms and their partial 
insecurity about how to use outward-oriented communication channels played an 
important role in changing Christian’s role as a “spokesperson”. As well as his 
media-oriented practices he was increasingly involved in other organisational 
matters. The reorganisation of Christian’s role as a fulltime spokesperson was also 
related to the more general constitution of CFE. 
I want to keep Christian in the team, but the financial situation 
doesn’t allow us to employ him as a member who is 
exclusively occupied with external communication. The fact 
that I have no idea of social media and I think that it is all 
“nonsense” doesn’t really matter in this relation. But of course 
I’ve chosen an area whose overall impact on our work I think 
is reasonable. I wouldn’t do the same thing with our journal 
Open Citizenship. (Martin) 
As a result the overall scepticism about the usefulness of particular online 
platforms and the prioritisation of particular media outlets, and with CFE’s limited 
financial resources in mind, Martin decided to reduce Christian’s outward-
oriented communication activity. Instead of decentralising hierarchies (Della Porta 
and Rucht 2013; Bennett et al. 2014), media practices – in particular related to 
online platforms – made visible and even amplified the organisational structures 
within CFE. Accordingly, internal organisational dynamics strongly shaped CFE’s 
outward-oriented communication and vice versa. Considering this finding and 
reading the above quotes one might wonder why CFE continued to employ a wide 
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range of communication channels at all. Almost surprised when asked whether 
CFE could refrain from being active on popular online platforms, Martin said: 
Social media has small positive effects that are helpful, which 
we want and need to maintain. In particular considering 
visibility, distribution of our ideas and the overall potential 
that something bigger might result from our practices. Why 
shouldn’t we use this potential? (Martin) 
Although Martin did not believe in the usefulness of online platforms like “social 
media” he saw an overall need to make use of commercial infrastructure provided 
by Facebook, Twitter and the like. The continuing use of online platforms did not 
coincide with participants’ conviction of the usefulness of such practices, but was 
based on the idea that the organisation did not want to miss out on the possible 
positive outcomes such mediated visibility might bring. Due to their general 
popularity and high number of users popular online platforms were seen as 
potentially beneficial, but not as infrastructures that were fundamental to CFE’s 
engagement practices. 
As has been shown so far, using “new media” was no naturally occurring 
development, but evolved over time and changed according to CFE’s needs, aims 
and preferences. While communicating to a wide range of people, audiences and 
publics was considered vital from day one, establishing and maintaining outward-
oriented communication channels was a conflictual process. As has been shown 
this was partially due to CFE’s limited financial and human resources; which 
demonstrates that despite the growing affordability of digital technologies media 
practices continue to depend on the resources organisations have at hand. Even 
more , media-related practices were the result of a conflictual process because 
members had different – often critical – attitudes about the relevance of online 
platforms and their usefulness to achieving political goals. The fact that external 
communication practices were the outcome of internal debates and discussions 
amongst CFE members shows that media-related practices strongly related to and 
at the same time influenced internal organisational formations. From a 
methodological perspective, these findings indicate the potency of qualitative 
research in general and the significance of interviewing people in particular. Only 
by talking to CFE members was it possible to ascertain that participants were 
rather insecure and ambivalent about the usefulness of the organisation’s 
outward-oriented media practices for its political work. From a purely quantitative 
perspective this findings would not have been detectable as CFE’s online presence 
spoke otherwise. 
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Up to this point I have mainly discussed communication in relation to 
organisational dynamics so as to indicate the role media-related practices played in 
the formation of CFE’s organisational structures. In the following section I will 
focus on how CFE’s externally oriented communication relates to their political 
engagements. More concretely, I will investigate CFE’s Every Vote 2011 campaign, 
which aimed to implement foreigners’ right to vote. 
 
5.3 Face-to-face and mediated communication 
Being asked about the general importance of media technologies and 
infrastructures for elaborating and implementing particular projects, Martin 
replied: 
The first contact is often via telephone or email but afterwards 
always through face-to-face communication. (Martin) 
To make this interrelation of mediated and non-mediated interactions more 
concrete Martin gave a recent example that is worth quoting at length here. 
I’m currently in contact with a potential collaborator in 
Copenhagen. This contact goes back to a two hour meeting 
with a woman from the British Council where we exchanged 
different contacts. I wrote my contact an email referring back 
to the British Council. He replied immediately and was keen 
to collaborate. So, even in cases without face-to-face 
interaction the communication can be traced back to earlier 
face-to-face situations. If I had sent a newsletter or posted 
something on Facebook we would have never ended up 
working together. (Martin) 
Participants made a stringent distinction between indirect forms of mediated 
communication via online platforms and newsletters and direct forms of 
communication related to telephone, email and face-to-face communication. 
Considering email and telephone as direct forms of communication pointed to the 
fact that with CFE’s focus on trans-territorial issues the organisation depends on 
mediated communication as a mode of interaction. The most direct way to do 
make such contact was by calling someone. In other words, because of their 
engagement with European issues particular forms of mediated communication 
were constitutive for both their day-to-day work as well as their longer term 
political endeavours. Although making phone calls and writing emails was 
recognised direct forms of communication participants emphasised the 
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outstanding importance of face-to-face interaction for bringing the organisation’s 
goals to life. 
We are all human beings. Whenever you meet someone you 
attach more importance to the whole interaction. You can do a 
lot of stuff online, but when things need to be done and 
brought to life you need people who sit together, talk to each 
other and do it. (Christian) 
Similarly, Louisa and Arianna emphasised the importance of face-to-face 
communication. 
I think personal contacts and physically meeting people is 
extremely important for the work we’re doing. It builds forms 
of trust that emails are not able to do. You rather remember 
and trust people you’ve met instead of people who have sent 
you an email. (Louisa) 
Real, personal contact – maintained over a long term – clearly 
predominates. (Arianna) 
The relevance of face-to-face communication was also brought into relation with 
the location of CFE’s office in Berlin. 
I have the feeling that Berlin is the place to be to do what we’re 
doing. Elsewhere we wouldn’t have the short walks to the big 
institutions. If you are working on the topics we are engaging 
with it makes a lot of sense to be here. (Christian) 
Berlin is extremely important for such a small organisation 
like us. First of all, because we can live on a rather small salary. 
And, even more importantly, because it is a place that pools 
“money and power”. Political parties, headquarters, members 
of the parliament, large foundations are all close by and are 
more easily approachable than if we were somewhere in the 
countryside. (Louisa) 
On the one hand, CFE was in need of mediated communication to initiate 
contacts, to coordinate activities with collaborators across Europe and to act 
beyond geographical borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Juris 2008). On the other 
hand, mediated practices were only one part of the organisation’s communication 
ecology as non-mediated communication and location continued to play a 
fundamental role for the political work of CFE’s political work (Kavada 2010; 
Kannengießer 2014). Mediated communication was vital for CFE, but it was far 
from being  the only form of communication, as it could not substitute for trust, 
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amongst other possible factors. Trust, in turn, was considered central for acting 
politically (Rosanvallon 2008). Considering the relevance of communicative 
action for CFE’s political engagements, face-to-face and mediated communication 
are best understood as complementary practices. The following analysis of the 
Every Vote 2011 campaign – one of CFE’s three central modes of political 
engagement – further elucidates this finding. 
In 2011, one year after its foundation, CFE and the Berlin-based association Jede 
Stimme (‘Every Vote’) initiated the project Jede Stimme 2011 (‘Every Vote 2011’).8 
The campaign pushed for voting rights at the regional level for almost half a 
million inhabitants of Berlin who did not have German citizenship. Campaigning 
for foreigners’ voting rights, Every Vote 2011 pointed towards a democratic deficit 
in German electoral law by critically acting on the question of who is included as 
citizen for political purposes and whose voices are excluded from political 
procedures (Bourdieu 2000; Couldry 2010). In this sense, the campaign very much 
echoed CFE’s general aim of acting on the democratic deficits of contemporary 
political constellations. In the run up to the elections for the House of 
Representatives in Berlin symbolic elections were held at around seventy-five 
polling stations across the capital from 29 August to 4 September 2011. 
Around half a year before the elections took place we met 
people from the Every Vote association who had the same 
idea. So we were convinced that it was worth putting effort 
into the campaign. (Christian) 
We initiated Every Vote 2011 because the elections took place 
in the same year and because of politicians and sponsors we 
met who wanted to support the campaign. Ideas normally 
establish themselves through the communication within our 
organisation, interactions with other actors and the context 
we are currently part of. (Martin) 
The aim was to make more people part of the political process by changing one 
aspect of Germany’s formal political procedures. Echoing notions that underline 
the relevance of opportunity structures for political engagement (see Cammaerts 
2012) Christian stressed that the overall timing was crucial for the campaign to gain 
attention and to have a chance to be successful. 
We knew that it would make no sense to introduce the topic 
outside of a context. So we initiated the symbolic elections in 
                                                
8 The registered association Every Vote was founded in 2010 by Robert Schaddach, a 
member of the House of Representatives in Berlin for the Social Democratic Party. 
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the run-up to the House of Representatives election in Berlin. 
(Christian) 
With over 2300 people without German passports participating in the symbolic 
elections the campaign had a large resonance amongst politicians as well as in 
mainstream media before and during the official election. 
We wanted to make the issue more prominent in society 
during election time. With some luck and a lot of effort we 
managed to do so. (Arianna) 
The efforts Arianna was referring to were largely put into communicative action. 
We rang a lot of bells across Berlin. Who answers to circular 
mails nowadays? Calling people was also important in the 
initial phase but we visited every collaborating association at 
least once in person to talk to those responsible. We also 
invited collaborators to meetings so that the local associations 
would meet regularly. Face-to-face meetings and personal 
contacts were a key factor. (Louisa) 
Following the initial face-to-face contact with potential collaborating associations, 
CFE continued their interactions via personal mediated communication to further 
coordinate the campaign. The reliance on face-to-face communication underlines 
that it is important not to undervalue the role “non-mediated” communication 
continues to play for engagement practices of organisational actors. The campaign 
was, first of all, grounded on direct meetings and conversations. As a consequence 
of this “persuading” CFE managed to bring together around one hundred 
individual and collective actors that brought the campaign to life. 
We got back to those actors who were interested in the 
campaign via telephone. Online media didn’t play a role at all. 
It had to be very personal. (Arianna) 
Once the initial group of participating associations was more or less fixed, 
personal face-to-face and mediated communicative practices were accompanied 
by the distribution of media material. Mediated communication was not 
important for initiating the campaign, but came into play once the groundwork of 
establishing collaborations was achieved. At the same time, it is important not to 
forget that CFE’s internal communicative routines relied on a range of practices 
oriented towards offline and online media to substantiate their day-to-day 
workflow. 
We had municipal funding that enabled us to print leaflets in 
the thirteen most spoken languages – according to the Federal 
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Statistical Office. We then went in person to the local 
associations – organisations of the Jewish community, Arabic 
cultural institutes, migrant associations and other civic 
associations. We approached them by saying, “We want to 
elaborate this issue. We would give you something like a 
corporate identity and media material and you can do 
whatever you want with it.” And that’s why they participated. 
(Christian) 
Equipped with leaflets and posters the collaborating groups, which were mostly 
migrant associations, implemented parts of the campaign by distributing the 
media material in their communities and within their local districts. When 
considering the role of media practices play in the context of political engagement 
it is not only important to include what actors’ do with media at first-hand, but 
also to take into account less explicit factors like passing on media material to 
collaborators. 
Many elderly are not very familiar with the internet and online 
platforms that have become part of younger people’s everyday 
life. So we decided that it would be good to use posters and 
leaflets to get all those people we wanted to reach. (Arianna) 
While CFE set the frame of the initiative by supplying media material to the 
associations the organisation left the actual realisation of the campaign to the 
participating associations. It was also the collaborating associations and collectives 
who then organised polling stations at around 100 local venues and clubhouses 
across the capital. 
We clearly were the initiators of the campaign but we were 
not trying to “teach migrants how democracy works”. […] The 
key was to directly collaborate with the associations and it 
proved to be a good strategy to leave room for their own 
engagement during the implementation of the campaign. 
(Louisa) 
It’s very straightforward: you just go there and listen to them. 
What we achieved was to make it clear that we don’t work for 
a group of individuals but with people who are excluded from 
formal political processes. (Christian)  
The campaign was organised in such a way that all 
participating actors could take their own role, could identify 
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with the project and were able to say, “Look, we are part of 
this campaign”. (Arianna) 
From this perspective, the role of CFE throughout the campaign was that of a 
mediator – establishing links amongst civic associations as well as between 
institutional politics and civil society – and that of an enabler – triggering the 
participating associations to actively engage with the issue of foreigners’ voting 
rights. By directly working with people excluded from formal political 
participation CFE gave partaking associations the opportunity to be part of the 
discussion around foreigners’ voting rights. What Cohen and Arato have 
described as ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ modes of activism (Cohen and Arato 1992) 
might be a suitable terminology to describe CFE’s engagement in this context. On 
the one hand, the organisation’s activities were directed inward to civil society 
enabling a number of individual and collective actors to get involved with an issue 
that affected their daily life as citizens and conditioned their ability to be part of 
formal political procedures like voting. On the other hand, CFE’s campaign was 
directed outward to state institutions as the overall aim was to influence political 
decision-making and to change electoral law. The activation and accomplishment 
of these two modes of activism relied on the organisation’s ability to merge face-
to-face communication and media-related practices as interlocking arrangements. 
Following the initial face-to-face interactions CFE was able to bring the 
campaign to life, by, amongst other means, providing associations with leaflets 
and posters. The ability to do this was based on additional municipal funding, 
which indicates that financial resources had a direct effect on the organisation’s 
diversification of media practices. Distributing media material gave the 
participating associations resources to make their local communities aware of 
people’s exclusion from formal political procedures. In this context, providing the 
associations with media material as resources to voice their political concerns is 
best understood as employing a form of relational media practices (Mattoni 2012: 
47–9). These media practices were part of creating an environment for citizens to 
voice their opinion and to allow them to participate symbolically in political 
procedures they were otherwise excluded from. Consequently, communicative 
action was not enacted to put issues on the global agenda or to solve problems on a 
trans-territorial scale (Fraser 2007; Bohman 2007), but rather to solve political 
issues that have emerged as a consequence of a globalising world at the local level. 
To complement the discussion of CFE’s voting rights campaign it is worth 
noting that in addition to their relational media practices the organisation also 
initiated a larger media campaign. As the following section explains, bringing 
different modes of relating to media together had consequences for the campaign 
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itself and, even more important for the context of this research, for CFE’s 
legitimation and longer term engagement. 
 
5.4 Every Vote as a trans-media campaign 
In addition to the active and self-guided inclusion of collaborating associations, 
CFE aimed to inform the general public about the issue of foreigners’ voting rights. 
It was clear that for our ‘Every Vote’ Campaign 2011 we needed 
to go out there and be visible in public. Otherwise the mass of 
people we wanted to reach simply wouldn’t realise what was 
going on. (Christian) 
The aim was to make the issue as visible as possible and to animate debates around 
foreigners’ voting rights during election time. On the one hand, this was 
important for creating public awareness and to mobilise as many people as 
possible to take part in the symbolic elections. On the other hand, it was 
important for putting public pressure on politicians and political parties that were 
up for election to expand voting rights in Germany. Accordingly, CFE decided to 
interact with the widest possible range of media outlets to achieve the largest 
possible mediated visibility (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Rucht 2013). To do so, 
the organisation initiated a well-orchestrated media campaign. 
CFE managed to recruit a number of mainstream media outlets to collaborate 
before and during the symbolic elections. The Berlin radio station MotorFM (now 
FluxFM) supported the campaign by regularly advertising and promoting the 
elections. The Berliner Fenster (‘Berlin windows’), which are the public screens 
installed in almost every subway in the German capital reaching around 1.5 million 
people a day, also promoted the campaign over four weeks by frequently 
displaying notices about the campaign.  
We got the opportunity to publicise our campaign in the 
subways, but didn’t really know what to do with it. So we sent 
out a message to a few email distribution lists asking people to 
submit their own slogans for the subway screens. We also 
called a few elderly we knew personally and asked them for 
their opinion. We got quiet a few responses and used them 
unmodified. People immediately identified with the project. 
(Christian) 
Distributing information about Every Vote 2011 through the subway screens, 
which are part of the growing mediatisation of public space (Berry et al. 2013), 
enabled CFE to reach a varied audience. In addition, similar to the inclusion of 
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organised collectives, directly taking up slogans composed by ordinary people 
enabled CFE to include people’s own voice, which made them an active part of the 
campaign. 
As participants recounted, the collaboration with Neue deutsche 
Medienmacher (‘New German media representatives’) was another important 
step to gain the widest possible attention. 
Through Every Vote 2011 we gained access to very strong 
networks like the New German media representatives – a 
group of journalists with and without migration backgrounds 
who aim to strengthen cross-cultural journalism and to 
challenge dominant media discourses. They were very 
receptive because they are directly affected, and distributed 
our campaign though their network. Suddenly we got a call 
from a Deutsche Welle [international public broadcaster] journalist 
who wanted to cover our initiative. He also gave us three more 
contacts. (Christian) 
The fact that CFE was being contacted by and collaborated with quality media 
outlets indicated that the organisation was starting to establish itself as an actor 
worth considering giving a voice (Gitlin 1980; Yoon 2005). In contrast to the 
earlier discussed scepticism towards some forms of external communication, all 
participants considered interactions with a diversity of media channels as highly 
important in the context of Every Vote 2011. 
Christian pulled together an unbelievable media campaign: 
online, but also with posters and in the subways. That was 
incredibly important. Without it, things would have never 
taken off the way they did. (Louisa) 
Depending on the project it is very helpful to work with 
“standard” media, as was the case with the symbolic elections. 
(Arianna) 
Mainstream media play a vital role while you get a campaign 
going. (Christian) 
If you want to reach mass attention and you want to influence 
public and political discourse you have do put efforts into 
media relations. You need a good media resonance. Otherwise 
you end up nowhere. (Martin) 
Participants were very aware of the dynamics related to recognition by media 
outlets and had a clear understanding of which audiences they wanted to reach. 
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CFE was neither critiquing nor adapting to any particular mainstream media 
(Rucht 2004), but was simply interacting with all interested media outlets as CFE 
wanted to reach the widest possible audience. 
It was very broad. There is no moral filter in regards to public 
relations. The moral filter is important in relation to 
collaborations with institutions. (Martin) 
On the eve of the symbolic election the campaign was concluded with a debate by 
leading representatives of the major political parties broadcasted live on regional 
television. Taken together, these findings together those in the previous section, 
indicate that the campaign was based on ‘transmedia mobilization’ (Costanza-
Chock 2014/forthcoming) that drew on leaflets, posters, broadcasting, public 
screens and mainstream media. The ability to initiate a campaign that included 
practices beyond online platforms was made possible by additional municipal 
funding for leaflets and posters and by the support of collaborating media outlets. 
CFE’s engagement practices relied on qualitative mobilisation – aiming to reach 
chosen recipients and audiences in local communities – and quantitative 
mobilisation – oriented towards the wider public (Rucht 2004). Media practices, 
as has been shown, played a vital part in both dynamics: on the one hand, to 
mobilise particular organised associations as collaborators and equip them with 
media material to make the issue visible amongst their communities; on the other 
hand, to use media to publicise the campaign and put the issue on the public 
agenda by mobilising a mass audience through mainstream media. Taken together, 
these dynamics indicate that CFE’s Every Vote 2011 was indeed a trans-media 
campaign. 
As a consequence of this trans-media campaign Every Vote 2011 was covered in 
German, English, Turkish, Italian and Spanish. 
99 per cent of the media reactions – articles, radio interviews, 
TV reports – did amplify our issue and were supportive of our 
demands for foreigners’ right to vote at municipal elections. 
(Martin) 
We had hoped for good feedback from the media. The actual 
amount of coverage was quiet surprising. I am not sure 
whether we would have managed to create such an impact 
without it. (Louisa) 
During the campaign CFE had the impression that they were able to achieve their 
political aims. The direct aim of gaining mediated visibility was achieved and 
showed that non-membership organisations can be very effective at securing 
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media attention (Andrews and Caren 2010). In some cases the participants did not 
get direct access to media outlets, but in other instances CFE was able to articulate 
their concerns in their own voice (Ericson et al. 1989). While it would be too much 
to argue that CFE was captured by the demands of mainstream media (cf. Powers 
2014) it can certainly be said that they were reliant on mediated visibility by 
mainstream outlets to gain the widest possible attention. 
In addition to the attention Every Vote 2011 gained in the mainstream media, 
several politicians promoted the campaign on their websites. For example, Renate 
Künast, chairperson of the Green Party and front-runner for her party at the 
elections in Berlin at that time, featured the campaign on her website and 
announced detailed information on where people could take part in the symbolic 
election. Likewise, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Left Party (Die 
Linke) featured the campaign on their websites (see Appendix 4). 
We got a lot of media attention. You can book that as a success. 
We were also in contact with quiet a lot of politicians. Overall, 
we had the impression that decision makers were really 
listening to us. (Arianna) 
Even if the political parties were referring to the campaign for the sake of 
promoting their own stance, this form of re-mediation acknowledged CFE as a 
serious political actor with a legitimate voice worth listening to (Suchman 1995; 
Couldry 2010). Accordingly, this public recognition of Every Vote 2011 can be seen 
as part of CFE’s successful trans-media campaign. 
At this point it is important to note that the campaign was oriented towards 
shifting fundamental democratic deficits. In the case of Every Vote 2011 the 
concrete manifestation of democratic deficits was the exclusion of particular social 
groups from formal political procedures. Despite their “successful” trans-media 
campaign and the apparent proximity to institutional politics, CFE’s political aim 
of changing the electoral law, and along with changing who is a citizen in relation 
to fundamental political procedures, was not achieved. 
Of course the aim was to achieve a legislation amendment. It 
all burst when the SPD formed a coalition with the CDU. 
Voting rights for non-German citizens was unthinkable with 
the CDU in power; which put a rather frustrating end to the 
campaign. But until that point I would still consider it a 
success. (Louisa) 
As much as the temporal context of the election was the starting point of the 
campaign, so the outcome of the elections decided the outcome of the campaign. 
From beginning to end CFE’s media practices were in one way or another in direct 
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correlation with the structured schedule of the political cycle. This finding in itself 
shows that institutional processes structuring democratic constellations continue 
to be strong and influential (Keane 2009; Rosanvallon 2008). As the case of CFE’s 
voting rights campaign demonstrates, it is not sufficient to exclusively investigate 
extra-parliamentary engagement when considering the complex links between 
actors’ media practices and political arrangements. Following the rather surprising 
election outcome the issue of foreigners’ voting rights disappeared swiftly from 
the public agenda. We could end the discussion of Every Vote 2011 at this point by 
concluding that CFE’s trans-media campaign was successful in enabling citizens to 
partake in symbolic political action, but was not successful in achieving its political 
goals. But, considering the focus of my research, it is worth digging deeper into the 
longer term consequences of the campaign for the organisation itself. 
As Christian mentioned casually: 
The office we are working in belongs to Humboldt University. 
We got in contact with them through our partner association 
Every Vote. […] We gained their trust throughout our 
collaboration. Without them we would probably still be 
meeting in Martin’s apartment. The rent we are paying is 
ridiculous for Berlin Mitte. (Christian) 
Three years after the campaign CFE was still residing in the same office space. 
Considering the earlier mentioned relevance participants attributed to the 
common workspace for the organisation’s ability to bring projects to life this was a 
considerable long-term consequence of the campaign. Another longer term 
consequence grounding in Every Vote 2011 was more explicitly related to the 
efforts the organisation had put into the trans-media campaign. 
Following the large resonance to our campaign we had a 
number of inquiries by people who were interested in doing a 
similar project in other federal states or even on a European 
scale. That’s definitely an option. One of our central aims is to 
bring continuity or consistency to our campaigns. (Louisa) 
Already during interviews in 2011 the participants were saying that the positive 
responses from a wide range of individual and collective actors, including the 
media and not-for profit foundations, prompted CFE to extend the event to a 
European scale on schedule for the European Parliament election in May 2014. 
There was a strong desire to sustain engagements related to the issue beyond a 
single event. In early 2014 Citizens for Europe sent an email newsletter containing 
the following information. 
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In the run up to the European Elections in May 2014, Citizens 
For Europe and the alliance Voting Rights for All (Wahlrecht 
für Alle) will launch a campaign to expand voting rights on 
local and European levels to Third Country Nationals. (CFE 
Newsletter 7 January 2014, Appendix 5) 
Unfortunately, this line of action could not be followed in more detail as my 
fieldwork had already come to an end. There was, however, a third long-term 
consequence unfolding during the time of my research. By making the issue of 
foreigner’s voting rights visible in public discourse through their trans-media 
campaign CFE itself gained increased visibility as a civil society organisation that 
was engaging with European citizenship and political participation in the EU. 
The media resonance also led to the situation that a number of 
foundations that we are working with nowadays approached 
us and said: “Great work. We would like to support you”. The 
project Every Vote 2011 was extremely important for the 
development of the organisation because it helped us to 
establish our reputation – within the foundation scene as well 
as amongst politicians and public institutions. We can still 
rely on this reputation to land big projects and collaborations. 
(Martin) 
The attention we gained with Every Vote was not only 
important to make the campaign happening, it was also very 
important to build up communication und reputation. 
(Arianna) 
The foundations realised that we made some conclusive 
projects that were well received by the public and were 
debated by politicians. […] We have, so to say, earned our 
recognition and legitimation. (Christian) 
One possible way of interpreting these statements would be to diagnose a more or 
less direct causality between “media attention” and legitimacy (Lazarsfeld and 
Merton 2004[1948]; Herbst 2003; Koopmans 2004). Yet, I want to argue, the 
findings and the discussion so far suggest another interpretation. First, as has been 
illustrated, Every Vote 2011 relied on face-to-face communication and a variety of 
media practices – from mainstream media to relational media practices. Second, 
one has to take into account the organisation’s actual mode of practice, which 
positioned CFE in the role of a mediator and enabler. It is impossible to isolate a 
single factor like media attention or mediated visibility and make it the exclusive 
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cause of a particular effect. Legitimacy did not grow out of media attention but out 
of the whole effort that CFE and its collaborators put into the campaign. 
Accordingly, to understand CFE’s engagement in relation to democratic deficits 
like foreigners’ voting rights one needs to draw a more comprehensive picture. 
Doing so opens up a wider perspective on the role media-related practices play for 
legitimacy and sustaining political engagement. 
It was not so much the direct “media effect” of gaining public attention during 
Every Vote 2011 but the integrity of the organisation’s trans-media campaign that 
contributed to establishing CFE as a trustworthy political organisation worth 
listening to, collaborating with and considering a legitimate civil society 
organisation. Although CFE did not deliberately take into account what 
consequences the campaign might have for their own standing its trans-media 
campaign and mode of practice gave the organisation a publicity profile that 
contributed to longer-term consequences. Triggering around 100 individual and 
collective actors to engage with the issue of voting rights, enabling over 2300 
people to take part in a symbolic election and succeeding in embedding the issue 
of foreigners’ voting rights in public discourse was a vital step for the CFE to 
establish legitimation as a mediator between civil society and politics. As a 
consequence of this consolidated recognition, CFE was able to stabilise its 
engagement by initiating new collaborations, attracting new funding sources and, 
growing out of the other two forms of recognition, establishing legitimation. 
While it is impossible to identify a straightforward causal chain between CFE’s 
trans-media campaign and the stabilisation of its political work, the above findings 
suggest that there are strong correlations between media-related practices, 
legitimation processes and sustaining political engagement. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to show the vital role media practices play for 
establishing and for maintaining Citizen for Europe as a civil society organisation 
by pointing to a number of important factors. The first section hinted at internal 
“organisational” dimensions by illustrating that along with its growing 
involvement over time CFE’s inward-oriented modes of communication and 
information exchange increasingly relied on media practices. The following 
section called attention to the finding that outward-oriented communication was 
a conflictual process. Utilising particular media platforms and tools was far from 
self-evident and not always crowned with success. Instead of decentralising 
hierarchies, media practices related to popular online platforms rather were the 
result of processes that made visible and even amplified organisational structures. 
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Accordingly, internal organisational dynamics strongly shaped CFE’s outward-
oriented communication and vice versa. Building on these findings the third and 
fourth section analysed the organisation’s Every Vote 2011 campaign. In this 
context the chapter highlighted the importance of CFE’s trans-media campaign for 
enabling citizens to actively engage with the issue of voting rights and to 
symbolically participate in political procedures they were otherwise excluded 
from. While the political aim of changing the electoral law was not fulfilled, the 
organisation’s mode of practice underlying the trans-media campaign contributed 
to establishing CFE as a trustworthy civil society organisation worth listening to 
and collaborating with. 
Taken together this chapter has shown that media-related practices were 
important in relation to both internal and external dimensions. On the one hand, 
practices oriented towards offline and online media perpetuated day-to-day 
communicative routines by constituting a consistent flow of information amongst 
members. This steady flow, in turn, generated a more transparent and constructive 
working process. At the same time, practices such as digital archiving were 
important for the longer term formation of the organisation because preserving 
relevant information in accessible and sharable ways led to an accumulation of 
relevant knowledge and experience . By doing so inward-oriented media practices 
contributed to the ability to sustain the organisation’s engagement over time. On 
the other hand, as the case of Every Vote 2011 has shown, outward-oriented media 
practices also had longer term consequences in relation to activating sources of 
funding, collaborations, and, ultimately, feeding into the stabilisation and 
legitimation of CFE’s engagements. A common thread that has been highlighted 
in this chapter is that internal and external modes of media practices were strongly 
interwoven with each other. Another thread that emerged throughout the above 
sections is the strong interconnection between face-to-face interactions and 
mediated communication. This synergy was evident in both internal and external 
communicative practices. As has been shown, for example, internal organisation 
relied heavily on both physical proximity and the ability to rely on offline and 
online media. Similarly, CFE’s voting rights campaign was grounded on physical 
meetings and media related practices that acted as interlocking arrangements. 
The findings presented so far on CFE emphasise the different ways media-
related practices play part in enabling and sustaining the organisation’s day-to-day 
work as well as its more explicit political engagements. Following this first set of 
findings, the next chapter will investigate CFE’s publication of its journal Open 
Citizenship, the organisation’s curating practices related to its website and CFE’s 
efforts to create and sustain a trans-local community of practice. 
	   113 
c h a p t e r  s i x  
Intermediary Politics  
 
The following chapter will take up the line of argument on which the previous 
sections concluded and further investigate the various ways media-related 
practices play a part in sustaining Citizens for Europe’s engagement over time and 
establishing legitimacy. The first section will analyse the organisation’s in-house 
publication Open Citizenship. It will be argued that the journal fulfilled two 
interrelated functions. First, practices related to Open Citizenship in part 
legitimised CFE’s political work by grounding its activities in academic knowledge 
and comparative examples. Second, the journal was an initial point of contact that 
allowed the organisation to establish long-term relationships with individual and 
collective actors belonging to different fields. The second section will investigate 
practices related to the CFE website. As I will argue, the website acted as an 
infrastructure to affiliate CFE with trusted well-known organisations. In doing 
this, it helped to embed CFE’s political endeavours within a legitimate context. In 
the third section I will focus on CFE’s efforts to establish and maintain a trans-
local community of practice. In this context I will argue that media-related 
practices are complementary to physical meetings to maintain the community of 
practice over time. The final section will further examine correlations between 
media-related practices and CFE’s aim to establish and maintain itself as a 
legitimate agent acting to mediate between different political spheres. 
 
6.1 Publishing a print journal 
As shown in the previous chapter, participants prioritised some media-related 
practices and were rather sceptical about others. One of the media mentioned as a 
side note in the earlier sections, and which was appreciated by all participants, was 
the organisation’s own publication Open Citizenship (OC). In particular Martin 
underlined the importance of the journal by stating that he clearly prioritised the 
journal in contrast to online platforms considering the journal one of the 
organisation’s three pillars for acting on democratic deficits. According to its 
online presence, OC ‘combines scientific discourses on the subject of European 
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citizenship with articles and reports on positive and negative effects of its current 
legal definition’. Published in print and online, the journal had the following aim:  
Open Citizenship aims to inform its readership about 
European issues and, more particularly, to create a publication 
where “activism”, “politics” and “academia” meet. (Louisa) 
During my research the journal was held in various university libraries, the library 
of the German Bundestag and a library of the United Nations, amongst others. 
OC is published twice a year. We are establishing structures to 
make the journal financially self-supportive through 
subscriptions by universities, libraries, institutions and private 
persons. Now we make around 15 per cent of total income 
through subscriptions. (Martin) 
There is an interest in making the project self-funding. That’s 
already a big challenge. I can’t see us making a profit with it. 
But that’s not the aim of the publication anyway. (Christian) 
As participants emphasised, the journal was no revenue stream. To the contrary, 
the organisation was putting more financial resources into the publication than 
they were getting out of it. Nevertheless Martin and Christian underlined the 
relevance of OC: 
We will keep on publishing our journal in any case. It is one of 
our long-term projects. (Martin) 
Open Citizenship was part of our activities from day one. The 
journal is particularly important for bringing people together 
on a long-term basis. (Christian) 
Throughout the research all participants involved in the journal were involved in 
reflecting on the relevance and efficacy of publishing a journal in print versus 
going fully online. Finally, the team decided to keep the print version. 
It is important to have something physical in your hands. […] 
Besides that, organisational websites and online platforms like 
Twitter are still used predominantly by a rather small group of 
people in Germany. (Christian) 
The decision against discontinuing the print publication was strongly related to 
the organisation’s internal modes of communication for which offline media 
continued to be of relevance. Even more importantly, the decision was based on 
experiences made during the Every Vote 2011 campaign, where offline media like 
leaflets and posters played a vital part in reaching the widest possible audience as 
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well as in actively involving collaborators in the campaign. Although the journal 
was loss-making the participants considered the publication worth investing in 
over the long term. Reading through all published issues it became clear that OC 
was not a “self-propaganda” tool for CFE announcements and promotion of their 
own activities or achievements. Considering the fact that OC was neither an in-
house publication propagating the organisation’s accomplishments nor a source of 
income, the question that came to mind was: Why would an organisation with 
limited human and financial resources put so much effort into publishing a 
journal in print bi-annually? 
The journal embodies our core activities. We constantly move 
between different actors – scholars, politicians and civil 
society. So we constantly move between academic know-
how, politics and civic grassroots action. (Martin) 
In other words, the journal echoed CFE’s overall modus operandi, as explained in 
one of their digital newsletters, to ‘connect practitioners and decision-makers 
from academia, civil society and politics’ (CfE newsletter 26 April 2013, Appendix 
3). Louisa, who was actively involved in the publication of the journal at the time 
of my research, concretised the practical dimensions of this as follows: 
It is a really good access point to current debates. It is also a 
great medium to make contact with people and to keep that 
contact going. I also think that it allows us to create a platform 
for opinions that are not regularly accommodated elsewhere. 
Our approach is to bridge gaps between rather abstract debates 
taking place in academic discourse and work that civil society 
organisations are doing on the ground in relation to the same 
issues. (Louisa) 
Louisa’s words highlight four factors worth analysing in depth. First, the journal 
was an access point to current debates. Second, it was a medium for making 
contact with other actors and for keeping contacts going. Third, OC created a 
platform for opinions that might not be accommodated elsewhere. Fourth, the 
journal was a bridge between academic debates and civil society organisations’ 
activities on the ground. It is reasonable to distinguish between two sets of 
dynamics. The latter two factors – creating a platform for opinions and bridging 
gaps between theory and practice – can be considered direct dynamics of the 
publication. The first two – OC as an access point to current debates and a medium 
for making and maintaining contact with other actors – are best described as 
implied dynamics as they implicitly aim to feed back into the organisation itself. 
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In regards to the direct dynamic of creating a platform for opinions not 
regularly accommodated elsewhere, OC was a publication that gave a voice to 
individual and collective actors working on issues that were often put aside in 
mainstream debates; for example, issues like ‘Exclusion and discrimination’ 
(Volume 1, Issue 1) and ‘Urban Citizenship’ (Volume 2, Issue 2). Here CFE was 
using OC as a tool to strengthen their position as an organisation working to 
disseminate issues related to political participation and European citizenship. 
Directly related to this was the second outcome of bridging gaps between rather 
abstract debates taking place in academic discourse and the work of civil society 
organisations on the ground. The journal added political value to CFE’s activities 
by creating dialogue and conjunctions between academic debates and organised 
civil society activities. In this sense OC fulfilled a mediating function by providing 
individual and collective actors with an arena to articulate and exchange ideas. It 
allowed actors from different fields and spheres to see and hear what “the others” 
were doing about the same issues. 
Through the journal we allocate information from A to B and 
from B to A. Scientific accounts are very important for us and 
for civil society organisations in general. So we publish a 
journal where things are said in ways that people can 
understand and use. It’s a utopian dream to believe that 
universities have the power to directly inform politics. 
Consequently we aim to establish and to maintain the 
discourse between organised civil society and scientists. 
(Martin) 
As a consequence, OC was an explicit resource for establishing and maintaining 
alternative public discourse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993), which allowed CFE to 
practise its long-term political programme of mediating between civil society, 
institutional politics and academia. 
Regarding the implied outcome of being an access point to current debates, 
research has shown that large NGOs often monitor an enormous range of media – 
from audio-visual and print media to lifestyle publications and emergent online 
platforms – looking for ways to build brand presence (Powers 2014). CFE 
monitored the news agenda and was embedded in a continuous flow of 
information through online platforms. In addition, the organisation gained 
information through face-to-face and mediated interaction with other actors. Yet, 
one of the main channels for accessing information about current debates around 
European citizenship was through practices related to the publication of their own 
journal. The reason for doing this was intimately related to CFE’s specialisation on 
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issues that were not often covered in mainstream media. To keep their own 
engagement going and to stay up-to-date in their field of engagement participants 
relied on the information they gathered and contacts they made through the 
journal. While this was directly related to sustaining the organisation’s activities 
another factor was more closely related to legitimation processes.  
Open Citizenship mirrors the way we do things. Our activities 
are characterised by a certain idealism, but they are 
substantiated by empirical findings and comparative studies. 
Instead of saying: “We are a small group of people who do 
stuff”, we say, “We do this and that because it has been proven 
to work very well in other countries or another context”. 
(Christian) 
One of the intentions behind the publication of OC was to base CFE’s activities on 
the empirical findings and comparative work of other civil society organisations. 
Whenever politicians, members of the organised civil society 
or our supporters ask us, “Your are five individuals, why 
should we listen to your advice?”, we are not backed up by a 
democratic mass that legitimises our actions. We develop this 
legitimation from existing scientific know-how that we 
partially publish in Open Citizenship. (Martin) 
In contrast to the legitimation of democratic leadership civil society organisations 
are not legitimised through a written constitution, institutional frameworks or 
people’s votes. As a result they need to look for legitimation elsewhere. Through 
publishing its journal CFE partially created its own source of legitimation. On the 
one hand, OC was a source for gaining information first hand. On the other hand, 
by creating a platform for such debates the journal demonstrated CFE’s ability to 
handle complex issues in a comprehensible manner. Taken together, the 
information and knowledge that was gained through OC was considered a key 
resource for legitimising the organisation’s activities. This finding complements 
the findings of the previous chapter, underlining how the relation between media 
practices and legitimation is more subtle and less straightforward than often 
assumed (Herbst 2003; Koopmans 2004). Considering the relation between 
media-related practices, legitimation and long-term involvement, the case of CFE 
shows that establishing legitimation is not only grounded in mainstream media 
attention and media practices that are visible first hand, but can also be created and 
sustained by less spectacular, less obvious practices. One way of building up 
legitimacy through practices related to OC was furthering the organisation’s 
impartial expertise by gaining access to current debates and coming into direct 
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contact with relevant actors in the field of European citizenship and political 
participation. 
This leads me to the second implied outcome of OC as a medium for making 
contact with other actors and keeping these contacts going. 
A lot of collaboration came out of initial contacts we had 
through Open Citizenship. Some of them published an article 
with us, we stayed in contact and later we started to 
collaborate with each other. OC gives us the opportunity to 
identify partners, to give them visibility and by doing so to 
“bind” them to us. (Martin) 
OC enabled CFE to affiliate with individual and collective actors that contributed 
to the journal and to stay connected with them over time. The journal was used to 
establish relationships to other civil society organisations and scholars which 
often led to further collaborations. In particular, through acting as a medium that 
gave actors visibility the journal became a resource that fed into the process of 
sustaining longer term relationships with other organisations. Accordingly, the 
journal had a twofold relevance for the organisation. The medium itself was part 
of CFE’s engagement (Cammaerts 2012) as OC gave actors a space where they 
could speak in their own voices and discuss issues that were not part of 
mainstream debate. Thus CFE created bridges between actors belonging to 
different fields and widened the discourse around issues of citizenship and 
political participation in Europe. As a consequence CFE was able to position itself 
as a legitimate actor that created ‘trans-institutional connections’ (Lovink and 
Rossiter 2011). At the same time this allowed CFE to gain relevant information and 
contacts that they could use for other activities and to legitimise their own 
activities by referring to empirical research. 
To conclude this section, one can remark that Open Citizenship was not simply 
an in-house publication that propagated CFE’s achievements. Neither was it a 
source of income for the organisation. Instead it fulfilled four interconnected 
functions: first, it was a platform to mediate between civil society, politicians and 
academia; second, it enabled CFE to gain knowledge about issues and debates 
related to European citizenship; third, it enabled CFE to base their activities on 
scientific arguments, knowledge and comparative examples; fourth, it initiated 
and sustained long-term relationships with other individual and collective actors. 
Taken together, as the above section has shown, these four factors enabled CFE to 
position itself as an intermediary organisation between civil society, academia and 
institutional politics. In other words, publishing OC was part of establishing CFE 
as a legitimate agent mediating between different spheres. 
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The above section focused on practices related to offline media. I will now 
continue to look at legitimation processes by discussing CFE’s use of its website. 
More particularly, I will look in more detail at the way CFE produced, documented 
and curated media material for its website. 
 
6.2 Producing, documenting and curating 
Externally oriented communication channels like popular online platforms were 
added over time but the organisation website was launched at the very beginning. 
The website had seven subsections. These included the organisation’s history, its 
aims and modus operandi and the team; a section where visitors could sign up to 
CFE’s mailing list; a section that announced vacancies; a section that gave an 
overview of all current and past projects; another was dedicated to the 
organisation’s active network of partners and collaborators; a section indicated 
how viewers might support CFE in form of donations or volunteering; and, 
finally, a section that listed contact details. As Christian mentioned earlier, the 
website was embedded in a wider media environment, which meant that a lot of 
its content was shared and distributed across Facebook, Twitter and Pinterest. 
While the organisation’s website had a comprehensible design and was well 
structured, some features that have become increasingly common for websites 
were consciously excluded. 
We don’t have a comment section on our website. If someone 
wants to comment on our work they need to call us or write 
emails. (Martin) 
The website was not interactive in a way that allowed visitors to be part of its 
content through commenting on or responding to entries or the like. Accordingly, 
it was a one-way communication channel; that is, an infrastructure strictly used 
for external communication. Overall, it appeared that the website’s main purpose 
was to familiarise visitors with the organisation and to fulfil a certain public 
relations function. When asked about the relevance of the website, participants 
emphasised its overall significance for the organisation. 
A reputable online presence has become incredibly important. 
(Louisa) 
Christian added to this: 
Nowadays a website is your business card. If you don’t appear 
online you simply don’t exist. (Christian) 
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Echoing the notion that mediated visibility today includes aspects beyond 
mainstream channels (Cammaerts et al. 2013), Christian’s comment shows that 
having a website was considered fundamental for CFE. This, however, did not 
explain the significance of the website for the organisation’s engagement practices. 
Analysing the website in more detail, it became apparent that two aspects of how 
CFE used their online presence were particularly important: first, for 
communicating CFE’s mode of practice, and second, for affiliating CFE with 
trusted organisations. 
The Brückenbauer Summer School 2012 is a good example in this context. As 
the CFE website stated, the purpose of this gathering was to bring together 
‘practitioners coming from all over Europe to connect and to exchange on their 
engagement for a more inclusive society in Europe’. The Bertelsmann Foundation, 
one of the best-resourced foundations in Germany, financed the Summer School. 
The group of around fifty people that came together over three days in Barcelona 
was composed of individuals representing different civil society organisations 
from fifteen European countries and members of the Bertelsmann Foundation’s 
promotion programme for politically motivated individuals with migration 
backgrounds. The opportunity to organise the Summer School, as participants 
emphasised, was the outcome of a temporal process. 
If we had approached a big foundation two years ago, before 
anyone had ever heard of our projects or knew who we’ve 
worked with, they would have said: “Of course we won’t give 
you any money or support your stuff”. By now they have 
followed our work for some time and have realised what we’re 
doing. The environment we’re working in and the network 
we’re embedded in create trust. (Martin) 
More concretely, the collaboration with Bertelsmann was largely a consequence of 
two processes: the standing that CFE had established through Every Vote 2011 and 
practices related to OC that highlighted the organisation’s focus on mediating and 
creating connections between actors from different fields. Matching this 
reputation, “Brückenbauer” means bridge builder in German. 
Considering the first point, to communicate CFE’s mode of practice, the 
website played a certain pre-event role announcing forthcoming activities, which 
demonstrated that CFE’s engagement was ongoing. Still more importantly, the 
group attached a lot of importance to the documentation of their projects. 
Hannerz has highlighted that ‘media technologies do not only allow us to reach 
out through space. They also bind time by allowing us to record things, and thus 
preserve ever more kinds of ideas and cultural forms, in great detail’ (Hannerz 
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1996: 24). While Hannerz was concerned with the role institutions like schools 
and museums play for the preservation of cultural heritage, one can translate his 
observation to CFE’s experience. Considering the organisation’s website practices, 
it became apparent that in fact almost every activity was documented in a rather 
detailed way. This was also clear during participant observation. As with the use of 
media in their own office, CFE made a lot of use of noticeboards during their 
workshops, which, as I noticed at various get-togethers, were then visually 
documented. Shortly after the meetings participants received these records in 
form of emails accompanied by photographs of participants and a short written 
report. The documentations was also made publicly available on the organisation’s 
website and shared across online platforms like Pinterest (see Appendix 6). 
In accordance with this general procedure, CFE’s documentation of the 
Brückenbauer Summer School included pictures of participants and the outcomes 
of the three-day gathering. CFE also embedded Bertelsmann’s own 
documentation on its website – including two film documentaries and a selection 
of participant Tweets.9 
The benefit of offering the participants different information 
channels and forms of media is that they know where the 
information is coming from – if they refer back to it in half a 
year or so it underlines the success of our workshop. It has a 
very strong long-term component. If I thought in the short, 
term like a marketing agency, I would be interested in the 
impact of the commercial on page 30. But that’s not how 
things are done in our organisation. (Christian) 
On the one hand, in producing media material documenting their workshops, 
CFE enabled participants to remember the gathering in more detail and to return 
to particular information to continue work on issue-related projects that might 
otherwise have been lost. On the other hand, CFE’s documentation and 
publicising practices implied another purpose. By making the documentation 
publicly available on the official website and various online platforms, CFE made 
its practice transparent and accessible to non-participants, its existing network of 
collaborators and possible future allies. As Louisa pointed out: 
It is important to demonstrate to the groups we already 
collaborate and work with our range of activities, but you also 
                                                
9 The Bertelsmann Foundation made short film documentaries that were uploaded on 
the foundation’s YouTube channel, published participant statements on its Facebook 
page, frequently made announcements on Twitter and published an extensive printed 
report on the Summer School. 
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want to show future collaborators and possible participants 
what we do. (Louisa) 
A significant element of the documentation of the initiatives and, even more so, 
the distribution of it was to communicate to relevant actors as well as to wider 
undefined publics how, with whom and on what issues CFE was acting. The 
website – and the media environment it was embedded in – was used to deepen 
relationships with existing collaborators and to establish new liaisons by 
demonstrating their mode of practice to potential collaborators. This became an 
ever more important dynamic as it was directly interrelated with another aim: to 
publicly affiliate CFE with trusted organisations. 
Considering this second issue, participants mentioned over and over again that 
since their establishment in 2010 the number of collaborators had increased 
considerably. As Martin explained (see above), many of the organisations CFE was 
currently working with would not have collaborated with them in the early days. 
Asked why this was the case Christian referred back to, amongst other factors, 
their practices related to the website. 
First of all, we have the references that we present on our 
website, which show that we’ve already worked with some 
big names. (Christian) 
While OC implicitly showed readers CFE’s role as a mediator connecting actors 
from different fields – academics, politicians and organised civil society – the 
website displayed the concrete outcomes of these connections. It was not only 
important ‘to show future collaborators and possible participants what we do’ 
(Louisa) but also with whom CFE was bringing these projects to life. Accordingly, 
the website dedicated a whole section to past and contemporary partners and 
collaborators (see Appendix 7). As legitimacy is grounded in the perceptions of 
stakeholders in the larger environment in which an organisation is embedded 
(Suchman 1995; Scott 2014; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975), the references were a clear 
signal to current and potential allies that CFE was embedded in a network of 
reputable organisations. While OC embodied the organisation’s modus operandi 
of acting as an intermediary association, the website was an infrastructure for 
positioning this mode of practice in a more institutionalised context. Besides 
communicating their mode of practice, the website portrayed their “successful” 
collaborations with relevant institutions such as the Bertelsmann Foundation. 
Accordingly, practices related to the website enabled CFE to embed itself in the 
context of other legitimate actors and was part of establishing and maintaining 
CFE as a legitimate intermediary organisation. This was particularly important, 
because as Martin stated in relation to the organisation’s reliance on scientific 
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expertise, ‘we are not legitimised by a democratic mass’ (Martin). The website, 
enabling CFE to publicly demonstrate its mode of practice and by affiliating itself 
with trustful actors, was part of the organisation’s legitimation process. 
It is therefore appropriate to refer to practices related to the website as 
cooptation; that is ‘strategic use of institutional ties to demonstrate the 
organization’s worthiness and acceptability to other external constituents from 
whom it hopes to obtain resources and approval’ (Oliver 1991: 158). Cooptation 
was particularly crucial for CFE’s efforts because the organisation had no 
democratic legitimation and needed to establish its legitimacy by other means. 
Besides their engagements related to Every Vote 2011 and Open Citizenship this 
was achieved by actively communicating its mode of practice and publicly 
embedding the organisation within a legitimate context of trusted actors. Taken 
together, CFE’s practices related to the website were not so much concerned with 
preserving, but rather with “curating”. Curation, as Bennett and his colleagues 
have characterised it, ‘entails the preservation, maintenance, and sorting of digital 
assets created in the production process’ (Bennett et al. 2014: 239). By curating 
content online CFE embedded itself within an environment of larger, well-
positioned and trusted organisations. Curating the organisation’s website and the 
wider media environment in which it was embedded enabled CFE to create a 
history of their projects and to tell a convincing narrative of why, how and with 
whom these activities had been brought to life. The website acted as an 
infrastructure that allowed CFE to establish and maintain the image of a coherent 
and legitimate organisation. 
Consequently, the website was only partially a platform for ‘publicity work’ 
(Powers 2014). Visibility and being findable online might be considered a 
precondition for reaching existing allies and actors outside of the network, but 
CFE was not curating content online for the sake of being visible. Rather, curating 
was a constitutive part of signalling CFE’s standing to third parties whose interest 
the collective action would benefit from. The curation of the website was 
particularly relevant as CFE’s work heavily relied on alliances and collaborations 
with other organisations. Because the organisation was small, almost every 
initiative was based on collaborative work. As Arianna stated: 
Collaborations are indispensable for us. As a small team we 
simply can’t imagine having an impact without our partners. 
(Arianna) 
In addition to CFE’s relatively small size, its newness in the scene amplified the 
need for collaborations and the need to affiliate the organisation with a network of 
relevant actors. In particular for recently established organisations, alliance 
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building in part depends on ‘the spread of information about the organization and 
its perception by prospective allies as a relevant political actor’ (Diani 2003: 108). 
Creating and maintaining legitimation amongst existing and prospective allies was 
first of all a process that needed time (Johnson et al. 2006; Rosanvallon 2011). An 
online reference list clearly did not do the legitimacy building per se. All the same, 
taken together practices related to the curation of the website were a vital part of 
CFE being perceived as a legitimate civil society organisation by other relevant 
individual and collective actors. As CFE’s modus operandi was reliant on 
collaborations – both for the sake of funding and bringing their political work 
building bridges to life – the formation of legitimacy and the sustaining of political 
engagement over time were inseparably connected to media-related practices. 
Taking photographs or videos and uploading them online has become part of 
many people’s everyday lives and, in fact, area a part of what corporations consider 
“sociality” nowadays. Yet, depending on the context, potentially ordinary media 
practices have different meanings and rationales and lead to different outcomes. 
As shown in this section, for CFE, producing, documenting and curating particular 
content online was tied to the long-term positioning of the group as a legitimate 
political organisation. 
So far I have covered two factors that Marin initially considered to be the pillars 
of CFE’s engagement – campaigning and the publication of the journal Open 
Citizenship. The third factor relates to the organisation’s networking efforts. 
 
6.3 A democratic community of practice 
In 2011 CFE was the driving force behind launching a trans-local network of 
around thirty individuals from the European Union who were either affiliated to 
civil society organisations or to academia. Trans-local in this context denotes a 
network of people who collaborate and operate beyond cultural and national 
boundaries (Kannengießer 2014). The network was constituted by organisations 
that contributed heterogeneous backgrounds, perspectives and experiences. 
Besides their heterogeneity the participating organisations shared common 
concerns and interests related to European citizenship and political participation. 
The launch in Berlin was followed by meetings in Copenhagen in February 2012, 
in Prague in September 2012 and in Paris in February 2013. 
The network meetings in Copenhagen and Berlin are 
extremely diffuse. If you asked “What are the concrete 
outcomes of the meetings?” I couldn’t tell you. I know that 
there are very concrete outcomes. Four or five new 
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collaborations emerged after the get-together in Berlin. People 
who would otherwise never have met communicate with each 
other. But the aim is not that the whole network appears as a 
single actor. The network facilitates new opportunities and 
creates synergy effects. (Martin) 
As Martin’s clarifies, the network was a concrete but diffused arrangement of 
interconnected organisations. As such it fitted well into CFE’s political aim of 
‘promoting actors’ collective intelligence and boosting self-empowerment’ (CfE 
newsletter 26 April 2013, Appendix 3), which had already been practised in the 
Every Vote 2011 campaign. Self-empowerment was not considered an 
individualistic process but based on collective synergies. There was a strong belief 
in the power of learning and acting jointly by bringing together different 
organisations to find suitable collaborators for their various political endeavours. 
During the first meetings the network was nameless. During the second 
meeting, in Copenhagen, discussion emerged concerning the benefits and deficits 
of giving the network a name. Finally, in the following months the participants 
agreed to name the network according to its mode of action: Democratic 
Community of Practice (DemCoP). The community of practice not only shared 
the name with the concept famously coined by Lave and Wenger in the early 
1990s (Lave and Wenger 1991), but also its actual conduct: like-minded groups of 
actors who are oriented towards a shared interest in learning and applying a 
common practice. 
We want to establish a form of “community of practice”. It is a 
long-term project to bring together thirty-forty people with 
different perspectives and from different countries to learn 
from each other and to act with each other – if possible, on a 
day-to-day basis. (Martin) 
The overall aim of DemCoP was to achieve political goals by creating workable 
partnerships in which information, knowledge and experience were harnessed as 
key resources of communicative action. This aim was formulated in more concrete 
terms on CFE’s website: ‘Before the background of the limited resources each 
member has, the members share these resources, such as language skills, valuable 
contacts, staff, office space, funding applications, knowledge, etc.’ (CFE website). 
From an organisational perspective there was no explicit sense of a core or centre, 
which might contradict common understandings of community (see Lave and 
Wenger 1991). As Martin emphasised, the diverse sets of actors connected in ways 
that were not under the control of any single agent. Nonetheless, as the 
participants emphasised and as became clear during the observation of the 
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network meetings, CFE and a hand full of other participants acted as the initiator 
and continued to act as the driving force of the community by, among other 
things, organising regular get-togethers and documenting the meetings. Similar to 
the Every Vote campaign, CFE co-initiated DemCoP and was concerned with 
coordinating its overall structure, but did not hold the reins tightly. 
You have to invest two or three years in such a structure until 
it runs on its own. (Christian) 
While the tendency of bringing together people in a fairly loose manner is 
increasingly noticeable amongst issue-oriented organisations in Europe (see 
Bennett and Segerberg 2013), participants emphasised that there was no 
comparable network or movement focusing exclusively on European citizenship 
and political participation in the EU. Former understandings of “communities of 
practice” originally described the involvement of individuals in local 
communities. The network’s self-conception, as well as the findings presented on 
DemCoP so far, show that the notion can be applied even when a given 
community is not associated with local territory or physical proximity. In fact, 
considering the common issues DemCoP was acting on, it was central that 
different perspectives from different countries had to brought together to create 
workable partnerships. As CFE mentioned on its website, the challenges that 
democracies in Europe face today ‘have led to many ad hoc reactions in the private, 
public and political sphere and too often they were motivated by short-term 
interests’ (CFE website). As a response DemCoP was aiming to ‘bring together 
different actors to lay the path for a long-term collaboration between these actors’ 
(CFE website). Trans-local sharing of resources was considered essential for 
responding to the scale at which societal and political constellations are organised 
in contemporary Europe – in particular, the fading of national boundaries and the 
widening of internal and external migration. 
From this perspective, DemCoP can be considered an alternative political 
structure for the articulation of practices and associated constitution of political 
agency beyond existing political objects like party politics. As with the Every Vote 
2011 campaign the community of practice enabled participating organisations to 
embed their own abilities and political work within a larger context. 
With the network we open up space for the formation of a 
new identity. (Christian) 
DemCoP established a common social world that was not bounded by formal 
membership or geography but rather only by the limits of communicative 
practices. Considering the fact that DemCoP was building on individuals who 
coexisted in time without being in reciprocal spatial reach (Schutz 1967), 
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communication was a pressing question. As has been shown, communication of 
certain kinds was taking place through meetings in different European cities. The 
frequency of these get-togethers over the first years underlined the relevance of 
creating moments of face-to-face interaction. Yet, given that the network only met 
every few months, the importance of mediated communication imposed itself. 
Accordingly, the constitution of the network, that is, the transformation of a 
centrally rooted organisation into a distributed collective (Keck and Sikkink 1998), 
went hand in hand with the development of new communication practices. For 
the participants, the building of a trans-local network would have been hard to 
imagine without a wide range of media-related practices. 
Media technologies have become essential for exchanging 
information and communicating with our European partners. 
Because most of our activities and projects are trans-European, 
tools like Skype that enable “direct” communication amongst 
people in different countries have become absolutely 
necessary. (Arianna) 
Media-related practices ranged from interpersonal communication via Skype 
between individual participants to using mailing lists to inform all members in the 
trans-local community about news or future activities (Kavada 2010; 
Kannengießer 2014). Especially as most members were resource-poor 
organisations, media-related practices played a crucial role in making it possible 
for them to be part of a trans-local community encouraging political engagement 
beyond the state. Due to the geographical distance of individual members, digital 
media were inserted as infrastructures to support a wide range of communicative 
practices and collective activities. As the participants emphasised, media 
infrastructures were inserted predominantly to bridge the time between regular 
face-to-face meetings and as means to review the meetings. 
To have the possibility to communicate with single 
individuals as well as the whole group via email or mailing 
lists is particularly relevant for our work prior to and after the 
meetings. Working collaboratively on documents online, for 
example, is a big part of organising a meeting and to develop a 
common programme together. (Louisa) 
In addition, underlining the previous findings on CFE’s curating practices, all 
meetings were documented and made publicly available online. Using different 
digital media enabled the network not only to establish engagements at scales 
larger than the local (Sassen 2008) but was also important for sustaining the 
network over time as resources did not allow for a higher frequency of meetings. 
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Digital media did not only facilitate the emergence and endurance of the network 
but also presented the network as a political subjectivity (Juris 2008) central for 
anyone wishing to engage with trans-local issues across Europe. Overall, all 
participants stressed the need to bring mediated and face-to-face interaction 
together.  
It was clear from the beginning that we wanted to work on- 
and offline by creating physical get-togethers and by enabling 
people to meet, organise and receive information via digital 
platforms. (Christian) 
A network needs to be vitalised through personal, direct 
communication. (Martin) 
I don’t believe that any meaningful politics can take place 
when people have never met. Not everyone who is part of the 
action needs to be there all of the time but at least the key 
figures need to know each other personally. (Louisa) 
From this perspective the network combined mediated networking and 
aggregation logics (Juris 2012: 269) to sustain its activities over time. Accordingly, 
to sustain and stabilise the trans-local community of practice a ‘mixture and a 
continuum of kinds of direct and mediated engagements’ (Hannerz 1996: 11) were 
vital. The conviction that face-to-face interaction was needed to form workable 
partnerships was in part based on negative experiences CFE had with online 
platforms. Although enabling communication beyond reciprocal spatial reach, not 
all expectations in digital infrastructures were fulfilled. 
We initiated a wiki in Copenhagen, but that’s already more or 
less dead. Only a few people contributed to it and within a few 
months or so nobody will ever use it again. […] It is difficult to 
facilitate direct, personal communication without walking 
right into the trap of “This or that online tool will solve all our 
problems”. (Martin) 
This negative experience resembled an earlier experience CFE had with Vote-
Exchange.org, a free web-based social community that the organisation created in 
its first year. The platform allowed citizens living in EU member states of which 
they were not nationals, ‘to enter a transnational discourse about national political 
parties, programmes and candidates and, eventually, a cross-border voting 
partnership’ (see Appendix 8). Over the whole period of my research the platform 
was still in a stage of orientation and user numbers remained very low. 
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We knew that it’s far from easy to build up a network, but 
Vote-Exchange didn’t work out the way we wanted it to. It’s 
still a work in progress and we’re still trying to improve it. For 
example, by producing a video that explains what Vote-
Exchange is capable of and what we are trying to achieve with 
it. (Christian) 
While empirical inquiries tend to investigate media-related practices that work, 
actors’ energy put into the creation and use of digital infrastructures is not 
necessarily o good investment. CFE’s disappointment over its plan to create an 
exclusively web-based social community and the failure of creating a common 
wiki for DemCoP strengthened the belief in and reliance on face-to-face 
interactions and mediated communication being brought together to build and 
sustain networked forms of engagement. 
To conclude this section, it can be said that participants of the trans-local 
community made use of a wide range of media-related practices – from telephony 
to Skype to email and mailing lists – to coordinate and organise common activities. 
While the use of digital media was vital modality for a dispersed community, 
increased communicative connectivity via mediated communication did not 
dissolve the network’s need for personal get-togethers. Using digital media was 
not about creating activism per se. Rather DemCoP relied on media-related 
practices to maintain the flow of information between face-to-face meetings to 
sustain the network’s interactions. Accordingly, media-related practices were 
fundamental for holding the participating organisations together and in doing so 
to sustain the community’s political engagement over time. Nevertheless, the 
actual potential of these practices was brought to life only in combination with 
face-to-face meetings. 
Coming to the last section of this chapter and my research on CFE, I now want 
to bring the above findings together by putting them into dialogue with CFE’s 
overall aim of establishing itself as an intermediary organisation and sustaining its 
engagement practices over time. 
 
6.4 Living your own aim and how to sustain it 
Financial resources are seldom raised as an issue in contemporary studies of 
political activism that relies heavily on the use of digital media (Castells 2012; 
Shirky 2009; Bennett et al. 2014). Yet, as has been hinted at throughout the above, 
as with many civil society organisations (Powers 2014), CFE was strongly 
concerned with its own survival. 
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People often act as if it wasn’t a big deal but we constantly 
have to figure out how we finance our activities. Part of our 
work is geared to gain new funding. CFE is strategically well 
positioned. […] An organisation of our size can easily dissolve 
once two sources cut off their money supply. (Louisa) 
To enable the organisation to sustain its political engagement over time CFE acted 
at different levels. Initially CFE based its activities on a three-tiered strategy that 
consisted of direct campaigns like Every Vote 2011, publishing the journal Open 
Citizenship and establishing the trans-local network DemCoP. All of these 
engagements relied on collaborations and external funding. Over the period of my 
research CFE began to establish a new pillar, discussed earlier in the context of the 
organisation’s curating practices, which allowed CFE to frame itself as a legitimate 
actor. 
As a small non-membership association it is almost 
impossible to exclusively rely on fundraising. […] One option 
is to be consolidated by public institutions like foundations to 
communicate or to handle particular information for them. 
Another option for generating income is to organise events 
where participants like ministry officials pay attendance fees. 
The money gained from facilitating such events can be used 
for other projects that have no sponsor. (Martin) 
The Brückenbauer Summer School for the Bertelsmann Foundation was one 
example of establishing a revenue model that allowed putting additional efforts 
into other activities. Yet, as has been argued, organising events like the Summer 
School were not solely important for financial reasons, but also for the overall 
legitimation of CFE. In fact, as has been shown throughout the whole analysis so 
far, the different levels on which CFE was acting were interrelated and in turn all 
related to issues of European citizenship and political participation in the EU. 
Taken together they secured CFE’s political engagement over time. To further 
explicate this argument one can take DemCoP as an example. 
Every project that we do benefits our own political work. The 
community of practice helps us to identify new partners. 
During our Every Vote campaign in Berlin we realised that it 
takes a lot of effort – organisation, translation, locations – to 
bring things to life. We were only able to pull it off because we 
collaborated with over 100 actors. […] We are building up 
DemCoP because we need it. (Martin) 
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Participants regarded connection and being embedded in a comprehensive 
network as highly valuable goods. 
Another big step to gain influence is through establishing a 
network. It sounds rather banal because everyone wants to be 
part of a network nowadays. But I think it is really essential to 
be networked on a Berlin level as well as on a European level. 
(Louisa) 
Of course you have to make sure that you don’t remain in the 
same network all the time to avoid stagnation or becoming 
conservative. The network is imperative to push through your 
ideas. […] The only thing that eventually makes the difference 
are your networks and your personal channels of information. 
(Christian) 
On first sight, then, participants’ emphasis could be interpreted as an 
endorsement of ‘connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg 2013) as they appeared 
to value connectivity for its own sake. Yet, as I looked more closely at CFE’s 
general mode of practice, and practices related to DemCoP in particular, it became 
clear that participants associated their embeddedness in a larger network of actors 
with establishing and sustaining the organisation’s political engagement. 
Accordingly, CFE’s appreciation of “networking” emphasised the organisation’s 
need to affiliate with networks of individual and organisational actors to survive in 
the long run (Walker and McCarthy 2010). Being part of a larger network like 
DemCoP provided a kind of backbone and, more concretely, established and at the 
same time strengthened CFE’s role as an intermediary organisation. 
The aim is to establish oneself as a reference point that people 
get in contact with whenever they’re looking for information 
about a particular issue. […] Currently it is our mode of practice 
that people are most interested in. The fact that we manage to 
get formal things done in a rather informal way. (Christian) 
Many of the collaborations that emerged towards the end of my research were 
based on CFE’s standing as a legitimate civil society organisation embedded in a 
large network and therefore able to mediate between actors from different fields. 
Currently we have the opportunity to establish CFE as an 
association with a particular know-how and expertise. […] The 
Bertelsmann Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
both want to gain access to our expertise, which in large part 
	   132 
comes in the form of contacts and our European network. 
(Martin)10 
CFE, as Martin stated, was “booked” by large German foundations as experts in the 
field of networking and creating bridges between different fields, which points to 
strong interdependences between the community of practice and CFE’s role as a 
facilitator of workshops. Similarly one can draw parallels between Open 
Citizenship, which embodied the organisation’s aim to act as an intermediary 
organisation, and DemCoP, which was the journal’s “physical” equivalent. 
We are often in a mediator position and do a lot of things 
where one can’t put one’s finger on the actual consequences. 
[…] With most projects we are a mediator, a mouthpiece where 
different people get together. (Louisa) 
Overall, the organisation’s various engagements were held together by CFE’s 
modes of practice, with the organisation acting at all layers as an intermediary 
organisation bringing together actors from different spheres and building bridges 
between different fields of action over time. 
If you consider legislation amendments as political influence 
we don’t have any influence. But we are creating a new 
political space. (Christian) 
This mode of practice has been described fittingly as, ‘To act, then, is neither 
arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually engaging in its creation. With 
that creative act the actor also creates herself/himself as the agent responsible for 
the scene created’ (Isin 2008: 27). Whether CFE’s engagement has the desired 
outcome and creates the settings the organisation is aiming for is hard to say as 
CFE is putting its energy into long-term transformations. 
Our organisation is still too young to tell what our efforts are 
leading to. So far we have been engaging within a rather broad 
field of participation and migration. […] But the perspective is 
that we are positioning our activities in a long-term frame. 
(Louisa) 
One of the central long-term aims of the group was to develop and promote a new 
form of trans-national European citizenship. A central step to fulfilling this aim 
was to actually bring together people from different European countries, 
belonging to different spheres. In other words, by establishing itself as an 
                                                
10 The German Friedrich Ebert Foundation is an independent foundation associated 
with the Social Democratic Party. It is the largest and oldest party-associated 
foundation in Germany. 
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intermediary organisation CFE was in part facilitating the kind of European 
citizenship they aspired to bring to life. From this perspective, CFE has already 
moved away from practising a traditional form of citizenship towards a more 
networked citizenship. 
One is tempted to frame this form of political engagement in the terms of 
Bohman’s idea of citizens who inhabit networks of communication and 
interaction and who over time will replace contemporary democratic 
intermediaries with a form agency that opens up and maintains the spaces needed 
for the exercise of communicative power (Bohman 2007). Following Bohman 
(2007), by employing new communications media, citizens become agents who 
create the means by which they gain voice and interact with and shape 
institutions. While in many ways CFE appeared to embody such an understanding 
of transformative agents my findings show that the various ways in which 
connections can be made between communicative status and decisional status are 
not as obvious as Bohman depicts them. As the analysis of CFE’s campaign Every 
Vote 2011 has shown, democratic election outcomes, for example, can put a rapid 
end to an organisation’s struggle for particular policy objectives, in that case 
related to changing formal voting procedures. Existing communicative 
connections between institutional politics and civil society organisations do not 
necessarily lead to increased influence or power to act on democratic deficits. In 
addition, as intermediaries, CFE’s aim was not overly focused on shaping 
institutions or connecting directly with political actors at the top end of the 
decision-making hierarchy. Instead they aimed to build up and to be part of an 
alternative European politics. 
In addition, CFE was far from establishing networks that exclusively relied on 
“new communications media” (Bohman 2007), as they had negative experiences 
with web-based platforms and generally did not believe in the exclusiveness of 
digital media. Instead, as my research underlines, it was the interlocking 
arrangements between face-to-face interaction and media-oriented practices that 
enabled CFE to practise their aim of being an intermediary organisation 
connecting individual and collective actors from different fields. As has been 
shown in the above sections, media-related practices were a constitutive part of 
establishing CFE as an ‘agent responsible for the scene created’ (Isin 2008: 27). Yet, 
as participants did not get tired of emphasising, digital technologies and 
infrastructures did not substitute for the continuing relevance of personal, face-to-
face interactions. Interlocking arrangements between mediated and face-to-face 
communication were constitutive for CFE in establishing their standing as a 
legitimate civil society organisation and in sustaining their political engagement 
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over time. This shows that media-oriented practices like the publication of OC 
and practices related to face-to-face interaction need to be viewed together to 
understand the dynamics underlying CFE’s way of acting politically. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
As this chapter has made clear, media-related practices played a constitutive role in 
Citizen for Europe’s political engagement. They were a key part of establishing and 
maintaining CFE’s role as an intermediary organisation that created ties and 
commonalities between actors belonging to different social and political spheres. 
In relation to each of the sections above it has been shown that the in-house 
publication OC neither acted as a revenue stream nor as a propaganda tool 
announcing CFE’s achievements. Rather it contributed to the stabilisation of CFE’s 
political work as it enabled the organisation to partially legitimise their activities 
and to establish longer term relationships with individual and collective actors. 
The journal had a twofold function: the medium itself was part of the 
organisation’s engagement and, at the same time, allowed CFE to gain relevant 
information and contacts that they could use for other activities and to legitimise 
their own activities. Practices related to the CFE website – described as curating 
practices – added another dimension to the organisation’s legitimation by acting as 
an infrastructure that affiliated CFE with trusted organisations and so embedded 
CFE’s political endeavours within a legitimate context. The organisation’s efforts 
related to establishing and maintaining a Democratic Community of Practice show 
that media-oriented practices complemented the physical meetings to maintain 
the community of practice over time. The final section shows that CFE’s diversity 
of communicative activities strongly contributed to its aim of promoting new 
forms of political participation in the EU. Interlocking arrangements of mediated 
and face-to-face communication not only established and maintained CFE’s role as 
an intermediary organisation but also facilitated the organisation practising 
networked forms of European citizenship by bringing together individual and 
collective actors from across Europe to act together. Accordingly, media-related 
practices were important for enabling CFE to legitimise and sustain their 
engagement practices, which relied on all levels of the organisation’s practices 
having a constructive conflation of organisational aspects and networking 
practices. 
Together with the findings of the previous chapter, the findings presented here 
suggest that it was an interlocking and complementarity of mediated and face-to-
face communication practices that sustained CFE’s mode of practice, allowing it to 
establish and maintain itself as a legitimate agent acting to mediation between 
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different political spheres. Consequently, the findings have implications for how 
one understands the role media-related practices play in fulfilling the political 
goals of civil society organisations. As shown across the two chapters, CFE 
engaged in various offline and online media-related practices. In other words, a 
constitutive part of their political work was based on acting with media 
technologies and infrastructures. What CFE was not concerned with was a more 
general reflexivity about the political dimension underlying these technologies 
and infrastructures. In the next three chapters my focus will turn to this aspect of 
contemporary political activism by introducing my findings on the Chaos 
Computer Club. 
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c h a p t e r  s e v e n  
The Chaos Computer Club  
 
This chapter is the starting point into the empirical analysis of my second case 
study – the Chaos Computer Club (CCC). Together with the next two chapters it 
investigates CCC’s political aims, how it intends to bring these goals to life and, 
more particularly, the relation between media-related practices and legitimation 
and long-term involvement. In the first section I look at a set of practices that 
hackers are probably most renown for: hacking. The second section analyses how 
the CCC constructs, supports and maintains “alternative” communication 
infrastructures that enable users to avoid being embedded in revenue-driven and 
data-hungry communication services. The third section investigates the 
organisation’s internal use of media technologies and infrastructures in order to 
understand how media-related practices contribute to the formation and 
continuity of CCC’s engagement. Overall, this chapter reveals that the hacker 
organisation is acting politically with and through media-related practices. In 
doing so it suggests the relevance of these two dimensions for widening the lens 
of analysis of political practices related to media. 
 
7.1 Hacking as direct digital action 
Let me start by chronologically analysing a set of practices that one might expect 
hackers to perform – hacking – which, for now, is understood as critical, creative 
and subversive use of technology. In an interview with Italian cyberpunk group 
Decoder Wau Holland, deceased co-founder of the CCC, described the 
organisation’s beginnings as follows. 
In essence, we realised that those who are in power in our 
society derive part of this authority from data processing, and 
that not only police forces or state authorities could use 
databases, but we could use them as well. […] This is how 
hacking started, which I would define as a practice that lets 
you be inside a situation as soon as it happens and allows you 
to create new meanings from it. (Holland interview in 
Guarneri 1990) 
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The CCC’s first hack that gained major attention was the so-called Btx hack. Btx 
(abbr. for Bildschirmtext, ‘screen text’) was an interactive online system deployed 
by different corporations across Europe in the early 1980s. From its nationwide 
launch in 1983 Btx was part of the German Federal Post Office’s monopoly on 
mediated communication – including mail, telephone, computer networks and 
hardware. Integrating a telephone and a screen in one medium, the main purpose 
of Btx was to facilitate and promote e-commerce and digital communication by 
enabling users to undertake banking transactions, shop electronically, write 
electronic letters and to receive news flashes. Following the rapid spread of the 
World Wide Web the last Btx access was disabled in 2001.11 Although the system 
was far less networked it can be seen as a precursor of contemporary services like 
online payment systems and news tickers. 
The system’s generally positive reputation was called into question when in 
November 1984 the CCC exploited a security flaw in Btx which allowed the 
hackers to transfer 135,000 Deutschmark (ca. 68.000 Euro) from Hamburg’s 
savings bank to their own donation page. Immediately after the hack the CCC re-
transferred the money and reported the incident to the data protection 
commissioner.12 Besides demonstrating the system’s security flaws the hack was 
an explicit protest against the prevailing monopolistic situation and a clear protest 
for free communication and information infrastructures. One of the Club’s old 
hands, Steffen Wernéry, described the initial conflicts between the hacker 
organisation and the German Federal Post Office in the following way. 
The interesting part of the whole story was that there was 
nothing and you had to establish and shape everything 
yourself. […]This was the foundation for the CCC’s fight for 
information freedom from the very beginning because we first 
of all had to crack the post monopoly. […] That’s how the fight 
for fundamental rights, for the freedom to communicate 
started right away with Wau, a few others and myself. 
(Steffen) 
News media reported widely on the hack and members even today refer back to 
the subversive “deconstruction” of the Btx system as the birth of the CCC’s public 
profile as an acknowledged organisation in the field of computing. 
                                                
11 In the UK the service was named Prestel and in France Minitel. In 1995 Deutsche 
Telekom renamed Btx T-Online, which is still the company’s online service today. In 
France Minitel was disconnected more than a decade later, in June 2012, with 
approximately 800,000 active connections remaining. For examples of early Btx 
terminals, see Appendix 9. 
12 For a detailed depiction of the Btx hack, see Denker (2011). 
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Looking at the Btx hack in 1984 one comes across a very 
interesting interview where the HASPA [Hamburg Savings 
Bank] director said that he no longer trusts the Federal Post, 
who sold the system, and praises the hackers’ competence. In 
my view that was the establishment of the CCC as a positive 
collective in Germany. It was considered an association that 
attracted positive attention, an association that was loyal and 
acted ethically. (Lars)13 
While Btx catapulted the hackers into prime time programmes and on the front 
page of many newspapers at that time the initial accomplishments were soon 
forgotten. Throughout the late 1980s and most of the 1990s a number of 
individual CCC members were involved in a hacks that were either in the grey area 
of legality or straightforwardly illegal. The wider implications of these activities 
will be made more apparent in the sections below. For now, let me simply note 
that it took many years for the Club to re-emerge as a trustful organisation. 
In October 2006 the Club, together with the Dutch citizen group Wij 
Vertrouwen Stemcomputers Niet (‘We do not trust voting computers’), hacked a 
voting computer that was at that time in use in elections in the Netherlands, 
France, Germany and the United States. Headed by Dutch hacker, and long-term 
CCC member, Rop Gonggrijp, the hackers demonstrated how the computers were 
stored at unguarded locations, and therefore accessible for manipulation, and 
proved that the software could be altered by replacing a chip (Gonggrijp 2006). 
The actual alteration of the software was made observable to outsiders by 
reprogramming the computer so that it could play chess. This also disproved the 
manufacturer’s earlier objection to criticism, which had stated that if the machine 
was a computer it could also play chess. By demonstrating that computers were 
not forgery-proof and that a fraud would be almost impossible to reconstruct, the 
hackers convincingly showed that basing elections on the use of these computers 
would endanger the democratic process. 
Activists around the world took the CCC’s engagement as an example and 
started to scrutinise the democratic deficit of voting computers in their home 
countries. The recipient of the prestigious Electronic Frontier Foundation’s 2010 
Pioneer Award, Hari Prasad, for example, was involved in revealing security flaws 
                                                
13 The interview with HASPA director Benno Schölermann took place on the main 
television news magazine of public broadcaster ZDF. In the same programme Steffen 
Wernéry and Wau Holland explained in more detail how they hacked the Btx system. 
The importance of the Btx hack can be seen in one of the CCC’s emblems, which is a 
fusion of the post office logo and a pirate skull (see Appendix 10). The emblem is 
called “Pesthörnchen” (pest horn) – an allusion to “Posthorn” (post horn). For an 
insightful account of hacker humour see Coleman (2012). 
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in India’s paperless electronic voting machines. Together with Gonggrijp and an 
international team of computer scientists and software engineers, he discovered 
serious flaws in India’s electronic voting system that would potentially alter 
national election results (Wolchok et al. 2010). Since early 2014 the CCC has been 
involved in an ongoing effort against the implementation of computerised vote 
counts in Switzerland, emphasising that the technological non-transparency of e-
counting contradicts the democratic nature of elections. 
In 2008 Club members obtained fingerprints from the German interior 
minister at that time, Wolfgang Schäuble, and published them in a format 
designed to fool passport fingerprint readers. The hack underlined the 
vulnerability of biometric identity systems at a time when biometric passports 
were introduced on a global scale and fingerprints became obligatory in German 
passports. The critique of the spread of biometric applications in day-to-day life 
was recapitulated more recently. In September 2013 starbug, an active member for 
over fifteen years, hacked Apple’s Touch ID – a technology that allows users to 
unlock their iPhone by fingerprint identification – within a week of its release. In 
the same year, during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Club provided a manual and 
matching tools enabling journalists and other interested users to circumvent 
online censorship and allow people free access to information and 
communication. 
One of the most recent hacks was the disclosure of the so-called Staatstrojaner 
(‘Federal Trojan’). An analysis of the CCC, published on its website on 8 October 
2011, stated that the hacker organisation ‘has reverse engineered and analyzed a 
“lawful interception” malware program used by German police forces’ (Chaos 
Computer Club 2011: n.p.). According to the CCC, the Trojan violated the terms 
set by the constitutional court as it could upload arbitrary programs and execute 
them remotely as well as activate the computer’s microphone or camera and use 
them for surveillance purposes. This was two years before the issue of surveillance 
gained global currency owing to Edward Snowden’s revelations of espionage 
tactics by the NSA and other foreign intelligent agencies. 
Taken together these forms of critically engaging with technological artefacts 
and infrastructures can be referred to as ‘alternative computing’ (Lievrouw 2011). A 
helpful starting point for discussing the more general meaning of these examples 
for direct action is a description by Lisa Thalheim, who has been a CCC member 
for around fourteen years and was involved in the technical groundwork as well as 
being an active member of the CCC biometry work group that was responsible for 
the fingerprint hacks. More recently she withdrew from active engagements with 
the Club to focused on biohacking – practices that seek to bring biology into 
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dialogue with the hacker ethic – at the CCC affiliated hackerspace 
Raumfahrtagentur (‘Space Travel Agency’) in Berlin. 
Technology as such has been around forever, but it should be 
shaped in ways that improve democracy, life or humanity. […] 
Technology has to be accompanied by people that critically 
interact with it extensively. The consequences of a given 
technology depend on who holds this tool in her hands. (Lisa) 
Sam May, a former board member who has been active in the Club’s local Cologne 
group since the late 1990s, stated: 
The Club is a collective that does not only observe technology, 
but also its impact on society, its impact on the economy, its 
impact on the state. (Sam) 
Steffen emphasised that this approach had been part of the organisation since the 
beginning. 
The CCC was initiated as a computer club with socio-political 
aspirations. (Steffen)  
The idea that ‘technology has to be accompanied’ allows translating the rather 
abstract notions of ‘supervising’ and ‘monitoring’ democracy (Keane 2009; 
Rosanvallon 2008) into actual practices implemented by concrete actors. The 
CCC’s statement on the Staatstrojaner hack, for example, concluded that the 
‘analysis revealed once again that law enforcement agencies will overstep their 
authority if not watched carefully’ (Chas Computer Club 2011: n.p.). Taking into 
account that the constant questioning of government actions can be considered 
‘the essence of constructive democratic politics’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 164), the 
hackers’ activities indicated two interconnected aspects of engagement: 
technological and political. 
All participants, each in their own way, articulated how the CCC was a useful 
organisation for critically accompanying technology and questioning government 
actions in relation to technological developments. The ability to act as watchdogs 
of technological developments and their political consequences was first of all 
grounded in the technical abilities and know-how of CCC members. Lars Weiler, 
who has been an active member since 1999 and who strongly influenced the global 
spread of hackerspaces by co-authoring the “Hackerspace Design Patterns” (Ohlig 
and Weiler 2007), put it as follows: 
We know what technology is doing and we can deconstruct it. 
This ranges from “soft” to “hard” methods, which means that 
we do stuff like reverse engineering. We even dismantle 
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microchips and look at them under the microscope to find out 
what is implemented in them. (Lars) 
In a similar tone, Jürgen Geuter, alias tante, a long-term member focusing on data 
privacy who was not actively affiliated with any local group, stated: 
They [the CCC] has completely understood the technologies – 
in fact, better than many others who have entirely embraced 
the net. The Club is able to see many negative side-effects that 
such an embracement can have. (tante) 
The high level of technological know-how was considered particularly significant 
because participants saw the ability for political engagement outside the realm of 
practices related to technology as decreasing. 
I think the areas where you can act politically without 
engaging with technology are by all means getting fewer and 
fewer. If you act in the field of social equality, for example, and 
you say “Hartz IV14 is all bollocks, we have to do something 
about it”, sooner or later you will stumble across issues like 
data collection, registration offices, data collation and stuff like 
that. And that’s going to be the case more and more. So, of 
course, you can do politics without dealing with technology, 
but probably not for much longer and nothing very 
significant. Even less so if you engage in a field where you 
want to communicate with others. (Lisa) 
The thematic spectrum of the Club’s hacks ranged from disclosing security flaws 
for users (Btx and iPhone hack) and for citizens (biometric passport) to 
highlighting the endangerment of basic democratic processes (voting computers) 
and supervising law enforcement agencies (Staatstrojaner). The common thread 
that linked the individual hacks was the Club’s overall political goal to propagate 
and deepen information and communication freedom. Implicitly echoing 
understandings that consider freedom to be fostered when the means of 
communication are dispersed and easily available instead of being concentrated 
and monopolised (de Sola Pool 1983), the hackers were directly acting on ‘the right 
to be informed, the right to inform, the right to privacy, the right to participate in 
public communication’ (MacBride 1980: 265). Hacking was less considered an 
alternative form of computing (cf. Lievrouw 2011) than hacktivism (Jordan and 
Taylor 2004; Jordan 2013) and ‘digital direct action’ (Coleman 2013) to make visible 
                                                
14 The colloquial term for a reform of the German labour market in 2005 that brought 
together unemployment and welfare benefits for long-term unemployed. 
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the political scope and democratic deficits of technological developments. Taken 
together the hacks underlined the political relevance of confronting corporate and 
governmental decisions and actions in the field of technology with a voice that 
represented civil society. Accordingly, in the context of the CCC “hacking” is best 
understood as a set of practices that explicitly relate to political dimensions of 
computing. Due to the increasing pervasiveness of technology in both people’s 
everyday lives and the formation of democratic constellations, direct engagement 
with technological developments was ever more notable. Yet, hacking was not the 
only way of practising a progressive politics in relation to technological artefacts 
and infrastructures. As Lisa’s earlier statement hinted, practices related to 
technology were indispensable for actors who engaged in a field where they want 
to communicate with one another. 
 
7.2 Alternative communication infrastructures 
So far I have discussed engagement practices, which can be considered the most 
common and natural amongst hackers cultures (Thomas 2002; Coleman 2012). At 
the same time, as the above section has shown, hacking can mean different things, 
and in the case of the CCC is grounded in a demanding and constructive vision of 
politics. What made the Club a fruitful case study was that in contrast to many 
other hacker collectives, its members did not only deconstruct existing 
technologies, but also put a lot of effort into building, supporting and maintain 
information and communication infrastructures. The reason for doing this was to 
create alternative communication environments that would enable more secure 
and anonymous ways of communication outside the realm of profit-oriented, 
data-hungry services. To explain the political dimensions of the hackers’ 
engagement, I will first give a short synopsis of three initiatives and then go into a 
more detailed analysis of two of them. 
The first example is Freifunk (‘Free Radio’) – a grassroots initiative establishing, 
supporting and maintaining free mesh networks in Germany that provide an 
alternative to commercial internet providers. Martin Haase, a member of CCC’s 
board, discussed the initiative in terms of the hackers’ basic political goals.   
There is broad agreement in the Club that free software and 
free communication are important. Freifunk, for example, is 
an initiative that is closely affiliated with the CCC. (Martin) 
The initiative also supports communities developing know-how to set up their 
own networks and is constantly growing in numbers of participants. Several 
members of the CCC were involved in the foundation of the project in the early 
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2000s. The second example is Tor – originally short for The Onion Router – client 
software that enhances online anonymity. To conceal users’ locations and usage 
from anyone conducting online surveillance or traffic analysis, Tor directs internet 
traffic through a global volunteer network of servers. By making it difficult to 
monitor or track internet activities back to users – including visits to websites, 
online posts, instant messages and other communication forms – the initiative 
aims to protect personal privacy and freedom. For the most part financed through 
donations made to the CCC-affiliated Wau Holland Foundation, the Club was 
operating five Tor servers at the time of research.15 The third example is Jabber – 
now known as Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) – an open 
technology for real-time communication, which powers a wide range of 
applications including instant messaging, multi-party chat, voice and video calls, 
collaboration, and content syndication. In some of the quotes above participants 
mentioned the service briefly. During my research the CCC was running one of 
the most used XMPP servers in the world. 
While the Freifunk network was a telling example of the hackers’ overall 
objective to build, support and maintain infrastructures outside the realm of 
corporate services, I will focus on Tor and XMPP as participants mentioned these 
two initiatives more often and emphasised their importance in more detail. Both 
initiatives were bottom-up infrastructures that were user-driven, decentralised, 
based on voluntary work and without formalised top-down structures. As self-
organised internet-based communication infrastructures they relied on a global 
network of participants. Accordingly, the CCC was not the initiator of the 
initiatives, but was actively involved in establishing the network and maintained 
several nodes of the network. Tor and XMPP are both interesting examples for the 
contradiction in contemporary media environments that scholars have 
highlighted in different contexts (Cammaerts 2008; Dahlgren 2013). Tor, for 
example, was originally developed by the US Navy for the purpose of protecting 
government communications and has developed into an infrastructure that is 
used by journalists, law enforcement officers, the military and activists as well as 
users who just want to surf the web.16 
                                                
15 Some local groups of the CCC operate additional servers. There are also personal 
overlaps between the CCC and the Tor project. Frank Rieger, long-term member and 
spokesperson of the CCC, is on the board of directors, Andreas Lehner has an 
honorary mention, and Jacob Appelbaum, spokesperson and developer for Tor, is a 
CCC affiliate who delivered the keynote at the 29th Chaos Communication Congress. 
16 During the period of my research around two million people were using Tor. 
However, the free and open-source web browser Mozilla Firefox was planning to 
embed the client software in its services; making it accessible to its 500 million users. 
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A set of reasons were given for the decision to become an active part of these 
initiatives. As Lars explained: 
It’s a free protocol. When you look back at other instant 
messengers and you look a bit more closely at the terms and 
conditions, you see that everything belongs to the company 
and that they also have the right to use all the content. Again, 
the issue is privacy. I don’t want anyone to do anything with 
my content. We sat together around 2004 and decided to do 
something in this context. Jabber, or XMPP as it is called 
today, already existed as a protocol and we said, “this is 
something that we want to support” and therefore initiated 
our own server – jabber.ccc.de is one of the best known servers 
worldwide. (Lars) 
In contrast to current developments that turn the web into an environment largely 
based on closed source software, on protocols not accessible to its users (Kelty 
2013), XMPP was a non-commercial and open protocol. For Lars and other 
participants this was reason enough to support what they considered to be a 
political endeavour that counteracted corporate interests by circumventing 
existing control points and enabling users to structure digital communication in 
more transparent ways. As fukami put it, a Club member for over fifteen years and 
active in different local groups: 
The control over your own hard- and software is part of the 
essence of what you identify as a hacker. (fukami) 
Further emphasising this understanding Erdgeist, Club member for around twelve 
years and spokesperson for over six years, added: 
The construction of non-commercial infrastructure that we’ve 
been promoting for a long time is particularly important when 
certain companies like Facebook and Twitter, who bow to 
every respective jurisdiction, are praised as democratic silver 
bullets; which only works as long as they rebel against the 
latest favourite enemy. […] To rely on commercially provided 
infrastructure is out of the question for the CCC. The 
possibility to communicate, for example, with an open and 
free communication system – where everyone is a participant, 
where everyone can establish their own services, is in control 
of their own emails, and where one can also fairly easily add 
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cryptography to communicate encoded with each other – 
needs to continue to exist. (Erdgeist) 
Creating open and free channels necessitated an alternative to existing services, 
which were seen as biased and unreliable due to their profit and data gathering and 
their general bias towards governmental administration. One way of interpreting 
this finding is by bringing it into dialogue with the notion of ‘communicative 
capitalism’ (Dean 2010). Freifunk, Tor and XMPP are three initiatives that enable 
diverse people to avoid being embedded in revenue-driven structures. They are 
thus political endeavours in themselves as they are infrastructures that critique 
and counteract contemporary neoliberal dynamics. Fittingly, participants 
highlighted how establishing and maintaining infrastructures was an active way to 
put direct pressure on companies to adjust their services – at least to some degree – 
and in doing so to influence the mainstream communication environment. 
When you create beneficial infrastructure like the Jabber 
server and you are able to demonstrate that you won’t do any 
mischief with it, people will use it. […] The allocation of free 
Jabber infrastructure has led to the situation that major tech 
corporations like Apple and Microsoft were no longer able to 
ignore Jabber and had to embed it in their services. (Erdgeist) 
By operating infrastructures we exploit the normative power 
of the given. […] Digital self-defence – through the creation of 
infrastructure that is simply a given and that is no longer 
possible to argue away – is getting more and more important. 
[…] In the digital age individuals and relatively small groups 
can make a difference, meaning changing the world in some 
way, by creating facts through the establishment of 
infrastructure. The CCC – financially, socially and technically – 
supports such infrastructure projects. (Erdgeist) 
The Club’s efforts towards independence from commercial and centralised 
infrastructures was not restricted to internal struggles that allowed the hackers to 
be in control of their own soft- and hardware. Being actively involved in shaping 
the features and values of the communicative systems they used (Gitelman 2008) 
was only a part of what they did. In fact, their overall goal was to establish a more 
open communication environment (de Sola Pool 1983). The hackers’ engagement 
includes but at the same time goes beyond a critique of corporate involvements. 
Media-related practices in this case are seen as enabling the collective to create 
technological facts that translate into a political project by pressuring other actors 
in the field to react and to take the new tool as a given. CCC members considered 
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the means of communication a political struggle in their own right (Milan 2013; 
Hintz 2013) and referred to the support, use and maintenance of alternative 
infrastructures as a fundamental part of political engagement that falls outside of 
conventional forms of doing democracy. As Kelty in his study of the cultural 
significance of free software stresses, hackers, or geeks as he calls them, not only 
express ideas but also ‘express infrastructures through which ideas can be 
expressed (and circulated) in new ways’ (Kelty 2008: 29). The Club was enabling 
and supporting emancipatory practices related to media technologies and 
infrastructures. Through creating and sustaining communication networks CCC 
was ‘executing political work and deploying strategies of engagement’ (Sassen 
2008: 339). This endeavour was driven by the overall aim of influencing 
democratic constellations by reconfiguring communicative arrangements. 
As Tim Pritlove, who acted as the main organiser of the annual Chaos 
Communication Congress from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, prompted 
attendees in his opening speech at the 30th CCC Congress: ‘What do we need to do 
now? We have to reinvent the net. We have to rethink the net. […] You can do it’ 
(Pritlove 2013: n.p.). It is important to mention at this stage that Tor and XMPP are 
only partially autonomous as they are still dependent on commercial 
infrastructures like the internet backbone – physical infrastructure like cables and 
internet exchange points as well as service providers. Their degree of 
independence is not absolute, but rather ‘structured in response to the historically 
constituted layering of power and control within the infrastructures of computing 
and communication’ (Kelty 2008: 9). All the same, they are initiatives that 
constitute serious alternatives to existing profit-driven data-hungry services. 
While they might not cause existing power relationships around communication 
infrastructures to vanish, they partially reconfigure certain interdependencies. 
Bruno Latour has described the role of the critic as follows: 
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who 
assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from 
under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers 
the participants arenas in which to gather. The critic is not 
the one who alternates haphazardly between antifetishism 
and positivism like the drunk iconoclast drawn by Goya, 
but the one for whom, if something is constructed, then it 
means it is fragile and thus in great need of care and caution. 
(Latour 2004: 246) 
While the initial section above might have given the impression that hacking to 
some degree is a deconstructive action, the CCC’s engagement practices related to 
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building, supporting and maintaining underlines the productive nature of the 
hackers’ critique. The notion of ‘offering participants arenas in which to gather’ is 
not exclusively a digital or “virtual” dimension. The CCC was heavily involved in 
establishing and spreading hackerspaces – places where people meet to build stuff 
together, to discuss, to work on projects, to share etc. Hackerspaces are physical 
infrastructures for exchange, collaboration and creating. Simultaneous with the 
increased connection via technological means, there is a global trend across hacker 
cultures to meet face-to-face by creating physical infrastructures and organising 
large-scale events. A closer analysis of the globally spreading phenomenon of 
hackerspaces, and the CCC’s role in this, would require a research project in itself, 
but it is important to hint at this aspect to illustrate the entanglement of mediated 
and non-mediated arenas of engagement. The way Club members enabled people 
to communicate outside of corporate platforms was not only a rejection of the 
status quo but an actively constructed alternative to influence current and 
emerging means of communication. Engagement with alternative infrastructures 
was about triggering and cultivating different types of communication processes. 
The CCC located collective action and everyday usage of technology on 
alternative infrastructures away from commercial interests and central control. In 
other words, the organisation aimed to transform democratic constellations – 
which are always already partially based on communication and information 
exchange (Thompson 1995) – by changing the nature of the media technologies 
and infrastructures that today are the basis of collaborations and collective action. 
For the CCC, technologies were not simply instruments for acting politically but 
were political matters in themselves. The hackers went beyond their role as 
watchdogs by actively engaging with the given technology in many ways. Actively 
supervising technological developments also meant intervening in technology. 
CCC was not enacting on “simplistic” individualistic modes of participation like 
signing petitions online, but acting on the fundamental structures and processes 
that enable communication far away from commercial, data-hungry, monopolistic 
infrastructures. 
As participants emphasised and as some of the earlier quotes suggested, the 
Club was not only supporting, building and maintaining Tor and XMPP for the 
sake of others. They were also engaging with these infrastructures to allow CCC’s 
members to communicate amongst themselves outside the realms of surveillance- 
and profit-friendly platforms. I will now look at the more internal aspects of the 
Club’s communication infrastructures. 
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7.3 Boundaries of internal communication 
As has been shown so far, the Chaos Computer Club’s engagement practices were 
grounded in an intimate relation to using as well as establishing alternative 
communication infrastructures. They did not only accompany technology, but 
actively intervened in new technological developments. Part of this active 
occupation with technology came to life in the organisation’s internal use of 
particular tools and platforms. To gain understanding of the overall role media-
related practices played for the CCC’s political endeavours the hackers’ own use of 
particular technologies is of particular interest. This is because analysing internal 
use of media helps us to understand the basic processes that contributed to the 
formation, organisation and maintenance of the CCC. Let me start by directly 
pointing to the role of XMPP. One of the co-founders of the Club, Klaus 
Schleisiek, also a chairperson of the Wau Holland Foundation, described it as 
follows. 
Jabber is very important for the communication with 
WikiLeaks, for example; it’s the channel that most interaction 
goes through and one can be sure that it is a secure 
communication channel. (Klaus) 
As a response to the deny of Amazon, PayPal, and other corporations to provide 
their services for the whistleblower platform (Hintz 2013), the CCC-affiliated 
foundation took on responsibility for administering all donations made to 
WikiLeaks. Due to the peculiarity and sensibility of the situation – Julian Assange 
had just entered the Ecuadorian embassy – members of the foundation based in 
Germany and Switzerland relied on face-to-face meetings and encrypted 
communication. Taking into account the known interest of third parties wanting 
to be part of the conversation between WikiLeaks and the Wau Holland 
Foundation, the full political dimension of being able to rely on alternative 
communication infrastructures became apparent. 
Besides enabling people around the world to communicate in more secure and 
anonymous ways, XMPP was supporting intra- and inter-organisational 
communication (Bimber et al. 2012) for the CCC that countered corporate and 
governmental interests. But let me step back in time and recount the internal use 
of media environments in a chronological manner to exemplify how internal 
communication practices have changed and to put the Club’s current practices into 
a broader frame. The CCC was founded in the early 1980s, a time when bulletin 
board systems were gradually emerging in Germany. Right from the start 
members of the Club made extensive use of what was described as ‘collaborative 
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mass media’ (Rafaeli and LaRose 1993) at that time. Steffen remembered the 
emergence of these new forms of information distribution. 
Many started to have their own bulletin boards at home and 
used the bulletin board systems as a public desktop they could 
share with others. So, they used the “black boards” as 
pigeonholes for different themes to make their knowledge 
accessible to others. (Steffen) 
Because of the rarity of personal computers and technological equipment these 
early forms of sharing mostly took place amongst individuals who had a strong 
interest in technology-related issues. As hackers were still a minor sub-cultural 
phenomenon and people interested in the creative and subversive use of 
technology were dispersed across the country, the possibility of sharing 
information and knowledge across time and space was a big step towards building 
a sense of communality. The spread of bulletin boards and the emergence of local 
CCC nodes went hand in hand. This was important in a social and a political sense. 
More concretely, the emerging ability to merge offline and online communication 
showed the initial Club activists that new forms of networked connectivity were 
possible, opening up new modes of engagement.  
We realised that it was a possibility through which people 
could collaborate and coordinate activities. That was the 
philosophy. Yet, the foundation was that we first had to build 
networks. There were single bulletin boards, but they weren’t 
connected with each other. (Steffen) 
Zerberus was a very interesting example because it was 
developed without a central hierarchy from day one. […] The 
whole network structure of Zerberus was designed in a way 
that did not allow censorship or central control but enabled 
maximum exchange. (Steffen)  
As a result, online networks like Zerberus emerged that consolidated several 
computers with each other. In stark contrast to other means of communication at 
the time that were part of the monopoly of the Federal Post, the newly developed 
networks were decentralised. The coming years saw increasing exchange amongst 
users of bulletin boards, made possible by the development of common 
communication protocols. Countering the Telecommunications Act 
(‘Fernmeldeanlagengesetz’), which prohibited individuals from tinkering with the 
telephones and from operating self-built or imported modems, the CCC amplified 
and made increasing use of digitally networked communication. As the Club 
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attributed great importance to this emerging form of interaction and believed in 
free communication, the hackers decided not to counteract existing laws but to 
productively oppose the monopoly. 
Schwarz-Schilling, then Federal Minister for Post and 
Communication, eventually relinquished the monopoly. The 
background to this was that we founded a registered 
association together with the commercial bulletin board 
system GeoNet, so that every person who was using the 
system was a Club member and the communication was 
officially club-internal and no longer subject to the post 
monopoly. (Steffen) 
Underlining the earlier argument that the Club not only made use of and 
accompanied technology, the case of bulletin boards demonstrates that the Club 
actively intervened in technological developments. It was thus that the hackers’ 
initial use and elaboration of bulletin board systems, which partially rested on 
self-interest, turned into a political engagement in itself perpetuating the 
decentralisation of communication. 
The desire to communicate and collaborate and to coordinate activities within 
and beyond the Club’s boundaries through decentralised infrastructures was the 
driving force behind establishing these networks. Of course, over the years the 
forms of communication networks have changed rather drastically, and so have 
the practices related to them. Zerberus, for example, dissolved in the 1990s and 
with the triumph of the web newer systems became predominant. One of the 
major tools that have been part of the CCC’s internal communication processes 
from the 1990s onwards are electronic mailing lists. Paralleling the growing 
importance of the internal newsletter as a means of communication for social 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s (Rucht 2004), the hackers made extensive use 
of its digital equivalent. The internal mailing list fulfilled different functions. As 
the participants described it, mailing lists were not only used for announcements 
and to exchange information, but even more, acted as an arena for debate and 
discussion of issues concerning the Club in general or particular members. As an 
example of discursive practices related to the list, Martin mentioned the following. 
We had a strong controversy when the CCC was invited to the 
47th Munich Security Conference in 2011.17 The board discussed 
the question of whether or not we should attend the event. 
We couldn’t agree and said, “Let’s see what the members say”. 
                                                
17 The Munich Security Conference is generally considered one of the world’s most 
important forums for international security policy decision-makers. 
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That’s always how it’s done: you ask the members on the 
internal mailing list. A vast majority of people said, “We don’t 
want to collaborate with the conference in any way, even if it 
is just passively, we don’t want that”. So we declined the 
invitation and nobody travelled to Munich. (Martin) 
The internal mailing list was a discussion list employed to enable the Club to 
coordinate decision-making processes across its membership (Polletta 2004; 
Kavada 2010). The electronic discussion list therefore provided an infrastructure 
for internal deliberation processes and discursive forum for coming to mutual 
agreement on Club matters. Yet, several members believed this function was being 
undermined by the harsh tone that commonly used by participants on the list. 
It is no list for “I just had an idea and post it on the list”, 
because if you do that you get pulled to pieces. It’s hate. I 
know many people who don’t subscribe to the list, even 
though they are very active in the Club, because this whole 
malice and hate is not much fun. […] The list is strongly 
dominated by particular members who put the boot in if they 
don’t like the person who is commenting. These are members 
who have been involved for a long time and it’s very difficult 
to contradict them. (tante) 
I haven’t had any active contact with the Club for a long time. 
Since have been with the Wau Holland Foundation for a year 
now, I have also started to raise my hand on the internal list 
again. In the start I was bullied in a very uncharming manner. 
“What are you looking for meddler?” I was told to shut up. 
This was an important communication channel and I 
shouldn’t obstruct it with my crap. There are manners on the 
internal list that reminded me why it would be necessary to 
work on the hacker ethic again. (Klaus) 
While the manufacturing of consensus relies in most cases on some form of 
conflict and exclusion (Hall 1982), the intimidating manners were seen as 
counterproductive to deliberation and the formation of agreement. As statements 
by other participants confirmed, this was not a personal issue of tante being overly 
sensitive. Besides considering the deeply conflictual nature of the mailing list as an 
obstacle for constructive debate, participants also noted how it obstructed the 
ability to make more powerful use of members’ different skills and perspectives. 
Karsten Nohl, a long-term member who specialised in cryptography, 
mentioned that regarding internal mediation tools, ‘surprisingly little’ has 
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changed over the past two decades. While newer tools and platforms were not 
entirely ignored he stressed that they were not ‘cannibalising’ the already existing 
tools because the Club ‘is partially barricaded’ against using them more 
intensively. What had changed, however, according to Karsten, was that members 
could now access the internal communication infrastructure while being on the 
move through mobile devices. So, while the Club’s membership figures have 
increased significantly, especially in the last decade (from a couple hundred 
members to around 4500), its internal communication structures apparently had 
not changed accordingly. Many participants regarded this ‘barricading’ against 
contemporary platforms as a problem and pointed to the fragmented character of 
internal communication channels. 
In a way the Club hasn’t grown with its proliferation of 
members and its de-centrality. […] At the moment there is no 
central discussion platform, but many individual ones, which 
makes it difficult to gather support for one’s position or to 
sharpen one’s reasoning. Sometimes you need a number of 
people to elaborate an idea decently. The Club offers very little 
infrastructure for this kind of process. […] The CCC as a whole 
has no infrastructure to act as one entity. (tante) 
The pluralism and diversity of internal channels used by local CCC groups and 
hackerspaces was seen as a central dilemma for their deliberation potential. At the 
same time tante’s critique pointed towards the lack of a central infrastructure that 
would allow individual members to form coherent groups to share relevant 
knowledge, information, experience and skills. This assessment in some ways 
turned Karsten’s statement, that the CCC’s internal communication tools hadn’t 
change much, into a critique of the Club’s reserved approach towards the potential 
of contemporary media. The consequences of obstructing implementation of 
certain contemporary tools was seen as a deficit for the actual functioning of the 
CCC as a political collective as it prevented the Club from acting as a consistent 
organisation that united individual agency into a larger whole. The ability to form 
a coherent voice amongst members (Fenton and Barassi 2011) was seen as crucial to 
achieve for promoting the Club’s political endeavours. While all participants 
emphasised the importance of internally elaborating coherent points of view, the 
interviewees pointed to different ways in which this could be achieved. 
As long-term member, fukami, put it, ‘the list has 850 subscribers – that’s no 
longer internal’. Along with the ongoing growth of the Club some participants 
saw the “internal” dimension of the mailing list dissolving and along with it its 
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role as an infrastructure to exchange thoughts, share relevant knowledge and 
develop a coherent voice within the boundaries of the organisation. 
If you take the mailing list, for example, which is called 
“internal mailing list”. Not even all the members are on it and 
still we know of journalists who read along on that list. […] 
That’s a problem. We also have an internal collection of links 
and it had the same problem that outsiders were reading 
along. It was password protected, but the password was 
circulated repeatedly. Now we have decided to give every user 
a personal password to avoid things getting to the outside so 
easily. If you discuss and organise stuff internally it shouldn’t 
be in every newspaper immediately. (Martin) 
As the introductory example of the communication between the Wau Holland 
Foundation and WikiLeaks has demonstrated, upholding boundaries between 
internal and external communication was vital for the collective. At the same time, 
as the example of the mailing list demonstrates, drawing clear boundaries was 
more and more difficult because of the Club’s growth in membership and the 
increasing interest of outsiders in the hackers’ activities. As a result, mailing lists 
were not an adequate infrastructure for deliberation, constructing a coherent voice 
or coordinating ‘digital direct action’ (Coleman 2013). Rather they were 
environments within which existing hierarchies held sway and confirmed 
through the (rhetorical) dominance of long-term active members whose positions 
were to be indisputable. While certain decisions like declining the invitation to 
the Munich Security Conference were made through the mailing list, participants’ 
statements have made clear that decisions concerning more sensitive information 
and activities had to be made in more secure and exclusive arenas. Similarly, to 
avoid fragmentation of the Club into numerous small sub-groups, which would 
render speaking with one voice and acting as a coherent collective impossible, 
additional modes of interaction and coordination were needed. 
 
7.4 Collaborating in exclusive circles 
The relevance of drawing clear boundaries around internal communication 
practices was also elaborated by Sam in his emphasis on the Club’s need to 
coordinate certain activities in ways that did not include all members. 
Some of the projects that we execute are very time-critical and 
we don’t want to lay everything on the table in advance. You 
can’t tell everything to everyone. We often do know more off 
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the record than we actually let on the media. There are many 
issues that you can’t discuss explicitly. We live from saying 
“we have an internal mailing list with several hundred 
people”, but how internal can a mailing list with several 
hundred people be? So that can’t be the place where 
“secretive” commandos are arranged. That’s simply 
impossible. Insofar as there are other structures and other 
forms of coordination they are run very individually, not 
through a formalised mailing list. (Sam) 
One of the main reasons for maintaining the internal communication boundaries 
was the importance of coordinating collective action in ways that didn’t allow 
outsiders to gain knowledge about upcoming activity. To achieve the modes of 
communication had to be more exclusive and oriented towards individual 
members instead of the Club as a whole. Participants identified several tools as 
adequate solutions to establish more individualised modes of communication. 
Participants indicated that online chat, or more particularly, Internet Relay Chats 
(IRC), were one of the main channels for elaborating projects amongst a more 
exclusive circle of members. IRC is a chat protocol for online messaging and data 
transfer, allowing one-to-one as well as group communication. Tobias Engel, one 
of the first members of the local Berlin Club in the 1990s, mentioned that ‘an 
animated exchange is taking place amongst members through IRC’. According to 
Tobias and other participants online chats were displacing telephony as well as 
emails as primary means of communication amongst Club members. 
The only people I still talk to on the phone are my girlfriend, 
my family and my non-nerd circle of friends. Apart from that I 
hardly use the phone at all. […] That’s so convenient with chat: 
you can write something and people can react now or later, 
and above all you can have simultaneous threads of 
communication. (Tobias) 
The CCC members still communicate through a server that 
you have to connect to and you basically get a black terminal – 
with an amber-coloured typography if necessary – and where 
people meet in a chat room to talk to each other. The system 
isn’t thirty years old but that’s what it looks like and it’s been 
around for at least twenty years and is still the main 
communication media. This terminal you dial into is called V-
chat. (Karsten) 
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Besides allowing for flexible communication – instantaneous, deferred and 
simultaneous – participants highlighted that IRC enabled a wide range of 
interactions – from messaging to data transfer – amongst individuals who had 
accepted each other as contacts. In contrast to the internal mailing list to which 
large numbers of members could subscribe IRC was a much more restricted 
channel as it only allowed selected members to communicate with each other and 
to form small groups that shared information amongst each other. Officially, V-
chat was not administrated by the CCC, but run by a private individual who was a 
long-term affiliate. The particularity about the system was that access to the chat 
was restricted and reserved for long-term, active and trusted members. Only a core 
group of around 100 individuals were allowed to access the system. The terminal 
was described as a central source of information where links were shared and news 
disseminated, as well as an environment for discussing future activities and 
coordinating current collective actions.  
I find it funny when people nowadays talk about “social 
media” all the time – about Facebook and Twitter and the like. 
We’ve had these structures to keep up continuous virtual 
contact for a long time. But we make them ourselves – that’s 
important! The need for them was part of the hacker 
community long before everything became so colourful. 
(Constanze) 
Being able to communicate with each other through online systems like IRC, and 
even more V-chat, allowed the CCC to create different layers of exclusivity in 
which members could communicate from one-to-many, from one-to-one, and 
amongst a selected few. These layers permitted the hackers to solve most of the 
above-mentioned issues regarding the boundaries of internal and external 
communication. Likewise, these layers formed and deepened existing 
organisational structures within the Club by creating exclusive communication 
environments for the sake of executing political work in more dynamic and 
secretive ways. The tools to do so have been, as participants underlined, part of the 
Club’s structure for a long time; IRC was initiated in the late 1980s and the V-chat 
terminal in the 1990s. Accordingly, establishing and maintaining organisational 
structures were for most of the Club’s history related to media practices. 
More recently, the spectrum of these tools has increased. While newer channels 
were not ‘cannibalising’ these tools, as Karsten has put it, CCC members were 
employing contemporary tools that played an important role in internal 
collaboration, coordination of digital direct action and more basic practices like 
finetuning press releases. 
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If you look back some years one had a document on a server 
where a number of people had access to and could work on it, 
but only one at a time. Now, through software, one is able to 
work in a comprehensible manner with a number of people at 
the same time. (Lars) 
As Constanze, one of the most prominent spokespersons of the Club, described 
the development towards online collaborations and their relevance regarding the 
Club’s ability to coordinate activities: 
Almost from day one, and long before web 2.0, the CCC had 
the required infrastructures to keep up permanent virtual 
contact across its members. What has changed, however, over 
the past three to four years is the increased use and 
exploitation of a range of collaborative tools. In particular, to 
write texts together or to share results from reverse 
engineering – things that really need collaboration. These 
tools were simply not there ten years ago. We had other 
methods, but they were by far not as effective as the 
contemporary ones. (Constanze) 
Web-based editing tools allowed a number of individuals to collaboratively edit a 
file, either simultaneously in real time or deferred in non-real-time. The major 
asset of these web-based editors, generally referred to as Pads by participants, was 
seen to be in their ability to enable time-efficient, location-independent 
collaborations amongst a chosen group of people. 
Pads are web-based editing interfaces where several people can 
simultaneously work on a text and this is used to quickly write 
a text together where everyone can bring in their expertise 
promptly without necessarily sitting in the same room. That’s 
definitely an important tool. (starbug) 
In fact, whenever referring to particular activities – from hacking to organising the 
annual Chas Communication Congress to publishing the Datenschleuder 
magazine – participants stressed that a wide range of their collective activities were 
based on practices related to Pads. They enabled them to act ‘interlinked’, ‘multi-
locally’ and ‘time-efficient’. In the case of the Staatstrojaner hack, for example, all 
interviewees involved stressed the fact that real-time editing tools, by enabling the 
actors to work collaboratively across distance and therefore to act together despite 
the fact that ‘everyone has always a lot of work to do and we are not all based in 
Berlin’ (Constanze) gave serious weight to the activities. In addition, to guarantee 
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the secrecy of collaborations, communication was highly safeguarded by 
operational security (opsec). 
We deploy opsec, in particular, when we know that a 
particular action is politically very controversial and when we 
have a holdback period for publication to achieve a 
concentrated action. (Constanze) 
As a consequence of these highlighted features other tools were no longer used as 
extensively as before. Pads were an advance compared to wikis as they enabled 
participants to bring different technological affordances together.  
Where we are heading to now – technology keeps on moving 
– are Pads. With a wiki you always have the issue that you 
write something and you have to save it; so you always get 
snap shots. With Pads you get instant. You see what the other 
person is writing and you see who has written what. […] Often 
you have a chat feature on the side which enables you to ask 
“How did you mean this or that? Can I change this or that? […] 
It’s basically a note pad that has become collaborative. […] Pads 
make a lot of sense because you can work in a straightforward 
way: you can click on “save” and you get a text that is ready to 
be published. Above all, everyone has contributed and it is 
therefore possible to achieve consensus. (Lars) 
Similar to other participants, Lars pointed to the fact that along with the ongoing 
technological change the organisation’s practices were shifting and evolving. Due 
to the Club’s increased membership and its publicity, CCC members saw a strong 
need to collaborate within rather exclusive circles to achieve consensus and 
coordinate collective action. In contrast to the more open information 
environment of mailing lists, chat systems and collaborative software applications 
were used particularly for project-based collaborations amongst a small set of 
people.  
Constanze and Frank, for example, sit in the chat and say, 
“let’s open a Pad” and then five to ten people meet and write 
or simply watch or sometimes add a smart sentence. 
(Anonymised) 
Depending on the particular need of the group, different media-related practices 
that formed layers of exclusivity fluently merged from one application to another. 
While the use of particular tools like IRC and Pads were creating and underlining 
organisational structures, this was not only done for reasons of secrecy or 
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exclusivity. As Constanze mentioned in relation to the Staatstrojaner hack, where 
around eight people were involved, each with different capacities: 
I think if you have more people in a team it gets a bit confusing 
because you have a very big communication effort. 
(Constanze) 
The fact that only a selected number of individuals were involved in particular 
activities and included in exclusive media-related practices was to a large degree 
due to practicality. Referring to the use of tools that enabled smaller groups of the 
Club to communicate with each other, Constanze stressed that the Club’s 
activities and organisation would be simply unimaginable without the discussed 
media-related practices. Although contemporary tools were described as highly 
potent and flexible, participants stressed that there was an inherent limit to the 
openness of these practices as communication needed to be limited to make it 
effective. While exclusivity was considered central for allowing concentrated 
coordination for collective action other participants who wanted more 
deliberative processes, saw this development as more critical. 
There is a lot of IRC, but also V-chat in Berlin or other things 
based on very distinct, closed groups. Which also leads to 
problems for internal communication in some places. Groups 
that are very closely connected and communicate a lot with 
each other often have already finished the process of 
reconsidering before they make it public – by public I mean 
internally – and there is not as much discussion as one would 
like to have. (fukami) 
Bastian Greshake, a relatively new member interested in bioinformatics, 
confirmed this process: 
I often learn of new activities and hacks in the news or when 
everything seems to be decided and settled. (Bastian) 
 Media-related practices allowed the bringing together of a well-integrated group 
of people. Keeping the number of participants in a given collective action down 
meant communication process could be more direct, productive and effective. 
Media-related practices allowed and to some degree encouraged the Club to act 
within more or less closed digital environments. One the one hand, restricting the 
number of participants also helped maintain the boundary between internal and 
external communication. On the other hand, it enabled the Club to establish a 
more constructive communication process as a lower number of participating 
members also meant a lower number of differing opinions; which, in turn, 
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enabled the group to stay more focused and to make decisions in a timely manner. 
Accordingly, direct digital action and practices related to collaborating online were 
directly related with each other as media-related practices played an important 
role in relation to organising, coordinating and executing digital direct action. 
Bringing this finding into dialogue with participants’ above-mentioned 
remarks that the CCC’s internal communication structures did not keep pace with 
the growth of its membership, one can remark that while there might be no 
central platform that solves issues around the decentralised organisation of the 
Club, its members are nevertheless able to collaborate through multiple, in parts 
overlapping media-related practices. This, clearly, is a long-term dimension. 
Despite rapid growth of the organisation, media-related practices allow the Club 
to act on politically controversial issues in timely and discreet ways. The overall 
relevance of these practices was summarised by Martin as follows. 
The members are better networked today than ever before. In 
the beginning we only had the internal mailing list and now 
we have chat, V-chat, IRC and Jabber and this obviously also 
brings with it a lot of communication. I would say the Club’s 
entire decentralised structure is strongly related to the fact that 
people at different locations were increasingly able to 
collaborate. This was unthinkable in the beginning. […] 
Emerging modes of communication and more generally 
practices around emerging technologies and infrastructures 
have made the Club what it is today. (Martin) 
The idea that the hacker collective was on the one hand better networked today 
than ever before and on the other hand lacking effective central communication 
infrastructures seemed to be contradictory. Upon closer examination this was not 
a paradoxical situation, but a parallel development proceeding over time. The 
overall level of connectivity had intensified drastically since the emergence of the 
Club in the early 1980s – from single bulletin boards over communication 
networks to instantaneous and overlapping web-based interaction. Yet, in spite of 
the ongoing development of media-related practices – how these practices relate 
to each other, how they support each other and how they displace one another – 
one can observe certain forms of continuity. Despite its rapid growth in 
membership figures, CCC’s media related practices enabled members to form 
internal groups and layers of communicative intimacy that created margins 
between internal and external communication and maintained organisational 
boundaries within the Club. Media practices related to both contemporary 
technologies and tools that emerged in the 1990s allowed a core group of members 
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to coordinate the Club’s activities effectively over time. Both “new” and “old” 
forms of communication channels enabled secured, exclusive and group-based 
communication, coordination and collaboration. 
Media-related practices are strongly related to being able to execute political 
work. More concretely, political work is to a large degree grounded in practices 
related to exclusive digital communication channels. The structure was 
polycentric, which to a large degree was enabled by media practices that allowed 
members to communicate largely independently of time and location. At the same 
time, the findings make visible organisational dimensions within the Club that 
were not formally acknowledged in descriptions of the CCC as a decentralised 
collective. The CCC’s internal mailing list was referred to as an indication that the 
Club was based on deliberative modes through which everyone could participate. 
This was in part the case and confirmed the portrait of the CCC as a decentralised 
organisation. At the same time the use of, for example, exclusive communication 
channels (like V-chat), which were central for decision-making and coordination 
of collective action, made obvious the existence of hierarchical dimensions within 
the organisation. This is not to say that particular members were authoritarian 
leadership figures that practiced domination, but to highlight that the CCC is not 
entirely horizontally organised as some members have played central roles in the 
organisational formation and functioning of the Club. 
CCC members put less effort into solving issues of consensus finding by 
introducing participatory software, which might enhance internal deliberation 
processes (Polletta 2004; Kavada 2010; Della Porta and Rucht 2013). Contemporary 
media technologies and infrastructures were rather used as an ‘organizational 
repertoire’ (Clemens 1993) to bring small groups together to enable operative 
collective action. Practices related to inward-oriented communication channels 
were particularly important because they helped to sustain the effectiveness and 
practicability of the CCC’s political endeavours. Despite rapid growth in 
membership numbers media-related practices facilitated and intensified the 
formation of sub-groups, which communicated extensively in operational ways. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I contextualised hacking as direct digital action rather than 
alternative computing because, in the case of the CCC, hacking indicates two 
interconnected aspects of engagement: technological and political. The common 
thread linking the individual hacks was the Club’s overall political goal to 
propagate and deepen information and communication freedom. Grounded in the 
technical abilities and know-how of CCC members the Club acts as a watchdog of 
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technological developments and their political consequences. Following this 
finding, the chapter has emphasised how, for the hacker organisation, 
technologies are not simply instruments for acting politically but are political 
matters in themselves. The hackers went beyond their role as watchdogs by 
actively supporting, building and maintaining (more or less) robust 
communication infrastructures and, by doing so, creating an alternative to existing 
commercial, exploitative or centralised services. The Club aims to transform 
democratic constellations by acting on the fundamental structures and processes 
that today are the basis of communication, collaborations and collective action. 
Finally, this chapter has emphasised that deliberating, collaborating and 
coordinate political work took place with the support of technical means – from 
single bulletin boards over communication networks to instantaneous and 
overlapping web-based interaction. Despite rapid growth of the organisation, 
media-related practices allow the Club to act on politically controversial issues in 
timely and discreet ways. Creating exclusive communication environments online 
draws clear boundaries around internal communication practices and, in turn, 
enables sub-groups within the CCC to organise, coordinate and execute political 
work in more dynamic and secretive ways. The aim of this chapter was to show 
how direct digital action, practices related to alternative communication 
infrastructures and practices related to inward-oriented communication were 
directly related with each other. So far, then, it might be most adequate to 
characterise the CCC’s engagement as hacktivism – understood as ‘activism gone 
electronic’ (Jordan and Taylor 2004: 1). Yet, this is not the whole story. So far I 
have shown how the CCC acts politically with and through media technologies 
and infrastructures. The next chapter will reveal how the hacker’s practised 
politics about media technologies and infrastructures. 
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c h a p t e r  e i g h t  
Hackers in Media Environments  
 
The previous chapter analysed the ways in which the Chaos Computer Club acted 
politically with and through media technologies and infrastructures. It also looked 
closely at the ways “inward-oriented” media practices co-determined the Club’s 
modes of organisation and coordination of collective action. Building on these 
findings, this chapter will first look at the relevance of outward-oriented 
communication for the initial formation of the hacker organisation. Then I 
investigate the development of what I will call “multi-layered media practices”; 
that is, interactions across different media environments that are entangled with 
each other by non-linear flows of information. The third section of this chapter 
shows that beyond making a distinction between coverage by and access to 
mainstream media, it is fruitful to investigate different styles and modes of access 
to deepen understanding of the collective’s different modalities of 
communication. The remaining two sections highlight how the CCC’s 
engagements were partially directed towards influencing the tenor of a given 
debate, but even more, towards changing the reference points of political debates 
around and predominant conceptions of the political per se. More concretely, this 
chapter aims to show that multi-layered media practices were important for the 
CCC being able to thematise “technical” issues in ways that emphasised their 
political dimension and societal significance. 
 
8.1 Mediated visibility and the emergence of the CCC 
The first public appearance of a loose group of individuals that later turned into 
the hacker organisation Chaos Computer Club was an announcement in the then 
newly founded tageszeitung (‘daily newspaper’), commonly referred to as taz, on 1 
September 1981. 
The 1978 Tunix congress in Berlin that brought together 
alternative political groups and my personal experiences 
converged and I thought: “maybe it is time to call politically 
interested people who have something to do with computers 
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together”. The five of us met one day and we placed this short 
notice in the taz. (Klaus) 
One can say that the nucleus of the CCC was in Berlin at the 
round table of the taz. (Lars) 
Philosophically, the CCC was actually founded in Berlin, at 
the table of Kommune 1 on the premises of the taz. (Steffen) 
The announcement proclaimed the need for individuals interested in computer 
technology to collaborate and organise (see Appendix 11). The aim was, as Klaus 
emphasises, to frame the computer and related technologies and infrastructures 
not only as technological artefacts, but as political phenomena relevant to societal 
constellations. Some of the signatories already knew each other from previous 
collaborations. One of them was the Medienladen (‘Media Workshop’), a child of 
the anti-nuclear movement established in the mid-1970s by students in Hamburg. 
As Jochen Büttner, one of the founding members of the Medienladen and later the 
CCC, put it, the workshop had aimed to do ‘concrete, political and conflict-
oriented media work’ and ‘to implement an alternative media approach against 
dominant media practices’ (Büttner 1979: 134). Following the dissolution of the 
Medienladen – due to internal disputes that led to its conversion into Germany’s 
first female Medienladen – Büttner initiated the municipal Blimp Kino (‘Blimp 
Cinema’). Accordingly, the announcement in the taz grew out of a context that 
saw media environments as increasingly important fields of engagement. As an 
initial course of action the signatories announced a meeting in the taz’s main 
building. 
Founded in 1978 the taz was seen as an ideal platform for counter publics in the 
early 1980s in a media environment that was dominated by tradition-bound 
outlets. It was the first mainstream outlet that was a political counterweight to the 
predominantly conservative media environment. From this perspective the taz 
fulfilled the Medienladen’s initial aim of implementing an alternative media 
approach against dominant media practices (Büttner 1979: 134). Steffen’s reference 
to the ‘the table of Kommune 1’ indicates the origins of the taz. Kommune 1 was 
one of the central, politically motivated communes in Germany; it dissolved in 
1969. As Dieter Rucht states in his work on the media strategies of protest 
movements, ‘The most significant step in terms of a communicative movement 
infrastructure in Germany was the establishment of the Berlin-based daily 
newspaper die tageszeitung’ (2004: 38–9). The CCC’s founding members were 
explicitly building on this emerging communicative infrastructure. 
As a counter public we were in a fortunate position with the 
taz at that time. All of a sudden there was a counter public. 
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And the taz was by far not as established and its structures not 
as crystallised as they are nowadays. It was a very open bunch. 
So it was absolutely no problem to place our call in the paper 
and to meet in their rooms. (Klaus)18 
Beyond the foundation phase, the collaboration with the taz continued to be of 
great importance for the CCC’s early years. This was taking place at a time where 
different media strongly contributed to or even initiated public discourse around 
hackers. In particular, the science-fiction film WarGames made hacking a popular 
phenomenon in Germany, as well as other countries like the United States, by 
inextricably linking the figure of the hacker to the cultural, social and political 
history of the computer (Thomas 2002: ix). Just after the film’s German premiere 
in autumn 1983, Wau Holland published four articles in the taz under the heading 
‘COMPUTER GUERILLA’ that were signed „chaos computer club“ (Appendix 12). 
Besides reporting about a technology fair in Geneva the articles were mainly 
concerned with hacking as an emerging political phenomenon and recommended 
a list of relevant publications. The reactions to the articles and the enquiries 
concerning the „chaos computer club“ motivated Holland to make the CCC even 
more public (see Holland interview, reprinted in Chaos-Computer-Club 1985: 13–
5). Less than two weeks after the COMPUTER GUERILLA articles appeared he 
published in the taz, under the heading ‘hacker’, how to make contact and the 
terms and conditions of joining the CCC (Appendix 13). 
The collaboration of the taz and the hackers reveal strong correlations between 
the emergence of the taz as a communicative infrastructure for counter publics and 
the formation of the CCC as a political organisation. On the one hand, the taz acted 
as a physical meeting point where politically interested people could interact face-
to-face and manifest their political ambitions. On the other hand, the newspaper 
played a constitutive role in providing an environment to enhance the 
organisation’s visibility amongst people interested in the societal role of computer 
technology. The taz was an access point to an emerging political collective and at 
the same time provided this very collective with access to segments of the general 
public. Based on mediated visibility and communicative action, the initial group of 
five individuals was able to establish the CCC as an organisation that aimed to 
collectively frame media technologies and infrastructures as political phenomena 
                                                
18 It is relevant to note that the “alternative” status of the taz has changed over time, as 
the newspaper ‘became more professional, more independent from the movements, 
and less “alternative” in its organizational structure’ (Rucht 2004: 39). With a 
circulation of roughly 60,000, the taz is nowadays one of the most important left-
leaning newspapers in Germany. In comparison, the circulation of other “left”-
oriented newspapers in Germany in 2013 was: Frankfurter Rundschau (87,000), neues 
deutschland (34,000), junge welt (18,500), der Freitag, (16,000). 
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relevant to societal constellations. 
In light of the CCC’s positive experiences publicising itself, Holland decided to 
intensify the Club’s outward-oriented communication by initiating the in-house 
publication Die Datenschleuder (‘The Data Slingshot’). The forthcoming 
publication of the magazine was, again, announced in the taz. 
Meanwhile hackers distribute different examples and forms of 
guidance. The information is freely accessible on “alternative 
data bases”. In cases of censorship in this country, the data is 
stored abroad, which is accessible through direct distance 
dialling. For the non-computerised there is the magazine “Die 
Datenschleuder” in print. (Holland 1984: 5; Appendix 14) 
The Datenschleuder was not yet ready at this stage, but as Wau stated in an 
interview at that time (reprinted in Chaos-Computer-Club 1985: 13), he received 
more than 100 orders and therefore finished the first issue of the magazine over 
the coming weeks. 
At the end of 1983 Wau composed the Datenschleuder 1. At 
this stage I joined the Chaos Computer Club and over the 
coming ten years we made it together – Wau on the political 
side and me on the organisational and media side. (Steffen) 
In the style of existing US magazines like TAP and Processed World the first issue 
consisted of only four A4 pages.19 This particular format made it easy to duplicate 
the magazine with a photocopier, which the imprint explicitly invited the reader 
to do. 
Distribution of the magazine takes place through 
dispatch/subscription (chain letter), posting in computer 
stores, laundrettes, universities, black boards, interiors of 
restrooms and – particularly important – through copy 
machines. Seeing, copying, distributing – at your own risk. 
(Reprinted in Chaos-Computer-Club 1985: 135) 
The appeal to multiply the Club’s in-house publication reveals the hackers’ aim to 
enhance its visibility by embedding the magazine in various locations. 
Photocopying here was an “early” media practice to enhance the distribution of 
the Datenschleuder. The imprint of the first Datenschleuder also contained a list 
                                                
19 TAP was a US phreaking magazine founded as the Youth International Part Line 
(YIPL), published from 1971 to 1984 and republished from 1989 to 1991 and in 2009. 
Published by the Community Memory Project group at Berkley, Processed World was 
considered an anarchist magazine that began publication in April 1981 and was printed 
two to four times annually until 1992 and on a very sporadic basis until 2005. 
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of eleven aims ‘for 1984 and the near future’ (reprinted in Chaos-Computer-Club 
1985: 137). Most of the aims were concerned with the spread of information on 
particular topics and the construction of communication infrastructures, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter – in particular public access systems like 
bulletin boards. Interestingly, aim number two was the ‘dissemination of the 
magazine “die datenschleuder”’ (reprinted in Chaos Computer Club 1985: 137). 
The imprint of the first Datenschleuder, then, was indicative of the Club’s 
determination to publicise the issues the hackers were acting on. Put differently, 
situating the issues at stake within public discourse was considered a central aim of 
the founding members. 
Focusing on a particular range of issue domains and communicating these 
issues by establishing their own publications became more and more common 
amongst political collectives in the 1970s and 1980s (Offe 1985). Yet, it was not 
common in relation to the particular issue the CCC was concerned with – the 
societal impact of computing as a political phenomenon – at all. The proliferation 
of the personal computer was first of all characterised by commercial dynamics 
and interests (de Sola Pool 1983). It was rare, to say the least, to address issues like 
information freedom and data security in Germany, as well as in most other 
countries in the early 1980s. It was even less common to frame these issues in an 
explicitly political way. Skills, knowledge and experience related to technology 
were considered vital for business and scientific purposes, but not necessarily for 
political engagement. 
While publishing was a more or less common practice for political collectives at 
that time most of these ‘movement media’ (Rucht 2004) disappeared over time. 
The Datenschleuder, in contrast, has been published without interruption since 
its initial release in 1984.20 Since 2002 the magazine has been available online and 
large parts of its editorial process are based on media-related practices like 
collaborative online editing (Chapter 7). Nonetheless it has continued to appear in 
print. Considering the hacker’s technology affinity, the sustaining of “traditional” 
media practices might be surprising. 
The Datenschleuder – the CCC’s publication magazine – is still 
published on paper. […] We also had some special editions. 
The Datenschleuder issue 87, for example, focused on the 
electronic passport and contained many articles around that 
theme. The cover looked like a passport; it was all very well 
                                                
20 The US-magazine 2600: The Hacker Quarterly has also been published 
continuously since 1984; which points to implicit imbrications between the media 
outlets of particular scenes in different geographical locations. 
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made. We couldn’t resist printing that issue with a higher 
print run and providing every Member of Parliament with a 
copy. (Lars) 
One of the formative rationales for continuing to print the Datenschleuder was 
that it enabled the hackers to bring together different aspects of their engagement 
practices. The physical nature of the publication enabled the CCC, for example, to 
complement their finger print hack by actually enclosing copies of the Interior 
Minister’s fingerprints to materialise the political dimension of their biometry 
hack. Acting with and through contemporary technologies was apparently deeply 
entangled with articulating knowledge and distributing information about these 
technologies. The taz was, and the Datenschleuder still is, a central medium for 
the CCC to frame technological developments as political phenomena relevant to 
society at large, as these publications enabled the hackers to distribute information 
about contemporary developments and to publicise the political ambitions of the 
hacker organisation. Compared with the early days, the interrelation between 
acting with, through and about media technologies and infrastructures has 
intensified rather drastically, at the same time as the channels and practices related 
to communicative action have diversified and multiplied. 
 
8.2 Articulation across media environments 
While the Btx hack brought a drastic change to the CCC’s use of the interactive 
service and catapulted the hackers’ technical abilities into the spotlight, the Club 
was running an information service on its online system. 
I had no more interest in doing the same thing all over again 
and was always looking for areas no one else was engaging 
with yet. Btx was exactly the right thing. Configuring 
information sides was closer to the medium again. So already 
back then Wau and I were running an information service 
with editorial reports on data privacy, security flaws, 
technological developments and the like. (Steffen) 
Parallel with publishing the Datenschleuder the Club employed Btx as an 
infrastructure to disseminate information and knowledge about contemporary 
technologies and the hackers’ experiences with computing. Accordingly, from the 
early 1980s onwards the Club combined online and print practices to establish 
interactions between CCC members and external publics and audiences. 
Articulating the societal importance of technological developments through 
diverse media practices was considered vital for positioning computing as a 
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political issue in public discourse. While some forms of outward-oriented 
communication have dissolved as the constituting infrastructures have 
disappeared – as was the case with Btx – the Club’s publications meant to carry out 
public discourse (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) have diversified and multiplied, 
and so have their media practices. Nowadays, the hacker’s spectrum of media-
related activities (Couldry 2012; Mattoni 2012) ranges from individual websites to 
personal blogs, from podcasts to radio shows, from alternative outlets to popular 
platforms. 
Some of these outputs relied on digital collaboration tools. Others were 
produced by active Club members who maintain physical information and 
communication infrastructures – with the financial and technical support of the 
hacker collective (see Appendix 2). Telling examples are Tim Pritlove’s recording 
studio and a recording studio in the Berlin hackerspace Raumfahrtagentur (‘Space 
Travel Agency’). Tim, a long-term CCC member who worked as a media producer 
and artist, used his studio to produce the interview podcast show Chaos Radio 
Express that discussed themes related to technology, society and politics. Tim was 
also the driving force of the Podlove initiative that aimed to improve podcasting 
infrastructures through open source software and new standards. Similarly, Frank 
Rieger and Fefe, both prominent long-term members of the Club, recorded their 
podcast show Alternativlos (‘Without Alternative’) in the on-site recording studio 
at the Raumfahrtagentur. The public broadcaster Deutschlandradio distinguished 
Alternativlos as the best political podcast in 2011. In addition Fefe was running a 
personal blog that, according to various ranking services, was one of the most-read 
technology blogs in Germany. 
In terms of readership, Fefe is one the most important 
technology bloggers in Germany. […] Although he is feeding a 
lot on what the Club is sharing internally – on V-chat etcetera. 
When I used to read V-chat there was no need to look at his 
blog, because I had all the information three days in advance. 
(Pluto) 
Pluto’s rather sarcastic depiction – mainly due to the fact that he had left the Club 
some time ago and was on bad terms with some active members – demonstrated 
that the information and knowledge that was spread through outward-oriented 
channels to a large degree relied on internal communication. Individual outlets 
like blogs and podcasts relied on the larger pool of information that was at hand 
through inward-oriented interaction amongst Club members. While keeping up 
the boundaries between internal and external communication was considered 
vital for the political capability of the hacker organisation (Chapter 7), partially 
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collapsing these boundaries was important for spreading the Club’s agenda 
beyond like-minded circles. Being part of the organisation’s core group enhanced 
the ability to take a central role in disseminating valuable knowledge as it allowed 
individual members to gain access to current discussions and information 
exchange. 
In addition to the individual outlets the Club was also maintaining a website 
that acted as a self-organised online archive. Users were able to retrieve talks and 
videos from annual conferences like the SIGINT in Cologne, the GPN in 
Karlsruhe, the Easterhegg in Leipzig, recordings from single projects like 
Blinkenlights and talks dating back to the 17th Congress. The website not only 
allowed CCC members who couldn’t partake in a particular event to follow the 
action, but also acted as an independent archive of media material (Hannerz 1996; 
Cammaerts 2012). The Club’s individual and collective ‘alternative media 
infrastructures’ (Milan 2013) acted as communication channels that enabled CCC 
members to articulate their own voice as well as third parties’ points of view 
relatively independently from dominant market and government logics. Being in 
the position to create and circulate messages in addition to existing cultural codes 
(Melucci 1996) enabled the hackers to introduce information, knowledge and 
experience into public discourse that was not yet part of the mainstream agenda. 
At the same time these media environments allowed the hacker collective to take 
at least partial control over the public representation of the Club. As has been 
highlighted convincingly, representational control, in the context of networked 
activism (Juris 2008) is vital for positioning a given issue within public discourse. 
As democratic constellations per se rely on the common production and 
dissemination of meaning (Thompson 1995), access to technologies and 
infrastructures that determine the production and distribution of knowledge are 
central to the constitution of power relationships (Hintz 2013). Consequently, 
maintaining alternative infrastructures was an essential facet of the CCC’s 
engagement practices as it fed into the ability to articulate knowledge and 
thoughts about particular issues: not only hacking but also talking about it. 
The extensive use of ‘alternative media infrastructures’ (Milan 2013) was 
complemented by interaction with so-called social media (van Dijck 2013). Most 
importantly, the hackers were making active use of the networking and micro-
blogging service Twitter. 
Twitter – as you know, we are not on Facebook – is a rather 
small “public”. At the end of the day not even 15 per cent of 
the people in Germany take part in it; that’s not a lot. 
Nonetheless this political public – in a Habermasian sense of 
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the word – is of great importance for us. And, of course, we 
know that the media will investigate stories and issues on 
Twitter. (Constanze)21 
One can extract several important features from Constanze’s quote. The Club did 
not have an official Facebook account as it disagreed with the company’s terms and 
conditions, as well as its way of dealing with user data. While internal 
communication relied on highly secured and largely exclusive communication 
channels, outward-oriented communication practices made use of a wide range of 
communication channels, which ranged from alternative to commercial and 
popular platforms. Articulating their point of view and spreading information 
across diverse media environments was clearly a crucial aspect of the CCC’s 
political endeavour – though, as the exclusion of Facebook shows, not at all costs. 
On the one hand, the Tweets addressed the Club’s ever-growing number of 
followers who possibly promoted and circulated the messages by retweeting and 
re-posting. On the other hand, the Tweets were directed towards mainstream 
media who picked up particular Tweets and in doing so enabled the hackers to 
reach an even wider range of people. It was both, the ability to reach and inform a 
relevant public and to spread the hackers’ point of view beyond the domain of the 
online platform, that made practices related to Twitter important. 
Interacting with popular platforms amplified the hackers’ message as it partially 
integrated the Club in an ‘information cycle’ that went beyond traditional ‘news 
cycles’ dominated by journalists and professional sources (Chadwick 2013). This 
does not contradict the earlier finding that the Club was relying on alternative 
media infrastructures, but underlines how practices related to popular platforms 
and mainstream outlets were not positively divisible from practices related to 
alternative and self-representational infrastructures (Rodriguez et al. 2014). A 
recent example of both the shifting information cycle and mainstream media’s 
magnifying effect was the earlier mentioned iPhone hack. Zeit Online, the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and other national and international 
quality media outlets directly quoted Tweets on the hack by CCC spokespersons 
in their coverage of the incident. Other outlets like the Guardian embedded 
starbug’s YouTube video directly in their online coverage of the biometry hack 
(see Appendix 15).22 The growing interdependence of different media outlets, 
                                                
21 At the time of research the main account @chaosupdates had 72,000 followers and 
an output of 2.3 Tweets per day. Similar to a number of unofficial Facebook accounts, 
the YouTube channel CCCdeVideos (10,112 subscribers and 1,384,767 views in August 
2014) was not an official Club output. 
22 At the time of research the video on starbug’s YouTube channel star bug had 
2,696,566 views. 
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technologies and platforms enabled the CCC to embed its voice within a 
widespread media environment, while still being in control of the actual content 
that was circulated. This dynamic underlines how the CCC was acting with, 
through and about contemporary media technologies and infrastructures. To 
further underline and to elaborate on the wider implications of this finding I will 
now look more closely at the hacker organisation’s interaction with mainstream 
media. 
 
8.3 Multi-layered media practices 
While scattered articles were published on the hacker collective around the time 
of its formation it is important to come back to the Btx hack to grasp today’s 
relationship between the Club and mainstream media outlets. The hackers’ 
“deconstruction” of the Federal Post’s security guarantee catapulted the Club into 
the national media overnight. 
Who is the CCC? Nobody knew anything about us before the 
Btx hack, which all of a sudden brought the Club into the press 
nationwide. It was also an incredible boost of know-how for 
the CCC itself. […] How to generally deal with the media was 
learned back then. That’s an expertise the CCC acquired at that 
time and has continued to refine ever since. (Klaus) 
All the “public relations” that took place at that time was 
based on my ideas. For a start the priority was to keep the 
scope of our action free and open through media practices. 
Which meant being the “nice guys next door” in the 
mainstream press, stilling people’s fear of the computer, 
establishing our areas of freedom in public opinion so we 
could tinker, explore and play with computer networks. 
(Steffen) 
The quantity and prominence of reports on the Btx hack gave the CCC 
mainstream visibility to a mass audience and significantly contributed to the 
Club’s active engagement with media representatives. The Btx hack shaped the 
Club’s understanding that it was not merely attention, but the actual content of 
media coverage that affected its standing in public discourse (Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld 1993; Cammaerts 2012). Over the years CCC members, in particular the 
spokespersons, acquired a careful understanding of the needs and rules of 
mainstream media. Already in its early years the Club’s members had a clear 
understanding of the discursive power of mainstream media and were striving for 
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(positive) media attention. Mainstream outlets were regarded as communication 
links for helping to establish the CCC’s general standing in the public. Taking into 
account the coverage of the Btx hack the hackers did in fact achieve to construct a 
positive image, as the reports on the hack were largely positive. Most outlets 
interpreted the situation as a David versus Goliath conflict and acknowledged the 
Club’s ambition to criticise the insecurity of the online system. While interactions 
with mainstream media reached at least back to the Btx hack and were ‘important 
all the while’ (Klaus), looking at the interaction between mainstream media and 
CCC members retrospectively one notices that the media’s interest in the hacker 
collective intensified particularly during the early 2000s. 
The media attention has increased considerably in the past ten 
years. (Martin) 
Media couldn’t be better positioned than they are at the 
moment for the CCC. (Karsten) 
Or as Lars, who was a spokesperson during the early 2000s, described it: 
In my role as a spokesperson over two years I was part of it 
myself. It was at a time when the CCC woke up from its long 
sleep. […] One notices very intensely how the media nowadays 
strive to capture voices from the CCC. The spokesperson team 
can hardly handle the demand. (Lars) 
And as CCC member and Green Party politician Malte Spitz put it: 
They are no longer dependent on searching for media outlets. 
Instead the media explicitly ask them for information. (Malte) 
As interviewees reported, and as the participant observations confirmed, 
journalists were eager to seek information from the collective and actively reached 
out to individual CCC members through face-to-face and mediated 
communication. In 2013 alone, the Club’s spokesperson received 8973 requests 
from media representatives via email (Kurz et al. 2013). The fact that journalists of 
all kinds actively approached the hacker organisation to gain information and 
opinions from within the Club reveals that interactions with mainstream media 
went beyond coverage or media attention (Andrews and Caren 2010). Instead of 
diagnosing a single-sided adaptation that saw the hackers captivated by the 
demands of news media, leading to trivialisation and debasement of their aims 
(see Powers 2014), one could notice two-sided processes of approximation based 
on assimilative practices amongst the CCC and mainstream media. The 
observation and media analysis part of my research further confirmed that 
paralleling the expansion of media coverage, the hacker organisation had gained 
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more and more access to and standing in the quality media over the past years 
(Ericson et al. 1989; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Ferree et al. 2002). CCC members 
appeared to be increasingly treated as actors with a legitimate voice in the media. 
Over the years CCC members have established a high level of credibility that 
makes them a respected source for journalists and analysis in public debate. 
Some forms of access could be traced back to the 1990s. Chaosradio, for 
example, was a monthly talkback show on the regional radio station Fritz that has 
been broadcasted since 1995 and had its 200th transmission in April 2014. Other 
forms of access were much more recent, like the collaboration with public radio 
station Deutschlandfunk that broadcasted live coverage, video reports, interviews, 
background stories and discussion forums from every Congress since 2010. 
Another important period in this process was the foundation of the news ticker 
Heise Online in 1996, which today features a variety of technology-oriented 
online magazines and platforms.23  
In some way one can say that Heise is the house and farm 
news service of the CCC. It’s been like that for over ten years. 
(Lars) 
To elaborate on the relationship between the Club and Heise it is fruitful to take 
into account one insightful example. Peter Glaser, honorary member of the Chaos 
Computer Club, joined the hacker collective around 1984 via contacts with the taz 
milieu. Over the coming years he became an editor and later chief editor of the 
Datenschleuder. From early 2006 Glaser blogged regularly for the German online 
version of Technology Review – a Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
magazine whose German subsidiary is published by Heise. Heise Online certainly 
was a mainstream outlet published by a major media group, but its focus on 
technology-related issues restricted its distribution to particular publics. Parallel to 
his engagements on Heise Online Glaser has run a blog named Glaserei for the 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (‘New Zurich Journal’), since autumn 2013.24 Writing 
articles and maintaining blogs for mainstream outlets were not the only forms of 
media access that needed to be taken into consideration. 
Constanze, who wrote a fortnightly column for the FAZ from early 2010, was a 
regular interview partner to various broadcasting and print outlets. In addition, 
                                                
23 According to Alexa Ranking Heise online was the 28th most visited website in 
Germany in 2013. In addition, with a circulation of 290,000 per issue, Heise’s 
computer magazine c’t was one of the most read computer magazines in Germany; 
only surpassed by Computer Bild (Springer, 494,000). 
24 With 129,627 daily copies the Swiss newspaper is considered one of the opinion 
forming publications in the German-speaking world. From 2008 till 2013 Glaser’s blog 
was part of the Stuttgarter Zeitung (‘Stuttgart Newspaper’); its archive with over 
12,000 postings continues to be available. 
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she often acted as an official or unofficial news source to many well-established 
national and international media representatives. During one of my observations 
that followed a two-hour long conversation, for example, Constanze met two 
Spiegel journalists to update on the Staatstrojaner hack and immediately 
afterwards she talked with Tagespiegel journalists about the unforeseen rise of the 
Pirate Party in Germany at that time. Constanze was also a regular discussant on 
panel discussions and political talk shows; an example being when she, along with 
now vice-chancellor Sigmar Gabriel and other guests, discussed the political 
relevance of Snowden’s disclosures in July 2013 on one of the most-watched talk 
shows. Together with Frank she is the author of Datenfresser (‘Data Muncher’), a 
book on information security, and more recently Arbeitsfrei (‘Work Free’), a book 
on the computerisation and automation of the workspace; both published by S. 
Fischer, one of Germany’s leading publishing houses. As became more and more 
apparent throughout my research, Constanze’s range of media-related practices 
was similar in one form or another to most of the Club’s spokespersons, as well as 
several of its active members. Frank, for example, was a speaker at the Digital-Life-
Design (DLD) 2014 conference in Munich – a yearly event hosted by Burda, one of 
Europe’s largest media companies. Rieger was announced in the program 
highlights next to Arianna Huffington and other well-known media and 
technology figures (see Appendix 16). Overall it can be seen that the hacker 
organisation has not only achieved singular (positive) coverage but has managed 
to sustain regular access to a diversity of mainstream outlets. 
The interviews, the observation and the media analysis revealed that the 
hackers did not only establish strong relationships with certain media outlets but 
also with individual journalists. During my observations at the 28th Chaos 
Communication Congress in 2011, for example, the Zeit journalist Kai Biermann 
was a habitual guest in the press area. He knew all the active members personally 
and was on very friendly terms with most of them. In the following year he was a 
speaker at the Congress. Biermann runs a blog with Martin Haase, with whom he 
has also published the book Sprachlügen (‘Language Lies’). In his articles on Zeit 
Online he often refers to CCC activities and links to the organisation’s statements 
and reports. Biermann was the leading journalist on a collaborative project with 
Malte Spitz, who sued the German telecommunications company Deutsche 
Telekom to hand over six months of his mobile phone data to demonstrate that 
mobile phones are tracking devices revealing aspects of people’s personal lives. 
Malte’s aim was to criticise contemporary tracking and surveillance tactics by 
corporations and governmental institutions. Besides the written critique the 
 175 
tracking practices were made comprehensible by visualisations (Appendix 17).25 
Biermann here stands representative for the personal “access” the CCC has to 
various journalists. In some cases, as in the example of Peter Glaser, and more 
recently Jacob Appelbaum, Club membership and journalistic activities even 
coincided. At the time of research, Appelbaum – a core member of the Tor project, 
former spokesperson for WikiLeaks and long-term associate of the CCC – worked 
for the Spiegel where he was particularly involved in publishing news related to 
the NSA scandal. The ongoing approximation of journalists and the hacker 
collective could also be witnessed when, at the 30th Chaos Communication 
Congress, Glenn Greenwald, best known for editing and publishing classified 
documents disclosed by Snowden for the Guardian, was the first journalist ever to 
give the keynote in the history of the annual hacker meeting. 
So far the focus of this section has been on the actual interactions taking place 
between mainstream media and CCC members to show the full spectrum of styles 
and modes of accessing mainstream media. As has been shown, the different 
forms of access were interrelated and taken together constitute an important part 
of the hackers’ media-related practices. I now want to dig deeper to clarify and 
elaborate the political relevance of these interactions. In particular, access to less 
specialised mainstream media like the FAZ, the German newspaper with the 
widest international circulation, was considered highly relevant. 
The feuilletons of well-established newspapers are beginning 
to address these themes and to offer space for discussion and 
moderation. And I think it is a reasonable response to embrace 
offers of talks that come from various directions. (Andreas 
Bogk) 
The FAZ is one of the media outlets in Germany that have 
recognised the zeitgeist and understand that they can’t insist 
on a monologue but need to open up and need to enter into a 
dialogue. […] They have recognised that the internet is a 
platform where one can enter into a dialogue and where 
different themes can be proclaimed; amongst others, also by 
actors like the CCC. It is a platform to establish a dialogue that 
is important for society at large. (Lars) 
                                                
25 The project received prestigious distinctions in Germany, like the Grimme Online 
Award and the Online Journalism Award. Following Malte’s example this data 
tracking “experiment” was recently repeated and even taken one step further by 
politicians and members of parliament in Switzerland and Denmark. 
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Similarly fukami, a long-term member active in different local nodes of the CCC, 
explained: 
Frank Schirrmacher [co-editor, now deceased, of the FAZ] is a 
very good example, but there are also a few others. They take 
time to see the importance of the things that are going on and 
understand that something is happening that needs to be 
discussed publicly, that a societal consensus needs to be 
established because in principle we are at the right time now. 
We are at the beginning of this transformation. (fukami) 
The primary incentive for gaining media access was to be able to proclaim 
‘different themes’ (Lars) and ‘to establish a dialogue that is important for society at 
large’ (Lars). Having ‘space for discussion and moderation’ (Andreas Bogk) about 
themes that needed to be ‘discussed publicly’ (fukami) was the driving force of the 
CCC’s interaction with mainstream media. Access to mainstream media space 
enabled the CCC to communicate knowledge about particular themes outside of 
the Club’s own circle and to interact with the general public. Media access enabled 
the CCC to embed their own voice in a public dialogue about societal 
transformations related to technological developments. Having space for 
moderation hints at the idea that the hackers had gained a position where they 
could initiate or even lead debates about themes that might not yet be part of 
mainstream media’s standard repertoire. Through direct access to mainstream 
media the CCC’s messages in many cases were communicated without distortion, 
which strongly indicates the notion that the Club was not only viewed as worth 
covering but also considered a legitimate actor with a right to voice its concerns. 
This appreciation of the hackers’ practical engagement and know-how enabled 
CCC members to ask different audiences, publics and relevant actors to take note 
of what they considered to be important political issues. By spreading their 
knowledge across diverse media environments, and in particular by embedding 
their argumentation in quality media outlets, the CCC took part in the social 
construction of political themes.  
Bringing the findings on the different styles and modes of media access 
together with the Club’s initially discussed outward-oriented communication 
practices, the CCC’s practices related to media environments are best considered as 
multi-layered. That is to say, multi-layered media practices describe the 
production, communication and circulation of messages across different media 
environments that are entangled with each other by non-linear flows of 
information. It is understood that each practice is particular in itself – blogging, 
giving an interview, participating in a talk show, producing video material, writing 
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140 characters and writing a book. Yet, as has been shown, these practices are 
strongly entangled with each and together form a multi-layered repertoire. It was 
this multi-layeredness that enabled the Club to embed its voice across media 
environments and in doing so to reach different publics and audiences. As has 
been emphasised, the CCC’s media practices have not simply multiplied but have 
also diversified. In more concrete terms this meant that in contrast to the Club’s 
early interactions with counter media taz, which reached only a fragment of the 
population, the CCC’s multi-layered media practices enabled the hackers to reach 
people across political spectrum. In other words, the CCC did not simply increase 
its interaction with media but developed from very “secluded” media practices to 
practices that reached a wide spectrum of audiences and publics. It is worth 
introducing a concrete example to make these dynamics more vivid and to 
underline the political value of these practices. 
 
8.4 Making a complex world comprehensible 
In 2011 the CCC discovered that German police offices were illegally – according to 
a previous verdict by the constitutional court – using surveillance and spy 
software. The findings of the Staatstrojaner hack were first announced on the 
Club’s main website and on the official CCC Twitter account. Simultaneously, the 
hack was covered on the website of the FAZ in German and in English. Constanze 
explained why the hackers regarded the FAZ as the ideal media output for the 
Staatstrojaner case. 
We wanted to place it in an “appropriately” newspaper. We 
wanted a publication that recognised that it is not a technical 
issue but a political one. (Constanze) 
So, every campaign we ask ourselves again “who is particularly 
interesting for the topic?” […] We definitely wanted a 
nationwide newspaper – so, no Berlin newspaper. We wanted 
a newspaper in print because it reaches a different readership 
than online publications – if I think of my parent’s generation, 
for example – but, of course, we also wanted to have it online. 
[…] And, of course, it also has to do with contacts that we have 
by now. (Constanze) 
In the FAZ’s following Sunday print edition its co-editor Schirrmacher wrote an 
editorial on the hack on the front page entitled ‘Staatstrojaner: Code ist Gesetz’ 
(‘Federal Trojan: Code is law’) – reciting Lessig’s well-known declaration. The 
edition also included an extensive article by CCC spokesperson Frank (Rieger 2011) 
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that explained the hackers’ approach and the political importance of the findings. 
The in-depth explanation was accompanied by a five-page visualisation of the 
actual code, which shortly afterwards was turned into conceptual art by media 
artist Aram Bartholl to underline the importance of publicly discussing the 
political significance of code (see Appendix 18 and Appendix 19). Here the 
continuing, or even increasing, relevance of mainstream outlets within 
contemporary media environments becomes apparent. In particular, mainstream 
channels continue to play a vital role for the Club’s ability to reach a wide 
spectrum of people that might otherwise not come into close contact with the 
politicisation of technological issues. Access to mainstream media was not only 
essential because it allowed for high visibility (Rucht 2013), but because of 
mainstream media’s centrality to public life per se and its ability to address people 
from across the whole social range (Couldry 2003). The role of mainstream media 
was particularly relevant in this case because, as recent research has shown, 
Germans tend to be loyal to established news outlets and are less likely to adopt 
newer and individualised services (Newman and Levy 2013). Covering the issue 
online was also relevant for reaching diverse and international publics. In fact, as 
Constanze added, the English material on the FAZ’s website was accessed more 
often than the German version. All major national and numerous international 
media reported on the hack – including the BBC, Huffington Post, Bloomberg, 
NBCNews and Al Jazeera. Constanze described the media “hype” as follows: 
The first days after the release were incredible. I was on the 
Morgenmagazin [’Morning Magazine’ broadcasted by German 
public broadcaster ARD], at ntv [German television news 
channel] and other television stations. I was handed around 
from one channel to the next one and came back to work in 
full make-up. […] There was no reason to get rid of it as the 
whole thing continued in the evening. Sometimes it’s strange 
to come back into “normal” working life. But that’s how it is 
when something is on fire. All spokespersons collaboratively 
worked on the case intensely. That’s a different kind of group 
work because the whole team is acting en bloc: radio, print, 
TV. (Constanze) 
Active audiences further circulated the mainstream reports. One online Spiegel 
article on the hack (Stöcker 2011), for example, had 360 comments, around 4000 
Facebook recommendations and 300 retweets within the first two days. 
Understandably, all the CCC’s own and affiliated communication channels – from 
Chaosradio and Twitter to individual blogs and podcasts – extensively addressed 
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the Staatstrojaner hack. The Club also dedicated the Twitter hashtag #Ozapftis to 
the hack.26 
We initiated #Ozapftis because it was important for us to 
make the whole thing as interactive as possible. We wanted to 
give people the possibility to react to the disclosure of the 
Staatstrojaner. (Constanze) 
Besides the interactive element, the earlier mentioned notion of mainstream 
media taking up CCC Tweets and using Twitter as a news source was another 
reason for the initiation of #Ozapftis. 
The hack catapulted governmental surveillance tactics onto the public agenda, 
initiating a heated political debate about the entanglements of technological 
developments and state surveillance in Germany. On the one hand, the CCC had a 
profound influence on the tone and quality of the public discussion. On the other 
hand, the CCC initiated debates around the role of contemporary technologies in 
surveillance in Germany at that time. This was two years before the topic gained 
global currency owing to Snowden’s revelations of surveillance and espionage 
tactics by the NSA and other foreign intelligence agencies. To be more precise, it 
was not the hack, but its publication and the way the findings of the hack were 
articulated that catapulted governmental surveillance tactics onto the public 
agenda and initiated a heated political debate about the entanglements of 
technological developments and state surveillance in Germany. To fully grasp the 
scope of this political debate it is vital to know that for historical reasons Germans 
are particularly sensitive about data privacy and surveillance by government 
agencies. The surveillance and control mechanisms of the Gestapo under the Nazi 
regime and later the Stasi in East Germany have profoundly marked the nation’s 
collective memory. That is to say, in addition to the above-mentioned (alternative, 
personal and social) media practices, access to mainstream media is vital to the 
CCC to politicise themes that are not yet part of the political debate. Taken 
together, the CCC was able to change the climate of opinion through 
communication by describing and shaping societal constellations via multi-
layered media practices that referred back to direct digital action. Through multi-
layered media practices CCC members asked different audiences, publics and 
relevant actors to take note of what they considered to be important political 
issues. Over the past thirty years the hackers’ intensive interaction with diverse 
media environments has contributed to establishing the Club as an organisation 
                                                
26 “Ozapftis” is the slogan of the annual Oktoberfest in Munich, Germany. In this case 
it is a word game with “zapfen” (‘to tap’), which means both to wiretap and to tap a 
cask of beer. See, again, Coleman (2012) For a depiction of hacker humour. 
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able to initiate public debates about particular issues. It was through this process of 
articulation, which relied on multi-layered media practices, that the CCC was able 
to state political “facts” and to introduce new themes to the political discourse. 
They achieved a position where they were able to change, or at least influence, the 
reference points of political debate. 
Taken together, multi-layered media practices enabled the CCC ‘to get their 
message across in the public discourse’ (Koopmans 2004: 372) amongst the rising 
number of non-state actors. The CCC, without doubt, is a collective that has 
‘something to gain by going public’ (Warren 2001: 164). Yet, as the findings show, 
going public and achieving mediated visibility was not an end in itself. Rather the 
Club’s manifold articulations of mediation (Cammaerts 2012: 117) were 
instrumental to realising the political goals of the hacker organisation. This view 
takes into account how political constellations, besides being based on material 
resources, today are increasingly based on the production and circulation of 
information (Melucci 1996: 176). To fully grasp the relevance of this line of 
thought one needs to see how, in the case of the CCC, “information” is related to 
the stark meaning of the verb “to inform” – from Latin, informare: to shape, 
fashion, describe. The CCC’s media practices were above all concerned with 
informing the largest possible public about the political dimension of “technical” 
issues. From day one outward-oriented communication was fundamental for the 
hackers if they were to become part of the description and shaping of societal 
constellations. More concretely, media practices spanning diverse media 
environments were fundamental to introducing themes to society that were not 
yet part of the public discourse. 
This modality of generating public attention around particular issues has been 
referred to as ‘thematization’ (Habermas 1996). The above findings illustrate that 
the CCC was ‘in the position to perceive, identify, and publicly thematize’ 
(Habermas 1996: 350) the political nature of technical developments. From this 
perspective, the hackers were not only aiming to be part of existing discussions 
but were concerned with the recognition of a particular ‘grammar of political 
claims-making’ (Fraser 2000: 108) by introducing new themes into public 
discourse. Accordingly, their political engagement was partially directed towards 
changing the agenda of a given debate (McCombs and Shaw 1972), but even more, 
it was about changing the reference-points of political debates and predominant 
conceptions of what is understood as politics (see Lechner 2003[1990]). The CCC 
introduced elements of conflict, resistance and antagonism into otherwise 
politically unconscious visions of democratic constellations. Democratic 
constellations are inherently situational, dynamic and potentially unstable (Dahl 
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1989; Keane 2009). This, however, does not mean that the thematisation of 
political issues is simply given. Individual and collective actors who exercise 
agency in controversial, conflictual and contested ways must bring new political 
themes to life. As this chapter demonstrates, media practices played a significant 
role in the Club’s struggle to change the ground of politics. 
After learning about the relevance interviewees ascribed to practices related to 
media environments, one of the straightforward questions I asked participants 
was: Why do you attribute so much importance to “the media”? The replies were 
often similar and went something like Martin’s response. 
As a lobby group you want to convince other people of your 
ideas, and you don’t do that exclusively with members of 
parliament or a selected public. Instead you also want to do 
that through the public at large […] because you can only fulfil 
your goals when you reach the public at large. I think that 
that’s rather obvious. The issues we are concerned with are 
questions that need general attention. (Martin) 
There are many technical things that need to be translated into 
everyday language. If I occupy myself with mobile phones and 
information security I also need to understand the technical 
side to comprehend how it works. The Club is really good at 
explaining “what’s the core of the problem?”, “what’s the 
impact on the individual and on society?”. Only a few are able 
to communicate answers to those questions with the clarity 
the CCC does. (fukami) 
As became clear throughout the interviews, communicating insights to the public 
at large through multi-layered media practices was not so much concerned with 
mobilisation. Instead the hackers wanted to change popular thinking more 
fundamentally by creating a reference point that would make particular themes 
accessible to the general public. The route they considered most productive for 
transforming societal constellations at large (see Zald and Ash 1966) was to inform 
diverse audiences and publics by explaining issues that might otherwise not be 
comprehensible. The need to translate technical jargon into everyday language 
was considered particularly important. As participants pointed out, the increased 
level of technical abstractness made it more and more challenging for lay-persons 
and politicians alike to understand the functioning of contemporary artefacts or 
infrastructures. As a consequence it was difficult, if not impossible, to notice the 
political impacts particular technical developments might bring. 
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What we are doing is something like Sendung mit der Maus 
[‘Mouse TV’, a German children’s TV series]; which means 
that we review a topic in ways that makes it understandable. 
[…] The world has changed from the concrete to the abstract. 
Back in the days – 60 years ago, in the 1950s – most things 
were very concrete: people were concerned with work in the 
fields and with machines where you could still see the gear 
wheels turning. It was possible to comprehend the 
mechanisms. With computers we can no longer see any of 
that. We can’t see bits. We don’t know where electrons are 
flying around. We can’t comprehend it but I can bring it to a 
level where it becomes comprehensible. (Lars) 
As a concrete example of the relevance of deconstructing the abstractness of 
technological artefacts or infrastructures to materialise their formerly 
unrecognised political quality, Lars used the Club’s engagement with the voting 
computer (Chapter 7). 
Elections in Germany are meant to be accountable. It is one of 
the requirements: free, secret, independent, and accountable 
elections. Accountable means that I have the possibility to 
recount votes. In the case of a computer where I press a button 
I simply don’t know what comes out at the other end. I can 
only trust but I can’t validate it. That’s one of the reasons why 
we doubted voting computers: the comprehensibility was no 
longer given. (Lars) 
By resetting the voting computer so that it could play chess, the hackers made the 
manipulability of the computer comprehensible in a straightforward manner. 
Nobody had seriously questioned the role of voting computers before the hack. 
Following the hackers’ engagement the constitutional court investigated the 
matter. The CCC did not only have an influence on the tone and quality of the 
public discussion around the democratic deficit of voting computers but in fact 
initiated the debate. While acting with and through technologies was the 
groundwork of their engagement, the political endeavour of thematising the 
dubious deployment of computing technology was only brought to life once the 
outcomes of the hack were articulated across diverse media environments. 
Bringing together direct digital action (Coleman 2013) and articulation through 
multi-layered media practices enabled the hackers to make the political dimension 
of a particular technology visible and comprehensible. 
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Whenever we have new insights it is important for us to 
communicate them. There is no other way for us than going 
through the general public. (Constanze) 
Spreading our knowledge and message as wide as possible, 
that’s the aim. It starts by organising the Congress where 
media representatives take part, by talking with other media 
representatives, by maintaining websites, the whole spectrum 
for how you reach people. (anonymised) 
Retrospectively: the more issues around technology and new 
media become part of society the more we are represented in 
society with our know-how and try to do our transparency 
and explanatory work. The articles in the FAZ, that’s 
explanatory work, it is the mediation of essentials and 
coherences. That’s a central part of the Club’s endeavours. 
(Steffen) 
We may not cause chaos, but we do understand some small 
part of how chaos works, and we have been able to help others 
deal with it better. (Gonggrijp 2010: n.p.) 
By articulating and framing the complexity of technical developments into 
messages that were intelligible for a wide range of publics and audiences, the 
hackers fulfilled a large part of their political aims. Multi-layered media practices 
were fundamental for enhancing ‘civic agency’ (Dahlgren 2013, 2009) as they 
allowed the hackers to practise informative and explanatory work by making 
complex issues that co-determine societal constellations more comprehensible to 
citizens. Through multi-layered media practices CCC encouraged citizens to make 
more informed political judgements. As a consequence, one could go so far as to 
say that through their engagement practices the hackers promoted democratic 
constellations generally as they stimulated practical knowledge that brought 
technical findings together with political values and social assumptions (Fischer 
2009: 7). Multi-layered media practices aimed at mediated visibility were not an 
end in themselves, but a vehicle to make the functioning and consequences of 
particular technologies comprehensible and, in making them so, to politicise 
them. 
These are things that simply need to be said and might 
otherwise not be said at all or might reach a much smaller 
audience. The column in the FAZ and the podcasts are good 
examples where people spread and extravert knowledge. […] 
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Data privacy and copyright, for instance, are themes that we 
have addressed at length and on which we can make more 
qualified statements than a journalist who has to cover 1000 
other topics and has only a few hours to become acquainted 
with the issue, and in the end cites Wikipedia. (starbug) 
What we’re doing is editing a topic so that we can 
convincingly explain it and people understand what’s going 
on. The object code of the binary data of the Staatstrojaner that 
was printed in the FAZ, for example, can be interpreted. 
Someone who does not study anything related might not 
necessarily understand the code that is written in the paper. 
Fascinatingly, after the FAZ published it, we got so many 
reactions of people saying, “Wow, I understand what is going 
on. It is comprehensible.” […] That’s the aim: to make it public 
until it is comprehensible. (Lars) 
In other words, the outcome of disassembling technical abstractions needed to be 
publicly communicated to bring the political dimension of hacking to life. To fulfil 
their goal of informing publics, CCC members decided to rely on particular 
practices that possessed the quality needed for making the political dimension of a 
given issue comprehensible. One reason to go with a newspaper in the case of the 
Staatstrojaner, for example, was because ‘the visualisation of the case is not very 
easy and therefore we decided against doing it on television’ (Constanze). The 
five-page visualisation that accompanied the FAZ article on the Staatstrojaner was 
therefore crucial for deepening readers’ comprehension of the surveillance 
software. The relevance of multi-layered media practices was also clear in the 
CCC’s biometric related hacks. As Lisa emphasised, ‘there are things that are 
difficult to explain in words’ (Lisa). As shown earlier, the self-produced video 
material which was taken up by national and international mainstream media 
played an important role in making the functioning and limitations of biometric 
technology comprehensible to a variety of audiences. 
Concluding this chapter, one can remark that acting with and through 
contemporary technologies and infrastructures appeared to be the core of the 
hackers’ engagement practices. Yet, the political project that informed this 
material deconstruction, establishment and maintenance was only accomplished 
once these engagements were communicated through multi-layered media 
practices. Framing technical developments as political to a large degree relied on 
comprehensible narratives, visualisation, metaphors and instructions. More 
concretely, multi-layered media practices were on the one hand fundamental for 
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positioning new issues in public discourse, and on the other hand to thematising 
them in ways that enabled different audiences and publics to understand the 
political dimension and societal significance of particular “technical” issues. 
Acting with, through and about technology were combined approaches that 
enabled the CCC to provide a hermeneutic to people so they could understand the 
political dimension and societal significance of particular technical issues. 
Engagement practices that challenged predominant conceptions of what is 
understood as political and elaborated new conceptions of politics were grounded 
in the synergy of symbolic and material resources. Instead of protesting or 
mobilising a crowd of people on the street the CCC predominantly relied on 
acting on the given issue through direct digital action and on articulating their 
field-tested knowledge and experience through multi-layered media practices. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
As this chapter has shown, acting with and through contemporary technologies 
was deeply entangled with articulating knowledge and distributing information to 
frame technological developments as political phenomena relevant to society at 
large. Compared with the early days, the interrelation between acting with, 
through and about media technologies and infrastructures has intensified rather 
drastically, at the same time as the channels and practices related to 
communicative action have diversified and multiplied. The growing 
interdependence of different media outlets, technologies and platforms enabled 
the CCC to embed its voice within a widespread media environment, while still 
being in control of the actual content that was circulated. In contrast to the Club’s 
early interactions with counter media taz, which reached only a fragment of the 
population, the CCC’s multi-layered media practices enabled the hackers to reach 
people across political spectrum. Multi-layered media practices describe the 
production, communication and circulation of messages across different media 
environments that are entangled with each other by non-linear flows of 
information. In other words, the CCC did not simply increase its interaction with 
media over time but developed from very “secluded” media practices to practices 
that reached a wide spectrum of audiences and publics – including various styles 
and modes of access to mainstream media. Acting with, through and about 
technology were combined approaches that enabled the CCC to provide a 
hermeneutic to people so they could understand the political dimension and 
societal significance of particular technical issues. Engagement practices that 
challenged predominant conceptions of what is understood as political were 
grounded in the synergy of symbolic and material resources. Instead of protesting 
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or mobilising the hacker organisation predominantly relied on acting on the given 
issue through direct digital action and on articulating their field-tested knowledge 
and experience through multi-layered media practices. Along with this 
development the CCC established a reputation as a trusted political organisation 
and was able to sustain its engagement over time. The rising number of Twitter 
followers, the continually growing interaction with mainstream media and the 
growing number of visitors to the annual Congress, amongst other developments, 
underline how the Club’s role in making a complex world comprehensible was 
recognised and considered relevant by a growing number of people. The following 
chapter will complement these findings by elaborating in more detail the CCC’s 
interaction with institutional politics and the importance of establishing a 
coherent identity. 
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c h a p t e r  n i n e  
A Concrete Multiplicity  
 
Following up on the previous chapter the first section in this chapter explains the 
Chaos Computer Club’s legitimation as occurring largely through the 
organisation’s interactions and collaborations with institutional political entities. 
The second section interrogates more closely the correlation between the CCC’s 
multi-layered media practices and its interactions with government agencies. 
Bringing together participants’ statements quoted in this chapter and relational 
notions of legitimation this section conceptualises the dynamics at hand as circuits 
of legitimation. Section three highlights how the Club is a heterogeneous 
collection of multi-socialised and multi-determined actors, who concentrate their 
expertise on a small set of issues concerning the political consequences of 
technology. I emphasise that the CCC’s political capacity was only brought to life 
once the hackers’ technology related skills, knowledge and experiences were 
consolidated and communicated coherently beyond a circle of like-minded 
people. I will particularly analyse the importance of the leading role played by 
Club spokespersons for the collective’s formation of legitimation and ability to act 
politically. Overall, opposing approaches that argue for a (more or less) direct 
causal chain between media attention and legitimacy, this chapter argues for a 
more relational understanding of the dynamic between actors’ media practices and 
legitimation.  
 
9.1 The hackers and institutional politics 
To fully grasp the political importance and societal embeddedness of the CC it is 
indispensible to look at the hackers’ interaction with institutionalised bodies. 
Since 1984, three years after its foundation, the CCC has acted as a registered 
association represented by an executive committee that has primarily functioned 
as a legal delegation. Registration as a not-for-profit association pre-empted the 
so-called anti-hacker-paragraph, which came into effect in 1985 in Germany and 
criminalised the penetration of unsecured computer systems. As Andreas Bogk, a 
CCC member since around 1994, long-term spokesperson and former board 
member put it: 
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We actively decided to stay on the legal side and formed a 
registered association when the government introduced the 
hacker-paragraph, instead of going underground. (Andreas 
Bogk) 
This decision was far from self-evident. The founding years of the CCC were 
preceded and accompanied by politically turbulent times that saw, for example, 
the radicalisation of political activism in form of the militant Red Army Fraction 
(RAF). The possibility of forming a legally legitimated collective is part of the very 
definition of democratic constellations, in that they create space for a plurality of 
civic and political associations (Dahl 1989; Fung 2003). From this perspective, the 
Club’s present-day standing partially originated in its legal legitimation. Yet, my 
analysis is less interested in the organisation’s legal status than in the engagement 
practices that led their activities to being perceived as appropriate and justified in 
its chosen course of action (Suchman 1995; Edwards 2000). As participants stated, 
over the thirty years the Club was slowly but steadily moving away from its 
anarchic, underground origins towards more established fields in society. As a 
consequence they came to be seen less as “nerds” in hacker scenes and increasingly 
appreciated by a various publics and relevant actors. In addition to the growing 
number of Twitter followers, the exponentially growing interactions with 
mainstream media and the growing number of visitors to the annual Congress, the 
process of increasing societal resonance could be witnessed in constantly rising 
membership figures. 
It is a strong, exponential growth. In the beginning we always 
had around 100 members, and it stayed like that for years. One 
can clearly see a sudden increase in the mid-2000s – that’s 
when it really got going. (Martin) 
Membership numbers matter because active participation in the collective work of 
an organisation is generally seen as a sign of an organisation’s “effectiveness” and 
to signal broader legitimacy for the group and its claims (Amenta et al. 2010). In 
the same time frame the CCC had been noticeably included in and distinctions 
bestowed by non-governmental organisations. In 2010 the CCC received a Prix Ars 
Electronica award for throwing the spotlight on the societal consequences of new 
technologies for the past thirty years. In the early 2000s Andy Müller-Maguhn 
was elected to the directory board of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) – a not-for-profit organisation responsible for 
coordinating critical parts of the internet’s infrastructure. More recently, 
Constanze Kurz received one of the highest nonpartisan distinctions in Germany, 
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the Theodor-Heuss-Medal, for igniting political discussion of values and publicly 
working towards democratic solutions. 
Even more importantly for the focus of this thesis on legitimation processes 
and long-term engagement was the Club’s growing interactions and 
collaborations with institutional politics. The hacker organisation was asked to 
appear as an official expert by the German constitutional court on five occasions – 
for example, relating to the use of voting computers and to governmental data 
retention.27 In most cases the federal judges implemented the Club’s 
recommendations. Along the way, the court also subscribed to the hacker’s 
Datenschleuder magazine. 
For me personally a decisive breakthrough was when the 
library of the constitutional court made a Datenschleuder 
subscription. That moment I thought, “wonderful, now the 
Club has really arrived in the middle of society”. (Klaus) 
At the same time, as participants recounted, the CCC was advising all major 
German political parties, as well as numerous senior legislators and a number of 
state ministries. Individual members were frequently asked to advise governments 
at both the provincial and federal levels to comment, for example, on the social 
and cultural significance of hackerspaces in Berlin, on information technology 
security in the economy, and on the security level of the newly introduced E-
Government communications service De-Mail. In addition, Constanze 
(nominated by the Left Party) and the honorary CCC member padeluun 
(nominated by the Free Democratic Party), acted as experts on the German 
parliament’s committee on Internet and Digital Society for duration of its work, 
from 2010 to 2013. 
Overall, through developing versatile political affiliations with various levels of 
governmental administration, CCC members in one way or another answered 
calls for hackers’ increased engagement ‘within the realm of traditional power and 
politics’ (Doctorow 2012: n.p.).28 Complementing the notion that the hackers 
enhanced ‘civic agency’ (Dahlgren 2009, 2013) by supporting citizens in 
comprehending complex issues, one can register that the Club also provided 
affected institutional actors – politicians, administrators, judges – with action-
oriented narratives required for decision-making (Fischer 2009: 7). The fact that all 
three branches of state governance sought to consult with the CCC’s shows that 
                                                
27 See Rosanvallon (2011) on the progressive role constitutional courts play in how the 
question of democracy is framed today. 
28 Cory Doctorow gave a much-praised talk at the 28th Chaos Communication 
Congress (28C3) on ‘The Coming War on General Purpose Computation’. 
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the hackers were considered advocates with a legitimate voice by institutional 
politics. Public statements by politicians across political camps about the Club’s 
role in developing democratic constellations further underlined this general level 
of acceptance. In the context of the Staatstrojaner hack, then Minister of Justice 
Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger stated in a much-cited interview: ‘Rarely are 
assessments of the technicians as important for legislators as they are today’ and 
continued by declaring that CCC members were ‘no anarchists but experts’ 
(Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger 2011: n.p.). In an award-winning television 
documentary on the Club’s history Thomas De Maizière, Federal Minister of the 
Interior, stated: ‘The CCC is something like a positive disturber. […] Society would 
be poorer without such a positive disturber. One needs them, but should not 
always entirely listen to them’ (Glasstetter and Meyer 2010: minute 13:40). As 
Klaus commented these developments: 
The aim was never to brand the Club but to spread substantial 
matters that emerged from the know-how pool of the CCC. 
And they’ve simply succeeded in making these matters 
acceptable. (Klaus) 
This is not to say that the relation between the CCC and institutional politics was 
entirely harmonious, as the last part of De Maizière’s appraisal hints. As an 
example from early 2014 demonstrates, the relationship continued to be 
conflictual, or at least tense. Together with the International League for Human 
Rights (ILMR), members of the CCC filed a criminal complaint against the 
German federal government and the presidents of the German intelligent services. 
The alliance accused German secret agents, the German Minister of the Interior as 
well as the German Chancellor of illegally aiding and abetting a violation of the 
right to privacy by bearing and cooperating with the electronic surveillance of 
German citizens by the NSA and other foreign intelligent agencies (Chaos 
Computer Club 2014). Both the advisory activities and making use of legal tools 
was that besides maintaining direct digital action and multi-layered media 
practices, the Club was also open to exercising more conventional and direct 
tactics for bringing about political change. 
A telling example of engagement practices that relied on “traditional” forms of 
doing democracy was the Club’s initiative for more governmental transparency. In 
2011 the CCC, together with the organisations Mehr Demokratie (‘More 
Democracy’) and Transparency International, successfully filed a people’s 
initiative for a new transparency law in Hamburg. The first federal state in 
Germany, Hamburg introduced a law that gave citizens the right to information 
from their government and administration free of charge and anonymously. The 
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online information register included senate resolutions, building permits, 
contracts concerning public services and expert appraisal. As Michael Hirdes aka 
Dodger, CCC spokesperson and a driving force behind the initiative, described it: 
Hamburg’s new transparency law can reduce distrust as 
anyone – citizens, organisation and journalists – can see how 
decisions are made and what they are based on. Also, 
authorities know that the public can check their work, which 
discourages corruption. (Dodger) 
As one might expect, media outlets reported widely on the issue and requested 
CCC members as sources, commentators and contributors to explain the meaning 
and importance of the initiative.29 As the latter example demonstrates, the Club’s 
interactions and collaborations with institutional politics indicate engagement 
practices that subject governments and other decision-making bodies to 
permanent public scrutiny and control (Keane 2009; Rosanvallon 2008). At the 
same time, successfully tabling new laws and advising the constitutional court 
point to more fundamental political issues. 
The versatile political affiliations and confrontations with various levels of state 
governance demonstrate that the hackers have not simply been adopted by 
institutional politics. Instead, we see that the hackers’ account of social reality was 
increasingly accepted and in demand. Accordingly, the processes depicted in this 
thesis further emphasise how the hackers were in the position to ‘convincingly 
and influentially thematize’ (Habermas 1996: 359) technological development as 
political subjects. One can even go a step further and pointing out that the CCC 
was not only capable of politicising particular issues, but was also in the position 
to ‘furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatize them in such a way that 
they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes’ (Habermas 1996: 
359). Participating in political committees, being consulted by political parties and 
ministries, advising the constitutional court and tabling new laws – what has been 
referred to as ‘effective problematization’ (Habermas 1996: 359) – indicate a level 
of legitimation and political involvement that complements the earlier attested 
capacity for effective articulation of issues and concerns. 
The previous chapter showed that the Club had become a trusted voice across 
diverse media environments. In particular, the different styles and forms of access 
to, as well as their reputation in the mainstream media (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993; Ericson et al. 1989; Ferree et al. 2002), indicate that the hackers were 
considered appropriate sources and actors with a legitimate right to voice their 
                                                
29 The total number of reports, articles and stories on the issue amounted to 407 at the 
time of research. 
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concerns (Gitlin 1980; Phillips et al. 2004). This chapter so far has made a similar 
argument for the case of institutional politics. As will be shown throughout the 
coming section, recognition by journalists and media organisations and the 
acceptance of the Club’s account of social reality by legislators, politicians and 
judges were deeply interconnected. A vital aspect of the Club’s multi-layered 
media practices and political work was to inform – that is, describing, making 
comprehensible and shaping – the largest possible public. By spreading practical 
knowledge about the political values of technological developments the hackers 
aimed to assist citizens in making more informed political judgements and 
thereby to enhance citizens’ deliberative processes. Considering the interrelation 
between media environments and institutional politics in more depth, it became 
clear that multi-layered media practices played an additional vital role for the 
Club’s political endeavours. 
Gaining access to, as well as their standing and preferred framing of the issues in 
quality newspapers like the FAZ was not necessarily seen as a proxy for access to 
elite policy makers (Powers 2014). Nonetheless participants saw it as a central 
vehicle to deepen insider strategies. More concretely, multi-layered media 
practices were considered indispensable for putting pressure on and gaining access 
to institutional politics. 
On the one hand we believe that the public has a right to 
know. It has been like that since the Btx hack – which, by the 
way, had its 27th anniversary recently. From Btx throughout all 
following hacks, uncovering a political scandal for us always 
implies public relations and interactions with the media. We 
can’t work in any other way because otherwise we can’t exert 
any pressure. (Constanze) 
If you manage to communicate appropriate public anger 
coupled with technical competence to the outside you 
become a contact person in demand. (Erdgeist) 
It is understood that policymakers and political institutions process the flood of 
information disproportionately as they allocate attention to some problems rather 
than others (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Through the 
multiplication and diversification of media-related practices the CCC occupied 
more and more information channels received by large-scale audiences and, at the 
same time, were digested by individuals and organisations that were more directly 
involved in decision-making. 
Whenever a totally absurd law is supposed to be pushed 
through the parliament, we have to mobilise all the media 
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power at hand to convey our venom. And this is indeed a 
quite powerful weapon. (Erdgeist) 
What we’ve learned based on earlier experiences – in 
particular the Btx hack – is that one has to go on the 
“offensive”, one has to make it public. That’s our procedure 
and it has proven to be successful since 1984. Once it is public 
you can’t take it back because a certain public pressure 
emerges. Once the pressure builds up you can apply it in a 
useful way. (Lars) 
Interestingly, Lars explicitly used the term offensive to describe the hackers’ 
modes of engagement directed to state institutions (see Cohen and Arato 1992: 
548–63). Multi-layered media practices, and in particular access to and coverage by 
mainstream outlets, meant CCC was able to become a “voice of the public” and 
appeared to furnish the CCC with legitimation in relation to relevant political 
actors (Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]). Club members made active use of this 
dynamic to gain attention by and admission to institutional politics. 
Once our ideas and messages have gained currency we seek 
talks with the major political parties. […] After the publication 
of the [Staatstrojaner] codes we did, of course, seek talks with 
all major parties. We had meetings in the FDP [Free 
Democratic Party] headquarters, we also had contact with the 
CDU [Christian Democratic Party], we met with the internet 
politicians of the SPD [Social Democratic Party], and we will 
continue this Friday. Next week we participate in the 
parliament’s subcommittee on new media. (Constanze) 
The observations by participants echo the notion that achieving positive standing 
in the media may be a necessary condition for recognition by targets of influence 
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Cammaerts et al. 2013). Even more tellingly, these 
statements by participants emphasise how the hacker organisation was bringing 
together “old” and “new” as well as “direct” and “indirect” modes of co-
determining the political landscape. While the Club was acting with and through 
media technologies and infrastructures in rather unconventional and radical ways 
(Chapter 7), its members acknowledged that influencing democratic constellations 
in large part included operating within the realm of institutional powers. While 
hacking was both to attract attention and to demonstrate the Club’s practical skills, 
direct digital action on its own was not sufficient to bring about political change. 
Bringing these findings into dialogue with the earlier notion that the Club was 
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acting about media technologies and infrastructures on the basis of their multi-
layered media practices, one can now add that the CCC was also acting about 
media technologies and infrastructures by interacting with institutional politics. 
In fact, as has been shown above, media-related practices and interaction with 
relevant actors were strongly interconnected. Articulation processes that enabled 
the hackers to ‘effectively problematize’ (Habermas 1996) technological 
developments as political relied on both multi-layered media practices and 
interactions with institutional politics. 
So far correlations between making an issue public and interacting with 
institutional politics appear to be rather event-oriented. In a similar way, the 
correlations might be interpreted as a one-way stream flowing from mediated 
visibility through public pressure to interactions with institutional politics. Yet, to 
stop the analysis at this stage would be to investigate the Club’s political activism 
only on the surface because the dynamics in play were in fact more complex and 
less straightforward. In particular, legitimation processes were much less causal 
than often proposed, and strongly interwoven with long-term developments. 
 
9.2 Circuits of legitimation 
One can conclude on the basis of the previous sections that the CCC established a 
reputation as a trusted organisation in a rapidly changing and uncertain field. 
Legitimation to a large degree rests on reputation. Reputation in turn is an 
‘invisible institution’ upon which trust is ultimately based (Rosanvallon 2008: 13). 
Over three decades, and in particular within the past ten to fifteen years, the CCC 
has managed to position itself as a reliable and impartial political actor. People 
across the spectrum – citizens, media representatives, constitutional judges, 
politicians – have trust in the ways the CCC contributes its knowledge and 
experience in thematising and politicising technological developments. The CCC’s 
activities, which range from offering diagnostic services to speaking truth to 
power, have largely been recognised as socially useful. 
These days the CCC is perceived as a collective that has a 
strong expertise in a particular area. When we manage to link 
this perception to an issue or topic that we want to 
communicate it is possible to implement our campaign and 
aims. (Erdgeist) 
Articulating believable narratives across media environments and in direct 
interaction with institutional politics played a vital part in the CCC gaining its 
current standing which enabled them to politicise technological developments. 
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What has been described as acting with, through and about media technologies 
and infrastructures can also be described as practising ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ 
modes of engagement (Cohen and Arato 1992: 548–63). On the one hand, the 
hackers’ engagement was directed inwards to civil society as it supported and 
enabled emancipatory practices related to contemporary technologies. On the 
other hand, their engagement was explicitly directed outwards to state 
institutions. 
Yet, the concrete interrelation of these three dimensions – with, through and 
about – and their relation to the formation of legitimation need further untangling. 
Let me start by unpacking the example of the voting computer in more detail. 
Computerised voting machines were first used in Germany during the European 
Election in 1999 and for the last time in September 2008 during council elections 
in the state of Brandenburg. Following the CCC’s expert report the German 
constitutional court ruled the use of voting computers unconstitutional, in March 
2009. The court’s verdict explicitly referred to the findings of the Club’s hack and 
stated that voting computers – used by around two million citizens during the 
general elections in 2005 – contradicted the convention of the public nature of 
elections, which guarantees every citizen control of the legality of any election. 
The legitimation of the Club’s direct digital action, as well as their narration by the 
highest court in Germany, was the tip of a series of acts that started with hacking 
the computer, initiating a public campaign across diverse media environments and 
direct interaction with the constitutional court, ending with the court’s ruling. 
Boundaries between “insider” and “outsider” tactics (Mosley 2011) were blending 
into each other. As a consequence of this process the CCC not only politicised the 
issue of electronic voting but achieved a concrete change in democratic procedure. 
In most of the world’s largest democracies – Brazil, India and the United States – 
where this form of intervention was not performed voting computers are still in 
use. 
One might interpret this process as a chain-like dynamic where A leads to B 
and B leads to C. In the course of the fieldwork this understanding of causality 
came to seem oversimplified. Instead of a chain the process appeared to 
correspond more strongly with a circular or spiral dynamic. 
It always arose out of the circumstances – for example, when 
the constitutional court approached us. One thing led to 
another: we became better known, other people approached 
us, and we became even more known. (starbug) 
Participants emphasised that after each implementation of the CCC’s 
recommendations by the constitutional court, interest by and access to different 
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media outlets grew and so did inquiries by politicians and legislators. Other 
interviewees who commented on this echoed starbug’s description of a 
cumulative effect taking place over time.  
It went hand in hand. On the one hand a wide public 
increasingly appreciated the themes we were acting on and on 
the other hand we became more professional. (anonymised) 
The fact that politicians take them seriously and listen to 
them, and the fact that large publishing houses pay court to 
the CCC and offer a platform to distribute its views – or rather 
the view of single CCC members – are clear signs of the Club’s 
standing. (Lisa) 
The participants’ statements point to longer term dynamics and complement the 
earlier rather event-oriented relation between acting with, through and about 
technologies. In this context multi-layered media practices and interactions with 
institutional politics were seen as interrelated and similarly important for the 
hackers’ legitimation. The interrelation between multiplying and diversifying 
media practices and interaction with various levels of government administration 
is also clear in given the fact that both dynamics took off at about the same time. 
Scholars who diagnose correlation between media practices and the societal 
standing of political actors have argued for a strong correlation between media 
representation and legitimacy (Lazarsfeld and Merton 2004[1948]; Herbst 2003; 
Koopmans 2004; Yoon 2005). My research agrees with theses account, as far as 
media environments serve both as an indicator of legitimacy by society-at-large 
and as a source of legitimacy in their own right (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). 
At the same time, my findings complement and complicate existing lines of 
reasoning. They do so in two ways. First, as has been emphasised throughout 
previous sections and chapters, actors’ media-related practices today go far beyond 
coverage by mainstream media. The CCC’s media related practices rely on multi-
layered interactions across diverse media environments. Second, instead of 
arguing for a straightforward causal chain between “media attention” and 
legitimacy my research reveals a more dynamic process. The reciprocal 
dependences grounded in both the hackers’ multi-layered media practices and 
their interactions with institutional politics. As a result, when considering the 
relationship between actors’ media- practices and legitimacy it is necessary to 
conceptualise the dynamics at hand as circuits of legitimation.  
Conceptualising the processes at hand as circuits of legitimation takes into 
account that legitimation is never constructed in a vacuum, but is established in 
relation to a range of actors within a given environment (Rosanvallon 2011; 
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Suchman 1995). The CCC’s ability to manoeuvre their issues into public discourse 
and to advance their political goals to a great extent relates to prevailing societal 
constellations. The more technology found its way into people’s everyday lives, 
the more attentive citizens, media representatives and decision makers became to 
actors that demonstrated and articulated reasonable engagement in relation to 
technical developments. Gaining and maintaining legitimacy is something that is 
framed and conditioned by social realities. As has been signalled, legitimation can 
be at least partially secured through institutions like the media (Thompson 1995). 
Yet, legitimation is never simply mediated. Media-related practices are vital for 
legitimation processes as they contribute to, amongst other things, mediated 
visibility. All the same, they are merely a part of larger figurations, even if an 
important one. 
In the case of the CCC, institutional politics reacted to public pressure that was 
built up through multi-layered media practices; which confirms that actors who 
receive preferred standing and are able to stabilise their appearances across media 
environments over time tend to be considered trustworthy (Gitlin 1980). 
Interestingly enough, this correlation also operated the other way round. Media 
representatives considered CCC members as legitimate voices due to their regular 
interaction with institutional politics. Politicians, legislators and judges learned 
about the collective’s engagement in part through the Club’s multi-layered media 
practices. As a consequence, they invited CCC members to articulate their stance 
in particular contexts, like committees, consultations and hearings. Due to their 
involvement in institutional politics, different media outlets regarded the CCC as 
worth covering as well as worth granting access. Interactions with both 
institutional politics and relevant media outlets strengthened the collective’s 
legitimation. Media environments and institutional politics, each in their own 
way, mutually signify the CCC’s engagement before a wide public. As a 
consequence their virtuous role as a civil society organisation that had something 
to say about the political relevance of technical developments continued to be 
acknowledged, inscribed and stabilised. Throughout this process the Club gained 
opportunities to illustrate its activities, articulate its objectives and politicise 
particular themes. Overall, instead of linearity one needs to stress circularity as the 
defining processual dynamic that best conceptualises the legitimation of the CCC. 
A circular conception points towards cumulative dynamics of legitimation that 
relate to multifaceted communication processes. 
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The circular dynamic underlying legitimation makes it almost impossible to 
determine a definite starting point.30 Arguing for a more relational process 
between actors’ media practices and legitimation conceptualises legitimacy as a 
relational term and takes into account that, analytically, one can distinguish 
between different levels of legitimation, but empirically these levels overlap 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967: 112). Understood as a conceptual framework, circuits 
of legitimation recognises political action as a struggle over both the legitimate 
boundaries of recognised players and the boundaries of legitimate positions 
(Bourdieu 2000: 185). The CCC was not building new political arenas, but 
embedded emerging political themes in existing ones; which over time might 
contribute to the modification of democratic constellations. Circuits of 
legitimation were vital for this process as they enabled the CCC to endure and 
intensify its engagement. By acting with, through and about media technologies 
and infrastructures, the CCC approximated its role of being a discursive interpreter 
of societal constellations with the role of an organisation that was making tangible 
legislative contributions. It was due to the ongoing establishment of the CCC as a 
civil society organisation worth trusting that the Club was able to thematise and 
act on (new) political issues. These dynamics were particularly relevant because as 
an unelected organisation the CCC had no democratic legitimacy; that it is to say, 
it was not representative in a traditional sense. 
As the idea of circuits of legitimation suggests, legitimacy is not a matter of 
singular events but of simultaneous communicative action – from face-to-face 
conversations to computer-mediated interaction, from co-presence to mediation – 
amongst different actors over time. It is also necessary to highlight that these 
processes are not self-reinforcing. As much as the dynamics described here can 
perpetuate an upward tendency they can also actuate de-legitimation. The CCC’s 
crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s is a telling example that legitimacy is never 
definitively acquired and always remains open to challenge. Circuits of 
legitimation are no whirlpools anyone can simply jump into. Neither do they rest 
on processes and practices that occur overnight. The notion points to a process of 
inscription over time whereby individuals coming together around common 
ends, objectives or projects develop into meaningful political actors (Lovink and 
Rossiter 2011). Circuits of legitimation echoes understandings that see time as a 
critical component in actors being able to co-determine democratic constellations, 
as political claims can only be realised over the long term (Tilly and Wood 2003; 
Amenta et al. 2010). Looking more closely at how the correlations between 
                                                
30 Already by the mid-1980s the CCC was advising the newly formed Green Party on 
the use of computers. 
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communication and legitimacy played out over time in the case of the CCC, one 
notices that the hackers’ current ability to practise a demanding vision of politics is 
strongly affiliated with the organisation’s history. For more than thirty years they 
have been speaking out and acting on the politicisation of technology. Only by 
transporting its voice over time and space (Warren 2001: 164) did the Club manage 
to establish itself as a reliable reference point with a lasting resonance to which 
people could relate. 
While longevity was no silver bullet to enhance the Club’s political impact, it is 
certain that legitimation was a dynamic that only unfolded over time (Johnson et 
al. 2006). In turn, the CCC relied on legitimation for its long-term survival 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Walker and McCarthy 2010). Sustaining engagement 
practices over time to challenge existing conceptions of what is understood as 
political (Lechner 2003[1990]) and shifting the legitimate boundaries of recognised 
actors (Bourdieu 2000) is a difficult task. The CCC continuously actualised its 
engagement to avoid it becoming vague (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 353) and 
established mechanisms to survive the ebbs and flows of mass attention. Beyond 
the spectacle of particular events, my findings show that communicative practices 
involving media environments and other political agents immediately before and 
after a particular hack were as vital for the effective problematisation of an 
emerging political issue as long-term engagement on a particular set of issues. 
Considering the societal standing of the Club as a trusted civil society organisation 
one needs to take into account distinct temporalities that include the effective 
publicising of actions like the Staatstrojaner and the hackers’ continuous 
contributions since the early 1980s. Taken together these two temporalities 
formed the circuits of legitimacy. 
So far what has been revealed in the above sections is that a wide range of single 
actors, organisations and institutions acknowledge the CCC as a political collective 
because of its abilities and achievements grounded in the Club’s practical 
manoeuvres and articulation practices. Accordingly, the hacker organisation has 
achieved a certain level of societal acceptance. In particular, developments in the 
past decade point towards the increasing legitimation of the CCC. Integration into 
media environments, interactions and collaborations with institutional politics, 
inclusion in and distinctions bestowed by non-governmental organisations and 
rising membership figures are some of the parameters that confirm this finding. 
This strengthens the idea that articulation practices related to media and 
institutional politics are intimately interconnected. Second is the long-term time 
frame, which is an essential component of the formation of legitimation through 
direct action, media practices and interaction with institutional politics; relates 
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more strongly to the formation of legitimation. These elements – the notion that 
legitimation only unfolded across time and to a considerable extent relates to 
prevailing societal constellations – strongly point to “external” dimensions. By 
focusing more explicitly on “internal” dimensions in the following section I will 
be able to integrate the findings of previous sections as well. 
 
9.3 A heterogeneous group with a coherent voice 
As the previous sections have already indicated, the CCC’s political manoeuvres 
rested on a large pool of hundreds of members with considerable know-how. 
There was a consensus amongst participants that the Club was a heterogeneous 
collective. As Peter Glaser restated in a Heise article on the 10th anniversary of Wau 
Holland’s death: 
The Chaos Computer was and still is the most 
unhomogeneous group of people I was ever involved with in 
my life. And at the same time it is the social network (we 
briefly reclaim the term that has been hijacked by the business 
world) in which people – with partially extremely different 
mindsets and highly diverse backgrounds – are always capable 
and willing to sit together at one table, not only to speak with 
each other but also to open up margins and boundaries. 
(Glaser 2011: n.p.) 
In a similar tone, Stephan “st” Kambor observed: 
In principle you can’t pigeonhole any particular group like 
“these are the pure privacy groups, these are the artists, and 
those are the guys who bustle in the political milieu”. That’s 
the great thing about the Club and its surrounding: it’s 
incredibly heterogeneous. (st) 
As these statements emphasise, and as other interviewees echoed, the CCC 
brought together multi-socialised and multi-determined actors that might 
otherwise have remained separate and disconnected. 
The CCC brings together a wide range of talents. There are 
members who don’t have a clue how to program, but are very 
aware of hardware or mobile phone related issues. We have 
members who are concerned with networks and network 
administration. Others specialise in biometry. Others again 
focus on the artistic and creative aspects of computer 
utilisation. (Constanze)  
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To gain deeper understanding of the ways the hackers put new political themes 
onto the public agenda one needs to look more closely at the organisational 
practices related to CCC’s heterogeneity that facilitated its political identity. The 
Club’s present-day composition is in part based on historical circumstances, 
namely, the former division of East and West Germany. In virtue of the political 
constellations, legal regulations and available technologies, hacker cultures east 
and west of the Berlin Wall were considerably different. Immediately after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall the Club brought these two cultures together by organising an 
event named KoKon (abbr. for Communication Congress).31 
It was more or less the reunification of east and west hackers. 
Compared to society as a whole it went relatively quick 
because we had a common foundation; namely those 
computers. (Andreas Bogk) 
The CCC still is the organisation that whenever a bit falls over 
somewhere and it is reported internally you will certainly find 
a specialist able to explain why and for what reason. Basically, 
it is simply an enormous pool of know-how that has come 
together. (Klaus) 
As these quotes highlight, internal cohesion, often considered vital for facilitating 
collective action (Juris 2008; Fenton and Barassi 2011), was undergirded by the 
group’s common fascination with and expertise related to computing. The only 
area in which the CCC did not display any heterogeneity was in relation to gender. 
Female participants in particular identified the hacker organisation as 
predominately male. 
There are, of course, 85 per cent men. It is a bit more levelled 
during events – we have more and more female participants, 
which I find really important – but overall the CCC is male-
dominated. The CCC platform Haecksen32 is explicitly 
concerned with bringing women together to work on projects. 
[…] Besides that, there is no explicit structural endeavour to 
change the situation. (Constanze) 
                                                
31 The name “KoKon” was an allusion to CoCom (Coordinating Committee on 
Multilateral Export Controls), a technology and arms embargo on COMECON 
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) states by Western bloc powers, which 
lasted from the end of World War II till 1991. 
32 “Haecksen” [ˈhɛksn̩] is a wordplay that blends the word “hacker” and “Hexe”, 
meaning witch in German. 
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Over the years, more and more women come to the Congress. 
But essentially, and in particular, considering the active 
members, not much has changed. (Lisa) 
All participants considered the lack of female members not a CCC-specific issue 
but a common phenomenon grounded in the configuration of computer-related 
scenes, cultures and educational establishments (see Turkle 1986). Overall, one can 
register that the Club was an organisation constituted by multi-socialised and 
multi-determined actors unifying diverse skills, knowledge and experience related 
to computing. Larger membership numbers further shaped this dynamic as it 
brought together even more members with a wider set of expertise. Given the 
range of competences in relation to contemporary media technologies and 
infrastructure, there was no other civil society organisation in Germany with a 
comparable level of know-how that could act with, through and about 
technologies. 
Being in the position of having access to a set of resources that other actors in 
the field didn’t have was a clear advantage for the organisation making a political 
impact (see Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 18). At the same time, as participants 
emphasised, the CCC strongly differed from more traditional organisations, like 
political parties, as it was exclusively focused on issues related to technology. 
The CCC has no consistent attitude to 95 per cent of politics. 
Opinions diverge as much as those of the FDP and the Green 
Party – from “unconditional basic income” to “It’s Hobson’s 
choice”. […] We only gather and agree with each other in 
regards to this one theme. (Karsten) 
Other participants brought this concentration of the Club’s competences and 
small set of issues into relation with effective problematisation and considered the 
focus a clear advantage for the organisation’s political activism. 
In contrast to political parties we can stay out of wider debates 
like family policy or employment law and can concentrate on 
our area of expertise. (fukami) 
There are a lot of issues that we don’t have to comment on, 
which makes it easier for us. […] We have the advantage that 
we can focus on our competences and we willingly provide 
information related to these issues. (Erdgeist) 
It enables us to be comparatively punchy. (Andreas Bogk) 
Dodger, spokesperson and member of the executive board, explained how this 
heterogeneous pool of knowledge, experience and skills acted together in practice. 
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Let’s take for example the Staatstrojaner, which by all accounts 
had a serious political impact. Someone brought our attention 
to the issue and then suddenly the gear wheels that function 
100 per cent and 1000 per cent mesh: very ambitious 
members are able to analyse code, there are competent people 
who can review what the analysis results mean exactly, and 
there are members who position our findings appropriately in 
public discourse. (Dodger) 
This illustrates how, as a result of the complexity of the Club’s field of 
engagement, its activities demanded collaboration by multiple actors, which 
brought together diverse abilities – from technical skills like reverse engineering to 
communication skills that enabled effective publicity. Practical skills and direct 
digital action worked hand in hand with communicative action and media-related 
practices. In particular, the latter was considered vital for the hackers’ ability to 
thematise and problematise technological developments. 
Nobody would ever listen to us in relation to constitutional 
matters. The whole thing looks different though, once we 
“deconstruct”, for example, the Staatstrojaner on a 
computational and technological level and the legal people 
draw their own conclusions and analyse the legal 
consequences of our technical report. In cases like that, an 
interplay of actors emerges that leads towards statements like, 
“The nerds have found out that …”. So, to frame and to 
present our expertise in the appropriate context is crucial. 
(Erdgeist) 
The CCC’s contemporary standing and its ability to state political “facts” as 
indicated in the wording ‘the nerds have found out that …’ (Erdgeist), was in large 
part brought to life by articulating the Club’s heterogeneous expertise in coherent 
ways. Spreading knowledge and experience in acceptable ways was strongly 
connected to the coherence and consistency with which the organisation 
articulated its expertise across media environments and in interactions with 
institutional actors. 
As emerged throughout the research, a group of long-term members and 
spokespersons who occupied a central position in the collective’s organisational 
structure was responsible for coordinating and implementing the Club’s 
articulation processes. In stark contrast to hacker collectives like Anonymous, 
which lacks both the structure of a formal political entity and trusted 
organisational culture, or WikiLeaks, which has been shattered by scandals and 
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individual hero worship, the CCC articulates and acts with a coherent political 
identity. When asked how the spokespersons had contributed to making the Club 
a trusted, legitimate political organisation, most participants who introduced 
themselves as part of the press team gave a rather classic description of their duties 
and did not consider themselves as “leaders” in any way. 
On the one hand, the spokespersons have to answer and sort 
the daily press inquiries and forward them whenever there 
might be a more suitable contact person. On the other hand, 
we have to bring important matters to the public’s attention. 
(Erdgeist) 
The procedure of becoming part of this core group was entirely unregulated. 
Spokespersons are not elected, but have simply started to do 
that kind of work and after a while others refer to them as 
spokespersons. (Erdgeist) 
While most spokesperson interpreted this informality as a sign of the openness of 
the Club’s organisational structure, others underlined the exclusivity of the 
dynamics around an informal, “non-democratic” formation of the press team. 
It is not a circle that you can simply join whenever you feel 
like it. People might say that this is not the case. But it’s not 
that easy. (tante) 
Generally, nobody is prevented from going public. But I guess 
if someone not used to appearing publicly for the CCC did it 
there would be enormous resistance. (Karsten) 
Looking back in time it became apparent that the existence of a core group 
responsible for the appropriate public contextualisation of the CCC’s diverse 
skills, knowledge and experience had been part of the organisation from the 
beginning. 
In the early years “public relations” were part of a bunker 
mentality of the three Ws – Wau, Wernéry and Wickmann. 
[…] Due to the technological situation it was a rather cohesive 
community. We always tried to come to an agreement with as 
many people as possible and to include a wide range of 
impressions on how to deal with a certain situation. But I 
wouldn’t call it grassroots democracy. (Steffen)  
It has been like that since I joined. And from what I know 
about the Club it has always been like that. Back then it was a 
clique in Hamburg. There is always a certain change of 
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generations, but the constant is that it’s always a rather small 
clique of people who often live in the same city and set the 
agenda. (Lisa)33 
With new technical possibilities in place to collaboratively coordinate collective 
action (Chapter 7) and to enhance participatory procedures (Kavada 2010; Della 
Porta and Rucht 2013), one might expect the core group to be more inclusive or 
participatory. This was not the case. Over the past three decades the personal 
constellation of the press team transformed completely and expanded from three 
to around ten members, but the Club does not make use of technical 
infrastructures that might enhance internal democratisation. The continuing 
relevance of physical proximity for this concentration of representational control 
seems to be the core reason for lack of uses of participatory tools. 
Tensions around the needs and deficits of the formation of a core group have 
been part of the CCC from the beginning. A reply to a reader’s letter in an early 
Datenschleuder edition critiquing Wau Holland’s central role in the Club’s public 
appearances, reads as follows: 
Whoever desires a democratic model for the media presence 
of computer subculture, like the green rotation principle for 
example, needs to be reminded that a socio-cybernetic 
infotope (read again slowly) like the CCC can’t be pushed 
together like a choral society in front of a TV camera. (Ls 
blofeld 1986: 6) 
This conviction that the hackers were in need of an operative press team further 
intensified over the years. 
In principle the work of the spokespersons has always been 
important, but it’s unclear whether it has always been staffed 
as efficiently as it is today. (Erdgeist) 
It has become much more professional. This is apparent in the 
way the press team deals with the media or how the Congress 
is organised. This also synergises with the general perception, 
the way the media perceives us and the way they approach us. 
(anonymised) 
                                                
33 Location-wise, Berlin and Hamburg were the two cities where most spokespersons 
and active members lived. Both cities also have an elevated position because they are 
or were the venues of the yearly Congress (from 1984–1997 in Hamburg, 1998–2011 in 
Berlin, and 2012 till 2014 in Hamburg). Other local nodes considered relatively 
important by participants were Cologne and Munich. 
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As was made clear by interviewees, the press team’s efficiency was based on 
longstanding experiences developed and shared within the group and amongst 
allies. Similarly, professionalisation was related to great effort put into 
coordination of the collective’s public representation and placing relevant themes 
in appropriate contexts. This form of professionalisation was a central part of the 
circuits of legitimation because legitimation strongly relied on the continuing 
interrelation between direct digital action and coherent articulation. 
The Club lives on the fact that it argues internally more than it 
does with the rest of the world. […] The CCC is internally 
extremely argumentative, but, of course, regarding the core 
topics it is only a matter of detail. In the public we still manage 
to find a consensus. (Karsten) 
Of course we mutually look over one’s shoulder to learn from 
each other and to make sure that we communicate a more or 
less coherent point of view to the public. (Erdgeist) 
An explicit reasoning for the modus operandi of speaking with one voice and 
managing the CCC’s public image can be found in the earlier mentioned 
Datenschleuder editorial. 
In particular, for such an unhomogeneous assortment like the 
computer freaks, it is of decisive importance to be equipped 
with spokespersons who gain widespread attention and who 
manage to accomplish the feat of encapsulating the common 
hacker philosophy in a up-to-date manner, and at the same 
time to send EDP [Electronic Data Processing] critical smoke 
signals from the land of the machines to non-freaks in a 
comprehensible fashion. Not everyone is capable of doing 
that. (Ls blofeld 1986: 6; emphasis added) 
The significance of communicating with a coherent voice for generating societal 
acceptance is best illustrated by the Club’s ‘existential crisis’ (Steffen) and its 
resurgence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During that time the CCC was 
publicly affiliated with illegal hacks that, amongst other things, involved the KGB 
(transl. the Committee for State Security) and hacking into National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) computer systems. As the positive image of the 
collective crumbled and internal accusations got out of hand, the Club experienced 
the organisation’s de-legitimation that was in large part due to internal disputes 
amongst core members leading to a controversial and incoherent public 
appearance. The CCC only woke up from this ‘deep sleep’ (Lars) during the late 
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1990s and early 2000s. This had both internal and external aspects. On the one 
hand, with the global spread of the internet and related technologies, the themes 
the hackers were acting on were becoming an increasingly important aspect of 
societal constellations. On the other hand, Wau Holland’s death in 2001 led to 
new organisational constellations within the Club. The engagement of active 
members like Andy Müller-Maguhn, Tim Pritlove and others turned Berlin into 
the centre of gravity for the CCC and equipped it with a coherent voice and clearly 
identifiable profile. Instead of hacking around the globe, the hackers now focused 
their competences on a geographically and thematically smaller set of issues. 
Opening up the annual Congress to a wider public by inviting a more diverse 
range of speakers and journalists was as much part of this process as the 
“professionalisation” of the press team that took great care in the hackers’ public 
presentation. The spokespersons’ scene-setting and scripting work was decisive in 
bringing coherence to the collective’s heterogeneous nature. 
Keeping the number of voices that represented the hacker organisation in 
public low did not only allow a narrow focus on a small set of issues (Sikkink 
2002: 312), it also enabled the Club to communicate its aims in a comprehensible 
manner. Considering the importance of making complex technical developments 
understandable to a broad public and the importance of this for the Club’s 
standing, this was crucial. The participants showed great awareness of the linkage 
between communicating consistent messages and legitimation processes. Even 
critical members acknowledged this as an ‘efficacy’ (tante) factor. The lack of 
internal democratisation allowed the organisation to be guided by a core group of 
spokespersons and long-term active members, which shaped the Club’s 
heterogeneous elements into an organisation with a focus on particular issues and 
coherent public representation. In the case of the CCC, acting with, through and 
about media technologies and infrastructure grounded in the skills, knowledge 
and experience of multi-socialised and multi-determined actors. Circuits of 
legitimation, in turn, strongly depended on the coherent articulation of this 
heterogeneity across media environments and in interactions with institutional 
politics. 
 
9.4 How to practice coherence 
Considering the increased interaction with media environments and institutional 
politics (Chapter 8), paying greater attention to coordinating the Club’s outward-
oriented communications became very important. The multiplication and 
diversification of media-related practices, for example, were advantageous for the 
hacker organisation as these processes allowed for a larger amount and a more 
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manifold distribution of information. At the same time it also complicated the 
communication of consistent messages and a coherent collective identity (see 
Fenton and Barassi 2011) to which the general public and key actors could relate. 
The media attention has increased considerably, and along 
with it the importance of the spokesperson. […] In the past the 
CCC was below radar level and it wasn’t too relevant who said 
what on behalf of the Club. […] This is a somewhat particular 
setting and therefore we have to pay attention to what 
information gets out. (Martin) 
One could identify four mechanisms the CCC was relying on to achieve 
coherence. First, a general lack of transparency. Constanze mentioned at the 30th 
Chaos Congress the Club had eleven spokespersons, but did not mention any 
names (Kurz et al. 2013). 
Nobody knows who the spokespersons are. Only the 
spokespersons know that they are a spokesperson. Formally, 
not even the executive board knows who the spokespersons 
are. (tante) 
The non-formalised nature of the press team concealed asymmetries in decision-
making processes and internal power structures. This, in turn, helped the hacker 
organisation maintain a collective identity based on participation, even though 
those values were not upheld in practice (Kavada 2010: 370). Second, only a very 
limited number of members had access to the Club’s official online platforms. 
Even some of the long-term members could not name the list of people who 
knew the password for the official Twitter account, for example, or who exactly 
was curating the Club’s main website. Echoing the internal power dynamics 
around public representation that are played out in many contemporary 
movements (Terranova and Donovan 2013; Kavada 2013) this aspect of the Club’s 
processes also linked to the fact that members were using a range of exclusive 
communication environments to coordinate direct digital action (Chapter 7). A 
third tactic for establishing a coherent voice was for prominent spokespersons to 
explicitly distinguish their personal platforms from the Club’s communication 
channels. Frank Rieger, for example, stated on his blog that was fittingly named 
Knowledge brings Fear: 
This is the personal weblog of Frank Rieger. It strictly contains 
my personal opinions only. I don’t speak here for any 
organization or company. Nothing posted here should be 
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constructed or quoted as “speaking for …”, “Frank Rieger of … 
said” or similar forms of attribution. Thanks. (Frank Rieger) 
Even Constanze, who initially was referred to in her column in the FAZ as a 
spokesperson of the CCC, changed this to a much more neutral formulation that 
did not mention her affiliation to the CCC at all. Fourth, ensuring a coherent 
public appearance was also achieved through the exclusion of voices that were not 
considered appropriate. An illustrative example was Sandro Gaycken, a former 
long-term CCC member who was excluded from the Club. I met Sandro for a two-
hour conversation in Berlin, just after he finished an interview with a journalist. 
As a technology researcher based at the Free University Berlin, journalists were 
particularly interested in Sandro’s point of view on so-called cyber warfare. Sandro 
used to be a regular speaker at the annual Congress, and together with Constanze 
he published 1984.exe, an edited book on surveillance technologies. At one point, 
as participants recounted, he made himself unpopular amongst CCC members 
because he spoke in the name of the Club about issues that were not considered 
part of the organisation’s consensus. As a consequence Sandro was no longer 
invited to speak at Club events. The internal mailing list acted as a forum to hassle 
him and discredit him. Asked why, Sandro replied: 
The leadership of the CCC didn’t like me any longer. […] 
According to them I work too closely with the evil state and 
aside from that I am competition for some leading members. 
Power politics also exist in small lobby groups. (Sandro) 
The exact reasons for Sandro’s exclusion were hard to clarify as opinions and 
perspectives differed, but his example demonstrates that unwanted and possibly 
incoherent voices were swiftly excluded from representing the Club. The number 
of individuals who acted as spokespeople was also limited due to the fact that only 
a few members were capable of communicating to diverse publics and willing to 
face the pressure of their name and personality being in the spotlight. 
One can summarise this formation of coherence as procedures that were based 
on power over communication – in the form of exclusion and restricted access – 
and power in communication – in the form of disregarding certain arguments and 
voices (Andretta 2013). As a consequence, the spokespersons established 
themselves as representatives of the whole organisation. Spokespersons not only 
centrally engaged in devising media strategies and making judgments regarding 
information provided to media, but were also leading figures in the organisational 
formation of the CCC. 
The strongest public efficacy is achieved through media 
contacts. The team that is in charge of these contacts is not 
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elected, but has more influence and discretionary competence 
than a de facto democratically legitimated executive board. 
The board is not in charge of the spokespersons. On the 
contrary, we are actually in the situation where the press team 
determines the composition of the board. (Sam) 
Sam’s statement implicitly refers to a dispute between Andy Müller-Maguhn and 
Daniel Domscheit-Berg, CCC member and former WikiLeaks spokesperson, 
about the latter’s plan to initiate a new whistleblower platform. Putting pressure 
on other members at an extraordinary generally assembly, a number of 
spokespersons urged a re-election of the board, which saw the deselection of 
Müller-Maguhn as a board member. 
It’s obvious that members who are the most visible also have 
the most influence on other members who simply float 
around, which after all is the largest part. […] And that’s a self-
perpetuating position: they have more influence because they 
are influential and thereby they have more influence. (tante) 
The central role of the spokesperson had further consequences. As Malte stated: 
Internally we have the case – I don’t want to call it absurdity – 
that by shaping the CCC’s public face the spokespersons also 
influence the content of the projects. (Malte) 
Taking into consideration that the spokespersons were guiding the collective’s 
political activities by coordinating its public representation, one can argue that 
they also strongly influenced the societal standing of the CCC, not only in relation 
to the media, but also related to interactions with institutional politics. In fact, the 
relevance of the spokespersons was explicitly linked to the political weight of the 
CCC. It was predominately the core group that interacted with institutional 
politics in the name of the CCC. 
There is a lot of political advice and counselling that we 
allocate amongst the spokespersons. (Constanze) 
It has a lot to do with the leadership or the group, which has 
the greatest say within the Club that the CCC is actually doing 
political work and is politically significant. (Lisa) 
The solely technical publications are rather easy to schedule 
media-wise, whereas the whole political work of the CCC that 
aims for an exchange with political parties and the 
government is more difficult to plan in advance. You need real 
spokespersons for that. (Karsten) 
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The need to coordinate and schedule articulation of technical findings to achieve 
political dialogue points to the notion how communicating and framing the 
Club’s heterogeneous expertise in particular ways played a crucial role.  The CCC 
was an organisation that brought multiple, even conflicting identities together. 
This heterogeneity was channelled through the spokespersons. A certain 
individual agency therefore had to be abandoned for the sake of coherence. The 
CCC was simultaneously enabling individual agency by bringing together a wide 
range of people and restricting individual agency for the sake of the collective’s 
political vitality. While the spatial allocation of CCC nodes across Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria made the organisation a multi-centred network, one 
could detect a concentration of particular individuals and geographic locations. 
The internal dynamics discussed above show that the CCC’s members struggled to 
reconcile their aspiration to internal democratisation with a persistent need for 
coherence of public representation (Melucci 1996: 344–7). The conflict between 
increased deliberation and effectiveness was clearly decided for the latter. 
It is fruitful to bring this finding together with conclusions made in chapters 7 
and 8. With individual members able to organise sub-groups within the 
organisation, inward-oriented communication (Chapter 7) was crucial for 
coordinating direct digital action. Taking into account the above findings one can 
also conclude that internal communicative practices enabled a group of core 
members to shape the Club as a coherent and consistent political organisation. As 
emphasised above, due to their central role in effectively coordinating the CCC as a 
coherent political organisation, the press team had a vital influence on the 
formation of the Club’s political alignments and actions. The construction of 
coherence relied on inward-oriented and outward-oriented communication that 
strongly related to media technologies and infrastructures. Accordingly, inward-
oriented and outward-oriented modes of communication were strongly linked 
with and in fact depended on each other in the process of legitimation. Despite the 
rejection of bounded conditions that are conventionally associated with 
bureaucratic procedures (Bimber 2003), the Club displayed an ordered 
organisation that was grounded in the communicative routines of spokespersons 
and leadership mechanisms. Instead of dissolving hierarchies and reducing the 
visibility of leaders (Bennett et al. 2014; Castells 2012), media-related practices 
were intimately interwoven with the formation of organisational structures and 
leadership roles. It has been through a process of continuous orchestration by a 
core group, largely consisting of spokespeople, that the Club became a trusted 
collective able to sustain its political project over time. This was particularly 
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highlighted by the ways in which the organisation managed to survive its 
existential crisis in the 1990s. 
This does not mean that the Club was practising traditional organisational 
structures based on top-down control, as equating the spokespersons with 
authority did not match the observed mechanisms. The spokespersons were not 
in full control of the sum of all articulation processes. All the same, the organised 
coalescence of skills, knowledge and experience of multi-socialised and multi-
determined individuals and articulation of a coherent image was vital for the 
hacker organisation’s societal standing. The CCC’s legitimation and, closely linked 
to this process, its ability to sustain its engagement practices over time, to a large 
degree rested on the Club’s non-formalised leadership structures. Both the 
collective’s ability to act politically and its legitimation were strongly related with 
the coordination of multi-layered media practices. This reasoning does not imply 
a straightforward causality between articulation and legitimation. Nonetheless, 
the findings throughout this research reveal strong correlations between media 
practices, internal modes of communication, outward-oriented communication, 
the thematisation of emerging political issues and the formation of legitimation. 
By communicating to the general public and relevant actors in a coherent 
manner, spokespersons established the CCC as an easily identifiable and distinct 
organisation in relation to other social groups. Bringing that heterogeneity under 
control in constructive ways was vital for generating appreciation of the Club as a 
trusted political organisation and thus for the hackers’ ability to alter the reference 
points of mainstream political debate. The fact that the CCC had been in existence 
for over thirty years underlines the relevance and necessity of organisational 
structures that both rely on and effectively support media-related practices. To 
achieve continuity the CCC was in need of a degree of stability, which in large part 
was achieved by keeping the Club’s public image and messages coherent. Internal 
organisational procedures and attribution of communicative power that have 
centralisation effects since the beginning in the early 1980s build a formative part 
of the CCC’s ability to communicate a coherent identity. Accordingly, circuits of 
legitimation are processes formed of interrelation between acting with, through 
and about media technologies and infrastructures over time. Following on from 
this, it is possible to reconsider existing conceptualisations of hackers. Initially I 
have related myself to literature that sees hacking as alternative form of computing 
(Lievrouw 2011), hacktivism (Jordan and Taylor 2004; Jordan 2013) and ‘digital 
direct action’ (Coleman 2013). Throughout the empirical chapters above I have 
emphasised that hacktivism is not only a technical endeavour and I have revealed 
that hacker organisations like the CCC do much more than hacking. By showing 
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that digital direct action is only one – though central – part of the way hackers 
practice politics my research extends concepts that equate hacktivism with protest 
gone electric. The Club effectually brings together “old” and “new” modes of 
activism and exemplifies that alternative and mainstream ways of doing politics 
are not as easily separable from each other as one might assume. Instead the CCC 
combine tactics like hacking and insider tactics like advising legislators to achieve 
their political goals.  
 
9.5 Conclusion 
People across the spectrum – citizens, media representatives, constitutional 
judges, politicians – have trust in the ways the CCC contributes its knowledge and 
experience in thematising and politicising technological developments. The CCC’s 
activities, which range from offering diagnostic services to speaking truth to 
power, have largely been recognised as socially useful. Integration into media 
environments, interactions and collaborations with institutional politics, 
inclusion in and distinctions bestowed by non-governmental organisations and 
rising membership figures are some of the parameters that confirm this finding. 
This strengthens the idea that articulation practices related to media and 
institutional politics are intimately interconnected. Over three decades, and in 
particular within the past ten to fifteen years, the CCC has managed to position 
itself as a reliable and impartial political actor in a rapidly changing and uncertain 
field. CCC’s direct digital actions have not changed drastically over the past three 
decades, but the Club’s way of communicating these actions has changed. 
While the hacker organisation was acting with and through media technologies 
and infrastructures in rather unconventional and radical ways, its members 
acknowledged that influencing democratic constellations in large part included 
operating within the realm of institutional powers. Bringing these findings into 
dialogue with the earlier notion that the Club was acting about technologies the 
chapter has shown how articulation processes that enabled the hackers to 
problematise technological developments relied on both multi-layered media 
practices and interactions with institutional politics. The CCC’s political 
manoeuvres rested on a large pool of hundreds of multi-socialised and multi-
determined members with considerable skills, knowledge and experience. 
Practicing a demanding and constructive vision of politics – through the 
combination of singular events and long-term involvement – was in need of 
organisational structures and leadership roles. The lack of internal democratisation 
allowed the organisation to be guided by a core group of spokespersons and long-
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term active members, which shaped the Club’s heterogeneous elements into an 
organisation with a focus on particular issues and coherent public representation. 
The CCC’s legitimation and, closely linked to this process, its ability to sustain 
its engagement practices over time, to a large degree rested on the Club’s non-
formalised leadership structures. By communicating to the general public and 
relevant actors in a coherent manner, spokespersons established the CCC as an 
easily identifiable and distinct organisation in relation to other social groups. 
Bringing that heterogeneity under control in constructive ways was vital for 
generating appreciation of the Club as a trusted political organisation and thus for 
the hackers’ ability to alter the reference points of mainstream political debate. The 
interrelation of these dynamics has been conceptualised as circuits of legitimation 
in this chapter. The chapter emphasised that multi-layered media practices occupy 
a key role in the circuit of legitimation and therefore in the thematisation of new 
political themes and problematisation of technical developments. Legitimation 
and sustaining engagement practices, in the case of the CCC, in large part 
grounded in acting with, through and about media technologies and 
infrastructures. 
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c h a p t e r  t e n  
Conclusion  
 
By adopting a qualitative approach, I sought to understand the role media-related 
practices play for Citizens for Europe and the Chaos Computer Club to establish 
legitimacy and to sustain their political engagement over time. Throughout the 
above chapters I have argued that practices circulating around and oriented 
towards media technologies and infrastructures play a configurative role for the 
organisations’ ability to establish legitimacy and to sustain their engagement over 
time. Instead of suggesting a straightforward causal chain my qualitative analysis 
conceptualised the entanglements between media-related practices, legitimation 
and long-term engagement as relational dynamics. In doing so my research 
compliments existing research on the role media practices play for political actors 
by investigating the missing links between media practices, legitimacy and 
sustaining engagement over time. Accordingly, my thesis provides an empirically 
informed interpretive account of the meaning media practices have for organised 
actors’ ability to co-determine contemporary democratic constellations. 
Consequently, the findings have implications for how one understands the role 
media-related practices play in fulfilling the political goals of civil society 
organisations. This chapter concludes this thesis by giving a brief synopsis of the 
earlier chapters, by bringing the findings of the two cases studies together and by 
pointing to the limitations of my research. In the second section I will show how 
my thesis objects, confirms and expands writings on the topic and draws points to 
conclusions that implicitly emerged out of the interviews, participant observation 
and media analysis. The final section concludes by making more general remarks 
about the findings of my thesis and points towards possible future research. 
 
10.1 Putting the findings into dialogue 
In recent years many attempts have been made to add understanding of the 
relation between media and politics. This has led to a growing approximation and 
exchange of different disciplines – in particular media studies, political sociology 
and social movement research. This thesis salutes and aims to expand this 
development by deepening understanding of the complex relation between 
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organisational actors’ media, legitimation and long-term engagement. Before 
discussing the relevance of my research in more detail I now want to briefly 
summarise the findings of the above chapters. 
Chapter 5 argued that media practices play a vital role for establishing and for 
maintaining CFE as a civil society organisation by pointing to a number of factors. 
First, along with its growing involvement over time CFE’s inward-oriented modes 
of communication and information exchange increasingly relied on media 
practices. By doing so inward-oriented media practices contributed to the ability 
to sustain the organisation’s engagement over time. Second, outward-oriented 
communication was the result of processes that made visible and even amplified 
organisational structures. Third, building on these findings, the chapter 
conceptualised CFE’s Every Vote 2011 campaign as a trans-media campaign that 
enabled citizens to actively engage with the issue of voting rights and to 
symbolically participate in political procedures they were otherwise excluded 
from. The organisation’s mode of practice underlying the trans-media campaign 
had longer term consequences in relation to activating sources of funding, 
collaborations, and, ultimately, feeding into the stabilisation and legitimation of 
CFE’s engagements. 
In Chapter 6 I have made clear that media-related practices were a key part of 
establishing and maintaining CFE’s role as an intermediary organisation that 
created ties and commonalities between actors belonging to different social and 
political spheres. In more detail, the chapter emphasised that the in-house 
publication OC contributed to the stabilisation of CFE’s political work as it 
enabled the organisation to partially legitimise their activities and to establish 
longer-term relationships with individual and collective actors. The chapter has 
also shown that practices related to the CFE website – described as curating 
practices – added another dimension to the organisation’s legitimation by acting as 
an infrastructure that affiliated CFE with trusted organisations and so embedded 
CFE’s political endeavours within a legitimate context. In addition, the 
organisation’s efforts related to establishing and maintaining a Democratic 
Community of Practice showed that media-oriented practices complemented the 
physical meetings to maintain the community of practice over time. Overall, the 
chapter emphasised interlocking arrangements of mediated and face-to-face 
communication not only established and maintained CFE’s role as an 
intermediary organisation but also facilitated the organisation practising 
networked forms of European citizenship by bringing together individual and 
collective actors from across Europe to act together. Accordingly, media-related 
practices were important for enabling CFE to legitimise and sustain their 
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engagement practices, which relied on all levels of the organisation’s practices 
having a constructive conflation of organisational aspects and networking 
practices. 
Chapter 7 contextualised the CCC’s activities as direct digital action and 
indicated that hacking had two interconnected aspects of engagement: 
technological and political. Following the finding that the Club acted as a 
watchdog of technological developments and their political consequences I 
emphasised that CCC members went beyond this role by supporting, building and 
maintaining alternative communication infrastructures. Accordingly, the chapter 
has emphasised how, for the hacker organisation, technologies were not simply 
instruments for acting politically but political matters in themselves. Finally, the 
chapter revealed how deliberating, collaborating and coordinate political work 
took place with the support of technical means. Creating exclusive online 
communication environments online allowed the Club to draw clear boundaries 
around internal communication practices despite rapid growth of membership 
numbers. This, in turn, enabled sub-groups within the CCC to organise, 
coordinate and execute political work in dynamic and discreet ways over time. 
Overall the chapter showed how the correlation of direct digital action, practices 
related to alternative communication infrastructures and inward-oriented 
communications allowed the CCC to politically with and through media 
technologies and infrastructures. 
In Chapter 8 I have elaborated how the CCC’s way of acting with and through 
contemporary technologies was deeply entangled with articulating knowledge 
and distributing information to frame technological developments as political 
phenomena relevant to society at large. Compared with the early days, the 
interrelation between acting with, through and about media technologies and 
infrastructures has intensified rather drastically, at the same time as the channels 
and practices related to communicative action have diversified and multiplied. 
Multi-layered media practices describe the production, communication and 
circulation of messages across different media environments that are entangled 
with each other by non-linear flows of information. Instead of protesting or 
mobilising the hacker organisation predominantly relied on acting on the given 
issue through direct digital action and on articulating their field-tested knowledge 
and experience to a wide spectrum of audiences and publics. Acting with, through 
and about technology were combined approaches that enabled the CCC to 
thematise new political issues and to provide a hermeneutic to people so they 
could understand the political dimension and societal significance of particular 
technical issues. 
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Finally, Chapter 9 has argued that people across the spectrum – citizens, media 
representatives, constitutional judges, politicians – have trust in the ways the CCC 
contributes its knowledge and experience in thematising and politicising 
technological developments. Integration into media environments, interactions 
and collaborations with institutional politics, inclusion in and distinctions 
bestowed by non-governmental organisations and rising membership figures are 
some of the parameters that confirm this development. Bringing these findings 
into dialogue with the earlier notion that the Club was acting about technologies 
the chapter has shown how articulation processes enabling the hackers to 
problematise technological developments relied on both multi-layered media 
practices and interactions with institutional politics. Guided by a core group of 
spokespersons and long-term active members the Club’s multi-socialised and 
multi-determined members were shaped into an organisation with a focus on 
particular issues and coherent public representation. The interrelation of these 
dynamics has been conceptualised as circuits of legitimation in this chapter. The 
chapter emphasised how legitimation and sustaining engagement practices, in the 
case of the CCC, in large part grounded in acting with, through and about media 
technologies and infrastructures. 
Considering the above findings that I have presented and discussed throughout 
this thesis my research makes two essential contributions to the field of media 
studies. First, I have systematically analysed and conceptualised the correlations 
between media and legitimacy through the lens of media practices. Studies so far 
heavily rely on classical status-conferral conception (Lazarsfeld and Merton 
2004[1948]) and exclusively focus on mainstream media as a source of legitimacy 
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Thompson 1995; Schudson 1996). Another clear deficit 
of existing writings on the topic is that scholars reduce the complex linkages 
between legitimation and media by constructing far too rigid and oversimplified 
causal chains (Herbst 2003; Koopmans 2004; Yoon 2005). By taking into account 
that actors’ media repertoires have drastically changed over the past decade and 
today expand across a diverse media environment my approach brings to the table 
a more nuanced and fitting analysis of contemporary correlations between media 
practices and legitimation. Second, and even more importantly, I bring the notion 
of legitimacy together with an inquiry of how these dynamics correlate with the 
formation and organisation of particular groups and their ability for sustaining 
longer-term engagement. There are outstanding studies on the relationship of 
media practices and political activism, but they do not necessarily look at aspect of 
legitimacy and sustaining political engagement. At the same time, as has been 
shown in detail in the literature review, there is great work on the role of 
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legitimacy and the relevance of time for political activism, but scholars mostly 
don’t look at media practices in this context. My research interrelates media 
practices with legitimation and longer-term engagement and, by doing so, 
contributes an important empirical building block to deepen understandings of 
the role media play for contemporary democratic constellations. Revealing 
correlations between media, legitimation and longer-term engagement enabled 
me to show how emerging political engagement of civil society organisations to a 
high degree is connected to and, in fact, relies on media-related practices. 
Consequently, my research increases scholarly knowledge on the influence of 
practices related to media technologies and infrastructures for contemporary 
democratic constellations. 
To explicate the scholarly significance of my thesis beyond this primary 
contribution I now want to discuss in more detail how this has been shown, 
where this leaves us and what implications my findings might have for future 
research. To do so I want to start with reviewing the limitations of my research. 
When analysing a moving target like the field of media and communications 
studies limitations are always given a priori. As structural and technical changes 
occur over time that might more or less strongly co-determine the way particular 
actors engage politically this research is in itself only a snapshot of a contemporary 
dynamics. One point of criticism that might be made against the set-up of my 
thesis is that it does not expose sufficiently the problems that gaining mainstream 
legitimation can entail. From an organisational perspective CFE and the CCC were 
registered associations that considered themselves civil society organisations. In 
both cases media technologies and infrastructures played an essential role for the 
organisations’ ability to establish legitimacy and to sustain their engagement over 
time. As a consequence, the thesis emphasised how media-related practices 
strongly contributed to the organisations’ ability to bring a demanding vision of 
politics to life. While non-state actors are often understood and portrayed as being 
“anti” or “counter”, both cases under investigation practice a constructive vision 
of politics as they articulate fruitful critique and offer solutions for the democratic 
deficits they expose. This constructive approach could be seen, amongst other 
things, in the actors’ interaction with mainstream media: CFE and the CCC both 
aimed to reach the widest possible audience instead of critiquing or even attacking 
mainstream media (Rucht 2004; Cammaerts 2012). CCC and CFE make strategic 
use of media environments and especially mainstream media outlets to narrate 
stories about their engagements and to interact with multiple audiences, publics, 
collaborators, potential supporters and other relevant actors. At the same time 
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both organisations interacted intensively with established foundations and 
institutionalised politics. 
For the CCC and CfE politics is not a revolution but rather a constructive 
process that they aim to codetermine over time. This was also apparent in the fact 
that the hackers as well as CFE members address shorter-term political goals as 
well as longer-term social and democratic aspirations. Accordingly, as civil society 
organisations, the two cases both practice ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ modes of 
activism (Cohen & Arato 1992: 548-63). One the one hand, their activities are 
directed inward to civil society – creating communities of practice (CFE) and 
enabling emancipatory practices related to communicative infrastructure (CCC). 
On the other hand, their engagements are directed outward to state institutions – 
campaigning for foreigners’ voting rights (CFE) and taking part in governmental 
committees (CCC). While one might read this form of political activism as 
cooptation or as being “too close to the system” my research reveals that CFE and 
the CCC both combine different means and forms of political engagement and 
were able to bring together insider and outsider tactics. These modes of 
engagement had in common that they were “positive” and “active” rather than 
“destructive” and “reactive”. Even in cases like the CCC’s hacks, direct digital 
action was not an act of deconstructing for the sake of demolishing, but for the 
sake of thematising and problematising political qualities of technological 
developments. Still, disclosing governmental surveillance software is best 
considered a straightforward confrontation and criticism of institutionalised 
politics. Similarly, campaigning for foreigners’ voting rights means to articulate a 
sharp critique of existing legislation. One can therefore not refer to a one-
dimensional cooptation process. The CCC and CFE both display characteristics of 
formal and informal organisations. Both organisations are state-regulated 
associations with identifiable organisational structures. At the same time the CFE 
and the CCC occupy strong extra-institutional and network elements. In fact, the 
political work that the organisations brought to life was only by means of bringing 
these two modalities together. Neither a single actor nor a loosely affiliated 
collective of actors would have been able, for example, to write an expert report for 
the constitutional court or to apply for funding with the EU. This is to say that my 
research reveals how CFE and the CCC bring together insider and outsider tactics 
that enable both organisations to interact with mainstream politics and at the same 
time to uphold their impartiality and critical distance. 
In a similar way, another possible point of criticism might be my focus on 
mainstream legitimacy, as my thesis does not take into account how acceptance by 
institutionalised entities influences recognition amongst other scenes, sub-
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cultures and alternative collectives. In other words, my research does not answer 
the question whether the two organisations gained legitimation in a mainstream 
discourse and sustained their engagement over time but simultaneously lost 
legitimation amongst their peers and non-institutionalised actors. My research 
partially addresses this query by highlighting that in the case of CFE, for example, 
the in-house publication OC was a platform where a wide range of individual and 
collective actors could voice their concerns and gain visibility; which shows that 
they did consider the organisation as an appropriate and suitable collaborator. 
Likewise, the growing number of both visitors as well as themes at the CCC’s 
annual hacker Congress illustrates that the hacker organisation was recognised and 
valued by a diverse range of actors. Nonetheless it is understood that these 
examples answer the request for a more extensive analysis of legitimation 
amongst non-institutionalised actors only in parts. My thesis is based on a 
conscious decision not to develop a grand theory for the entire phenomenon of 
media and politics. Rather my thesis set out to contribute an empirical building 
block serving a larger heuristic. Accordingly the emphasis of this thesis on 
mainstream legitimacy leaves certain areas more or less unobserved. This is a 
common procedure of academic research – to focus on a particular set of aspects 
means to fade out other facets – but it could be valuable to extend the research at 
hand in the near future into this direction. 
Another line of criticism might address the methodological choices made in 
this thesis. Above all one might question the decision to focus on actors’ media 
practices instead of also including external perspectives from journalists and 
politicians in the data set. The reason to do so was based on two reasons. First, case 
study research is above all a time-consuming and effortful method. The extent of 
research that would have been necessary to include “external” viewpoints in my 
analysis would have simply gone beyond the scope of this thesis. Second, while 
my thesis did not explicitly investigate motivations, strategies, and the like on the 
side of journalists and politicians it includes this dimension another way. 
Incorporating a media analysis into my research design enabled me both to capture 
voices by a large number of “external” actors and to show that journalist were 
obviously willing and interested in giving CFE and the CCC space for their point 
of view. All the same, echoing what has been said in the previous paragraph, 
future research could add valuable findings to the presented thesis by investigating 
what journalists, politicians and other relevant actors have to say about the two 
organisations. 
Taking into consideration these limitations and the methodological set-up of 
my research I will now relate the findings of my thesis more concretely with the 
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body of empirical and theoretical work discussed in the earlier literature reviews 
and make more general reflections on the relevance of my research. 
 
10.2 Literature reconsidered 
Let me begin by explicating my take on media practices, which also means to 
discuss and to reflect on the theoretical framework that informs my research in 
more detail. Taking into account the particularity of actors’ use of media 
technologies and infrastructures my research confirms and expands the value of 
media practice approach (Couldry 2004; Mattoni 2012). Focusing on practices 
related to and oriented towards media environments had constitutive 
consequences for the kind of findings that resulted from my research. To start 
with, it enabled me to avoid a one-medium bias; which continues to be a deficit of 
many studies that exclusively look at mailing lists, popular online platforms or 
mainstream media. Investigating how participants were using and interacting with 
a wide range of devices, tools, outlets and platforms diminishes the risk of over-
looking important aspects. More concretely, it allowed me to show, for example, 
that interactions with mainstream media (coverage and access) continue to be 
critical for gaining legitimation and sustaining engagement. Yet, they do so as 
being embedded in a larger media environment. Not predetermining the set of 
media that will be of interest, but to approach participants’ activities in an open 
and receptive manner not only allowed for considering the use of diverse media 
but also for analysing how newer technologies materialise and how they merge 
with existing media. 
Over the three-year period of my research I could witness that media practices, 
like media themselves (Gitelman 2008), were always in the making. While both 
organisations initiated with a particular set of media-related practices the use of 
media technologies and infrastructures continuously changed over time. Civil 
society organisations rely both upon “traditional” and “new” media: newer 
platforms and services emerged and were incorporated into the actors’ day-to-day 
communicative practices while others disappeared, were put aside or actively 
opposed. Listening to the participants revealed that instead of a self-evident 
procedure media practices were rather based on an ongoing process of negotiation, 
evaluation and adaptation. Considering the role contemporary media technologies 
and infrastructures play in the reconfiguration of democratic constellations it is 
important to keep in mind that actors’ practices related to media are a moving 
target as they change more or less drastically over time. Interestingly, the thesis 
reveals that in both cases media-related practices appear to become more 
important – both for internal and external factors – with growing age. Adapting a 
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media practice approach therefore allowed me to avoid an a-historical approach 
that leaves aside prior media that were important for the actors and enabled me to 
elaborate a more relational understanding of how actors use media today. 
Following the above said it is reasonable to position my practice approach in 
relation to studies that stress the relevance of mediation theory. At least since 
Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) seminal work on movements and media as 
interacting systems scholars have stressed the (increased) relevance of mediated 
visibility if political collectives are to exist in the public mind, make their voices 
heard, achieve public recognition and gain attention beyond the circle of 
likeminded individuals and publics (Cammaerts 2012; Rucht 2013). My research 
echoes this explication as it underlines the major importance for civil society 
organisations to reach diverse audiences and publics. Yet, I also caution that 
mediated visibility is not a political goal in itself, but rather one important facet of 
how actors relate to media environments. Visibility is an explicitly outward-
oriented feature. Focussing exclusively on the “larger” picture risks leaving aside 
more mundane aspects of how actors use media that feed into visibility. With the 
growing fascination for digital and “social” media the trend to analyse outward-
oriented communication and mediation has further increased. In particular 
research coming out of social movement studies tends to overlook the relevance 
media play for internal communication. Here a media practice approach is 
beneficial to analyse in more detail how visibility is generated within 
organisations. This has to do with the fact that investigating practices also includes 
looking at the ways media are used within organisations. In both case studies 
inward-oriented media practices were critical for establishing a coherent voice that 
permitted the organisations to appear as a reliable and trustful actor across media 
environments; which, in return, fed into gaining legitimacy and sustaining 
engagement over time. 
Taking into consideration inward-oriented media practices also allowed me to 
highlight how these modes of communicating correlated with face-to-face 
interactions. Both organisations stressed the relevance of face-to-face 
communication and direct interaction to bring their political work to life. In fact, 
as I emphasise in my thesis, mediated and face-to-face communication are best 
understood as interlocking arrangements. CFE members emphasised the role of 
their common office and the importance to personally meet collaborators. For the 
hackers large-scale events like the annual Congress and locations like hackerspaces 
were vital to exchange ideas in person as well as meeting media representatives 
and institutional actors in person remained a central mode of interaction. Media-
related practices were vital to initiate and maintain (more or less) stable 
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collaborations with individual and collective actors, but could not substitute for 
face-to-face contact per se. Put in other words, the thesis shows how mediated and 
direct communication act as interlocking arrangements and together form a vital 
part of the organisations’ ability to practice a demanding vision of politics. 
Similarly, the thesis emphasises that inward-oriented and outward-oriented 
communicative practices strongly influence each other. In fact, the synergy of 
internal and external media practices co-determines organisational structures as 
well as the ways the organisations act politically. 
Building on this approach my findings stand in stark contradiction to recent 
writings arguing that the internet makes organisation unnecessary (Shirky 2009) 
and leadership structures in political formations redundant (Castells 2012; Bennett 
et al. 2014). Instead of diagnosing the dissolution of organisation my thesis echoes 
the idea that different modalities of organising are emerging (Juris 2008; Karpf 
2012; Bimber et al. 2012) and explicitly contradict notions of leaderless collectives. 
In particular taking into consideration inward-oriented communication has 
allowed me to demonstrate that in strong contrast to common assumptions (cf. 
Bennett and Segerberg 2013) contemporary political collectives are not necessarily 
characterised by dehierarchisation. Au contraire, internal structuring and 
hierarchies were critical for both organisations under investigation to make their 
engagement reliable, comprehensive and effectual. Media-related practices, again, 
played an important role in this context as they enable members to form exclusive 
sub-groups, to exchange thoughts and ideas amongst individual members, to go 
public with a coherent voice and to coordinate collective action in a time-efficient 
manner. Despite rejecting bounded conditions that are conventionally associated 
with bureaucratic procedures, both cases displayed an ordered organisation that 
was grounded in communicative routines and leadership mechanisms. As 
emphasised throughout the empirical chapters, media technologies and 
infrastructures do not necessarily decentralise organisations, but, as shown in this 
thesis, strongly influence organisational structures and vice versa. This is not to 
argue that digital tools and platforms do not have specific affordances but to 
emphasise that it is impossible to draw causal relations between technical 
characteristics and the way actors make use of particular media. A media practice 
approach enables researchers to take into account aspects that might be considered 
banal, but in fact make up important aspects of organisations’ day-to-day and 
long-term formation. 
Taken together, one can diagnose that there is still a gap in research on the role 
internal communication plays for the actual formation of organisations (and 
movements) that seek political change. To understand the role media 
 225 
environments play for organisational actors’ ability to bring political endeavours 
to life it is vital to take into consideration both inward- and outward-oriented 
communication as well as the correlation between face-to-face and mediated 
communication. In particular social movement scholars, political scientist and 
political sociologists need to further acknowledge the relevance of media-related 
practices for individual and collective actors’ day-to-day deployment. Focusing 
exclusively on outward-oriented communication risks overlooking aspects that 
are constitutive for actors’ political activism. Practices that might appear banal like 
recruiting new members and employees, curating online profiles and websites or 
being able to combine political action with work in asynchronous ways are a 
critical part of initiating and maintaining political engagement today. 
Introducing what might be considered a bottom-up approach to mediation 
theory not only allows for moving beyond “social media” fetishism but also 
shows that boundaries between media practices and larger-scale dynamics like 
mediation are as stringent as presumed. While one might characterise a media 
practice approach as one that is operating on the microlevel my research shows 
that media-related practices intersect with a wide range of social practices and 
processes that might commonly be situated at a larger-scale level. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to uphold clear distinctions like micro, meso and macro (cf. Mattoni & 
Treré 2014) as they appear to be overly selective to describe the boundaries 
between actors’ media practices on the one hand and the flow of media 
productions, circulation and interpretation on the other hand. Due to their 
processual nature, contemporary dynamics concerning the use of media 
technologies and infrastructures escape rigid demarcations. This is to say that 
mediated visibility, circulation as well as other forms of mediation go hand in 
hand with media-related practices. Similarly, one can conclude that longer-term 
dynamics that are framed under the notion of mediatisation (Hepp 2012) stand in 
close correlation with practices that are oriented towards media. Instead of 
imposing more or less rigid and artificial boundaries on the relationship between 
media and society contemporary developments discussed in my thesis rather 
point to figurational procedures (Elias 1978). This is also why the notion of media 
environment has proven to be fruitful as it accentuates the interconnectedness of 
diverse platforms, outlets and devices, which is brought to the reader’s attention 
in my thesis through the notion of multi-layered media practices. As this 
conception accentuates, media-related practices are far from being isolated from 
broader societal processes: actors’ interaction with and practices oriented towards 
media environments continually feed into mediation as well as mediatisation and 
vice versa. When brought into contact with political processes more explicitly this 
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becomes apparent throughout my research as my thesis underlines how media-
related practices feed into legitimation and sustaining engagement over time. 
Taken together, the strength of implementing a media practice approach is to 
be in the position to include a wide range of interconnected activities related to 
contemporary media environments. As scholars have largely remained silent 
about the correlation between organisational actors’ media practices, establishing 
legitimacy and sustaining engagement over time my thesis adds new empirical 
findings to research. By taking into consideration the actors’ diverse practices 
related to and oriented towards media technologies and infrastructures it was 
possible to reveal the relation between legitimation and media practices. Instead of 
detecting causal chains between media attention and legitimacy (Herbst 2003; 
Koopmans 2004) investigating actors’ media practices revealed a more complex 
relationship. Similarly, analysing actors’ media practices allowed for revealing the 
role media technologies and infrastructures play for sustaining long-term 
engagement. At this stage it is important to emphasise that legitimation and long-
term engagement was, of course, based on what the organisations were actually 
doing and how they were doing it. At the same time, as the research findings 
show, what organisational actors do and how they do it in many ways relates to 
media today. As a consequence of explicating the role of media-related practices 
for actors’ legitimation and long-term engagement my thesis also emphasises the 
importance of civil society organisations for the ‘democratisation of democracy’ 
(Santos 2005). Put it other words, my thesis shows how the health of democratic 
constellations depends on the plural composition of civil society (Cohen and 
Arato 1992; Warren 2001; Fung 2003). In line with this chain of reasoning, media-
related practices are not only potentially meaningful for political arrangements but 
are constitutive for democratic constellations. This is in part the case because civil 
society organisations’ media practices play an influential role in processes that has 
been described as the ‘decentering of democratic legitimacy’ (Rosanvallon 2011). 
This does not exclude the potential that entanglements of media environments 
and political arrangements might pose a risk for the health of democratic 
constellations. All the same, there are good reasons to take into account the 
entanglements of organisational actors, media-related practices, legitimation and 
long-term engagement to further understandings of democratic constellations. I 
have focused on civil society organisations, but, as many contemporary political 
collectives defuse the boundaries between “typical” characteristics of 
organisations, associations, networks and movements it is important to underline 
that legitimation and longer-term engagement is not only an issue for 
organisations. Most political actors – may they be mainstream, alternative or 
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radical – are in need for legitimation in one way or another. Similarly, political 
activism only becomes substantial once it is sustained in one way or another over 
time. As media technologies and infrastructures have become a critical repertoire 
of political activism the findings of my thesis are an explicit recommendation to 
look at the links between media and legitimation and sustaining engagement 
across diverse forms of collectivity. 
 
10.3 General remarks and links to possible future research 
My research set out to research, analyse and contextualise emerging paths to 
legitimation and long-term engagement. The theoretical framework that informed 
my thesis has allowed me to enlarge understandings of how organisational actors 
make use of media technologies and infrastructures and what this means for 
contemporary modes of political engagement. In the case of the CCC this resulted 
in enlarging the conceptual positioning of hacktivism by emphasising that hackers 
do much more than hacking. Summarised in a more general statement, my 
research highlights that making sharp distinctions between “new” and “old” 
forms of political engagement is no valuable strategy when investigating 
contemporary politics. To explain the role media-related practices play for 
contemporary democratic constellations it is by far not enough to look at “social” 
media. At the same time, it is not sufficient to exclusively look at institutional 
politics and traditional centres of power. Instead one has to take into account the 
growing encounters between traditional and developing modes of doing politics. 
Emerging paths means that existing and upcoming modes of doing politics come 
together, merge and co-depend each other. This is even true in cases where one 
might not necessarily expect such consolidation: hackers talk to politicians, 
interact with the constitutional court and write for mainstream newspapers – at 
least in Germany. 
Following this it is interesting to note how the hackers act on issues like 
surveillance and CFE approach issues such as voting rights, which are significant 
political matters in numerous countries and indeed might be considered 
transnational issues. Yet, instead of aiming to form a transnational or global public 
sphere (Fraser 2007; Bohman 2007) the two civil society organisations rather 
approach political issues at the local, regional and national level. Even in cases 
were the objective was to bring together actors from different countries, like CFE’s 
Democratic Community of Practice, the aim was to share resources and to learn 
from each other to solve local problems. Accordingly, media-related practices do 
not necessarily lead to activism independent from time and space but facilitate 
engagement that is very much bound to different levels of locality. It is therefore 
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reasonable to treat arguments that generalise about the role media practices play 
across different cultures and societies with caution. Not only the cultural and 
political but also the economic and legal arrangements vary drastically across 
different regions and countries. Accordingly, taking into consideration the 
situatedness of my research, comparative studies analysing the ways civil society 
organisations use media technologies and infrastructures in other social, cultural 
and political contexts to gain legitimacy and to sustain their engagement over time 
would be very beneficial. 
Bringing the above said together it is reasonable to argue that to gain deepen our 
comprehension of contemporary societal figurations it is fruitful to investigate 
what actors do with media technologies and infrastructures. Indeed, throughout 
this thesis I have made the case that it appears more and more difficult to imagine 
the project of democracy without taking into account the role of practices related 
to media technologies and infrastructures. Accordingly, there is ample need to 
investigate how (individual and collective) actors deal with the growing 
pervasiveness of media environments. In this context I want to point to a finding 
that was not made explicit so far, but implicitly resonates throughout my thesis. In 
particular, the analysis of the CCC reveals how acting about contemporary media 
is becoming an increasingly important political issue. Due to the increasing 
pervasiveness of technology in both people’s everyday lives and the formation of 
political arrangements, direct involvement with technological developments 
emerges as an ever more pressing engagement practice. As they are part of the 
fundament that makes political action possible today, media technologies and 
infrastructures increasingly turn into a political endeavour in themselves. Directly 
engaging with the fundamental embeddedness of digital media in everyday life 
appears to be a manifestation of the struggle to act on the ‘grammar of political 
claims-making’ (Fraser 2000: 108). Considering the “technical” as “political” 
means to acknowledge how the hacker organisation’s engagements point to 
second-order or “meta-political” questions raised by the pervasiveness of 
contemporary media technologies and infrastructures. 
It is important to acknowledge that the CCC is a particular case in this regard. As 
a hacker collective the Club is inevitably embedded and entangled within 
technological areas of practice. One won’t necessarily find a comparable 
complexity and multiplicity of engaging with meta-political issues related to 
digital technologies and infrastructures when looking at other organised actors. 
Future research projects investigating the ways people take up knowledge related 
to media technologies and infrastructures and how this relates to their ability to 
act politically would be important. The push towards the inclusion of this 
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dimension should not be taken as an empirical benchmark, but rather as an 
approach that allows widening the lens through which one can analyse and 
understand contemporary engagement practices related. Although the focus of 
this thesis was on the relation between media practices, legitimacy and long-term 
engagement my findings implicitly point to an important and possibly growing 
field of political engagement. This leaves us with somewhat paradoxical situation. 
On the one hand, it is reasonable to state that organisational actors are able to 
articulate their claims in ways that make people actually listening to what they 
have to say. Media-related practices play an (increasingly) important part in this 
process. Broadening and increasing the number of voices that are able to speak and 
are listened to is generally a welcome tendency. On the other hand, my findings 
also show that media-related practices and media environments are crucial for 
being part of the political landscape per se. If this is the case, then, one needs to 
carefully consider who is talking and listened to. The organisations I have analysed 
where predominately male, white and well-educated. The question whether 
media-related practices are helpful for democratic culture at large is therefore not 
answered in the context of my thesis. Perhaps most fundamentally, my thesis 
leaves unanswered the following question: How sustainable are the activities of 
CFE and the CCC in regards to larger parts of society? 
This thesis never set out to find answers to the question whether the 
developments I investigated are good or bad for democracy. From an analytical 
point of view, my thesis emphasises the relationship between organised actors’ 
media practices, legitimation and long-term engagement. From a more normative 
perspective, the findings of my research can be interpreted as a democratic deficit 
as they reveal dynamics that attribute political potency to organisations that are 
not democratically elected or legitimised. In this sense, the organisations’ agency 
can be understood as problematic because it appears to be a violation of the 
conditions of equality by democratic accountability. In other words, more research 
needs to be done on the emerging inequalities that rise along with the political 
relevance of media-related practices. What happens, for example, to homeless 
people in a world where engagement to a large degree relies on being connected to 
a media environment that spans across platforms, tools and devices? It is 
understood that not every single person and citizen can be involved in the 
formation of political arrangements (Dahl 1989). At the same time, relying on the 
engagement of a small set of active civil society organisations implies the danger of 
ignoring the importance of people’s day-to-day use of media technologies and 
infrastructures and the role their practices play for democratic constellations at 
large. To put it in other words, with media being intimately embedded in people’s 
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everyday life the question remains whether the engagement of civil society 
organisations is enough to create a counterpart to institutional and economic 
actors. 
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Appendix 1 
Short participant biographies for CCC case studies 
 
Anonym ised 
- long-term member for around 15 years 
- former spokesperson 
- active in the maintenance of the Club’s anonymizing 
- specialised in legal issues 
 
Andreas Bogk 
- long-term member active since around 1994 
- former board member 
- long-term spokesperson 
- head of CCC event organisation 
- specialised in information security 
 
Tobias Engel  
- one of the first members of the local CCC node in Berlin 
- part of the artistic Blinkenlights team 
- specialised in software development (for mobile communication) 
 
Erdgeist  
- long-term member for around 12 years 
- spokesperson for over 6 years 
- co-editor of the magazine Datenschleuder 
 
Sandro G aycken 
- former active Club member 
- researcher at the Free University of Berlin 
- specialised in cyber security and data protection 
 
Jürgen G euter,  alias  tante 
- long-term member without direct affiliation to a local node 
- researcher at the University of Oldenburg 
- specialised in data privacy 
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Bastian Greshake 
- new member  
- specialised in in genetics and bioinformatics 
 
Fukam i 
- long-term member for around 15 years 
- active member in five local nodes of the CCC (Karlsruhe, Dresden, 
Cologne, Berlin and Hamburg) 
- active in different NGOs (Digitale Gesellschaft, Open Data Network, 
LiquidDemocracy e.V.) 
- specialised in information security 
 
M artin H aase 
- long-term member active for around 10 years 
- member of the board since 2009 
- specialised in linguistics and philology 
 
hadez 
- paying member 
- co-organiser of the hackerspace ‘shack space’ in Stuttgart 
- specialised in electric engineering and programming  
 
M ichael  H irdes,  alias  dodger 
- long-term member active for around 10 years 
- member of the board since 2012 
- specialised in data privacy and surveillance 
 
Patrick H offm ann, alias  f ightling 
- member for around 5 years at the CCC 
- mostly active in the Berlin hackerspace Raumfahrtagentur 
- specialised in software engineering for over 20 years 
 
Stephan Kam bor,  alias  st  
- long-term CCC member for around 11 years 
- founder of BlinkenArea 
- specialised in computer science 
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Frank Karlitschek 
- open source developer 
- co-founder of owncould.org 
 
M ey Lean Kronem ann 
- new CCC member 
- artist, interaction designer and researcher 
 
Constanze Kurz 
- long-term member 
- long-term spokesperson 
- specialised in computer science and data privacy 
 
Andreas Lehner 
- long-term member 
- former board member 
- active in the anonymising infrastructure 
 
Sam  M ay 
- long-term member since 1998/99 
- former board member 
- specialised in security research and information systems 
 
Evgeny M ozorov 
- technology writer and researcher 
- keynote speaker at 28th Congress 
 
Karsten Nohl 
- long term active member 
- specialised in cryptography and security research 
 
Christoph Puppe,  alias  Pluto 
- former active member for around 12 years 
- specialised in information security 
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M ark Rendeiro,  alias Bicyclem ark 
- alternative journalist 
- together with Tim Pritlove producer of Newz of the World podcast 
 
Klaus Schleisiek, alias Tom  Tw iddlebit  
- co-initiator of the first meeting in 1981 
- vice-president of Wau Holland Foundation 
- specialised in measuring instruments 
 
M alte Spitz  
- member since 2007 
- member of the board of the Green Party 
- specialised in media, citizens’ right and internet politics 
 
Starbug 
- long term member for over 15 years 
- specialised in biometry 
 
Lisa  Thalheim  
- long term member for around 14 years 
- active in the Berlin hackerspace Raumfahrtagentur 
- specialised in information security, biometry and biohacking 
 
Lars  W eiler  
- long term member since 1999 
- co-founder of local CCC node in Düsseldorf 
- specialised in mechatronics  
- co-author of “Hackerspace Design Patterns” 
 
Steffen W ernéry 
- long-term member since 1983 
- former member of the board 
- spokesperson of the Club in the founding years 
- one of the main characters in the CCC during the 1980s 
- specialised in computer science and lock picking 
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Webliography1  
 
Citizens for Europe 
Homepage: citizensforeurope.org 
Overview of activities: citizensforeurope.org/projects-activities 
List of official partners and collaborators: citizensforeurope.org/partners-friends 
 
In-house media 
Open Citizenship: citizensforeurope.org/projects-activities/open-citizenship-
the-journal  
Podcast series: cfe.podomatic.com 
Newsfeed: citizensforeurope.org/newsfeed 
 
Democratic Community of Practice (DemCop) 
citizensforeurope.org/projects-activities/project-archive/democratic-
community-of-practice 
 
Social media accounts 
facebook.com/CitizensForEurope 
twitter.com/opencitizenship 
youtube.com/user/OpenCitizenship 
pinterest.com/opencitizenship 
 
Media collaborations 
neuemedienmacher.de 
fluxfm.de 
mcrud.de 
 
Core funding 
ec.europa.eu/youth/tools/youth-in-action_en.htm (European Union Youth in 
Action Programme) 
 
 
 
                                                
1 All online sources last accessed on 20 July 2014. 
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Chaos Computer Club 
Homepage: ccc.de 
Regional clubs: ccc.de/de/regional; ccc.de/de/club/erfas 
Executive committee: ccc.de/vorstand 
Events: events.ccc.de 
CCC affiliated Wau Holland Foundation: wauland.de 
CCC affiliated arts project: blinkenlights.net/arcade 
Members at the German parliament’s committee (2010–2013) on Internet and 
Digital Society: 
bundestag.de/internetenquete/mitglieder/kurz_constanze/index.jsp; 
bundestag.de/internetenquete/mitglieder/padeluun/index.jsp 
Public mailing lists: dasalte.ccc.de/mailinglists 
 
Anonymiser Services 
ccc.de/anonymizer 
web.jabber.ccc.de 
twitter.com/jabbercccde 
 
Official CCC media outlets 
In-house media: ccc.de/de/publications 
Datenschleuder: ds.ccc.de 
Twitter: twitter.com/chaosupdates; twitter.com/ccc 
Chaosradio: chaosradio.ccc.de 
Online archive: media.ccc.de 
 
Selection of media outlets by individual CCC members 
Fefe: blog.fefe.de and fefe.de 
Frank Rieger and Fefe: alternativlos.org 
Chaos Radio Express: cre.fm 
Tim Pritlove and Linus Neumann: logbuch-netzpolitik.de 
Tim Pritlove and Mark Rendeiro: newz-of-the-world.com 
Lars Weiler: konvergenzfehler.de 
Martin Haase and Kai Biermann: neusprech.org 
Fukami: blog.fukami.io 
Constanze Kurz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) fortnightly column: 
faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/aus-dem-maschinenraum 
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Peter Glaser, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (‘New Zurich Journal’) blog: 
glaserei.blog.nzz.ch (and archive of former blog: blog.stuttgarter-zeitung.de) 
twitter.com/frank_rieger 
twitter.com/erdgeist 
twitter.com/Alternativlos 
twitter.com/zuendelkind 
twitter.com/PylonC 
twitter.com/fukami 
twitter.com/timpritlove 
twitter.com/andreasdotorg 
 
Selection of mainstream media coverage 
aljazeera.com/video/europe/2011/10/20111025213014548714 
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15253259 
bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16367042 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/8567934.stm 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-10/german-trojan-spyware-may-violate-
constitution.html 
dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15449054,00.html 
guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/aug/07/censorship.hacking 
h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/CCC-publishes-fingerprints-of-German-
Home-Secretary-734713.html 
huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/27/spyware-scandal-outrages-_n_1035344.html 
Website of IT-news service Golem dedicated to the CCC: golem.de/specials/ccc 
(German) 
Collaboration with public broadcaster Deutschlandfunk (since 27th Congress): 
deutschlandfunk.de/hackerkongress (German) 
Media reports and outputs on the initiative for transparency law: 
transparenzgesetz.de/presseschau (German) 
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CFE newsletter April 2013 
 
[Call for Action - Project Overview 2013 - 2016] towards cosmopolitan citizenship and
full political participation in the European Union #diversity #participation #citizenship
Is this email not displaying correctly?
View it in your browser.
Call for Action
towards cosmopolitan citizenship and full political participation in the European Union #diversity
#participation #citizenship
Project Overview 2013 - 2016
The European integration process and transnational migration lead to more diverse local
communities. Today, 32 million people in the European Union live outside their country of origin,
which poses fundamental challenges to classical models of citizenship, participation and
democracy in Europe. Citizens For Europe e.V. (CFE), a Berlin-based European NGO, addresses
these challenges. We invite actors from all fields to get involved. CFE is focused on:
1. Diversity in Private and Public Institutions
2. Democracy and Political Participation in Europe
3. Citizenship in the European Union
We connect practitioners and decision-makers from academia, civil society and politics to address
these challenges by promoting actors' collective intelligence and boosting self-empowerment. If
you are engaged in similar topics professionally or personally and would like to participate, co-
host events or become a partner in our projects, let us know!
 
DiverseCity onBoard
Despite growing diversity in cities, migrants' social mobility and political representation remain
Citizens For Europe e.V.
 <office@citizensforeurope.org>
To: <s.kubitschko@gold.ac.uk>
Reply-To: Citizens For Europe e.V. <office@citizensforeurope.org>
Call for Action: Project Overview 2013 - 2016 @opencitizenship #Diversity #EP2012 #Citizenship
 
26 April 2013 10:50
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CFE political parties 
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CFE newsletter January 2014 
 
 
From: Citizens For Europe e.V. office@citizensforeurope.org
Subject: Urban Citizenship - DiverseCity onBoard Project starts - European Elections 2014 - EU Convention
Date: 7 January 2014 14:54
To: s.kubitschko@gold.ac.uk
Urban Citizenship: Reclaiming the European City - DiverseCity onBoard Project starts -
European Elections 2014: Voting Rights for all! - European Convention #citizenship
#diversity #EP2014 #convention
Is this email not displaying correctly?
View it in your browser.
Urban Citizenship: Reclaiming the
European City - Out Now!
The new edition of Open Citizenship is out now!
 
In this edition, we look at urban citizenship. Debate on Europe
often focuses on EU-level legislation and institutions,
overlooking the places where Europe is actually experienced by
people: at the local level, especially in urban spaces. While crises
often direct our attention to large-scale policies, they can obscure
the processes of re-invention constantly taking place when
citizens interact with each other. In this edition of Open
Citizenship, we investigate just how Europe is being shaped by
how people live together and organise their local communities.
 
Articles include:
Urban citizenship, border practices and immigrants' rights by Dr. Henrik Lebuhn
The LGBTQ struggle in eastern European Cities by Tomasz Kitlinski and Pawel
Leszkowicz
An interview with organisers of the Subversive Festival, Srecko Horvat and Igor
Stiks on how to challenge the capitalist takeover of cities
Basurama - an architectural collective changing the way people experience Madrid
And much, much more!
Read more on Urban Citizenship - Reclaiming the European City
 
Get the full range of Open Citizenship content -
subscribe today!
Subscriptions provide you with print editions of the journal as well as online access to articles,
and provides Open Citizenship with the chance to build on its success for the future.  If you would
 
like to sub cribe t  the journal go to our website, or if you have any questions, please contact Ms.
Lisa Pettibone at pettibone@citizensforeurope.org
As a non-profit publication, Open Citizenship needs your help to foster exchange across different
actors o provide free access to knowledge and to increase awarenes  of igra ion, participation
and citizenship within the European Union.
 
Voting Rights for All - EP2014
In the run up to the European Elections in May 2014,
Citizens For Europe and the alliance Voting Rights for
All (Wahlrecht für Alle) will launch a campaign to
expand voting rights on local and European levels to
Third Country Nationals. The successful Kick-Off
meeting took place on December 9th where
representatives of 20 civil society organisations and
political parties met to network and develop concrete campaigning ideas. To raise the pressure on
politicians to expand  voting rights in Germany we’re going to focus on raising public awareness
on the topic and on organising “share your vote” actions.
The next meeting will be held in mid-January. More info will be available soon, which we will post
to our website. Stay tuned!
Interested in joining the campaign? Contact Ms. Louisa Prause: prause@citizensforeurope.org
European Convention - join now!
Citizens For Europe e.V. (CFE) supports a citizen-
driven European convention to boost the
democratisation of the EU and its institutions,
 especially as a response to the ongoing financial crisis
in Europe. In anticipation of potential changes to
European treaties, CFE and its partners brought
together a wide range of activists, experts and
politicians in a series of workshops across Europe in 2013. For information about these events,
click the following links: NECE, November 2013 (web), Deutsch-Französischer-Dialog May 2013 -
Workshop 4 (pdf).
The aim of these ongoing workshops is to develop a network of actors conceptualising a people's
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CFE Pinterest 
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CFE collaborations 
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CFE Vote Exchange 
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CCC Btx terminals 
 
Telephone Btx terminal combination 
 
 
Austrian Post Btx system (Mupid 1, television and telephone) 
 
 
Public Btx terminal (today at Museum for Communication Frankfurt) 
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Btx logo 
 
 
Copyright: by Discostu (under GFDL), Museum for Communication Frankfurt, 
Much Projekte, Deutsche Post 
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CCC Post emblem 
 
Variations of the CCC Pesthörnchen (pest horn) an allusion to Posthorn (post 
horn) 
           
 
 
 
The original Deutsche Post logo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright: Chaos Computer Club, ~SebDominguez and Deutsche Post 
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CCC taz TUWAT 
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CCC taz Computer Guerrilla 
 
lQc O O L T O  u R tu  Dienstag. 8.11. KJ 
Ein  Fan  auf  der  'telecom  8 3 ' 
SCHWEIZER  GESCHICHTEN 
Iis ist Ende Oktober 1983. Seit Tagen fie-
bere ich der Reise nach Genf zur TELE-
C O M '10 entgegen. Dort will ich Richard 
treffen, den Herausgeber einer New Yor-
ker Zeitung für telecom-junkies. Im Zug 
lerne ich Stephen, einen anderen Ami. ken-
nen. Er liest Coevolution Quarterly. das ist 
lür mich das Zeichen, ihn anzusprechen. 
Er arbeitet bei der I ' N O in Wien fürs Jahr 
der Jugend 1985 
Auf dem Bahnhof in Genf komme ich am 
Pol-Shop vorbei. Die Polizei bietet hier 
Sicherheit an! .Gute Kunden" heißen in 
Deutschland Wiederholungstäter. In der 
Schweiz werden sie offen verkauft. 
Auch auf der Messe waren viele grüne 
Jungs und Madeis von der SECURfTAS: 
irgenwie war Bombendrohung. 
Überall Laser. Der Bildaufbau ist noch 
etwas langsam. Es werden nicht nur grafi-
sche Muster, sondern auch Umrisse von 
Erdteilen usw mehrfarbig gezeigt. Aber 
die mechanische Ablenkung des Laser-
strahls via Spiegel laßt das Großbild noch 
zittern. 
hast alle Firmen bieten digitale Fernkopie-
rer (Stufe 3)an. Siesenden alle eine Absen-
derkennung. Datum und Uhrzeit. BKA 
und Militär haben da ein Wortchen mitge-
redet. sie wollen ja auch in Zukunft wissen, 
wer wem was mitteilt (Wer mag schon 
anonyme pornographische Fernkopien?). 
Der IBM-Stand sieht röhrend aus. Ein 
Wachmann schützt die Treppe nach oben. 
Frauen rennen dauernd in ein Blechge-
hause das aussieht wie eine Umkleideka-
bine. Dann begreife ich. d a ß d o n der Foto-
kopierer steht. 
Am russischen Stand gibt es Gerate für die 
Medizin/Psychiatrie. Gerate für physiolo-
gische und psychologische Studien werden 
- hier wie dort - gebraucht . Lügendetekto-
ren basieren u.a. auf Haut» iderstandsmes-
sungen. Elektroschock* sind ein probates 
Mittel. Und schmerzcrzeugende Gerate, 
wer weiß, wozu das gut ist. 
Die russischen Personal Computer RIGA I 
sehen verdammt nach ( P / M aus. Nur die 
Tastatur ist so schwergangig. daß man 
(zumindest für die Leertaste) einen Ham-
mer benötigt Das Dollarzeichen(ein übli-
ches Steuerzeichen aul der Terminaltas-
tatur) ist noch drauf. In der DDR findet 
sich stattdessen das ..internationale Wah-
rungssymbol". 
Als ich ein lautendes Programm mit „Con-
trol C" anhalte (ich musste erst das ruvsi-
sche C finden), erscheint BREAK AT 
11454 am Bildschirm und neben mir ein 
Herr. Er teilt mir mit. dass ich das nicht tun 
solle und startet das Programm wieder. Er 
sucht dazu auf der russischen Tastatur R. 
U u n d N . 
Nach kurzer Zeit habe ich diverses Stand-
personal um mich, da runter einen Dolmet-
M-her, der meine Fragen an einen Russen 
weiterleitet und mir dessen Antworten 
übersetzt. Der Rechner ist ein Nachbau des 
Intel 8080. und daß darauf dann die gleiche 
Software lauft wie im Westen, ist wohl 
klar. 
Auch die Zeichentrickfilme auf den russi-
schen TVs sind so abartig wie hier. Nur die 
Verkehrsschilder sind russisch beschriftet. 
Die Filme sind sicher billig. 
Vermutlich ist in der „electronic mail" für 
Messegäste ne Nachricht, aber ich habe 
noch Keine Karte dafür. Mein erster Ver-
such bringt mir zwar eine bedruckte Karte, 
aber sie paßt nicht! 
Abends In Genf 
Ich gehe durch die Straßen, um das Flair 
der Stadt in mich aufzunehmen. Es ist eine 
Schweizer Stadt. Die Briefkästen in den 
modernen Häusern haben die Ästhetik 
von Panzerschränken, ine Digitaluhr hetzt 
im lotel Sekundentakt über eine Haus-
wand. Ich schaue mir die Wände an. um 
ein wildes Plakat für eine Musikveranstal-
tung zu finden, und wundere mich über 
kleine briefmarkenartige Aufkleber. Dann 
begreife ich. daß es Anschlagsgebühren-
marken sind. 
Die Schweiz ist eben ein sauberes Land 
und die stummen Zeilungsverkäufer sind 
nicht verriegelt und verrammelt wie in 
deutschen Landen. In der obersten, leicht 
zerfledderten Zeitung suche ich Veranstal-
tungshinweise. Rock im Sud des Alpes. Ich 
lege die Zeitung zurück und mache mich 
auf den Weg. 
Am Ufer des Genfer Sees blicke ich aufeine 
hell beleuchtete Stadt. In Hamburg sieht 
die Mönckebergstraße an Weihnachten so 
aus. Hier immer 
Man ist so stolz auf die echten Bäume im 
Park am Ufer, daß sie nachts mit Schein-
werfern angestrahlt werden. Ich bewun-
dere eine etwa drei Meter große' runde 
Blumenrabatte. Überrascht bemerke ich 
drei Zeiger in der Mitte. Wieder eine Uhr, 
mit Sekundenzeiger 
Bei der Musikveranstaltung sitzt alles brav 
da und hört zu. obwohl ein paar Stücke 
mich einfach zum Tanzen bringen. 
Mit einem der Musiker unterhalte ich mich 
und er meint, daß Genf eine der kälteren 
Städte der Schweiz sei. 
Sonntag 
Auf der Telecom hat sich Richard inzwi-
schen gemeldet. Um 18 Uhrsollen wir uns 
treffen. Pei Pinnwand und Zettel klapp: 
das eben. Vorher suchte ich in der Presseli-
ste nach seinem Namen - gefunden. 
Es i.>t einfach toll und gleichzeitig übel, 
dauernd stolpere ich hier über Nanunsli-
sten von Journalisten. Besuchern usw. An 
Datenschutz denken hier wohl nur die 
Leute, die die Daten hinterher weiterver-
kaufen. 
Außerdem habe ich jetzt eine Karte für die 
.electronic mailbox", aber der Rechner ist 
zur Zeit außer Betrieb. Einer amerikani-
schen Journalistin verspreche ich. das tel-
vom-System der mail box zu erklären.aber 
es ist immer noch nicht wieder in Betrieb. 
Sie sieht meinen Button „TAKE A COM-
PUTER T O LUNCH", lacht und meint, 
sie habe in den USA einen gesehen: 
..H AVE YOU H U G E D Y O U R COMPU-
TER TODAY?" (Hast du deinen Compu-
ter heute schon lieb gehabt?) 
Am Stand von 3M bin ich nichts böses 
ahnend radioaktiv verseucht worden. Bei 
der Vorführungeines Meßgerätes für stati-
sche Aufladung bat mich ein freundlicher 
Deutschschweizer, mal ineine Hand hin-
zuhalten. Das Radioaktivitätswamzei-
chen auf dem Gerät bemerkte ich erst 
hinterher. 
Er erklärte, das sei alles gaaanz ungefähr-
lich. Da kämen zu mehr als 95% nur 
Alphastrahlen raus und nur eine ganz 
geringe Dosis. Na dann! So'n Zeug wird in 
großen Elektronikfirmen eingesetzt, denn 
mit radioaktiver Strahlung läßt sich stati-
sche Aufladung beseitigen. Sonst gingen 
teure elektronische Bauteile hopps. Radio-
activity is everywhere. For you and me. 
Am 30.10. ist US-Messetag und in der 
USA-Ecke spielt ne Militär-Big-Band 
flotte Kriegswaisen. Dazu gibts Kekse und 
Whiskv. 
verdaut hat. Zusammenfassung: entweder 
ist ein System einfach und unsicher oder 
sicher und unhandlich. 
Am Stand der VR China bewundere ich 
das Funkgerät .Rote Laterne" und stehe 
sehnsüchtig vor dem chinesischen Münz-
fernsprecher. Keine Chance, ihn zu 
klauen. 
Interessant sind einige technische Daten-
blätter. die zumindest einen sehr hohen 
technischen Stand aufzeigen. Nur weisen 
Namen wie HEBEI S E M I C O N D U C -
TOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE eher auf 
Labormuster als auf Serienproduktion 
hin. Außerdem sind alle chinesischen Pro-
spekte im Buchdruck hergestellt. Das Ist 
bei einigen „unterentwickelten" Staaten 
anders: exzellent gemachte Prospekte und 
„HIER einwerfen, weil Nachttresor 
kaputt!" Vor ein paar Wochen war sowas 
in einem nordischen Land erfolgreich und 
es hieß, die Geschichte habe in Micky 
Maus. Rubrik Panzerknacker gestanden. 
E iweder schreibt Micky Maus bei T A P 
ab oder bestimmte Ideen sind jetzt einfach 
rc . Ich möchte das Hinweisschild mit 
di . *'m Hinweis mitnehmen, lasse das aber 
wegen der vielen Passanten. Erst hinterher 
bemerke ich die Kamera. Der ganze Bahn-
hcr wimmelt von ihnen. Ich muß noch viel 
Ii ien. 
Ii Bus ein Plakat „Vorsicht - Taschen-
diebe! Schütze dein Eigentum! Der Pol-
Shop." 
Außerdem die Hinweise, daß Rauchen 
von Zigaretten und Pfeife sowie Roll-
schuhfahren im Bus untersagt ist. Das 
t t i t t t t t t t t t tt tt I t t t # t 1 . tt i * tt f ; t t t t t t t t « tt tí tt t t t t t t t t 
# t t - tt tt ' t t t t , t t t t tt . tt tt tt tt • tt tt % 
tt tt » tt tt t» tt tt _ tt tt- tt tt ' tt t t . tt 
tt # tt tt tt tt - tt, t t t t t t tt ,tt tt tt t t t t t t t t t f # t t 
# tt - * tt tt ft tt tt tt # tt tt 
_ • ' # K tt tt * tt Jt tt » * tt 
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Und ich habe heute erst 2 Paßworter raus-
getundenü! Das muß ich noch lernen, da 
bin ich noch kein Profi. (Inzwischen weiß 
ich: Alle Tastaturen hochheben. Zettel 
drunter abschreiben! Oder anderen hinle-
gen. Kilrov was here.) 
Ich sitze wieder vor dem electronic mail 
System. Jetzt meint die Kiste, ich sei unbe-
kannt. Außerdem dauert das nahezu eme 
Ewigkeit. Mit DFN Antwortzeiten gib! 
sich das BKA bestimmt nicht zufrieden. 
Habe mir eine neue Karte geholt. Aber es 
dauert noch ne Stunde, bis das Svstem das 
Hi-Tech-Produkte. Eine verkürzte inter-
nationale Zusammenfassung: Entwick-
lung in Japan, Produktion in der 3. Welt. 
Verkauf in der ersten. 
Abends laufe ich durch dieStadt und suche 
etwas zum Pennen. 
Bei der Schweizerischen Bankgesellschaft 
am Bahnhof ist der Nachteinwurf für 
Geldbomben wiedei defekt. Das erinnert 
mich an eine Geschichte aus T A P vor ca. 2 
Jahren. Dort wurde ein Bankraub 
beschrieben, der mit solch einem Schild 
begangen wurde. Ein Tresor auf Rädern 
stand daneben und der Hinweis besagte: 
kenne ich sonst nur aus Kaufhäusern.Da-
für fehlt der Hinweis auf Pommes-frites-
Verbot wie in Hamburg. 
Abends in der Stadt Jucht mich bei einer 
Ruggeselbchaft ein Bildschirm an. Aul' 
ihm ist zu lesen: 
-PADAII52 / JOOCT ..cr-
" G V A K K A I / G V A R R A I / G V A K D S R / 
Z R I M S R . c r 
MESSAGE SENT 
"I -cr" 
I G N O R E D " 
Vielleicht kann jemand was damit anlan-
gen. VieJ Spaß beim Hacken Mau 
Zu  Gast  in  fremden  Datennetzen  Zeitschriftentips 
LOGISCHE  BOMBEN  UND  BONBONS  T. A. P. T. H. E. M. - ZAPF  SIE AN 
Geschichten über Wanderer in Datenhan-
ken. I oschen. Verandern und Kopieren 
von Daten stehen hoch im Kurv Das 
bringt außer den Technikern auch die Juri-
sten ins Rotieren. Der Datenklau bringt 
neue Probleme im Recht weii nichts 
gestohlen", sondern nur ..gedoppelt" 
wird. Besonders gefürchtet sind soge-
nannte „logischen Bomben". Das sind pas-
sive Computerprogramme in militäri-
schen Rechnern und Datenbanken, die -
w ie in den klassischen Agentengeschichten 
die ..Schläfer" - erst bei Bedarf aktiviert 
werden. Sie verbreiten dann Desinforma-
tion im Datenherz des Gegners. Ei. wo will 
die IVrshing heute hin'* IX-r Phantasie sind 
keine Grenzen gesetzt. 
Die erste Forschungsphase besteht im 
Erkunden der Telefonnummer des 
gewünschten Computersystems. Bauan-
leitungen und Programme dafür in älteren 
TAP-Ausgaben. Zum zweiten sollte man 
mit dem entsprechenden Computersv stem 
umgehen können (/ B SIEMENS* und 
IBM-Kurse-). Und dann beginnt, mit der 
Paßwort suche: 
DAS GROSSE SPIEL' 
Ein Student der Carnegie-Mellon Univer-
sität in Pittsburgh wurde bei seiner For-
schungsarbeit erwischt. Fr war von seinem 
Schlaf/immer aus per Telefon bis Com pu-
tersystem des US-Vcrtei<fcgungsministc-
riums eingedrungen Da das alles hierar-
chisch organisiert ist. konnte er sich von 
«Jon aus weiterschalten zu diVelsen ande-
ren staatlichen und öffentlichen Compu-
tern. Er war im Air-Force Computer, als er 
geschnappt wurde. Sein Ziel: Bauplane 
von „crutse missiles" iausholen, um sie >n 
1 AP zu veröffentlichen 
Natürlich lassen sich EDV-Kenntnisse 
j i r I i cui veiwenden, wenn man kv.ui«. 
Duekiveibiiiuiiiig / u einem Keebncr h.n 
Die Aktion . GIROBLAU" von Robin 
Wood etwa will die Elektrizitätswerke 
ökonomisch treffen, damit u.a. mehr zur 
Entschwefelung der Kraftwerke getan wir-
d. Als Verbraueherbankkunde lassen sieh 
bis /u 65 Dauerauftrage kostenlos einrich-
ten. Man kann auf die verschiedenen Kon-
ten der E-Werke überweisen, mehrmals 
täglich geht das. und immer nur Pf ennigbe-
trage. 23 Pfennig für Erisianer! 
Am 5. September '83 erschien in NEWS-
WEEK ein Artikel über Hacker Die 
ersten beiden Strophen eines Hacker - Lie-
des von Cheshire Catalyst. einem Heraus-
geber der Hackerzeitung TAP. waren 
darin wiedergegeben. 
Einige Tage später wurde im Fernsehen 
von BBC London eineComputersendung 
ausgestrahlt. Dabei wollte jemand sich in 
Put another password in 
Bomb it out and try again 
Try to get past logging in 
We're hacking, hacking, hacking. 
1 r> his first wile s maiden name. 
This is more than just a game. 
It's real fun. it is the same. 
It's hacking, hacking, hacking. 
SvvcaH. let's try a sys-call. 
Remember the great bug from version 3. 
Of R S X. it's here! Whoppcc! 
Put another svs-caH in. 
Run those passuords out and then. 
Dial back up. we're logging in. 
We're hacking, hacking, hacking' 
einen Großrechner ein-loggen. Bei diesem 
Versuch war am Bildschirm zu lesen: ..I'm 
sorrv. but I was here first. By the way. I'm 
changing your password." ('tschuldigung. 
ich war vor dir da. Übrigens andere ich 
gerade dein Paßwort) und es folgten die 
ersten beiden Strophen der Hackerhymne. 
Heiklere Geschichten fliegen oft aus 
Dummheit auf. So änderten einige kids m 
den Staaten nicht nur ihre Noten am Schul-
eomputer. sondern auch das Gehalt des 
Direktors. Wie? Sie kürzten es. Doch das 
war zu kurz gedacht Hätten sie es ohne 
Rachegelüste - deutlich, aber im Rahmen 
erhöht, ware es hart für den Direktor, der 
solches mit sich geschehen läßt: Dieses 
..strategische" Denken wird die neuen 
Gesellschaftsspiele, die tausendmal span-
nender sind als müde Latschedemos, in 
Zukunft prägen. wau. 
G ib ein neues Paßwort ein 
Oft lliegst du raus, mal kommste rein 
Schau genau beim Tippen zu 
Wir hacken, hacken, hacken. 
Find vom Chef die Freundin raus 
Probiere ihren Namen aus 
Tast dich ran mit Ruh im Nu 
Zum Hacken. Hacken. Hacken 
Begreite endlich das System 
Dann hast du es ganz bequem 
Was du willst das tu. ia tu 
Du Hacker. Hacker. Hacker' 
Cheshire Catalyst. T.A.P.-magazm 
Ubersetzung frei nach wau 
In den USA erscheinen eine Reihe von sehr 
informativen Büchern, deren Titel allein 
einem deutschen Staatsanwalt eine Her-
zattacke bescheren würde. Daß solche 
Publikationen z.T. eine ISB-Nummer tra-
gen. sprengt das Hirn manch eines preußi-
schen Beamten. Hier ein paar Kostproben: 
T.A.P.. erscheint jetzt fast 15 Jahre Ein 
MUSS für tclccom-iunkies! 
Adresse: TAP. Room 603. 147 W. 42 St.. 
New York NY-10036. USA. 10 US-Dollar 
hinschicken und abwarten! 
CocvoiuiionQuarterly (CQ). eine Viertel-
jahreszeitschrift. die man einfach kennen 
sollte. Im Buch „Zukunkftspcrspcktivcn" 
von Werner Pieper sind ein paar Artikel 
aus ihr übersetzt. (TAP habe ich durch C Q 
kennengelernt!) 
LOOMPANICS. ein Buchversand mit so 
gegensätzlichen Themen wie Bienenzucht, 
das Besiedeln unbewohnter Inseln. 
Buchern über Selbstbau von Waffen, dis-
kordischc Prinzipien fürPfeif-mcht-wenn-
du-pißt-Fans. Herstellung falscher Aus-
weise und was mensch sonst so braucht. 
Leider alles auf Englisch. L O O M P A N I C S 
UNLIMITED.P.O.B. 1197. Port Town-
send. WA 986«. USA 
Aktuell aus dem Loopmanics-Katalog: 
The Code-Book. Alles über schwer /u 
knackende Codes und ihre Anwendung. 
Mit Bcispidprogrammcn in BASIC, von 
Michael E. Marotta. ca. 10 Dollar 
Ein anderes Buch. das mir v erschiedentlich 
empfohlen wurde: The hitchhikers Guide 
through the galaxy. Schon auf deutsch 
erschienen. Anhänger von Verschwö-
rung»! hconcn sollten diese Fachzeitschrift 
mal antesten. Die besten V e r s c h w ö r u n g 
theorctiker der Welt schreiben. Hirnfutter 
für galaktische Guerillafreaks. Adresse: 
C R I T I Q U E . 2364 Vallev West Drive. 
Santa Rosa. C A 95401. USA 
Computernetzwerke, mit lclefon und 
Modem anwählbaren „bulletin boards". 
sind ein neues Medium, so etwas wie Bild-
schirmtext ohne eingebaute Staatsauf-
sicht. Jetzt auch in diesen Landen. Auf den 
gerade entstehenden bundesdeutschen 
Netzwerken gibt es u.a. Infos über neue 
Piratensender - jetzt auch in Stereo und mit 
Verkehrsfunkkennung! 
Daß mit Hilfe von EUROPIEPauch Über-
wachungskameras des BKA ein- und aus-
geschaltet werden, ist ja bekannt. Aber 
auch höchst wichtige Alarmanlagen wer-
den darüber scharf gemacht. Wenn jeder 
von Zeit zu Zeit mal EUROPIEP anruft 
unter irgend einer ausgedachten Nummer, 
(für Computerfreaks: Random-Pro-
gramm!) passiert irgend was. Man bewirkt 
u.U. zwar, daß ein Arzt, der Eurosignal 
verwendet, im Krankenhaus anruft , aber 
mehr Schaden nchict man kaum an. Nur 
Chaos Deshaib: Ruf mal wieder an ' 
In den amerikanischen Netzen finden sich 
neben der CommuniTree-Gruppe mit 
ihrem sozialen Computernetzwerk über 
u.a. globale Informationsfreiheit andere 
mit härterem StolT. Paßwörter für kom-
merzielle und staatliche Computer und 
ahnliche Infos tx.'i den bullctin boards von 
T.H.E.M. den ..Tclccommunication 
Hackers. Embezzlers and Manipula-
teurs ' 
Die feletongebuhren nach drüben sind 
recht hoch.. 
Aber v icllcicht fällt da einem Leser was ein 
Zumindest furamerikanische Verhältnisse 
gibt es Baubeschreibungen für ..Bluc 
Botes" und ahnliche Geräte zum Gratis-
Ieiefonicren in T.A.P. 
wau • chaos Computer club 
Die Hacker-Hymne 
Zu singen nach der Medlodie: ..Pul anolher nickel in" 
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Telefonitis 
DAS GROESSTE  DATENNETZ  DER  WELT 
Die Deutsche Bundes pest war auf dertele-
com mit einem eigenen Stand vertreten. 
Mich interessierte ihr neuer 130-Sen«cv. 
Man wähle Ol 30 und dann eine vierstellige 
Nummer . F ü r 23 Pfennig läßt sich beliebig 
lang mit verschiedensten Firmen auch in 
weit entfernten Städten (Ländern?) telefo-
nieren. Die angeschlossenen Firmen über-
nehmen den Rest der Gebühren . In den 
USA gibt es das mit 80ft:r N u m m e r n s c h o n 
seil Jahren . Diverse Artikel in T A P berich-
ten von Mißbrauch des 800er Service 
durch Telefonfreaks fü r kostenlose welt-
weite Ferngespräche (Bau von blue/yel-
low/green und anderen boxes). 
Auf dem Stand der Bundespost wußte kei-
ner Näheres zum neuen 130er Dienst. Man 
verwies mich an den Pressesprecher. Bei 
einem Kaffee fragte er mich, von welcher 
Zeitung ich komme. 
„taz" antwortete ich und er verstand 
.F .A.Z." . Ich wiederholte „Nein. t a z . D I E 
T A G E S Z E I T U N G " . Er kannte sie noch 
immer nicht und ich ergänzte, „das ist so'n 
linksradikales Revolverblatt ." Er schaute 
mich irritiert an und meinte, er habe sich 
schon wegen meines t ragbaren Reporter-
terminals gewundert , weil die F .A.Z. 
sowas noch nicht habe. 
Das ist T E X I . sagte ich. mein elektroni-
sches Notizbuch. Und wenn ich einen Arti-
kel fertig habe, rufe ich in Berlin an und 
sende ihn direkt ins Satzsystem per Aku-
stikkoppler. Und all das hat sogar eine 
F T Z - N u m m e r (das ist ne Pestgenehmi-
gung)! 
Aber zur Sache: Was können Sie mir zum 
neuen 130-Dienst sagen? 
Er wußte auch nichts genaues nicht und 
vertröstete mich auf ein Papier, das er mir 
schicken wollte. 
Da ich aber einmal einen Postler a m 
Haken hatte, ging es gleich weiter: W a r u m 
verbiete» die deutsche Bundespest den 
Empfang des sowjetischen Fernsehpro-
gramms. das per Satellit ausgestrahlt wird? 
In der Schweiz und den Niederlanden geht 
das und wird u.a. per Kabel verbreitet. 
Auch dazu wußte er nichts. Immerhin 
ha t te / u m Thema Satell i tenempfang die 
C D U / C S U - F r a k t i o n , als sie noch in der 
Opposi t ion war. ne Bundestagsanfrage 
gemacht mit der V e r m u t u n g . o b d i e ( S P D / 
FDP-)Regierung den Satel l i tenempfang 
verbieten wolle. Die Antwort der damal i -
gen Regierung: Im Prinzip nein, aber die 
Frequenzen werden für die Bundeswehr 
gebraucht . (Außerdem genehmigen das 
die Sowjets nicht, da sie sonst auch mit 
Ansprüchen in umgekehrter Richtung 
rechnen müßten.) 
Meine nächste Frage zielte auf Bildschirm-
text. Nach der Pestordnung darf dieselbe 
keine Briefe mit außergesetzlichem Inhalt 
transportieren. Und entsprechendes müß-
te wohl für Bildschirmtext gelten. Bei Brie-
fen sei die Kontrolle auf Inhalt schwer, bei 
Bildschirmtext leichter. Wie das gehand-
habt würde mit der elektronischen Zensur , 
wollte ich wissen. . E s gibt keine Zensur" 
entgegnete er heftig. Tja . antworte te ich, 
schon der B.B.U. darf auf seinem Frei-
stempler die badische Winzersonne nicht 
verwenden. Da sei die Post vor. Und ich 
habe vor einigen Wochen einen Brief an 
einen Freund in Köln geschickt und auf 
den Umschlag geschrieben: »Enthält 
staatsfeindliche Hetze im Sinne des Straf-
gesetzbuches der D D R " . Dieser Brief war 
von der Oberpostdirekt ion Köln gefangen 
gehalten worden und nu r nach heftiger 
Intervention wieder frei gekommen. (Bei 
der Auslieferung war der Text amtlich 
übermalt und der Zusteller meinte . d a s 
Ding war bis beim Chef".) 
Das könne ich ja auch nicht machen, 
meinte der Pressesprecher, denn ein einla-
cher Beamter würde nur lesen .enthäl t 
staatsfeindliche Hetze" und deshalb aus-
sortieren. 
Zum Abschluß des Gesprächs erhielt ich 
sogar die Visitenkarte, wenn auch erst 
nach einigem Zögern. 
Ein anderes Rätsel hatte sich schon ohne 
Hilfe von Pressesprechern geklärt. Im 
norddeutschen Raum k o m m e n täglich in 
Verkehrsdurchsagen Meldungen: _da-dü-
da. Im Ortsnetz Kleckersdorf ist der 
Not ruf ausgefallen. Bitte rufen Sie die Poli-
zei über Amt an!". D a s wunderte mich, 
schließlich schätze ich die enorme Zuver-
lässigkeit des gelben Riesen. Gleich bei 
zwei Quellen wurde ich fündig: In der Zeit-
schritt „Polizei und Technik im 20ten Jahr -
hunder t" (sahnegeil!) und in den „Unter-
richtsblättern fü r das Fernmeldewesen" 
wurde das „Notrufsystem "76" erklärt. 
Automat ische Fangschal tung beim Wäh-
len von 110/112 und son Schickimicki. 
Außerdem senden die neuen Notrulgeber 
in den Telefonzellen gleich ne vierstellige 
Kennung des Telefons, von w o man 
gewählt hat . Durch Drehen des Hebels 
wird automat isch ein 12er Wähl-Tackern 
am Anfang und dann die S tandor tnum-
mer an Polizei und Feuerwehr geschickt. 
D a ß man auch durch Drücken der Tele-
fongabel wählen kann, ist von den Telefon-
schlössern her bekannt (I einmal. 2 zwei-
mal... 0 zehnmal tackern). Die Doppelnull 
( l l m a l tackern j gab es an posteigenen 
Appara ten vor Einführung des Selbst-
wählferndienstes. G e ü b t e Hacker führ ten 
damals so Ferngespräche ohne Vermitt-
lung. 
Was heute passiert bei elfmal Tackern. ist 
sicher streng geheim. Richard vom T A P -
Magazin erzählte dazu , in New York sei 
auf den Polizeiapparaten jjeich ne Anzeige 
mit der N u m m e r des Anrufenden. Und die 
erste Frage lautet: Von welchem Apparat 
aus rufen Sie an? Sonderbehandlung bei 
Nichtübereinst immung der N u m m e r n ! 
Mit Richard sprach ich auf der Messe noch 
ü b e andere TAP-Geschichten: 
Y.I.P.L.. ..Youth International Party 
Line" war eine Idee (unter vielen, es war die 
Hippie/Y ippie-Zeit) a m Anfang: Fü r 
gchcimdiciistliche und andere Zwecke gibt 
es R u f n u m m e r n oder Rufnummernfo l -
gen. die bewirken, d a ß alle, die dort anru-
fen. miteinander sprechen können. In die-
sem Früh jah r berichtete der „Stern" dar -
über. daß in Schweden eine solche Num-
mer unter kids kursierte und daß über 
Wochen hinweg (tag&nacht) Gesp räche / 
Diskussionei i /Jokes liefen. Irgendwann 
wollten sich die kids nicht nur hören, son-
dern auch mal sehen. Man verabredetesich 
an einem Tag an einer U-Bahnstation. Es 
wurde eine paartausend-köpfige Ver-
sammlung und die Tumbeschuhten zogen 
in einen Park. Die Polizei geriet in unge-
heure Panik, weil: Sie wußte von nichts 
und entwickelte zwanghaft die wahnsin-
nigsten Verschwörungstheorien. Eine 
schnell zusammengetrommel te größere 
Polizeieinheit sorgte für einen üblen Knüp-
peleinsatz. Hinterher hieß es amtlich, ja. 
wenn wir das gewußt hätten... 
Na. jedenfalls laufen solche Telefonparties 
schon seit Jahrzehnten ohne Knüppelei 
und ohne viel drüber zu reden. Und das 
nicht nur in USA. 
Vor fast genau zehn Jahren, a m 12. II 
1973. verkündete die norwegische Regie-
rung das Sonntagsfahrverbot . Am 13. II . 
wurde im norwegischen Wirtschaltsmini-
s tenum eine Telefonzentrale durch einen 
Brand zerstört. Nach Angaben des Mini-
steriums riefen so viele tausend Norweger 
an . die sich um eine Ausnahmegenehmi-
gung bemühten, d a ß die überlasteten 
Schaltrelais heiß liefen und die Vermitt-
lungszentrale in Flammen aufging. . 
Last, but not least: Es wird darauf hinge-
wiesen. daß komplizierte elektronische 
Appara turen recht sensibel auf den EMP. 
den elektromagnetischen Impuls, der bei 
Atomexplosionen entsteht, reagieren. Mit 
dem Funken eines piezoelektrischen Feu-
erzeuganzünders. der nicht ein paar hun-
dert Kilometer weg ist wie eine Atom-
bombe im All. sondern zen."'met.Tnah an 
Tasten. Knöpfen und Schaltern, lassen 
sich interessante Effekte erzielen. 
Happy hackenings for haefcy Happenings 
and grwtings from Richard and wau. 
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Der 19-jährige Student Mark Austin aus Kalifornien wurde am 3. Oktober 
verhaftet. Ihm wird vorgeworfen, von seinem Heim-Computer aus in 200 
Computerdaleier., darunter einer aus dem Verteidigungsministerium, eingedrun-
gen zu sein. Obwohl er keinen Schaden anrichten', droht ihm nach dem neuen 
Gesetz gegen Computerkrimina/iläi eine mehrjährige Gefängnisstrafe. yQio: ap 
Unsicher  oder  umstaendlich 
SICHERHEITSPROBLEHE  GROSSER  RECHNER 
Große Rechnersysteme sind bisher nicht 
gegen geheime Zugriffe abzudichten. Ihre 
„Hardware" .d .h . Zentraleinheit . Daten-
speicher. Drucker . Bildschirmterminals. 
Datenfernleitungen usw. sind über das 
ganze Gebäude , häufig sogar über meh-
rere Städte verteilt. Es gibt praktisch kei-
nen Überblick - außer über das (manipu-
lierbare) Rechnerprotokol l selbst, wer 
wann art welchem Gera t sitzt. 
Ähnlich war es mit der .Sof tware" , der 
ganzen Hierarchie von verschiedenen 
Rcchnerprogiummen und Daten-files. 
K a u m jemand kann sagenulaß er sich 
w irklich in jedem Winkel des Progammsy-
stems auskennt . Es ist wie mit einem alten 
Bau: Die ursprüngliche Programm- und 
Datens t ruk tur (d ie „Rechner-Architektur-
~) wird im Laufe der Jahre durch Ergän-
zungen. Fehicrkorrekturen, die häufig von 
anderen Programmierern gemacht wer-
den als der Systementwuri . durchzogen 
und überwuchert , so d a ß niemand mehr 
durchblickt. Ich habe schon alte Füchse an 
Rechnern gesehen, mit denen sie jahrelang 
zu tun hatten, die hiltlos auf den Bild-
schirm starrten mit der Frage: „Was macht 
ER denn jetzt schon wieder '". 
Lemziel Nr . l in der Ir.formatikerausbil-
dung ist deshalb: O r d n u n g halten im Pro-
g rammau lbau . alles sauber dokument ie-
ren. ordentliche und durchschaubare 
Schnittstellen zu anderen Programmsyste-
men einhalten usw. 
Aber viele In format iker /Programmiere r 
sind immer noch mehr Bastelfanatikerals 
Zwangscharaktere , so daß sie der Versu-
chung k a u m widerstehen können, hier und 
da k lone , schnelle Sprunge im Programm 
anzubringen, die aber niemand außer 
ihnen durchschaut , die aber vom Ord -
nuu^ssia i idpunki streng verpönt sind. 
Viele haben natürlich auch eine geheime 
Freude, wenn ohne sie nichts zum Lauten 
zu bringen ist. 
Typisch ist eine Geschichte, über die die 
amerikanische Zeitung „Stars and Stnpes" 
in einem Artikel vom 30.9. über C o m p u -
terknminal i tä t berichtete. Bei einem in vie-
len Institutionen verwendeten Compute r -
bei r iebsprogramm. das in den Bell Labo-
ratories programmier t worden war . 
konnte man mit einem bestimmten Code-
wort alle Sicherheitsstufen überspringen 
und direkt auf den innersten Programmtei l 
zugreifen. Zwei Jahre blieb diese „Hinter-
tür" der Sys temprogrammierer unent-
deckt , allmählich aber sprach sich auch 
unter den Programmierern bei den 
Anwendern des Systems herum, wie man 
die umständlichen Sicherheitsabiragen 
abkurzen konnte . Einer davon war die 
national sccurity agency. die auf elektroni-
sche Aufk lä rung spezialisiert ist und das 
Computer-Sicherhei tszcntrum des Penta-
gon leitet. Dor t flog die Sache schließlich 
auf . 
Ein großes Softwaresystem ist wie ein ver-
wunschenes Schloß: was auf den ersten 
Blick übersichtlich und wohlgeordnet 
w irkt. hat viele geheime Gange , n i t sdhaf te 
Türen , verbotene Räume. Ein illegaler 
Besucher findet onne weiteres Wege.etwas 
hinein oder herauszuschmuggeln oder es 
auch, von anderen unbemerkt , dor t aufzu-
bewahren. 
Das ist sicher kein unwichtiger G r u n d , 
warum in vielen Bereichen, in denen mit 
Rechnern gearbeitet wird, der Trend /u 
dezentralen Kleincomputern echt. Die 
Einsatzmöglichketten sind allerdings 
beschränkt. 
Auch wenn die Technologie schon sehr 
weit entwickelt ist. kann mit dezentralen 
Rechnern einfach nicht die Leistung zur 
Verfügung gestellt werden, die ein 
Rechenzentum mit Da tenbanken . Schnell-
druckern. hohen Rechengeschwindigkei-
ten usw. hat. Außerdem besteht der Sinn 
der rechnergeführten Datenverarbei tung 
in größeren Institutionen ja gerade d a n n , 
d a ß es ein Datennetz gibt, an dem von 
vielen verschiedenen Stellen aus herumge-
strickt werden kann. D a ß nicht jeder mit 
den Daten alles machen kann, soll ein 
hierarchisch geordnetes System von Paß-
wörtern gewahrleisten, mit denen sich 
jeder Benutzer dem Rechner gegenüber 
ausweisen muß. wennermi t i hm in Verbin-
dung tritt. Das Paßwort sagt dem Rechner 
auch, mit welcher Kompetenz sich der 
Benutzer an ihn wendet. In Abhängigkeit 
davon akzeptiert er Befehle zum Lesen 
oder Überschreiben von Daten, oder auch 
nicht. 
Ein Beispiel: In der Firma Meier & Sohn 
sind d:*: Buchhaltung, die Personalabtei-
l u n g der Einkauf, die Werbung und der 
Kundendienst an den zentralen C o m p u t e r 
angeschlossen. Ein Mitarbeiter der Buch-
hal tung hat z.B. das Paßwort „Muller.bu-
"(w-as nun allerdings leicht zu erraten 
wäre!). Der Zusatz „bu" sagt dem Rechner, 
daß Müller Buchungsdaten lesen und 
überschreiben darf . Daten der Personalab-
teilung jedoch nur lesen. Mit dem Paßwort 
„Krause.per." darf man hingegen umge-
kehrt Buchung>datcn /war lesen und Pcr-
sonaldatcn verandern. Wenn Herr Muller 
Herrn Krause aber sein Paßwort mitteilt 
und ihn bittet, bei den nächsten Rechner-
eingaben seine paar Zahlen vom letzten 
Buchungstag doch eben mit einzugeben, 
dann ist das ganze Sicherungssv stem wir-
kungslos. 
In groüeren Betriehen bleiben Paßwörter 
auf die Dauer nie geheim, sie werden des-
halb von Zeit zu Zeit ausgetauscht, was 
auch entweder unsicher oder umständlich 
ist. Schließlich kann man die neuen Paß-
wörter nicht am Schwarzen Brett aushan-
gen. 
Ein schöner Trick. Paßwörter herauszufin-
den. wird in dein besagten Artikel aus 
„Stars and Stnpes" beschrieben: Ein 
Hacker schreibt ein Programm, das akti-
viert wird, sobald ein Benutzer ein Termi-
nal einschaltet. Es simuliert den Dialog des 
Rechners mit dem Benutzer, lordert ihn 
auf . seinen Namen und sein Paßwort ein-
zugeben. speichert die Angaben in einem, 
geheimen, nur dem Hacker bekannten 
Daten-file und schaltet erst dann zum 
eigentlichen Rechnerdialog durch. Sosam-
melt sich in dem Daten-file eine schone 
Paßworteriiste an. Mit solchen Listen w ird 
in den l SA übrigens lebhaft gehandelt. 
Dieser Trick ist in/wischen schon klassisch 
und es gibt eine Reihe von Gegenmaßnah-
men. die aber alle umständlich sind, oder 
neue Unsicherheiten zur Folge haben. 
G r o ß e Unternehmen, denen j n der Sicher-
heit ihres Rechnersystems viel gelegen ist. 
beschäftigen inzwischen Spezialsiabe von 
Informatikern, häufig ehemalige Hacker , 
die Locher im System linden sollen. 
Aber Hacker operieren auch psycholo-
gisch weil sie sich in ihre Kollegen von der 
anderen Seite hineindenken können, sind 
sie ihnen überlegen. Sie w issen. die meisten 
braven Intormat ikers ind völlig phantasie-
los Wenn sie ihr Paßwort frei wählen dür-
fen. fallt ihnen meistens nichts anderes als 
der Name ihrer Freundin, ihr eigenes 
Gebur t sda tum oder irgendein Compute r -
begnff ein. Mit ein bißchen Wissen über die 
Person und ein bißchen Ausprobieren laßt 
sich so manches Paßwort herausknegen. 
Sehr realitatsnah sind Methoden. Paßwor-
ter zu finden, in dem inzwischen beruhmt-
beruchtigten Film „War Games" (Knegs-
spiele) beschneben. Der Filmheld zettelt 
mit seinen Computerspielereien last einen 
Weltkneg an . der sich dann allerdings als 
virtueller Kneg im Rechnerhirn heraus-
stellt. 
Sehr realistisch ist d a n n dargestellt, daß 
Paßwörter häufig in der näheren Umge-
bung eines Terminals aufgeschrieben ste-
hen (siehe auch W.-iu's Artikel) oder daß 
man von seinem Heimcomputer wahllos 
Te ie fonnumcm durchprobieren lassen 
kann, ohne selbst dabei zu s:tzen. Wenn er 
zufällig eine Tdefon-Datenle i tung zu 
einem Rechner angezapft hat . dann 
erkennt er dasan einem signifikanten Pfeif-
ton. 
In der Bundesrepublik spielt die C o m p u -
ter-Piraterie bisher kaum eine Rolle, wie 
von Datenschutzcrscitc zuu ertahren ist. 
obwohl sich die Sichcrhcitsexpcnen gro-
ßer Unternehmen angesichts der US-ame-
nkanischen Erfahrungen intensiv auf tlas 
Problem vorbereiten. Aber die bundes-
deutschen Datennetze sind noch langM 
nicht so verfilzt und allgegenwärtig wie in 
den I SA. Außerdem ziehen die deutschen 
Verdatungsgegner den ideologischen 
Ahwehrkampt noch immer der suhersivm 
Infiltration vor. Imma  
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Feuilleton
CODE IST GESETZ
Der gefährlichste Abschnitt der Spionagesoftware auf fünf Seiten: ein Text, den wir nicht verstehen – und der doch unser Leben bestimmt
Seiten 43 bis 47
A m 27. Februar 2008 fälltedas Bundesverfassungs-gericht ein historisches Ur-teil. Als Abschluss der Aus-einandersetzung um den
Bundestrojaner – im Amtsdeutsch „On-
line-Durchsuchung“ – verkündete das
höchste deutsche Gericht ein neues
Grundrecht auf Gewährleistung der Ver-
traulichkeit und Integrität informations-
technischer Systeme. Es setzte damit sehr
hohe Hürden für Geheimdienste und Er-
mittlungsbehörden, wenn diese die Com-
puter von Bürgern infiltrieren wollen,
um an deren digitale Lebensspuren und
Daten zu gelangen.
Das Urteil enthält jedoch eine Passa-
ge, die bei aufmerksamen Beobachtern
schon bei der ersten Lektüre sorgenvol-
les Stirnrunzeln hervorrief: Es ist der Ab-
schnitt zur sogenannten „Quellen-Tele-
kommunikationsüberwachung“. Die Re-
gierung und Vertreter der Ermittlungsbe-
hörden hatten in der Karlsruher Verhand-
lung vehement argumentiert, dass sie
eine Möglichkeit brauchten, etwaige ver-
schlüsselte Kommunikation schon auf
dem Computer des Verdächtigen abzufan-
gen, bevor sie verschlüsselt wird. Das Ge-
richt mochte sich diesem Begehren nicht
ganz verschließen und ließ eine sogenann-
te „Quellen-Telekommunikationsüberwa-
chung“ zu – allerdings nur, „wenn sich
die Überwachung ausschließlich auf Da-
ten aus einem laufenden Telekommunika-
tionsvorgang beschränkt. Dies muss
durch technische Vorkehrungen und
rechtliche Vorgaben sichergestellt sein.“
Wie denn eine derartige Sicherstellung
in der Praxis technisch funktionieren soll-
te, war schon während der mündlichen An-
hörung zum Bundestrojaner in Karlsruhe
ein höchst umstrittener Punkt. Das Ge-
richt hatte die Gefahren jedenfalls erkannt
und schrieb: „Wird ein komplexes informa-
tionstechnisches System zum Zweck der
Telekommunikationsüberwachung tech-
nisch infiltriert (,Quellen-Telekommunika-
tionsüberwachung‘), so ist mit der Infiltra-
tion die entscheidende Hürde genommen,
um das System insgesamt auszuspähen.
Die dadurch bedingte Gefährdung geht
weit über die hinaus, die mit einer bloßen
Überwachung der laufenden Telekommu-
nikation verbunden ist.“
Der technische Hintergrund dieser Be-
denken ist, dass ein einmal auf einem
Computer installiertes Hintertürpro-
gramm problemlos so ausgelegt werden
kann, dass es Funktionen enthält oder die-
se über das Netz nachladen könnte, wel-
che über das verfassungsrechtlich Zulässi-
ge weit hinausgehen. Über diese Hinter-
türfunktionen könnte dann unkontrollier-
bar tief in den geschützten Kernbereich
der privaten Lebensgestaltung des Betrof-
fenen eingegriffen werden.
Seit dem Urteil sind mehr als drei Jah-
re vergangen, und die deutschen Ermitt-
lungsbehörden sind nicht untätig geblie-
ben. In Strafverfahren landauf, landab
gab es in den letzten Monaten Hinweise
auf den Einsatz von Trojanern zur Kom-
munikationsüberwachung: Wenn sich
etwa Informationen in den Akten finden,
die über das am Telefon Besprochene
weit hinausgehen, oder Bildschirmfotos
vom Rechner des Beschuldigten auftau-
chen, die unerklärlichen Ursprungs sind.
In solchen sogenannten Screenshots
werden verschiedene – in den Augen der
Ermittler belastende – E-Mails oder
Chat-Gespräche dokumentiert. Bean-
tragt und richterlich genehmigt wird die
sogenannte „Quellen-Telekommunika-
tionsüberwachung“ wie eine normale Te-
lefonüberwachung.
Wehren sich Beschuldigte gegen die-
ses Eindringen in ihre private Sphäre, re-
den sich die Ermittlungsbehörden damit
heraus, dass die dazu eingesetzte Überwa-
chungssoftware von einem externen, si-
cherheitsüberprüften Dienstleister stam-
me. Sie sei außerdem spezifisch entspre-
chend der jeweiligen Abhöranordnung
zusammengestellt worden. Umfangrei-
che Qualitätssicherungsprozesse sollen
garantieren, dass keine über die Telekom-
munikationsüberwachung hinausgehen-
den Funktionen enthalten seien.
Besonders betont wird immer wieder,
dass die Funktionserweiterung einer
„Quellen-Telekommunikationsüberwa-
chung“ zu einer „Online-Durchsu-
chung“ vollständig ausgeschlossen sei,
mit welcher alle Daten auf einem Compu-
ter ausgespäht und alle Computerfunktio-
nen ferngesteuert werden könnten. Eine
unabhängige technische Untersuchung
dieser Angaben und Prozesse gab es bis-
her nicht, man musste sich auf die Beteue-
rungen der Behörden verlassen.
Einige der von der Spionagesoftware
Betroffenen wollten nun offenbar genau-
er wissen, was auf ihren Computern ei-
gentlich geschehen war und was genau al-
les überwacht wurde. So trafen im Ver-
lauf der letzten Wochen diverse Festplat-
ten in den berühmten braunen Umschlä-
gen anonym beim Chaos Computer
Club ein.
Nach kurzer forensischer Durchsicht
der Datenträger durch eine Gruppe von
CCC-Hackern fand sich auf einigen der
Festplatten tatsächlich jeweils eine be-
hördliche Computerwanzensoftware.
Die Trojaner-Varianten sind einander aus-
gesprochen ähnlich und weisen nur ge-
ringfügige Unterschiede auf. Die Datei-
en, die einst die Betroffenen ausspioniert
hatten, waren nur amateurhaft gelöscht
worden und ließen sich ohne großen Auf-
wand mit gängigen Computerforensik-
werkzeugen rekonstruieren. Die Hacker
machten sich an die Detailuntersuchung.
Was sie dabei fanden, erstaunte selbst
hartgesottene Zyniker.
Eine Schadsoftware zu analysieren ist
vergleichbar mit der Obduktion einer un-
bekannten Spezies von Lebewesen. Man
versucht, einzelne Funktionen zu identifi-
zieren, etwa Augen, Ohren, Atemsystem,
Kreislauf, Verdauungsorgane oder Stimm-
apparat. Dazu zieht man Vergleiche mit
bekannten Strukturen heran – etwa dass
in Augen von Wirbeltieren typischerwei-
se Linse, Hornhaut, Pupille, Glaskörper
und Netzhaut zu finden sind. Aus dem
Vorhandensein oder auch Fehlen dieser
bekannten Strukturen erschließt man
wahrscheinliche Funktionen und Zusam-
menhänge der Anatomie. Mit vergleich-
baren Methoden identifiziert man auch
Funktionen und Zusammenhänge in ei-
ner unbekannten Schadsoftware, die ja
nur als Maschinencode vorliegt.
Maschinencode ist im Gegensatz zum
ursprünglich in einer Programmier-
hochsprache wie C++ geschriebenen und
später in Maschinencode übersetzten Pro-
grammcode für Menschen nur mühsam
zu lesen und zu verstehen. Wenn man er-
gründen will, was eine bestimmte Routi-
ne des Trojaners bewirkt, schaut man als
Erstes nach, welche Funktionen des Be-
triebssystems sie benutzt.
Das Betriebssystem eines Computers
stellt ganz grundlegende Funktionen be-
reit, die jedes Programm benötigt, um
auf dem Computer zu laufen. Dazu gehö-
ren zum Beispiel das Lesen und Schrei-
ben von Dateien, Senden und Empfan-
gen von Daten über das Netz, Tastatur-
eingaben, Tonein- und -ausgabe oder
auch der Start von Programmen. Einzel-
ne Teile des Schadprogramms erfüllen
verschiedene Aufgaben und benutzen
also auch unterschiedliche Betriebssys-
temsfunktionen, aus denen sich auf ihre
Funktion schließen lässt, so wie etwa ein
Pathologe aus dem Vorhandensein einer
Linse auf ein optisches Sinnesorgan
schließen kann.
Von besonderem Interesse war der bei
der Analyse alsbald identifizierte Teil der
Software, der für die Fernsteuerung des
Trojaners über das Netz verantwortlich
ist. Nach dem Start eines neu infizierten
Computers bindet sich die Schadsoftware
heimlich in alle laufenden Programme
ein und sendet an einen fest konfigurier-
ten Server, der sich interessanterweise in
den Vereinigten Staaten – einer bekannt-
lich fremden Jurisdiktion – befindet, ein
paar Datenpakete, um seine Dienstbereit-
schaft zu signalisieren.
Die Pakete, die zum Server geschickt
werden, sind mit einer AES-Verschlüsse-
lung abgesichert. AES ist ein bewährtes
Standardverschlüsselungsverfahren, bei
dem für die Ver- und Entschlüsselung der
gleiche Schlüssel verwendet wird. Dieser
Schlüssel ist in den dem CCC zugesand-
ten Trojaner-Varianten identisch, scheint
also in unterschiedlichen Überwachungs-
fällen wiederverwendet zu werden.
Um die Kommunikation zum Server
zu entschlüsseln und zu analysieren,
mussten die Hacker nur den Schlüssel
aus einem der Trojaner extrahieren und
den Trojaner in einem von der Außen-
welt isolierten Netz in Betrieb nehmen.
Dabei mussten sie allerdings feststellen,
dass die Verschlüsselung fachlich falsch
implementiert ist, so dass auch ohne
Kenntnis des Schlüssels Rückschlüsse auf
den Inhalt der vom Trojaner zum Server
übermittelten Daten möglich sind.
Der Trojaner sendet in regelmäßigen
Abständen eine Art Parole, die benutzt
wird, um dem amerikanischen Server zu
signalisieren, dass es sich tatsächlich um
einen von ihm kontrollierten Trojaner
handelt. Die Parole der amtlichen Schad-
software für ihren Serverzugang lautet
hier C3PO-r2d2-POE. Offenbar war der
Programmierer ein Star-Wars-Fan:
C3PO und POE sind sogenannte Proto-
koll-Droiden aus dem SciFi-Universum
der Star-Wars-Saga, die dort für die rei-
bungslose Kommunikation zwischen un-
terschiedlichen Völkern und außerirdi-
schen Rassen zuständig sind. Der Droide
R2D2 repariert Raumschiffe.
Nachdem der Trojaner mit dieser Pa-
role seine Anwesenheit signalisiert und
noch einige weitere Daten übermittelt
hat, beispielsweise eine Art digitale Fall-
nummer, wartet er auf Befehle vom
Server. Die CCC-Hacker mussten ent-
setzt feststellen, dass die Schadsoftware
ihre Kommandos ohne jegliche Absiche-
rung oder Authentifizierung entgegen-
nimmt.
Die Kommandos bestehen nur aus ein-
zelnen Zahlen von eins bis 18 sowie eini-
gen Parametern. Zum Absetzen der Be-
fehle wird keine Verschlüsselung verwen-
det, es gibt keine kryptographische
Authentifizierung oder Vergleichbares.
Überall sonst im Netz, etwa beim On-
line-Banking oder selbst in Flirtportalen,
sind das längst übliche Absicherungs-
mechanismen. Die einzige Bedingung
für die Akzeptanz der Befehle an die staat-
liche Spionagesoftware aber ist es, dass
sie so aussehen, als wenn sie von der IP-
Adresse des Weiterleitungsservers kom-
men. Das Vorspiegeln einer falschen Ab-
senderadresse ist jedoch für Kundige ein
Leichtes. Dadurch hat die behördliche
Computerwanze ein scheunentorgroßes
Sicherheitsloch aufgestoßen, das ganz ein-
fach ausgenutzt werden kann.
Die Funktionen, die über diese Fern-
steuerungsschnittstelle aufgerufen werden
können, sind aufschlussreich. Ihre Zusam-
menstellung und Art der Ausführung las-
sen keinen Zweifel daran, dass es sich um
ein von Ermittlungsbehörden eingesetz-
tes Schnüffelprogramm handelt. Die In-
ternettelefonate mittels Skype abzuhören
und Bildschirmfotos von im Vordergrund
befindlichen Webbrowser-Fenstern zu ma-
chen sind genau die Funktionen, die von
den Ermittlungsbehörden immer wieder
lautstark gefordert wurden, um Verschlüs-
selung zu umgehen, die ein „normales“
Abhören unmöglich macht. „Kommerziel-
le“ Trojaner, wie sie etwa zum Abschöp-
fen von Online-Banking-Daten verwen-
det werden, hätten andere, obendrein ele-
gantere Mechanismen verwendet. Den
gängigen Antivirusprogrammen ist der
Trojaner völlig unbekannt.
Die weitaus schockierendste Funktion,
bei der die beteiligten Hacker zuerst ih-
ren Augen nicht trauen wollten, wird mit
dem Kommando 14 aufgerufen. Damit
kann der Inhaber der Trojaner-Befehlsge-
walt ein beliebiges Programm über das
Netz auf den infizierten Computer laden
und ausführen lassen, ohne dass der be-
troffene Nutzer etwas davon mit-
bekommt. Genau die verfassungsrecht-
lich höchst problematische Funktion, von
der die Ermittlungsbehörden nachdrück-
lich behaupteten, sie sei keinesfalls in
einer „Quellen-Telekommunikationsüber-
wachungs“-Software enthalten, fand sich
bei der Analyse.
Mit dem Nachladen von Programmtei-
len ließen sich beliebige, die Grenzen des
vom Bundesverfassungsgericht Erlaubten
weit überschreitende Überwachungsmo-
dule installieren, die zum Beispiel Mikro-
fon und Kamera am Computer als Raum-
überwachungswanze nutzen – das ist der
digitale große Lausch- und Spähangriff.
Genauso ist es möglich, durch dieses
Programmnachladen Funktionen zu in-
stallieren, mit deren Hilfe die Festplatte
des infiltrierten Computers durchsucht
und Dateien heruntergeladen werden kön-
nen – die exakte Definition der „Online-
Durchsuchung“. Ein nachgeladenes Pro-
gramm könnte sogar Dateien heimlich
über das Netz auf den Computer schie-
ben oder gespeicherte Daten verändern.
Technisch gesehen lassen sich so digita-
le Beweismittel problemlos erzeugen,
ohne dass der Ausspionierte dies verhin-
dern oder auch nur beweisen könnte. Fin-
den sich auf einer Festplatte Bilder oder
Filme, die Kindesmissbrauch zeigen,
oder anderes schwer belastendes Mate-
rial, so könnte es dort auch plaziert wor-
den sein. Solche „Beweise“ würden zum
Beispiel bei einer späteren Beschlagnah-
me des Computers „gefunden“ werden
und sind auch mit forensischen Mitteln
nicht als Fälschung erkennbar.
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